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I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
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I. 1. Passions and Their Relevance in the Early Modern Context 
 
A woman’s face with Nature’s own hand painted 
Hast thou, the master-mistress of my passion;  
   (Shakespeare, “Sonnet XX”) 
 
 
Come, go with me. I will go seek the King. 
This is the very ecstasy of love, 
Whose violent property fordoes itself 
And leads the will to desperate undertakings 
As oft as any passion under heaven 
That does afflict our natures.  
   (Hamlet, II. 1. 105-109) 
 
Give me that man 
That is not passion’s slave, and I will wear him 
In my heart’s core, ay, in my heart of heart, 
As I do thee.  
     (Hamlet, III. 2. 74-77) 
 
Nay truly learned men have learnedly thought, that where once reason hath so much 
over-mastered passion, as that the minde hath a free desire to doo well, the inward light 
each minde hath in it selfe, is as good as a Philosophers booke, since in Nature we know 
it is well, to doo well, and what is well, and what is evill, although not in the wordes of 
Art which Philosophers bestow uppon us: for out of naturall conceit the Philosophers 
drew it; but to be moved to doo that which wee know, or to be mooved with desire to 
know. Hoc opus, hic labor est. 
    (Sir Philip Sidney, A Defence of Poesie) 
 
 
Then it is thus: the passions of the mind, 
That have their first conception by misdread, 
Have after-nourishment and life by care, 
And what was first but fear what might be done 
Grows elder now, and cares it be not done.  
    (Shakespeare, Pericles, I. 2. 11-15) 
 
Desire, though thou my old companion art 
 And oft so clings to my pure love, that I 
 One from the other scarcely can descry, 
While each doth blow the fire of my heart, 
Now from thy fellowship I needs must par. 
 Venus is taught with Dian’s wings to fly; 
 I must no more in thy sweet passions lie; 
  (Sir Philip Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, “Sonnet 72”, ll 1-7) 
 
In this great passion of unwonted lust, 
 Or wonted feare of doing ought amis, 
 He started up, as seeming to mistrust, 
 Some secret ill, or hidden foe of his: 
  (Edmund Spencer, The Faerie Queen, Book 1. Canto 1. 49.) 
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The noble hart, that harbours vertuous thought, 
 And is with child of glorious great intent, 
 Can neuer rest, untill it forth have brought 
 Th'eternall brood of glorie excellent: 
 Such restlesse passion did all night torment 
 The flaming corage of that Faery knight, 
 Devizing, how that doughtie turnament 
 With greatest honour he atchieven might; 
Still did he wake, and still did watch for dawning light. 




As the quotations above show, “passion” is far from being a univocal term in Early 
Modern English literature. The present study wishes to examine how “passion” was 
understood in the period, what were the implications of the term with relation to ethical 
behaviour and right action, and how did its sense evolve? Thus it is a kind of a background 
study in the history of ideas, in the study of words and concepts, using different branches of 
philosophical inquiry in order (it is hoped) to enhance the understanding and appreciation of 
the literary works of the period under consideration. The study seeks to explore the ethical, 
theological and anthropological concerns “passion” (as a word and as a concept) mobilized, 
the challenges did it raised and the implicit or explicit ethical stakes and preoccupations 
involved in the change of the meaning of the word ‘passion’ in the late 16th century? What 
were the theological and ethical accommodations and transformations that this change 
entailed in the historical context of Early Modern Humanism1? This historical context is 
characterised by the resuscitation of certain elements of Classical humanism, most 
prominently the doctrines of Hellenistic and Roman Stoicism in what is usually termed as the 
neo-Stoic trend of the second half of the 16th century. Of course, Renaissance humanism 
helped to revitalise the legacy of other Hellenistic philosophical schools as well, such as 
Epicureanism, Scepticism but for the evolution of the word and concept of ‘passion’, the Stoic 
                                                 
1 For ease of reference, I shall refer to Early Modern Humanism bearing in mind that 1) as is well-
known, this humanism developed a bit later North of the Alps and more specifically in England 
(second half of 16th century) cf. Warren Boutcher, “Vernacular Humanism in the sixteenth century” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism edited by Jill Kraye, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996, pp. 189-203; and 2) most of the authors I shall be discussing in this study 
belong already to a second generation of humanists.  
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impact was the most important. This is because the passions were of particular concern to the 
Stoics and with their revival, this issue and the problems associated with it were transposed 
and accommodated into an Early Modern Christian context. Part of the attraction for the Stoic 
authors and their Early Modern interpreters was due to the appeal that the Stoic precepts of 
rational, emotion-free response to external events had for the European public as the ideal 
solution for the political and religious turbulences of late 16th and 17th 2 century.  The topic did 
have its place in Medieval treatises but it gained even more pertinence and acuity with the 
Renaissance Humanist movement due to the possibilities it opened for the human being on 
two, corresponding and interdependent levels: the indeterminacy and malleability of human 
nature and the ensuing practical questions of how to face the adversities of life and how to 
behave. Both of these issues can be seen as belonging to the cluster of ideas that constituted 
the Renaissance conception of the dignity of man. Early Modern Humanism, just as Classical 
humanism, was dependent on a number of philosophical, theological assumptions that 
determined its view of what it is to be human and the place of man in the universe. The 
differences in these assumptions are necessarily reflected in the understanding and treatment 
of the passions. Thus the aim of this study is to consider how the ensuing interaction between 
the two humanisms (Classical and Early Modern) surface in the perception of the passions. 
The perspective in which the present study wishes to tell this story can be 
characterised as intercultural inasmuch as the peculiarity of Renaissance Humanism lies in the 
encounter of Europe with what it claims to be its own past and this past is, in the case of 
Europe, a cultural other. This is because the constitutive element of Early Modern Humanism, 
the return to the works of the Greco-Latin Classical authors, was confronting European 
culture with what was outside it. The contemporary French cultural historian and philosopher, 
Rémi Brague, describes European culture and civilisation as having this capacity (in contrast 
with Islam for example) to have a re-naissance (or indeed, to be in continual renaissances), to 
interrogate its own past in order to formulate from it an ideal of culture toward which it 
measures itself in an attitude of willed cultural secondariness. This is what Brague calls 
“attitude romaine” characterised by an “identité excentrique” in the sense of establishing its 
                                                 
2 Cf. Jill Kraye, “Philologists and philosophers” in The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance 
Humanism, p. 152. 
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3point of normative reference outside itself.  He contrasts religious revival movements, which 
aim to return to the source of the religion within the same tradition, with the concept of re-
naissance proper. In the case of the latter, the source from which one wants to draw is to be 
found outside a historical continuity. « Il s’agit alors de s’approprier une origine par rapport 
à laquelle on se sent étranger, voir aliéné – et en particulier les sources antiques. » [“One has 
to appropriate an origin towards which one feels like a stranger, to the point of being 
alienated – the Classical sources in particular.”]4  
5 This “Roman attitude” of a cultural secondariness  (in the unequivocally positive 
sense that Brague attributes to it) can also be exploited for its self-reflexive potentials. The 
Early Modern perception of the passions is part and parcel of this intercultural encounter 
taking place within the Early Modern context. Furthermore, our own historical perspective on 
this process can help to lay bare the changing assumptions about human nature. If Early 
Modern thinkers became aware of the difference between their own and the ancients’ 
treatment of the passions, it was but one step forward in the acknowledgement and 
recognition of the historical contingency of human nature. Thus the story of the passions in 
the Early Modern context considered as a case of cultural appropriation can form part of a 
critical ontology of human nature. 
 This perspective is partly inspired by some of the writings of the late Michel Foucault 
to whom we shall have the occasion to return below. Let it suffice to state in this introductory 
context that these considerations were encouraged by his essay “What is Enlightenment?”6 in 
which he describes a philosophical ethos that has its origins in Kant and is oriented toward 
probing the “contemporary limits of the necessary”7. According to Foucault, this entails a 
“historical ontology of ourselves” established through precise historical inquiries that are 
                                                 
3 Cf. Rémi Brague, Europe, la voie romaine, Paris : Gallimard, 1992, « Folio essais », in particular pp. 
142ff 
4 Ibid. p. 156-157. Emphasis in the original – my translation, G.S. 
5 Cf. the formulation in the History of Western Philosophy 3. Renaissance Philosophy, p. 62.: “On the 
assumption that the age of an idea was an index of its value, the humanists elevated antiquity itself – 
all of it – to a position of cultural superiority.” 
6 Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, New York: 
Pantheon Book, 1984, pp. 32-50. 
7 M. Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” p. 43. 
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concerned with the “events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves 
as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.” Its ‘limit-attitude’ means a probing of the 
frontiers, analysing the limits in order to see that “in what is given to us as universal, 
necessary, obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent and the 
product of arbitrary constraints?” This philosophical ethos is rooted in the Enlightenment and 
has nothing to do with a chameleon-like humanism that, according to Foucault, is “too supple, 
too diverse, too inconsistent to serve as an axis of reflection”. Foucault explains his 
reservations concerning humanism by the observation that there have been various 
humanisms in European societies and that they have been closely linked to and served the 
purposes of certain value-judgements. Thus they were dependent on views of man borrowed 
from the prevailing religion, science, or politics. According to Foucault, these humanisms, 
instead of performing a progressive critical role and attitude, served as justification of the 
borrowed views of man. 
 In the historiography of Renaissance humanism, in the wake of Paul Oskar Kristeller’s 
works that have emphasized the importance of rhetoric in order to demonstrate the underlying 
unity of a singularly complex movement, attempts were made to explore the inherent duality 
and struggle within humanism. Such an attempt was made in an essay by William J. 
Bouwsma, published originally in a Festschrift for Kristeller, on the occasion of his seventieth 
birthday.8 The internal tension, within humanism, between the two ideological poles of 
Stoicism and Augustinianism as set out by Bouwsma, generate an “internal struggle [that] 
also helps to explain the adaptability of Renaissance humanism to changing needs, and hence 
its singular durability.”9
 I wish to argue that Early Modern Humanism, inasmuch as it is part of a renaissance in 
Brague’s sense of the term, inherently contains a self-reflexive element on culture and on 
human nature itself. Thus, rather than contrasting Early Modern Humanism with the 
                                                 
8 William J. Bouwsma, “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Later 
Renaissance Culture” in Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of 
Its European Transformations, edited by Heiko A. Oberman with Thomas Brady, Jr. E. J. Brill: 
Leiden, 1975, pp. 3-60. I am using its reprint from W. J. Bouwsma, A Usable Past: Essays in 
European Cultural History, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford; 1990, pp. 
19-73. 
9 W. J. Bouwsma, Ibid., p. 20. 
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philosophical ethos of a critical Enlightenment, I would rather emphasize its reflexive 
potentials deriving from its intercultural nature.  As Early Modern authors reassess and adapt 
Classical authors to a Christian humanist context and the expectations of the readership, they 
appropriate a cultural other. This process requires conceptual, terminological and even 
semantic accommodations that inescapably contribute to an increasing awareness of the 
contingencies of what it is to be human. Even if it were not explicitly thematised in the period 
under consideration, our present historical perspective10 on what we think took place in the 
late 16th – early 17th century should allow for such reflexivity. This, I hope to show, is 
particularly true with regard to the passions that mobilize theological, anthropological and 
ethical assumptions. I believe Foucault is right in claiming that humanism in its historical 
forms borrowed conceptions of man from the prevailing religion, politics, and science. But 
even if that is the case, the very phenomenon of the renaissance in the sense of an intercultural 
confrontation with a cultural other has a self-reflexive potential. Thus the study of the history 
of Classical and Early Modern humanisms as renaissance can elicit the kind of philosophical 
ethos prompted by the Foucauldian-Kantian enlightenment and may also contribute to a 
critical ontology of human nature inasmuch as it reveals the historical contingencies in the 
evolution of ‘passion’. 
In order to elicit the historical contingencies and to assess the historical changes 
related to the notion of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern context, I shall take stock of the various 
semantic layers in ‘passion’ proper, Chapter I.2; in Chapter I.4. I shall expose the broader 
historical argument of this thesis by relating ‘passion’ to the much more recent term of 
‘emotion’. The rich etymology of the word ‘passion’ and of its changing meanings 
                                                 
10 Another but related aspect inherent in our historical situation is the issue of mediation. The study of 
the passions at a given historical moment shares with all historical studies the difficulty of having to 
pass by mediation. To put it bluntly, one cannot assist and witness directly how individuals and 
societies in the past handled passions just as one cannot be the witness to the Battle of Agincourt. 
Beside the obvious fact that humans must have experienced passions in all times and all places (even 
if the denominations are far from being uniform) we are left with written, discursive practices as the 
direct object of investigation. If we want to gain an insight into the culture of the passions in Early 
Modern England one must look at the moral, philosophical treatises, dramas, homilies, poems, 
conduct-books, and, in particular, various lexicons and dictionaries, produced in the period. Of course, 
this study is far from being all-inclusive in this respect. 
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underscores the succeeding cultural appropriations and highlights the semantic instability 
inherent in a term so charged with value-judgements. These examinations of the semantic 
evolution of the word should serve as a canvass for Chapter II and III which delve more into 
the historical depths of how ‘passion’ was employed in order to describe its changing cultural 
and ethical contexts. Chapter II will single out certain stages from the rich Classical heritage 
including some Medieval mediations; Chapter III examines how it is accommodated to Early 
Modern use in the Humanist agenda and the theological debates of the late 16th century, in 
Bacon’s programme for the advancement of science, and in Michel de Montaigne’s Essais 
read parallel with John Florio’s 1603 translation. Part of the difficulty of writing about the 
passions in a given historical context is the manifold ways in which it is connected to a 
multitude of other issues. As we shall see, ‘passion’ is never a stand-alone issue – it is linked 
to and mobilizes anthropological, physiological, medical, ethical ideas. Therefore, chapter 
III.1. will single out some from this cluster of ideas that the problem of the passions is 
involved with and map their connections in the Early Modern context such as the theme of the 
dignity of man, the orientation of moral philosophy as knowledge of one’s self (the Nosce 
teipsum tradition), and the manner in which the operation of the passions is described as 
physiological processes involving body and soul. In chapter III.2. the presentation and a 
tentative explanation of the different uses of ‘passion’ (conducive to, as I wish to suggest, its 
semantic shift) will take account of some of the theological underpinnings of these concerns 
about the ‘passions’, and their ethical implications. Chapter III.3. will turn to Florio’s 
translation of Montaigne’s Essais as the locus of vernacular innovations on the meaning of the 
word. The aim is to present the different planes of analysis in order to show how the concept 
is re-inscribed, with a new sense, in a new field: as different senses of the word ‘passion’ are 
negotiated within the Early Modern Christian context leading to a semantic shift from the 
Classical Stoic-coloured technical sense of the word to a narrower, Early Modern sense. 
Chapter III.4. will be devoted to Bacon’s understanding of the passions and his cultura animi 
in the context of The Advancement of Learning (1605) and his Essayes or Counsels Civill and 
Moral (1597, 1612 and 1625). The discussion is related to the Early Modern humanist 
preoccupation about the use of learning as instrumental for moral advancement and thus as a 
form of care for the self. The choice of Bacon is motivated by his encyclopaedic tour de force 
of Early Modern learning and his systematic overview of what has been achieved and what 
requires further study. Of course, for Bacon, the problem of the passions is only one among 
many fields concerning knowledge about man. His attitude can also be taken as a response to 
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humanistic discourses about the nature and dignity of man, the role of learning in life and in 
matters of ethics. 
 
 
I. 2. “Passion”: the Story of the Oxford English Dictionary 
 
 
It seems plausible to assume that the various historical accommodations the term 
‘passion’ underwent are reflected in the semantic evolution of the word. The entry passion’ of 
the Oxford English Dictionary can therefore serve as a good introduction to examining the 
cultural appropriation of the term in the Early Modern context. A brief survey of the history of 
the meaning of the word can also highlight the semantic instability inherent in a term so 
charged with value-judgements. The enlargement of the temporal horizon to which the Oxford 
English Dictionary article invites us can also be taken as a heuristic device: the broadening of 
the perspective makes us even more aware of the semantic transformations of ‘passion’ 
between the Renaissance and today. The series of changes in the meaning of the word 
underscore the succeeding cultural appropriations involving the use and meaning of a web of 
related words such as soul, disease, culture of the mind, etc. that have either disappeared form 
our affective vocabulary or has completely changed signification and significance. This 
semantic history suggests that probably the most important change in the meaning began 
around the 16th century and culminated in the middle of the 17th century.  
A recapitulation of the main stages of the history of the word exhibit different layers 
of meaning which were at times coeval and superposed on each other, sometimes one layer of 
meaning superimposing on others.11 Thus we can distinguish a markedly Biblical layer as the 
word arrives to Middle English from Latin (passio) through Old French mediation and refers 
to the sufferings of Christ or of the Christian martyrs and related expressions implying “the 
suffering of pain.”12 Another layer that came to English from late Latin passio could be called 
                                                 
11 For ease of reference and in order to avoid long citations from The Oxford English Dictionary, I 
attach the article “passion” in Appendix 1. 
12 I shall return to this sense of the word and its relationship to the other layers of meaning in Chapter 
I.4 and II. 
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broadly philosophical in that it goes back to the ancient Greek  / pathos and conveys the 
general sense of “being acted upon, being passive”. This passivity in Ancient Greek  / 
pathos implies a movement by an external force that can be another person, events of fate, or 
the divine. This passivity was perceived as a hindrance to developing a course of action.  If 
we go back to the etymological origins of the Ancient Greek word itself we find in pre-
classical Greek culture numerous antecedents of  / pathos covering a relatively 
undifferentiated and overcharged semantic field. Examples are  / paskho meaning “to 
have pleasure when talking about woman or a pederast”13; the Homeric sense of  / 
páthein is “to endure a treatment or being punished”; but there was probably a link between 
these two because  / penthein, which derives from the same stem as  /  
(páthein / páskhein), means “to be bereaved, to lament the death of somebody”. 
A third layer, which could be termed as psychologico-moral, means “an affection of 
the mind” and this segment concentrates the greatest number of significations including the 
most current, modern sense as well. In the enumeration of the Oxford English Dictionary 
there are eleven senses attributed to passions altogether out of which 1-4. are contained in I. 
(what I termed as the Biblical layer); the “philosophical” layer (II) has only one subdivision 
(5.); whereas the psychologico-moral layer (III) has more than half of all the documented 
meanings (6-11.). The present study is mostly concerned with this third layer since the 
conceptual changes and cultural accommodations in the Early Modern period take place 
within this segment. As the numbering of the Oxford English Dictionary, following the 
chronological order, indicates: a change is under way in the period from the meanings listed 
under III.6.a towards the meanings of III.6.b – 8.a. This can be attested by the simple but 
highly significant fact that all first appearances of the new meanings of III.6.b. – 8.a. occur in 
1580s-1590s. As a first approximation of this complex problem let me proceed in a large 
sweep in order to draw the contours of the issue under consideration. Let me suggest the 
following thought-experiment: let us locate ourselves in around 1580s and see what comes to 
us from accepted meaning for ‘passion’. We have then the Biblical (I.), the philosophical 
layers (II.) and, I wish to argue, the sense structure of 6.a from the psychological-moral 
layer.14 Broadly speaking, the definition given in 6.a is what comes to the Early Modern 
                                                 
 
13 P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, Paris : Klincksieck, 1968, p. 862. 
14 ”6.a Any kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, 
commanding, or overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in which the mind is 
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period from Classical and Medieval authorities beginning with Plato, Aristotle, various 
Hellenistic schools (the Stoics in particular), Galen and Christian Church Fathers, Aquinas 
and Petrarch. While their doctrines and teachings on how to handle the passions differed 
largely, these authors had one thing in common: by the word ‘passion’ (  / pathos and 
passio) they meant a group of – what we would call today - emotions and mental states 
understood as “perturbations or affections of the mind”. Thinkers of the antiquity explicitly 
contrasted pathos with logos (reason) and thus established a dichotomy of the pathetic-
irrational vs. the logical-rational. In Latin, Ancient Greek pathos was translated as passio, 
affectio, perturbatio animi.15 This negative connotation was evident in the designation of the 
passions as perturbatio animi (Cicero), and in Saint Augustine's definition as "movement of 
the soul against reason"16 For example, for Cicero all passions are a movement of the soul 
devoid of reason or contrary to reason. This movement, provoked by an imaginary good or 
evil believed to exist in the present or the future, expresses itself as one of the four primary 
passions (the Ciceronian tetrachord of the passions): distress (aegritudo), delight (laetitia), 
fear (metus), lust (libido or cupiditas). The Ancient Greek pathos is translated by him as 
perturbatio animi.17 Similarly, albeit in a different perspective, St. Augustine spoke of delight 
(laetitia), sadness (tristitia), desire (cupiditas) and fear (timor) as the most important 
passions.18 St. Thomas Aquinas established a classification of eleven passions: six in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
affected or acted upon (whether vehemently or not), as ambition, avarice, desire, hope, fear, hatred, 
joy, grief, anger, revenge. Sometimes personified.” (Oxford English Dictionary) 
15 Although this study is concerned with ‘passion’ in a given context (Early Modern English culture), 
it also has to be noted that vernacular ‘passion’ (whether in French, in Italian or in English) 
corresponds, in fact, to several Classical words: pathos, pathema, and epithumia, in Ancient Greek 
mediated through Latin commotio animi, affectus, passio, and also libido. While it is beyond the scope 
of this study to explore the far-reaching implications of this diversity of origins, an awareness of this 
rich semantic background helps us to avoid a “naturalistic fallacy” (about which more below) in 
studying the shifting meaning of this word in our context proper. 
16 Cf. Saint Augustine, De Civitate Dei, IX. 4. (The City of God against the Pagans, edited and 
translated by R. W. Dyson, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, 1988.) 
17 Cf. Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV. vii. 14-15. in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, with an English 
translation by J. E. King, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: 
Harvard University Press, 1966 (1927, rev. 1945) vol. XVIII. 
18 Cf. Saint Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIV. 6 and similarly in De anima et spiritu, passim 
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concupiscible appetite (in three pairs of joy - sadness, desire - aversion, love - hatred); and 
five in the irascible appetite (hope – despair, courage – fear, and anger).19 Apart from the 
specialised elite that were well versed in the ins and outs of the Aquinian system the less 
scholarly-minded reading public20 was more familiar with the Ciceronian tetrachord of the 
passions. As St. Augustine knew, it was based not only on the authority of Cicero, but also on 
that of Virgil. The Aeneid (especially Book VI) was the subject of several commentaries in 
the Renaissance that related Virgil’s account of the passions to that of the Stoic 
philosophers.21 Moreover, the four passions were related to the structure of the universe (sky, 
heavens, earth, sea) and to the four elements composing the human body (earth, moisture, 
breath, heat) as well as establishing a connection between the four passions and the four 
humours (blood, bile, black bile, phlegm). This complex of the four passions and the four 
humours was a commonplace of Renaissance medicine and anthropology attesting to the 
centuries-old influence of Hippocratic and Galenist tradition in European medicine. Galen’s 
view and treatment of the passions owes a great deal to Plato’s tri-partite model and even 
more to Stoic physical, metaphysical, epistemological and ethical views on the pathe. 
Thus the Stoic tetrachord of the passions underpins Renaissance anthropology and 
such a dramatist as Ben Jonson who received his education and immense classical learning  
from the humanist William Camden can consciously build on this relationship in his so-called 
“comedies of humours” as he exposes for satiric deflation the prevailing eccentricities and 
ruling passions (or humours) of men.  The favourable reception of such comedies further 
testifies to the fact that the four passions – four humours complex was not only the knowledge 
of an initiated humanist elite but was also a commonplace for the less scholarly-minded 
reading  and theatre-going public. Thus the reference to this issue in title of Jonson’s first 
published play, Every Man in His Humour (1598) was certainly not missed on the audience 
                                                 
19 Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part II., Question 23; Question 25, Art 4. 
20 The phrase “less scholarly-minded reading public” comes from Zsolt Almási, Angelic Monster – 
Custom in Early Modern Context, The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003, p. 24-25. 
21 Cf. Rolf Soellner, “The Four Primary Passions: A Renaissance Theory reflected in the Works of 
Shakespeare”, Studies in Philology, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, vol. 55 (1958), p. 
551ff who cites the commentaries of Servius and Landino from a 1504, Venice edition Virgil, Opera, 
p. CCXXXVIII. And Marsilio Ficino’s Theologica Platonica de immortalitate animorum (Paris, 
1559), p. 344, lib. XVIII, cap. 10. 
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and in Every Man out of His Humour (1599) Macilente can ask “but, Stoque, where (in the 
vast world) / Doth that man breathe, that can so much command his bloud, and his affection?” 
(I. 1. 2-4). Later in his career, Jonson even put on stage the four humours with the four 
passions in his masque Hymenaei22. 
That the tetrachord based on Cicero’s and Saint Augustine’s authority enjoyed greater 
popularity than the scheme of eleven passions elaborated by Aquinas can also be inferred 
from the moral treatises dealing with the passions and published in England in the period, that 
is between 1580s and 1610s. Some of these were translations from French, Italian or Latin – I 
propose a non-exhaustive list as Appendix 2. From the great number of treatises on the 
passions published in English around the turn of the 16th-17th century and aimed at a more 
general, less scholarly-minded, readership, only four follow the scheme of Saint Thomas 
Aquinas. These are the following: Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde in Generall 
(1601); Robert Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) which owes much to Wright’s treatise; 
the work of the French neo-Stoic, Pierre Charron, Of Wisdome (1606) translated into English 
by Sampson Lennard; and Nicolas Coffeteau, A table of humane passions (1621) translated 
into English by Edmund Grimeston. The Ciceronian tetrachord is used in Thomas Rogers, A 
philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the minde (1576); La Primauday, The 
French Academy (1586); Timothy Bright, A Treatise of Melancholie (1586); Batman vppon 
Bartholome, his booke De proprietabus rerum (1592); Sir John Davies, Nosce Teipsum, 
(1599); John Davies of Hereford, Microcosmus, the discovery of the little world, (1603); 
Anthony Dixon, The dignitie of man (1612). 
In the case of those four authors who relied on Aquinas’s scheme of the passions 
rather than that of Cicero, the preference for Aquinas can be explained by different motifs 
albeit none of these is absolutely decisive. For the works written in English by English 
writers, the choice of Cicero is probably due to the prominence of the works of Cicero in the 
English grammar school of the 16th century that was itself a result and reflection of the great 
number of translations of Cicero published in English starting at the end of the 15th 23 century.  
                                                 
22 “[O]ut of a microcosm or globe figuring man with a kind of contentious music issued forth the first 
masque of eight men. These represented the four Humours and the four Affections, all gloriously 
attired, distinguished only by their several ensigns and colours.” Quoted by Rolf Sollner, Ibid., p. 553.  
23 For example: De Amicitia (1481), De senectute, De Officiis (translated by Robert Whyttynton, 1534, 
and by Nicholas Grimald, 1553), Tusculanae Disputationes, (translated by John Dolman, 1561). 
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The moral training of the 16th century English grammar school was centred upon Cicero – 
coloured and combined with Christian doctrine of course. Roger Ascham who wrote The 
Schoolmaster “in the English tongue for Englishmen” consciously patterned his style on 
Cicero whose prose was the ultimate norm of Latin in schools.24 It might be the case that the 
Aquinian system had a greater appeal on the Continent since two of the treatises following it 
were originally written by French authors. In the case of the English Jesuit priest, Thomas 
Wright, the preference for Aquinas may be due to his Catholic-Jesuit background. 
 
For the sake of the argument I wish to put forward in this chapter, and without going 
into further detail about the individual treatises referred here, it suffices to take a look at the 
title of some of these treatises to see that these authors write in the Classical idiom on the 
passions. The titles of the works of Wright, Rogers and Juan de Huarte Navarro speak for 
themselves and bear testimony to the fact that they use the Classical (Ciceronian or Aquinian) 
vocabulary of the passions that refers to “affections of the mind” in a collective sense 
referring to certain emotions as disturbances of the mind (perturbatio animi). They use the 
word ‘passion’ as a hyperonym for the four or eleven perturbations or affections of the mind. 
The word is thus employed as a generic term implying a family of mental states and includes 
the entire affective life of the subject that is distinct from mere sensations, physiological 
appetites or purely intellectual processes. The Early Modern period still has this Classical 
(mainly Stoico-Aquinian) vocabulary and framework at its disposal denoting this broad field 
of experience. But the semantic change attested by the Oxford English Dictionary shows that 
this field of experience was changing its very contours and internal delimitations. Certain 
elements within the field were losing importance while others rose to predominance reflecting 
a change of focus and scope in the meaning of the word and resulting in a re-mapping of 
                                                 
24 Cf. J. B. Trapp, “Education in the Renaissance” in Background to the English Renaissance – 
Introductory Lectures, foreword by J. B. Trapp, London : Gray-Mills Publishing, 1974, p. 82f. and 
Ralph Graham Palmer’s Introduction to Seneca’s De remedies Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans – An 
essay on the influence of Seneca’s ethical thought in the sixteenth century, together with the newly-
edited Latin text and English translation of 1547 entitled: Lucii Annei Senecae ad Gallioneni de 
Remedis Fortuitorum. The Remedyes against all casuall chances. Dialogus inter sensum et Rationem. 
A dialogue between Sensualyte and Reason. Lately translated out of Latyn into Englyshe by Robert 
Whyttynton poet Laureat and nowe newely Imprynted, by Ralph Graham Palmer, Chicago: Institute of 
Elizabethan Studies, Ill., 1953. 
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‘passions’. It is the methodological assumption and premise of this study to understand the 
word’s semantic change in terms of changing concerns and preoccupations with the 
phenomenon in question. Although this assumption may sound somewhat commonsensical, it 
is better to be formulated explicitly in order to better define the objectives of this study. It can 
also be stated in the following terms: since we use words for practical/pragmatic ends (and the 
example of ‘passion’ is a particularly strong case in point), changes in these ends (purpose) go 
hand in hand with changes in meaning and usage. While we do not claim to give a fully-
fledged answer concerning the reasons for changes in the ends, we shall try to present the 
cultural context of this change and assess its significance. In other words, although the 
semantic change will be assessed in terms of the underlying cultural semiotics in which it is 
enmeshed.  
As the examples given under III. 6.b – 8.a indicate, 'passions' or 'passion' assumed a 
more specific and more circumcised definition. This semantic shift related more to poetry and 
drama than to the systematic discourse in the 1590s. 'Passions' referred less to the collective, 
generic meaning of the Classical definition and more to the excess of uncontrollable emotion 
and amorous feeling in particular. As the Oxford English Dictionary attests it: in the meanings 
and examples of first appearances in English listed under 6b - 8a we witness such a shift away 
from the classically-coloured meaning towards the Present-Day English sense and common 
usage. 
 When we say ‘passion’ in contemporary English, we mean most often one of the 
followings: “a commanding, vehement, or overpowering feeling or emotion” (6. b); “a fit or 
mood marked by stress of feeling or abandonment to emotion; a transport of excited feeling; 
and outburst of feeling” (6. c); “an outburst of anger or bad temper” (7. a); “amorous feeling; 
strong sexual affection; love; sexual desire or impulse” (8. a). Unless employing a consciously 
scholarly language, we do not consider as ‘passion’ the emotional and mental states of fear, 
hope or grief. In this regard, it is noteworthy that The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of 
Current English25, published in 1964 as the fifth edition of the 1911 first edition (after 
numerous revisions), lists the following meanings only: 
 
                                                 
25 The Concise Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, edited by H. W. Fowler and F. G. 
Fowler based on The Oxford Dictionary, Fifth edition revised by E. McIntosh, etymologies revised by 
G. W. S. Friedrichsen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19645 (1911) 
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1. Strong emotion; outburst of anger; sexual love; strong enthusiasm and 2. 
Passion as the sufferings of Christ and related theological usages. 
 
This indicates that while the “Biblical layer” (in my division) is retained as the second sense, 
the other sense recorded for the word by the authors is to be found in what I termed as the 
“psychologico-moral layer” of the word’s historical semantic field. In The Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary of Current English this latter sense (numbered as 1) concerns exclusively 
post-17th century senses of the word’s semantic development as attested by the Oxford 
English Dictionary (6.b., 6.c., 7.a., and 8.a. as above). Apparently, the Early Modern semantic 
shift from 6.a. to these sense structures is left without a trace in this entry just as the entire 
“philosophical layer” (5.a. and 5.b.) denoting “passivity, being acted upon”. 
 
Apparently, we do not mean the same thing by ‘passions’ today as it was understood 
until roughly the beginning of the 17th century. For the modern understanding, what were the 
‘passions’ in Classical and Early Modern culture display a heterogeneous list of different 
mental states. A semantic shift took place in the English language and in our psychological-
moral-affective vocabulary. This change in the ordinary use of the word over time attests 
perhaps to a change in the grammar of our affectivity. The meaning of ‘passion’ shifted from 
the “tetrachord of passions” and from the larger group of affections named as ‘passions’ by 
Classical and Medieval authorities to intense emotion and amorous feeling in particular. This 
is not to say, of course, that amourous feeling, love was not part of the ‘passions’ before: but 
this eros-based sense was only one of the affections, mentals states called collectively as 
‘passions’. There were changes both in the importance of intensity and in the field of meaning 
(a limitation). On the one hand, intensity gained importance: not all affections qualify as 
passions, only those that possess a particularly heightened intensity. On the other hand, the 
meaning shifted from a general sense of “perturbation of the mind” towards a more specific 
sense of emotional perturbation and, more specifically, towards amorous ardour and 
excitement (eros). To put it briefly, there is a general shift from “affection” in the Classical 
sense towards eros although the traditional, Classical meanings survive as well. And this 
change begins to emerge around the 1580s. 
In order to corroborate this point of semantic change, I propose to turn to a recent 
study written from a linguistic point of view, more precisely from the perspective of historical 
lexicology. Heli Tissari discusses the changes in prototypical senses and cognitive metaphors 
related to them since 1500. Her study is focused on the changes in emotion-words, and 
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26includes a chapter on the word ‘passion’.  The book is most valuable not only for the 
richness of its insights but also for the wide range of historical material of the English 
language its author had the possibility to consult as her corpus data. Some of the “raw 
material” researched by Tissari goes back even to the Late Middle English period (15th 
century), the most voluminous body of the corpus is from the Early Modern (ca 1500-1700) 
and Present-Day English.27 More specifically, the corpora used for her chapter 
“AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, PASSION and CHARITY: A history of four “love lexemes” 
since the fifteenth century” are: the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts (HC), Shakespeare’s 
Complete Works, the Corpus of Early English Correspondence Sampler (CEECS), and the 
British National Corpus (BNC).28 The immense advantage of these corpora used by Tissari is 
their machine readability which allow her to draw conclusions about semantic change on a 
much more solid and broader base than I attempted to do on the basis of the Oxford English 
Dictionary only. Her findings help me to further refine my point about the semantic change 
‘passion’ underwent around and since the Early Modern period. 
Tissari’s perspective concerning this word is defined in the title of the chapter dealing 
with ‘passion’: “PASSION”: “AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, PASSION, and CHARITY: A 
history of four ‘love lexemes’ since the fifteenth century”29. This title – that is more than 
well-served, so to say, by the chapter itself – reflects a consciously retrospective attitude made 
manifest by considering “PASSION” passion as one love lexeme among others such as 
“AFFECTION, FRIENDSHIP, and CHARITY”. This démarche is legitimate when one is 
concerned with prototypical categories of love-lexemes from the perspective of historical 
lexicology and wants to see how different categories of love can be assigned to different 
                                                 
26 Heli Tissari, LOVEscapes – Changes in prototypical senses and cognitive metaphors since 1500, 
Helsinki : Mémoires de la Société Néophilologique de Helsinki, Tome LXII, Société Néophilologique, 
2003. pp. 305-313. 
27 Although, as Heli Tissari, notes we have far more data from the Present-Day English period given 
that much less was published in the Early Modern period than today. The three Early Modern sources 
together do not constitute even the tenth of the data from the Present-Day English period. Cf. Tissari, 
Ibid, p. 295. 
28 Tissari, Ibid., p. 294.  
29 Tissari, Ibid, pp. 289-324. 
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30domains.  However, I have the impression that the overall picture is incomplete because, by 
placing PASSION in the context of love lexemes from the start it misses certain layers of 
meaning. It looks as if the preliminary decision about the meaning of the word, inherent in 
approaching it as a love lexeme, leaves no room for the broader, Classical sense. The 
narrowing of the focus to ‘passion’ as a love lexeme thereby loses some of the ramifications 
of the broader conceptual grid that ‘passion’ entails. Thus, in Heli Tissari’s analysis, 
“PASSION is both a hyperonym for ‘(strong) emotion’ and its own hyponym, denoting a 
single emotion.”31 It seems to me that some of the pre-modern underpinnings of the 
“affections of the mind” (perturbatio animi) are not fully taken into account in this 
description that assimilates ‘passion’ to emotions in the modern sense too quickly. I wish to 
contend that ‘passion’ is a Janus-faced word that, at around the turn of the 16th thand 17  
century, displays both pre-modern and modern aspects at the same time and by this twofold 
nature presents a genuinely Early Modern visage. 
Tissari notes that, in the Early Modern English data, “[t]he dominant sense is ‘an 
affection of the mind’, i.e. ‘emotion’, but this result may be somewhat distorted because 
Shakespeare influences the result so much.”32 In a way, this sentence carries all the 
ambiguities latent in the historical period under consideration. First of all, it can be argued 
that what is termed by ‘passion’ in the sense of an ‘affection of the mind’  in this period (in 
the Classical idiom) will be called “emotion” later. It is also true that the Shakespeare’s usage 
of ‘passion’ was taking part, as well as contributing to this semantic change. Several facts 
seem to corroborate this point. First, there are one-hundred and fifty-two occurrences of 
‘passion’ in Shakespeare’s works33 that is probably the greatest number when compared to his 
contemporaries. In the Oxford English Dictionary entry ‘passion’, Shakespeare is the most 
often cited author in the psychologico-moral layer (III.) seconded by Spenser when the whole 
layer is considered and matched by him when the categories from 6.b onwards are considered: 
five examples are cited from Shakespeare (in 6.a, 6.b, 6.d and twice in 8.a) and four from 
Spenser (in 6.b, 6.c, 7.a, and 8.a). Although, as Tissari notes citing other scholars in support of 
her point, the Oxford English Dictionary suffers from certain limitations due to the fact that 
                                                 
30 Tissari, Ibid., p. 290-291. 
31 Ibid, p. 307. 
32 Tissari, Ibid., p. 306. 
33 I consulted the online 1866 Globe edition: http://etext.virginia.edu/shakespeare/works/ 
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“some authors have been researched and quoted more thoroughly than others, certain kinds of 
texts have not been included at all”.34 Given the OED’s origins in the 19th century when 
Shakespeare’s reputation reached its highest since the death of the poet, the pre-eminence of 
Shakespearean texts as example could reflect a cultural bias. But, and this is the second case 
in point, we also have evidence from Shakespeare’s contemporaries concerning his status as 
the “poet of passion”. The publication of the erotic tales of Venus and Adonis (1593) and of 
The Rape of Lucrece (1594) firmly secured their author’s reputation as the poet of love as the 
two poems were lodged together in the general contemporary estimate of Shakespeare.35 Thus 
Francis Meres, surveying the current state of English letters, in Palladis Tamia listed 
Shakespeare as one of “the most passionate among us to bevail and bemoan the perplexities of 
love” and declares that “the soul of Ovid lives in mellifluous and honey-tongued Shakespeare, 
witness his Venus and Adonis, his Lucrece, and his sugared sonnets among his private 
friends.”36 So if Shakespeare “distorts” the result of the dominant sense of ‘passion’ in the 
Early Modern English data – as Tissari puts it – then it is because he employs the term so 
frequently. But even if the contemporary perception of Shakespeare at the beginning of his 
carreer as the “poet of passion” meant primarily that he was a poet of love, when looking at 
the totality of the Shakespearian oeuvre, his usage of “passion” included of course all the 
broader, Classical “affection of the mind” senses.37
                                                 
 
34 Tissari, Ibid, p. 195. 
35 Cf. Richard Dutton, William Shakespeare – A Literary Life, (Basingstoke and London, etc.: 
Macmillan Press, 1989) pp. 36.ff. Cf. also Bruce R. Smith, “Studies in Sexuality” in Shakespeare – An 
Oxford Guide, edited by Stanley Wells, Lena Cowen Orlin, (Oxford, New York, etc, : Oxford 
University Press, 2003) pp. 431.ff. 
36 Francis Meres, Palladis Tamia, Wit’s Treasury, ed. D. C. Allen, New York: Scholar’s Facsimiles 
and Reprints, 1938, fols. 280v-281. cited by Bruce R. Smith, Ibid. p. 431. Richard Dutton notes that 
there is no way of knowing, however, whether Meres’s ‘sugared sonnets’ represented all, or even 
some of those published by the printer Thomas Thorpe in 1609. But Meres’s expression “among his 
private friends” suggest, as Smith notes, that they circulated in manuscript, well before their 
publication in 1609, among Shakespeare’s private friends including, most probably, the Earl of 
Southampton and his circle. 
37 Examples could be enumerated at length, instead, let me refer to the Shakespeare lexicon that 
registers the following five senses definition based on the oeuvre: “‘Passion’ (n) 
(1) any suffering. Emphatically, the last suffer of the Saviour. 
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The complex Early Modern sense of ‘passion’ hinges on changing cultural 
assumptions about the nature and role of the passions in human life. Changes in these 
assumptions are leading to the change of meaning of the word and towards the gaining ground 
of ‘emotion’ replacing much of what the pre-moderns meant by ‘passion’. Thus in 19th 
century English naturalist psychology (A. Bain, Ch. Darwin, J. Sully, W. James) the use of 
the word ‘passion’ is rejected because of its ethical implications and the value-judgements 
involved and the more neutral term ‘emotion’ is employed instead.38 This reservation 
notwithstanding, I find extremely helpful Tissari’s conclusions drawn from the comparison 
between the Early Modern and the Present-Day period: 
 
While the Early Modern data often names the ‘strong emotion’ in question or 
describes its symptoms, in the Present-Day English data the emphasis falls more 
and more on the strength and intensity of the emotion or the characteristic of 
emotionality at the expense of exact identification of the emotion. The data thus 
suggests a metonymic development in which the subset ‘intensity’ is 
foregrounded.39
 
This formal description of the change that occurred also indicates that a “semantic 
shift” took place. Let me put aside for the moment my reservation concerning the still marked 
existence of the pre-modern sense of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern period as perturbatio 
animi as “affection of the mind" (and not only strong emotion). Tissari’s findings too point in 
the sense of a semantic shift from a technical (one could say ‘umbrella’) sense of ‘passion’ 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2) Disorder, disease 
(3) Any violent commotion of the mind 
(4) Amorous desire 
(5) Any disposition or affection ruling the mind” 
(Shakespeare lexicon. A Complete Dictionary of all the English words, phrases and constructions in 
the Works of the Poet by Alexander Schmidt, 3rd edition, revised and enlarged by Gregor Sarrazin, 
Anno Press: New York, 1980.) In this way, the Shakespearian usage is quite mainstream, even if more 
frequent. 
38 Out of a similar concern to differentiate between ethically neutral and negative contents, Kant makes 
a marked distinction between Leidenschaft and Affekt. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Anthropology From A 
Pragmatic Point Of View, (1798) § 73. and I. Kant, The Critique of Judgement, translated by James 
Creed Meredith, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, (reprint of 1911) §29. 
39 Ibid, p. 313. (emphasis mine, G.S.) 
 23
(that can explain the need in the Early Modern period for naming the emotion in question) 
towards a narrowing of its use and eros taking predominance. Although she can find evidence 
from the Present-Day English data to almost all the senses the pre-moderns and the Early 
Moderns still grouped under the umbrella sense of ‘passion’, the development of the sense 
shows the foregrounding of intensity and amorous intensity in particular.40
 
The emphasis is on eros and straightforward sexuality, which may be accentuated 
by adjectives like erotic, physical, or sexual, or cognitive metaphors of fire. 
Passion is associated with being in love. [… it fits] ideal and typical models of 
love where the experiencer lacks any control of the emotion and ‘love’s intensity 
is maximal’.41
 














Early Modern period Present-Day period
 
42Figure 1: ‘passion’, the percentage shares of the domains in each period.
Source: Heli Tissari (2003) 
 
The interpretation of this figure requires a brief note on the use of the different Greek words 
denoting different sense of love. Building on research by C. S. Lewis and others, Tissari 
distinguishes among the following senses:  
 
                                                 
40 Tissari notes that “[t]he phrase with passion seems to be a new means to imply the strength or 
intensity of the emotion.” She cites as evidence that this phrase occurs 63 times in the British National 
Corpus (BNC), while without passion occurs only 7 times. With passion seems to be particular to 
accompanying verbs of utterance and describing acts of eros love. 
41 Tissari, Ibid, p. 311. 
42 Tissari, Ibid, p. 313. The figure is reproduced here with Heli Tissari’s kind permission. 
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(1) Storge occurs in the domain of family, between family members. 
(2) Philia occurs in the domain of friendship, between friends. 
(3) Eros occurs in the domain of sexuality, between lovers. 
(4) Agape occurs in the domain of religion, between people and God and by 
people acting according to their faith in God. 
(5) Love of things involves non-human participants and covers the remaining 
cases. From now on, I will be calling this love khreia.43
 
 
The figure shows that, in the Early Modern period, ‘passion’ takes the sense of eros in 
roughly 20% of all the cases, while almost 80% of occurrences of ‘passion’ are “other” i.e. 
other than any of the ‘love lexemes’. This statistics attests the predominance of the broader, 
“umbrella sense” of ‘passion’ in the Early Modern period. The data from Present-Day English 
shows eros increasing to 40%, khreia (love of things) having 20%, whereas “other” senses of 
‘passion’ reduced to its half: 40%. My assumption is that what Tissari categorizes as “other” 
in Early Modern would come under Christ’s passion and its cognates or they would fall into 
the category of the “affections of the mind” as the umbrella sense of ‘passion’ excepting 
“love” of course.44 This then further corroborates the point that the umbrella sense declines 
(from 80% to 40%) and the specified love-senses (eros and khreia) rise to dominance having 
– together - 60% of all occurrences of ‘passion’ (eros: 40% plus khreia: 20%). Although my 
study is not concerned specifically with the Present-Day English developments of ‘passion’ it 
would be interesting to follow up on Tissari’s suggestion about khreia. She notes that “while 
in the Early Modern period the ‘love’ is almost always eros, in Present-Day English almost a 
quarter of items are khreia. In other word, beside being more often used about ‘eros love’, 
PASSION has acquired a new frequent sense of ‘loving some thing intensely’. She suggests 
that a tendency of secularisation is under way in the development of this lexeme.45 Indeed, the 
use of ‘passion’ in the sense of khreia has recently found its way into the language of 
advertisements and marketing which build precisely on the prestige of this word. Hence 
slogans like “Volvo: the passion of quality” or “Our passion, your comfort” (Microsoft) while 
                                                 
43 Tissari, Ibid, p. 292. 
44 The fact that she does not explore these categories further is understandable from her point of view: 
the historical lexicology of love-lexemes and not the study of ‘passion’ as such. I admit though that it 
is not possible to tell from her figure how much is the theological sense (Christ’s passion) within the 
“other”. 
45 Tissari, Ibid., p. 313. 
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inciting to the love of things tamper with the romantic and post-romantic resonances of the 
cult of passion as the source of inspiration and energy for creation. 
Tissari’s findings provide a solid linguistic background for analysing and assessing the 
Early Modern cultural context in which the change began. Looking at these conclusions from 
a broader perspective, they further advance the perhaps obvious claim that ‘passion’ has a 
certain historical contingency. There is no fixed or permanent definition of ‘passion’ and its 
content is affected by changes in value-judgements, cultural practices and discourses. Thus 
the perspective of historical lexicology should help us to avoid the “naturalistic fallacy” in 
dealing with this term. It would be an error to think of ‘passions’ as something given in 
advance and established within human nature waiting to be named and deciphered. Not only 
are the ancient origins of  / pathos diverse but also the historical development of the 
word in the vernacular languages bears witness to changes in ethical outlooks and changing 
preoccupations with certain aspects of human behaviour. Thus the discourses about the 
passions (be they philosophical, medical, or other) circumscribe a certain semantic field and 
delimit a field of experience in order to make it an object proper for study, discussion, and 
moral/medical counsel. To put it somewhat radically, it is the historically situated discourses 
with their changing perspectives about these fields of experience that constitute them as 
‘passions’. It does not imply that there is no distress (aegritudo), delight (laetitia), fear 
(metus), lust (libido or cupiditas), to use the Ciceronian tetrachord, without discourse, 
however, calling them collectively as ‘passion’ involves value-judgements and other cultural 
assumptions that may be explicit or not. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on the unstable and pragmatic character of 
psychological concepts point also in this sense and they are probably valid for this word as 
well: 
 
Psychological concepts are just everyday concepts. They are not concepts newly 
fashioned by science for its own purpose, as are the concepts of physics and 
chemistry. Psychological concepts are related to those of the exact sciences as the 
concepts of the science of medicine are to those of old women who spend their 
time nursing the sick.46
 
                                                 
46 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology, two volumes edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, translated by C. G. 
Luckhardt and M. A. E. Aue, The University of Chicago Press, 1980, II. § 62. 
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 As we shall see in the following chapters, the medical parallels are very much to the 
point in discussions about the ‘passions’. Even more relevant is Wittgenstein’s reference to 
the pragmatic ends of psychological concepts. This study is concerned with, to take 
Wittgenstein’s example, the change in what is considered ‘sickness’ and the simultaneous 
change in the ‘old woman’, that is, the practices and prescriptions the prevailing culture 
provides for their treatment. In the context of Early Modern culture, such practices and 
prescriptions are the subject matter of cultural appropriations taking place between Classical, 
Christian and Early Modern vernacular culture. The adoption of the intercultural perspective 
in the study of the passions calls for a method and terminology that is capable of comparing 
and assessing the implications of the use of the notion of ‘passion’ in different cultural 
contexts. In order to be able to assess these broader historical and cultural underpinnings of 
the semantic change, I propose to turn to the writings of the late Michel Foucault. His 
genealogical perspective and even more his notion of “care for the self” as a form of ethical 
practice provide a vantage point for analysing changes in meaning in terms of changes in the 
substance of ethical practice. I wish to expose this methodological inspiration by turning to 
the writings of the late Foucault. 
 
 
I. 3. In Search of a Vantage Point: Foucault on the ‘Care for the Self’ 
 
 
By exposing the semantic evolution of ‘passion’ the previous chapter showed the 
inherent historical contingency of passion. It could be argued that ‘passion’, together with its 
etymological antecedents, is a somewhat over-determined word invested with different layers 
of meaning from the very beginnings of Western consciousness. When addressing the issue of 
passions in a given historical context, the problem consists partly in the multiplicity of layers 
of significations attached to ‘passions’ as describing the affective and emotive life of the 
subject. Any discussion quickly finds itself embedded in a complex web of determinations. A 
historical reconstruction of the meaning of ‘passion’ and, in particular, one that tries to 
account for the historical change described in the previous chapter as a “semantic shift” 
requires a vantage point and a method of analysis. The method I will be proposing in this 
chapter builds on the work of the late Michel Foucault and, more specifically, on the idea that 
the approach to passions is part of a certain ethical practice understood as a means of 
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transforming the subject. This approach is motivated by the understanding that the word 
‘passion’ is a meta-level of discourse that reflects not only a certain structuring and grouping 
of mental and bodily states but also their evaluation. The historical contingency and change in 
what ‘passion’ means shows that the phenomena described by this word is not given in a 
natural, spontaneous way whereby ‘passions’ would come as a given mental experience 
waiting for an adequate name. The unstable and pragmatic character of psychological 
concepts indicated by Wittgenstein and cited above is particularly true for the ‘passions’. It 
would be a naturalistic fallacy to set up passions as a pre-given mental disruption awaiting a 
discourse that would describe, canalise, and temper it. This model would imply that, on the 
one hand, there would be nature with its own force and, on the other hand, there would be 
culture, human discourse, exercising a counter-force: defining what passion is, evaluating and, 
if needs be, combating them. But in fact, there is no such division, no such antagonism: 
passions are not a naturally given category, they are form the outset defined by culture and 
cultural discourses that shape the subject relations to his or her passions. In a way, discourse 
about passions constitutes them by establishing a particular grouping and selection on a meta-
level of discourse. Interpreting Foucault’s project of subjectivation Christian Jambet describes 
this process in the following way: 
 
Certain states of being, certain acts, arise out of the lack of material distinction 
where they were vegetating before calling forth or giving rise to this sort of 
questioning." […] Whereas other modes of existence remain in a state of 
indifference where they are of no interest to the search for the true: they do not 
disturb knowledge (savoir) and they do not require of it that it should be the 
material of its analyses and maxims. In Aristotelian terms, they remain pure 
possibilities.47
 
The word  / paskho, for example, was in pre-classical Greek culture was a relatively 
undifferentiated or overcharged semantic field implying both grief and sexual pleasure. This 
field of multiple and contrasting meanings was later explored by Homer, Plato and Aristotle, 
who invested it with more specific values, imperatives, requirements, rules and exhortations, 
thus creating a form of knowledge about it that was the effective content of a particular 
                                                 
47 Christian Jambet, "The constitution of the subject and spiritual practice" in Michel Foucault, 
Philosopher, Essays translated from the French and German by Timothy J. Armstrong, New York, 
London, Toronto, Sydney, Tokyo, Singapore: Harvester, Wheatsheaf, 1992, p. 241. 
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problematisation. 'Passions' came to life as they became ethical problems, requiring 
theoretical and practical treatment in Plato, Aristotle, and later in the writings of the Stoics.  
I propose to situate that problem of the passions as an interrogation about instituted 
modes of relation to the self and their possible history. What I find common to practically 
every field of knowledge related to the passions in the Renaissance period are questions 
related in some way or another to practices related to the subject and to means of transforming 
its state and behaviour. After all, the imperative of ‘know thyself’, often evoked in 16th 
century treatises about the passions, could be taken as the motto of popular philosophy in the 
Renaissance. But this imperative of ‘know thyself’ must also be placed in the broader 
historical and conceptual context it is derived from: namely Classical Greek culture and its 
care for the self. As we shall see, the preoccupation with the passions is part of this practice. 
The issue of the care for the self was the central theme of Michel Foucault’s work in 
the 1970s-1980s.48 He studied it in the context of Classical Greek culture where, at least for 
the European consciousness, it takes its origins and one of its first manifestations in 
philosophy in Plato’s Alcibiades. Foucault followed the various uses to which care of the self 
were put in Hellenistic philosophy and later in early Christianity roughly until the 4th century 
A.C. Although Foucault’s studies on this topic do not address the care for the self or more 
specifically the issue of the passions in the context of the Renaissance49, I find them 
methodologically inspiring that conceptually encouraging for my topic. As for the strictly 
historical relevance of Foucault’s analyses of Hellenistic authors for the Renaissance, it is 
noteworthy that Stoic practices of care for the self – a topic he dealt with in detail – were 
extremely important in shaping the Renaissance attitude towards the passions due to the neo-
Stoic revival in the second half of 16th century. 
                                                 
48 As Foucault himself indicates in his Histoire de la sexualité 3. Le souci de soi, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1984) p. 60. the centrality of the topic “culture of the self” (techné tou biou) had been well 
documented before him by Pierre Hadot, Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique, Paris, 1981. In 
another book dealing with similar issues Pierre Hadot notes this influence on the work of Michel 
Foucault; cf. P. Hadot, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique? Paris: Gallimard, 1995, p. 24. 
49 With the exception of some sporadic remarks in the interview given in Dreyfus-Rabinow, of which 
see more below. 
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The very notion of “technologies of the self” (often used as a synonym for “care for the 
self”) is an issue difficult to grasp because this practice is so widespread and almost self-
evident our culture. Foucault himself was aware of this and he noted that  
 
… the hermeneutics of the self has been diffused across Western culture through 
different channels and integrated with various types of attitudes and experience so 
that it is difficult to isolate and separate it from our own spontaneous 
experiences.50
 
The importance of Foucault’s study of this concept was that he was able to show, by historical 
comparisons among practices in Classical Greek, Hellenistic and early Christian culture – and 
often wind specific hindsight to our own modern world – that the technologies of the self are 
far from being self-evident. Instead, he demonstrated that these techniques exhibit certain 
specificities in different historical periods, they undergo major changes and transformations 
and are thus part of the historical contingency of our being. 
What follows is a brief presentation of Foucault’s evolving concept of technologies of 
the self. We shall briefly locate it in Foucault’s oeuvre with indications to the broader 
programmatic agenda of Foucault’s intellectual outlook. 
 
What I mean by the phrase are those intentional and voluntary actions by which 
men not only set themselves rules of conduct, but also seek to transform 
themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life 
into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic 
criteria. These ‘arts of existence’, these ‘techniques of the self’, no doubt lost 
some of their importance and autonomy when they were assimilated into the 
exercise of priestly power in early Christianity and later, into educative, medical, 
and psychological types of practices. Still, I thought that the long history of 
aesthetics of existence and these technologies of the self remained to be done, or 
resumed. It has been a long time since Burckhardt pointed out their significance 
for the epoch of the Renaissance, but their perpetuation, their history, and their 
development do not end here. (IN FOOTNOTE: It is not quite correct to imply 
that since Burckhardt the study of these arts and this aesthetics of existence has 
been completely neglected. One thinks of Benjamin’s study on Baudelaire. There 
is also an interesting analysis in Stephen Greenblatt’s recent book, Renaissance 
Self-Fashioning (1984)) In any case, it seemed to me that the study of the 
problematisation of sexual behaviour in antiquity could be regarded as a chapter – 
one of the first chapters – of that general history of the ‘techniques of the self’ 
                                                 
50 M. Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault. Edited by L. H. Martin, et 





And to explain how I was led, through certain paradoxes and difficulties, to 
substitute a history of ethical problematisations based on practices of the self, for 
a history of systems of morality based, hypothetically, in interdictions.51
 
 
The present study can be seen as appendix to this “history of ethical problematisations based 
on practices of the self” inasmuch as the technologies of the self, being praxis, presuppose a 
language in which acts, phenomena and behaviour of the self are represented with a view to 
modifying them. When changes in that language denoting affective and mental states of the 
subject occur then these changes are necessarily accompanied by concomitant changes in 
what to be cared for: the very terms used to denote phenomena that is of relevance for ethical 
substance and practice. Foucault refers to the prescriptive texts he studies as “functional 
devices that would enable individuals to question their own conduct, to watch over and give 
shape to it, and to shape themselves as ethical subjects; in short, their function was ‘etho-
poetic’, to transpose a word found in Plutarch.”52 If the texts are “etho-poetic”, then the 
keywords the texts use, the terms in which the possible prescriptions arise or are formulated 
and possible gestures of care for the self / techniques of the self are deployed and carried out 
are the atoms, the basic elements and units of this poetics. And while Foucault may be right in 
arguing for an underlying continuity in the moral codes, and for emphasising instead that it is 
“a history of ethical problematisations based on practices of the self” that really matters, it 
remains, however, that those codes and prescriptions as well as the techniques of the care for 
the self are formulated and mediated by a language, even if only an internal monologue. And 
that language too, has its history interlaced with and imbricated in the history of the codes and 
of the techniques of the self: systematic changes in patterns of belief and attitude intersect 
with and are correlated with changes in meaning, language. Coming closer to the period that 
is by and large the subject of this study, certain words of that code and of those practices 
involved show a remarkable semantic instability from around 1600 and ultimately lead to a 
marked change of affective vocabulary by the turn of 18th-19th century. 
 
                                                 
51 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure. The History of Sexuality Volume 2, translated from the 
French by Robert Hurley, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, p. 10-13 passim 
52 Ibid. p. 12-13. 
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In the early 1980s, as a retrospective view about his work in an article written under the 
pseudonym “Maurice Florence” for the entry “Foucault” in the Dictionnaire des 
philosophes Michel Foucault situated himself in the philosophical tradition of Kant and called 
his project a “Critical History of Thought”.53 He defined it as “an analysis of the conditions 
under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those 
relations constitute a possible knowledge.” More specifically, this meant an analysis of those 
relations of subject and object in which “the subject himself is posited as an object of possible 
knowledge”. This lead first to the study of formations of knowledge relating to the subject 
(The Order of Things), then to the study of the formation of the relationships to fields of 
power (Madness and Civilization, Birth of the Clinic, Discipline and Punish), and last to the 
study of the constitution of the subject as object for himself. This latter entails “the formation 
of procedures by which the subject is led to observe himself, analyse himself, interpret 
himself, recognize himself as a domain of possible knowledge.” In the second volume of The 
History of Sexuality Foucault gives an outline of the way his different works relate to each 
other: 
A theoretical shift had seemed necessary in order to analyse what was often 
designated as the advancement of learning; it led me to examine the forms of 
discursive practices that articulated the human sciences. A theoretical shift had 
also been required in order to analyse what is often described as 'manifestations of 
power'; it led me to imagine, rather, the manifold relations, the open strategies, 
and the rational techniques that articulate the exercise of powers. It appeared that I 
now had to undertake a third shift, in order to analyse what is termed 'the subject'. 
It seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self 
by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject. After first 
studying the games of truth (jeux de vérité) in their interplay with one another, as 
exemplified by certain empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, and then studying their interaction with power relations, as exemplified 
by punitive practices -  I felt obliged to study the games of truth in the relationship 
of self with self and the forming of oneself as a subject, taking as my domain of 
                                                 
53 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. edited by James D. Faubion, translated by 
Robert Hurley and others, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 Volume two, Allen Lane, The 
Penguin Press, 1998. p. 456. 
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reference and field of investigation what might be called 'the history of desiring 
man'.54
 
 The History of Sexuality and the various lectures and seminars in the Collège de 
France and various universities in the United States emanating from this project were 
concerned with the study of ethical modes and the ways of how we constitute ourselves as 
ethical subjects.55 It is for this reason that his study of this topic have proved so seminal; in 
fact, through a historical study of how subjects have constituted themselves in various ways in 
Antiquity and early Christianity, Foucault addressed issues central to contemporary 
philosophical discourse and made a significant contribution that had its repercussions in 
political science, literary and social criticism, educational studies, feminism, etc. But despite 
the changed focus of the book about the history of sexuality, Foucault’s interest in this topic 
had its coherence within the oeuvre as suggested also by his retrospective article on his work. 
His analysis of technologies of the self are inscribed in a series of theoretical shifts that 
occurred in his work and are related to different domains of what he calls “genealogies”: a 
                                                 
54 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 1985, p. 6. In an interview, Foucault himself describes these, 
often interrelated, domains in the following way: “First a historical ontology of ourselves in our 
relation to truth through which we constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge. Then a historical 
ontology of ourselves in our relationships to a field of power where we constitute ourselves as subjects 
acting over others. And finally a historical ontology of our relationship to morals that constitutes us as 
ethical agents.” (Italics and translation mine – G.S.) in Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988, édition établie sous 
la direction de Daniel Defert et François Ewald avec la collaboration de Jacques Lagrange, Quarto, 
Paris : Gallimard, 20012  (1994), p. 1212. 
55 Cf. "Par là, je ne veux pas dire faire une histoire des conceptions successives du désir, de la 
concupiscence ou de la libido, mais analyser les pratiques par lesquelles les individus ont été amenés à 
porter attention à eux-mêmes, à se déchiffrer, à se reconnaître et à s'avouer comme sujets de désir, 
faisant jouer entre eux-mêmes et eux-mêmes un certain rapport qui leur permet de découvrir dans le 
désir la vérité de leur être, qu'il soit naturel ou déchu. Bref, l'idée était, dans cette généalogie, de 
chercher comment les individus ont été amenés à exercer sur eux-mêmes, et sur les autres, une 
herméneutique de désir dont leur comportement sexuel a bien été sans doute l'occasion, mais n'a 
certainement pas été le domaine exclusif. M. Foucault, L'Usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2. 
Paris : Gallimard, 1984. p. 10. 
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56Nietzsche-inspired concept and practice of historical-philosophical research.  These domains 
of genealogy are relationships of knowledge or truth, of power, and of ethics. What gives the 
methodological unity of Foucault’s research in these fields is that they are all centred on the 
analysis of certain practices with a view to bring out and make intelligible their historical 
contingency.57
As for the historical contingency of the subject’s practices, a topic Foucault insists on 
throughout his career, it is part of his broader critical strategy of contributing to a historical 
ontology of human nature. In the “Foucault”-article a “systematic scepticism toward all 
anthropological universals” is established as a rule. “In regard to human nature or the 
categories that may be applied to the subject, everything in our knowledge which is suggested 
to us as being universally valid must be tested and analysed. […] Insofar as possible, 
circumvent the anthropological universals (and, of course, those of a humanism that would 
assert the rights, privileges, and the nature of a human being as an immediate and timeless 
truth of the subject) in order to examine them as historical constructs.”58 Foucault wrote more 
explicitly on how this ‘systematic scepticism’ functions as part of a philosophical ethos rooted 
in the Enlightenment and more specifically in Kant’s instruction of Aude sapere: ‘dare to 
know’, “have the courage, the audacity to know’.59 This scepticism is part and parcel of a 
type of philosophical interrogation that simultaneously problematises man’s relation to the 
present, man’s historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous 
subject. This interrogation is “oriented toward the ‘contemporary limits of the necessary’, that 
is, toward what is no longer indispensable for the constitution of ourselves as autonomous 
                                                 
56 For the Nietzschean origin of this practice see for example M. Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History” in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology. edited by James D. Faubion, 
translated by Robert Hurley and others, Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984 volume two, Allen 
Lane, The Penguin Press, 1998. pp. 369-392. 
57 For approaching Foucault’s writing along the two primary axes of philosophical history and 
historicist philosophy cf. Gary Gutting, “Introduction. Michel Foucault: A user’s manual” in in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, edited by Gary Gutting, Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 2. 
58 Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, p. 462. (my emphasis, G.S.) 
59 Cf. Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment” in Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader, New 
York, Pantheon Book, 1984, pp. 32-50. 
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60subjects.”  It entails a “historical ontology of ourselves” established through precise 
historical inquiries that are concerned with the “events that have led us to constitute ourselves 
and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying.” Its ‘limit-
attitude’ means a probing of the frontiers, analysing the limits in order to see that “in what is 
given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory what place is occupied by whatever is singular, 
contingent and the product of arbitrary constraints?.  
 
The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, 
a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it 
has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the 
critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the 
limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them.61
 
In summary then and coming back to Foucault’s methodology the Enlightenment-article 
proposes a philosophical ethos that is deployed in concrete historical inquiries in order to 
grasp the contingencies in the practices that shaped and still shape us. In studying the 
practices of a historical period, the goal is of course not to reactivate past practices or to see 
exemplary value in them as if they constituted a golden age. Instead of a nostalgic evocation, 
they can serve as vantage points in order to see the contingencies in our current limitations 
requiring “a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty.”62
Foucault’s analyses and comparisons of self-relation in Classical Greek, Stoic Greek 
and early Christian contexts explore the different different modalities and finalities of the 
self.63 For an analysis of the Renaissance concern with the passions Foucault’s study of how 
                                                 
60 What is Enlightenment, p. 43. 
61 “What is Enlightenment?” p. 50. 
62 “What is Enlightenment?” p. 50. 
63 Publications related to this topic are The History of Sexuality 3 vols. as well as Foucault’s courses at 
the Collège de France from 1978-94 of which summaries are accessible in French and some in 
English. Cf. Dits et écrits II, 1976-1988 ; and Résumé des cours, 1970-1982 ; Paris : Julliard (1989). 
The course of 1981-1982 was published in a separate volume as Michel Foucault, L’Herméneutique 
du sujet. Cours au Collège de France, 1981-1982. Edition établie sous la direction de François Ewald 
et Alessandro Fontana, par Frédéric Gros, (Paris : Hautes Etudes, Seuil/Gallimard, 2001) The 1977-
1978 course on "Sécurité, territoire et population" appeared as "Historical Systems of Thought, 1978" 
translated by James Bernauer in Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 8:2, Summer, pp. 238ff. 
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self-relations operated in Classical culture (both Greek and Stoic) and early Christianity are 
important not only as a conceptual device in this study but also because of the importance of 
these epochs in shaping the Renaissance outlook and practices concerning the passions. Since 
the issue of the passions in Renaissance culture is at the crossroads of Classical humanism, of 
neo-Stoicism and of the Christianity of the day, the concern with the passions entails a 
reconfiguration of this threefold legacy. The concatenation of Stoic and Christian ideas about 
technologies of the self are presented (albeit in a different vocabulary) by Gordon Braden, in 
Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition. Anger’s Privilege (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1985)64
Foucault himself gives an indication of this possibility in the interview cited above on 
the genealogy of ethics: 
It seems to me that in the religious crisis of the sixteenth century - the great 
rejection of the Catholic confessional practices - new modes of relationship to the 
self were being developed. We can see the reactivation of ancient Stoic practices 
of the Classical era.65  
 
Foucault refers to the notion of self-test as being thematically very close to what one can find 
among the Stoics for whom the experience of the self is not the discovery of a hidden self 
within us but rather an attempt to determine what we can do and what we cannot do given the 
liberty we dispose of. Both Catholics and Protestants reactivate these ancient practices and 
give them the form (and finality) of Christian spiritual practice. What emerges is that similar 
techniques of the self may hide differences in the telos of care for the self. Thus Foucault’s 
description of ethical practices may serve as a method for studying the debates and cultural 
interactions between different ethical practices in the context of Early Modern culture as 
cultural appropriations took between Classical, Christian and Early Modern vernacular 
cultures. 
 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of ethics shows us where to locate the 
transvaluations consequent upon the emergence of Christian ethics. And, 
moreover, by isolating the relation to oneself as a separate component of ethics, he 
                                                 
64 In particular in the chapters “Stoicism and Empire” (pp. 5-27) and “Stoicism and Renaissance” (63-
98). 
65 Cf. p. 1226-1227 in Dits et écrits II 
 36
opened up a domain of analysis that can be profitably investigated both when 
moral codes are relatively static and when they undergo great upheaval.66
 
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, I do not mean to apply Foucault’s categories 
to Early Modern texts and to the practices implied in them in a strict, “strait-jacket” sense. 
Rather the point is to use his insights liberally as a source of methodological inspiration that 
can help to understand semantic shifts, ethical debates in terms of differences in care for the 
self and ethics as a study of the self’s relationship to itself, rapport à soi. That is how 
Foucault defined ethics: as a component of morality concerning the self’s relationship to 
itself. “Foucault argued that our histories of morality should not be exclusively focused on the 
history of codes of moral behaviour, and that we must also pay careful attention to the history 
of the forms of subjectivation, to how we constitute ourselves as moral subjects of our own 
moral actions.”67 His work and moreover his historical analysis of care for the self are useful 
mutatis mutandis for an analysis of the evolution of the meaning of ‘passion’ in the Early 
Modern period. In my view, the study of the Early Modern reconfiguration of ‘passions’ is 
related to the history of the care for the self in the following way. In most cases, if not 
exclusively68, care for the self passes by verbal processes that involve language as its 
medium. Although practices of the self are not limited to discursive practices, but it is from 
discursive testimonies that we can study practices far broader in range that what can be 
described discursively. Foucault, as a historian, was obliged to turn to diaries, self-
inspections, treatises on dreams, letters of counsel, etc.69 It is legitimate and almost banal to 
assume that the history of our relationship to ourselves is paralleled in the history of the 
                                                 
66 Arnold I. Davidson, “Archaeology, Genealogy, Ethics” in Foucault: A Critical Reader, edited by 
David Couzens Hoy, Oxford and Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1986, (19925), p. 231. 
67 Arnold I Davidson, “Ethics as ascetics: Foucault, the history of ethics, and ancient thought” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, edited by Gary Gutting, Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 118. 
68 Ultimately, all such practices, when historical, are mediated to us through written or other semiotic 
records. This means that irrespective of whether they were verbal or not on the first place, they come 
to us through written records. Of course, there is a lot of room for contemplation as to how thought, 
feeling, emotion and other mental processes are related to verbal acts… 
69 M. Foucault, “L’Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France. 1981-1982” in Résumé des 
cours, 1970-1982 ; Paris : Julliard, 1989, 145ff 
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medium of these verbal processes, language, and more specifically, in the semantic fields 
specific words acquire.70 The semantic fields of the words we use are adapted to changing 
needs of our care for the self. When there are changes in what needs care (governance and 
control), changes in meanings of words, even of whole clusters of words are attending to it. 
Thus tracing the phases of and moments of renegotiations of semantic shifts in language is 
tantamount to identifying changes in care for the self – in fact, the two are hardly separable 
form one another and cannot be rendered simply in relationships of causality (which is why I 
prefer to refer to ‘Early Modern configurations’). 
 
 
I. 4. The Broader Historical Argument: ‘Passions’ and ‘Emotions’ 
 
As stated in the first chapter, this study is concerned with presenting and possibly explaining, 
albeit tentatively, the change of the meaning of ‘passion’ around the late 16th century in the 
English language. Drawing on the Oxford English Dictionary and related historical evidence, 
Chapter I.2. took stock of the shift in the meaning. But an understanding of the terms of this 
change requires a broader historical perspective situating this development in the history of 
what could be called “affectivity”. While the presentation of the change itself can be done by 
turning to the linguistic evidence and historical material within the Early Modern period, the 
explanation of this change is a more difficult and complex issue. It requires a method that will 
do justice to the historical complexities involved (and evoked above as the intercultural 
context of the Renaissance cf. Chapter I.1.) and will meet the requirements of conceptual 
clarity. To put my tentative explanation for the semantic change in question in the broadest 
possible terms, I would venture to claim that it was within the complex intercultural 
constellation and interaction combining elements of various and on crucial points often 
conflicting traditions that ‘passion’ acquired a culturally, philosophically and theologically 
unsustainable semantic richness/plenitude that called for change. I wish to contend that the 
Early Modern period – and precisely by virtue of its intercultural character – plays a pivotal 
                                                 
70 Cf. L. Wittgenstein’s remark on the on the unstable and pragmatic character of psychological 
concepts above, chapter I. 2. 
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71role in the re-negotiation of the very terms of affectivity.  To put it briefly: prior to the Early 
Modern period affects were subsumed under the term ‘passion’ (path ): a broader historical 
view should allow us to see how that history of affects is embedded in that of the passions. Of 
course, it would go far beyond the confines of this study to follow in detail this intertwined 
history of ‘passion’ from pre-classical Greece (Homer in particular), to the Greek tragedies 
and philosophers through Hellenistic and Roman culture, Early Christianity (Saint Augustine 
in particular) and scholasticism.72 For the sake of understanding and exploring the 
significance of the change in the Early Modern period, I shall, however, highlight major 
points of this history; those moments in particular that had an impact on the Early Modern 
transformation in order to elicit, retrospectively, the double nature of ‘passion’ prior to the 
Renaissance and to account for the semantic shift that takes place in this period. 
A remark by a noted Classical scholar will illustrate the point about the ambiguity of 
‘passion’. In his Emotion and Peace of Mind; From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation73 
(that was originally given as the prestigious Gifford Lectures in 1997) Richard Sorabji makes 
the following remark at the outset: 
 
I shall speak of ‘emotions’ rather than ‘passions’ when rendering the Greek term 
path . This is for the reason given in the Introduction, that, in so far as there is a 
distinction nowadays, passion is thought of as a very strong type of emotion. 
Those who, like the Stoic Chrysippus, wanted to eradicate emotion hoped to 
                                                 
71 While it has to be acknowledged that the concept of affectivity emerges within the framework of the 
modern institution of the subject but it would be a case of excessive nominalism to suppose that it had 
not existed prior to its recent “invention” about two hundred years ago. (The case is also valid of 
course in a spatial dimension referring to other cultures codes…) 
72 For a similar approach but taking the Kantian distinction between Affekt and Leidenschaft as a 
historical vantage point cf. Marc Richir, “Affectivité” in Encyclopædia Universalis, France, 1996 
(CD-ROM version) who traces the filiations of the “double conception of pathos as both ‘passion’ and 
‘affect’” back to Classical Greece (Plato, Aristotle), and Stoicism as well as Christianity, most notably 
in the Protestant re-elaboration of Christian interiority. Cf. also Jürgen HENGELBROCK and Jakob 
LANZ, “Affekt” in Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie edited by Joachim RITTER, Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971, translated into French by Jacques Gillot as « Examen 
historique du concept de passion » 
73 Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation. The 
Gifford Lectures, Oxford, New York : Oxford University Press, 2000. 
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eradicate not only the strong ones, but very nearly all, as I shall argue in Chapters 
2 and 14. So their view would not be well expressed by saying that they were only 
against passions.74
 
Similarly, another eminent Classical and medievalist scholar, Simo Knuuttila, offers the same 
translation of the Greek pathos as modern ‘emotion’ already in the title of his commanding 
study Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy.75 Furthermore, one may also turn to 
modern translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics to verify that translations of pathos 
may even vary. Thus in 1147a 11ff (Book VII. Chapter 3) of the Nicomachean Ethics the 
word is translated by J. A. K. Thomson as being “in the grip of emotion”,76 whereas a more 
recent translation by Roger Crisp, published in the prestigious “Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy Series” the translation is a rather vague “under the influence of the 
ways they are affected”77 78. Examples of this sort could be enumerated much further.  My 
point is of course not to criticise Sorabji’s, Knuuttila’s, Thomson’s and others’ rather elegant 
and neat solution to the problem of terminological history but rather to alert to the ambiguity 
of the term as the source of later semantic rearrangements. (I shall return to the Stoic concept 
                                                 
74 Richard Sorabji, Ibid. p. 17, cf. also p. 7. and 206-210 on whether the dispute on apatheia is merely 
verbal 
75 Simo Knuuttila, Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Cf. 
also the same logic at work in Deborah J. Brown, Descartes and the Passionate Mind, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 32. and passim. 
76 Aristotle, Ethics. The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by J. A. K. Thomson, revised with notes and 
appendices by Hugh Tredennick, introduction and bibliography by Julian Barnes, London: Penguin 
Books, 1955, p. 232. 
77 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, translated and edited by Roger Crisp, “Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy”, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2000, p. 124. It has to be noted that 
the “Glossary” at the end of the book defines or rather glosses “pathos” as “feeling or way of being 
affected. Alternative translation: ‘passion’. Opposed to ‘actions’ (praxeis), connotes passivity as 
against activity, experiencing rather than doing.” Ibid.p. 207. 
78 Cf. Tad Brennan, “The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions” in J. Sihvola and T. Engberg-Pedersen, 
(eds.) The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1998. As well as problematic 
translations of Cicero’s perturbatio as ‘emotion’ in the Loeb edition of De finibus and the translation 
of animi motibus as ‘mental emotions’ in the “Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought” 
series edition of Augustine, Civitate Dei (both will be cited below). 
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of the ‘passions’ in more detail in Chapter II.1.3.) Although the historical studies contained in 
these scholarly books make clear that the authors are far from throwing an anachronistic 
semantic veil unto the disturbing strangeness of a Classical term. There is, however, a risk of 
assimilating a historically defined term that was conditioned by a host of assumptions about 
what it is to be human, what is the right action, etc., to a modern concept. The fact that the 
theological-moral associations of path  (such as vitium, (fault, defect, vice) perturbatio 
(perturbation, disturbance)) have progressively been eliminated in modern discourses resulted 
in a narrowing and a marked shift of in the semantic field under consideration. Thus, since the 
19th century, it has been limited to the sphere of ‘sentiments’, ‘emotions’. Therefore it is 
important to emphasise that the retrospective perspective focusing on the historical ambiguity 
of ‘passion’ as sketched out above is in no way meant to occult historical change and to 
suppose instead transhistorical continuity in human affectivity. The point is rather, to lay bare, 
to the extent possible, the conditions within which we can assess changes in ‘passion’ at all 
and to expose how such a semantic change is influenced by and intersects with changes in 
systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes. The history of the concept of ‘passion’ has been 
attempted from various perspectives albeit with different emphases on the aspects of the 
phenomenon under consideration. 
Jürgen Hengelbrock and Jakob Lanz presented a survey of the concept of passion in a 
twin article: the first one tracing the history of the concept up to the Thomas Aquinas, while 
the second article, addressing the modern era, starts, noticeably with 17  century authors like 
Descartes, Hobbes and Spinoza, Pascal – with the early-modern phase conspicuously 
missing.
th
79 However, the second article presents three phases through which the modern 
conception of ‘passion’ developed. The historically first phase is of ‘passion’ denotes, in a 
large and generic sense all non-rational psychological phenomena often considered as passive. 
The second phase reflects a change in their evaluation: rather than seeing them as obstacle to 
virtue, or as diseases, they are examined from aesthetic, psychological, and economic points 
of view (Hume, Pope, Vico, Helvétius, Mandeville). It is in the third phase that a significant 
semantic change comes about: the distinction ‘passion’ / ‘emotion’ is established between 
extreme desire / movement of the sensitive faculties. The article also notes that in the course 
                                                 
79 Jürgen Hengelbrock and Jakob Lanz, « Examen historique du concept de passion » “Affekt” in 
Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie edited by Joachim Ritter, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1971, translated from German by Jacques Gillot. 
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of the transition from the large to the narrower sense of ‘passion’, the use of the term varies 
largely in the 17  and 18  century. th th As indicated above, the present study is concerned with 
the transition from the first, large to the third, narrow sense, and in particular the beginnings 
and possible motivations of this change. 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty published an article in 1982 entitled “From Passions to 
Emotions and Sentiments”80 that, albeit its main focus is on Descartes and Hobbes, provides 
interesting and inviting clues for understanding the change in conceptions of the passions. Her 
account of the change is in terms of a shift from invading passions external to the self linked 
with the fallen condition of man and requiring operations of control, transformation, and 
suppression to conceiving passions as “the very activities of the mind, its own motions”, “a 
person’s own resources and direction of energy, and then, as sentiments, they provide the 
conditions for civilized society”81. While the Early Modern period can still be characterised as 
falling, by and large, into the first phase of this description, there are, however, significant 
developments that signal a shift of focus. A. O. Rorty’s description is noteworthy in this 
regard and goes straight to the heart of the issue: 
 
And of course as conceptions of the passions change, the prime examples of the 
passions change, and their relations to the other activities of the mind also shift. 
When fear and anger are the prime examples of invading passions then we are 
‘overcome’ by love, pity or compassion. In such a system, it is rationality that 
assures justice. But when the primary examples of the passions include sentiments 
acquired by sympathetic vibrations to others like ourselves – when we sorrow 
because others sorrow – the virtue of justice can become the sense of justice, its 
operations assured by benevolent social passions rather than by rationality.82
 
As we shall see in the context of the Early Modern debate between neo-Stoics and Christians 
of an Augustinian inspiration, this shift from the rule of reason (with the radicalism of 
psychological monism in the case of the Stoics) to Christian accommodations of “sympathetic 
vibrations” partly modelled on Christ will be central to the change in the conceptions of 
‘passion’. But A. O. Rorty’s more general approach to the issue is also convincing: she claims 
that “we can use transformations of the passions to emotions and sentiments as a scarlet dye, 
                                                 
80 A. O. Rorty, “From Passions to Emotions and Sentiments” in Philosophy: the Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, 57 (1982), pp. 159-172. 
81 A. O. Rorty, Ibid. p. 159. 
82 A. O. Rorty, Ibid. p. 159-160. 
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83as it were, to locate other changes in the mind.”   For her “one of the reasons that the 
passions are especially interesting, red dye tracers of the shifts of the mind, is that they are 
found in that no-man’s land where theories create experiences they describe…”84 I find the 
metaphor of “scarlet dye” particularly apt to describe the interwoven nature of conceptions of 
the passions with ideas in ethics, theology and anthropology. Furthermore, these ideas do not 
stop there but find their way to inform our everyday lives and words. Thus, in a playful coda 
to her article, A. O. Rorty concludes: 
 
Philosophy begins at home, but with any lick it doesn’t end there: it moves back 
and forth to sermons, scientific treatises, political rhetoric, poetry and trashy 
fiction, obituaries that praise and editorials that blame, and above all the daily 
gossip that explains the mysterious actions of friends and foes. All these, 
combining theory and practice as they do, carry our predecessors alive within 
them. We carry all the participants in foro interno. That is what comes of our 
being historical creatures, formed by the words of our predecessors as well as by 
The Look of the Other. Not only society, but history with its babble of conflicting 
tongues remains alive and intact within us.85
 
It is also the premise of the current study to understand the ordinary use of the word ‘passion’ 
as informed by philosophical, theological and other ideas even if, as we shall see the ordinary, 
literary and scholarly uses of the word do not always coincide. 
86Hans-Jürgen Diller traced a pre-history of ‘emotion’ Old and Middle English texts  
and I can concur with his approach that shares my (and Marc Richir’s) working assumption 
that there is, of course, a prehistory of ‘emotion’ prior to the existence of this word. Diller’s 
scope of research takes into account, rightly, in my view, not only ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ 
but also such vernacular developments as ‘mood’, ‘feeling’ and ‘stirring’ and the minutiae of 
his analysis are extremely insightful and informative. Since my focus in the present study is 
the semantic change of ‘passion’ around 1600, and since this change is precisely about the 
disambiguation of ‘passion’, namely that modern ‘emotion’, ‘affection’, ‘passion’ were all 
                                                 
83 A. O. Rorty, Ibid. p. 159. 
84 A. O. Rorty, Ibid. p. 171. 
85 A. O. Rorty, Ibid. p. 172. 
86 Hans-Jürgen Diller, “Affection, passion, feeling, stirring: Towards a pre-history of the category 
‘emotion’” in Paul Michel (ed.), Unmitte(i)lbarkeit: Gestaltungen und Lesbarkeit von Emotionen, 
PANO Verlag, 2005, pp. 155-191. 
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part of ‘passion’ in the Classical  sense, our fields of research are contiguous and to some 
extent overlap. I.e. Diller traces the pre-history of ‘emotion’ that, from my perspective at 
least, is part and parcel of the history of ‘passion’. Perhaps it is due to such differences in 
perspective and the material considered that I would somewhat disagree with him concerning 
the pertinence of the first question he raises in his article87: “1. Was there a need, before the 
end of the 16th century, for a generic term covering phenomena like fear, hope, joy, sadness 
etc.?”88 As it may be clear from my subsequent chapters on the Classical heritage of 
‘passion’, such a collective term existed in Greek (path ) as well as Latin (passiones) and was 
adopted and adapted in European vernacular languages especially due to Stoic influence 
mediated by Cicero and Saint Augustine. Some of the examples cited by Diller from the 
Middle English period attest it, for example his quotation from Chaucer89 that lists the Classic 
tetrachord of passions established by the Stoics and inherited from them through Cicero and 
the early Christian Church Fathers, especially Saint Augustine. In my view, question 1 does 
not really exist in this form. The really pertinent question is Diller’s third question: “What do 
these words designate apart from ‘emotion’?”90 It should be added that Diller’s answers to 
this question at the end of his paper (pp. 185-187) are revealing of his modernist bias in 
looking for a term like modern ‘emotion’ to capture fear, hope, joy, sadness in Medieval 
English. The point is precisely that the generic term is there but it is predicated on a 
completely different conceptual plane than modern ‘emotion’.91 But even in this form, the 
question invites a note: while it is perfectly legitimate to trace the antecedents of ‘emotion’, it 
has to be borne in mind (and I take Diller to be aware of this) that this enterprise is slightly 
                                                 
87 I am aware from his 2005 article that Diller published two more papers on the same issue, one in 
2002, and another in 2005 but I must confess that I could not get access to these publications. 
88 Diller, Ibid. p. 156. 
89 “[W]eyve thow joie, / dryf fro the drede, fleme thow hope, / ne lat no sorwe aproche = [avoid joy, / 
drive away fear, / put hope to flight, do not let sorrow approach] (that is to seyn, lat not thise foure 
passiouns overcomen the or blended [blind] the). = [avoid joy, / drive away fear, / put hope to flight, 
do not let sorrow approach] Quoted by Diller, Ibid. p. 164 from Boëthius, De Consolatione 
Philosophiae, Book I, m 7 (Chaucer’s translation). It should be noted that four passions listed are 
roughly those of the Stoic-Ciceronian tetrachord, cf. chapter II.1.3. 
90 Diller, Ibid. p. 156. 
91 As a consequence, I am also inclined to disagree with the upshot of the answer Diller gives to his 
concomitant second question: “If so, which words were used to satisfy that need?” 
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anachronistic. It is looking for something in history the conceptual bases of which had not 
existed yet: Diller’s “unashamedly modern” definition92 taken from the Trésor de la langue 
française (1994) is of course heavily laid with assumptions about the human mind and action 
and concerns ethical issues as well. Thus it is no wonder that Diller can find collective words, 
“superordinate categories”93 designating joy, fear, hope, sorrow, etc. in a collective sense 
such as passioun and affection but that, at the end of his paper, he is forced to conclude, in the 
form of another question, that there is no such collective word as ‘emotion’ in Middle 
English. 
 
Finally, we may ask why there was so little need for a term covering pleasant as 
well as unpleasant, morally approved as well as disapproved, active as well as 
passive emotions. A medievalist attempting an answer should be aware that he is 
skating on very thin ice indeed, but the risk seems worth taking. […] I would 
submit that when the human soul becomes a phenomenon to be studied and 
observed for its own sake (not only for the sake of its salvation), a new 
metaphorical vehicle becomes necessary which assimilates it to the category of 
natural phenomena. Perhaps the most telling contrast between the Middle Ages 
and the modern age is captured in the contrast between stirring and emotion: from 
movement caused by an external agent to movement coming ‘out of’ the moved 
object itself.94
 
This is perhaps another way of saying that ‘passion’ and ‘affection’ do not qualify for being 
‘emotion’ because the perspective in which they function as hyperonyms is completely 
different from the modern sense of ‘emotion’: they bring with themselves the Classical 
heritage of path  and passiones and the ethical connotations implicit in them and which is 
altogether different from those of the morally and ontologically more neutral ‘emotion’. In my 
view, and I think Diller’s conclusion points to this direction as well, a ‘pre-history of emotion’ 
can only reveal that there is no transhistorical continuity of ‘emotion’: neither of the word, nor 
of the concept implied in this metaphorical vehicle. Of course, people always had the kind of 
involuntary, evaluative reactions experienced simultaneously at the physical and the affective 
level and typically communicated by physical symptoms given in the definition cited by 
                                                 
92 “An involuntary, evaluative reaction which is experienced simultaneously at the physical and the 
affective level and which is typically communicated by physical symptoms.” Diller, Ibid. p. 156. 
93 Diller, Ibid. p. 171. 
94 Diller, Ibid. p. 186-187. (my emphasis, G.S.) 
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95Diller above.  But their designations and their metaphoric devices do have their history. And 
such a history is also decisive for the history of the care for the self partly because 
technologies of the self  are mainly but not exclusively based on discursive acts and partly 
because the very words and names that are used to describe phenomena relating to the human 
soul or mind are also means of structuring and labelling them and they entail decisions about 
whether they require or not control, whether they should become material of analysis and 
fields of application of precepts and maxims.96 In a way, the objective of the current study is 
to trace the emergence of the need for such new metaphorical vehicle or, rather, to look at it 
from the perspective of the semantic change of ‘passion’ proper, to detect when and why the 
former metaphorical vehicle of ‘passion’ ceases to function in the way it had done more or 
less coherently and continuously for two thousand or so years. But the exposition of this 
change requires the presentation of what is to change in more detail therefore I shall expose 
the major steps of the conceptual baggage of ‘passion’ in the chapter II. 
 A point that is of particular relevance for the present study is – and Diller rightly calls 
attention to this fact97 - that Michel de Montaigne may have been the first European writer to 
use ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense rather than a socio-political one. I think that this fact 
cannot be overestimated since it is here that - as I hope I will be able to show it in a chapter on 
Montaigne - the distinctively modern sense of ‘emotion’ is taking shape in the context of a 
highly original and epoch-making philosophical-literary introspection that is tinted with 
scepticism concerning the power of reason to regulate human affairs, whose author is 
informed by but also looks critically at Renaissance humanism and who has a somewhat laid-
back liberal Catholic and even fideist-conformist outlook at matters religious. I shall return to 
                                                 
95 There are of course nuances in this field as well as the growing body of literature on the history of 
emotions shows, cf. also Reading the Early Modern Passions. Essays in the Cultural History of 
Emotion, edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, in particular its “Introduction”; as well as The Social 
Construction of Emotions, edited by Rom Harre, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986; and “History of 
Emotions: Issues of Change and Impact” in Handbook of Emotions edited by Michael Lewis, Jeanette 
M. Haviland-Jones, New York, London: The Guilford Press, second ed. 2000.
96 I am adapting here the late Michel Foucault’s studies about the souci de soi as presented above in 
Chapter I.1.2. 
97 Diller, Ibid. p. 155. 
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this moment of semantic accommodation and its relationship to the sense of ‘passion’ in the 
chapter on Montaigne (III.3.). but here I would wish to pursue Diller’s tentative claim about 
the originality of Montaigne’s use of ‘emotion’. The word entered the English context through 
John Florio’s 1603 translation of the Essais of Montaigne and Florio himself feels obliged to 
apologise for what he considers as an “uncouth term”.98 His apology can be understood 
considering the fact that the word in English was brand new. There had been two prior 
recorded uses attested by the Oxford English Dictionary: one from 1579 and one from the 
same year as the publication of Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s Essays.99 Furthermore, his 
diagnosis of ‘emotion’ as an “uncouth term” and his subsequent apology for it is all the more 
understandable since neither of these uses of ‘emotion’ have the psychological sense that 
Florio, importing it from the French émotion, emotion and esmotion100 gives to it: the 
meaning of the 1579 use is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “political, social 
agitation; a tumult, popular disobedience”, the 1603 as “a moving out, migration, transference 
from one place to another”.101
Diller’s claim that Montaigne may have been the first European writer to have used 
‘esmotion’ in the psychological sense can also be indirectly supported by the fact that John 
Florio’s own Italian-English dictionary 102A Worlde of Wordes  published first in 1598 and 
republished augmented and dedicated to Queen Anna103 in 1611 (both in London) does not have an 
                                                 
98 Michel Montaigne. The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597. translated by John 
Florio, 1603. World's Classics edition, 3 volumes, London:  Frowde, 1904, “To the Curteous Reader” 
99 Of course, theoretically speaking, John Florio might have been familiar with the 1579 use of 
‘emotion’ (Fenton Guicciard. ii,: “There were… great stirres and emocions in Lombardye.”) when 
preparing his translation. He is unlikely to have known the 1603 occurrence in Knolles Hist. Turks 
(1621) 3 “The divers emotions of that people [the Turks].” 
100 The spelling varies in the Essais as usual in Early Modern texts. 
101 Quoted also by Hans-Jürgen Diller, Ibid. p. 155. Cf. also the slightly archaic-sounding Hungarian 
word felindulás that captures precisely this double sense of social agitation as well as individual 
psychological state. 
102 A Worlde of Wordes, Or Most copious, and exact Dictionarie in Italian and English 
103 Queen Anna’s New World of Words or Dictionarie of the Italian and English Tongues collected 
and newly much augmented by John Florio 
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104entry for emozione (Italian).  Had it existed in Italian at the time, and particularly in the new sense 
Montaigne was giving to it, Florio would probably have recorded it in his dictionary. The Worlde of 
Wordes does have an entry for (Italian) commotione that is defined by Florio as “commotion, an 
insurrection” which is the equivalent of the social-political sense of ‘emotion’.  I assume that Florio, 
who had translated Montaigne’s Essais in between the two editions of his Italian-English 
dictionary and he himself indicated the new sense of ‘emotion’ in his preface to the Essays 
(“To the curteous Reader”) would have been sensitive enough to detect in Italian emozione. 
Also, Florio recapitulates the Classical idiom about the ‘passions’ when he defines ‘Passio’ 
(Italian) as used for Christ’s passion; ‘Passionato’ (It.) as “passionate, perturbed in minde. 
Also given to some passion”; and ‘Passione’ (It.) as “a passion or perturbation of minde, a 
passion, a sufferance, a feeling, an accident or symptome concurring with some disease to 
distemper the minde or bodie”. All these sense are perfectly in line with the Classical heritage 
of ‘passion’. 
It does seem to be the case that Montaigne is indeed the first to use émotion in the 
psychological sense and it is then translated into English by John Florio in his 1603 publication of 
Montaigne’s Essays. However, one should not expect that such an innovation takes place very quickly, 
due to the publication of a single book. It is but one thing that certain ideas are gaining ground in the 
age and are expressed in certain books and – as we shall see in the subsequent chapters – in 
philosophical and theological debates of the period: they signal the emergence of “the need for such 
new metaphorical vehicle”105 to describe mental-affective phenomena. But the taking root of 
such innovations, the translation of such a need into concrete words that imply semantic 
                                                 
104 Modern edition: John Florio, A Worlde of Wordes (1598). Anglistica & Americana 114. 
Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1972. – I had access to the online version of the 1611 edition dedicated to 
Queen Anna: http://www.pbm.com/~lindahl/florio/all.pdf
105 I am adapting the expression used by Diller (2005) cited above. I wish to add, however, that the 
metaphorical vehicle itself was not entirely new: it is true that e-motion referring to movements within 
the soul (as opposed to the perspective of pathos that put the soul and body in a passive, “suffering” 
position, (cf. the etymology of pascho discussed in the chapter “‘Passion’: the Story of the OED”) 
entails a new metaphorical vehicle. But this vehicle itself was used by Latin authors in referring to the 
passions: animi motibus (‘mental emotions’ or ‘motions of the mind’) in Augustine, City of God, IX. 4 
and motus (‘motions’) City of God, XIV. 9. as well as passim cf. Chapter II.2.1. on St. Augustine. In 
my opinion, the real issue is why and when this metaphorical vehicle of ‘emotion’ did partly replace 
that other one implied in ‘passion’...  
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changes takes longer time. Add to this the fact that the Early Modern period accommodated 
semantic indeterminacy fairly easily allowing for different senses to live side by side and to 
occasionally coalesce into each other. A proof of this is that the old, Classical sense of passion 
dies hard and that the new sense of ‘emotion’ takes about a century to get widespread. The 
chart in Figure 2 below indicates the occurrences of ‘emotion’ in lexicons of the period. The 
fact that an entry ‘emotion’ starts to figure after 1600 indicates the need to define the word as 
its new meaning is taking shape.
 
Figure 2: ‘emotion’ in English 1450 – 1750 
Source: LEME (Lexicons of early Modern English) http://leme.library.utoronto.ca/ 
 
Thus French esmotion is defined in Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionary of the French and English 
Tongues (London, 1611) as “An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an 
agitation of the spirit, violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind.” In 
Thomas Blount, Glossographia or a Dictionary106 (London, 1656) emotion (Lat. emotio) is 
defined as “a stiring or moving forth.” In Edward Phillips, The New World of English 
                                                 
106 Glossographia: Or A Dictionary, Interpreting all such Hard Words, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, 
Italian, Spanish, French, Teutonick, Belgick, British or Saxon; as are now used in our refined English 
Tongue. Also the Terms of Divinity, Law, Physick, Mathematicks, Heraldry, Anatomy, War, Musick, 
Architecture; and of several other Arts and Sciences Explicated. With Etymologies, Definitions, and 
Historical Observations on the same. Very useful for all such as desire to understand what they read 
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107Words  (London, 1658) it is “a moving out, a stirring up, also trouble of mind”; in Elisha 
Coles, An English Dictionary108 (London, 1676) it is “a moving out, a stirring up, also trouble 
of mind”; and in John Kersey the younger, English Dictionary109 (London, 1702) ‘emotion’ is 
a “trouble of mind”. This enumeration of 17th century definition of ‘emotion’ shows that the 
sense is gradually shifting from a physiological sense (moving, stirring) closer to the Latin 
origin (movere) to what will become the psychological sense as (trouble of mind). I would 
rather not discuss such nuances as whether trouble of mind is fully psychological indeed or 
not (perhaps not yet), my point being rather that “trouble of mind” is, in fact, a synonym of 
‘passion’ as defined in dictionaries of the same period, for example the definition of Italian 
passione in A Worlde of Wordes (1598) of John Florio cited above. But cf. also John Baret, An 
Alveary or Triple Dictionary, in English, Latin, and French110 (London, 1574) where rage is a 
‘trouble of minde’, a ‘passion’; cf. also Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus Linguae Romanae et 
                                                 
107 The New World of English Words: Or, a Generall Dictionary: Containing the Interpretations of 
such hard words as are derived from other Languages; whether Hebrew, Arabick, Syriack, Greek, 
Latin, Italian, French, Spanish, British, Dutch, Saxon, &c. their Etymologies and perfect Definitions ... 
108An English Dictionary: Explaining The difficult Terms that are used in Divinity, Husbandry, 
Physick, Phylosophy, Law, Navigation, Mathematicks, and other Arts and Sciences. Containing Many 
Thousands of Hard Words (and proper names of Places) more than are in any other English 
Dictionary or Expositor. Together With The Etymological Derivation of them from their proper 
Fountains, whether Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, or any other Language. In a Method more 
comprehensive, than any that is extant 
109 English Dictionary: Or, a Complete  Collection Of the Most Proper and Significant Words, 
Commonly used in the Language; With a Short and Clear Exposition of Difficult Words and Terms of 
Art. The whole digested into Alphabetical Order; and chiefly designed for the benefit of Young 
Scholars, Tradesmen, Artificers, and the Female Sex, who would learn to spell truely; being so fitted 
to every Capacity, that it may be a continual help to all that want an Instructer 
110 An Alvearie Or Triple Dictionarie, in Englishe, Latin, and French: Very profitable for all such as 
be desirous of any of those three Languages. Also by the two Tables in the ende of this booke, they 
may contrariwise, finde the most necessary Latin or French wordes, placed after the order of an 
Alphabet, whatsoeuer are to be founde in any other Dictionarie: and so to turne them backwardes 
againe into Englishe when they reade any Latin or French Aucthors, & doubt of any harde worde 
therein 
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111Britannicae  (London, 1584) where Lat. perturbatio is defined as “A troublous passion, 
affection, or motion of mind: perturbation, trouble, disturbance, disquieting, vexation.”; also 
in Randall Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues: 
 
“Passion: f. Passion, perturbation, trouble, or affliction; also, a motion, 
disposition, inclination, or affection, of the mind; also, an accident, or symtome 
concurring with some disease to th'offence, or distemperature, of the bodie.” 
 
In Edward Phillips, The New World of English Words (London, 1658), the sense of ’passion’ 
is both the Classical “suffering, also an affection of the mind,” but he also adds: “also in 
Poems and Romances it is more peculiarly taken for the passion of love” (italics mine) this 
latter sense reflecting already the meaning after the “semantic shift” of ‘passion’ towards 
‘amorous love’. As we shall see below and in Chapter III.3 (on Montaigne), such parallel 
meanings are not at all exceptional. The increasing dominance of “amorous love” as the 
meaning of “passion” by the early 17th century (which is, of course, not to say, that “love” 
was not part of the meaning of “passion”, as a hyperonim, before) builds on the “lineage of 
love” as it evolved from the Platonic tradition of the love of the beautiful and the “ladder of 
love” (toward intellectual love), and Petrarcan patterns of yearing modulated by the English 
sonnet tradition. 
The broad structure of my argument is the following: the meaning of the word 
‘passion’ undergoes a significant change between the late 16th and the early 17th century 
(roughly from 1570s to 1610s). This is also a period that produces the highest density in the 
turnout of the word in Early Modern lexicons with the most sustained peak around 1590s-
1610s. See the chart in Figure 3 below. 
 
                                                 
111 Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae tam accurate congestus, vt nihil penè in eo desyderari 
possit, quod vel Latinè complectatur amplissimus Stephani Thesaurus, vel Anglicè, toties aucta Eliotae 
Bibliotheca: opera & industria Thomae Cooperi Magdalenensis. ... Accessit dictionarium historicum 
& poëticum propria vocabula virorum, mulierum, sectarum, populorum, vrbium, montium, & 
caeterorum locorum complectens, & in his iucundissimas & omnium cognitione dignissimas historias. 
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Figure 3: ‘passion’ in English 1450 – 1750 
112Source: LEME (Lexicons of Early Modern English) http://leme.library.utoronto.ca/
 
The definitions in these dictionaries still reflect the Classical sense of passion and the high 
number of occurrences in dictionaries of the period may be indicative of the general necessity 
to engage with such ‘passions’, to control them in a perspective of governance. This broad, 
technical sense of ‘passion’ denotes its rich Classical heritage both as  
                                                 
112 I am aware that LEME by its focus on lexicons of Earl Modern English does not give a full picture 
of the use of ‘passion’ in the period. I hope to compensate this partiality by complementing it with the 
findings of Tissari (2003) and by cross-checking it with the data given in the Oxford English 
Dictionary. However, the advantage of LEME is that Early Modern lexicons characteristically do not 
feel the need to define the Biblical sense of ‘passion’ as in ‘Passion of Christ’, although there are some 
exceptions. Thus the turnout of ‘Passion of Christ’, that is likely to be the most frequent and 
semantically unchanged usage of ‘passion’ in the period, does not, in a way, distort the picture. (The 
expression ‘distort’ in this sentence is meant in the sense that it does not detract attention from the 
other senses of ‘passion’ where semantic change is taking place.) Thus the biased statistics finds its 
merit and legitimacy. Another advantage of using lexicons for tracking changes in meaning that one is 
not reliant on interpreting the context (as in narrative or poetic texts) for determining the meaning of a 
given word. Such interpretations can be difficult and even unsure and have to cope with some 
vagueness in the meaning. (Cf. Diller’s remarks in this sense, Ibid. p. 160-161.) 
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i. a collective term referring to the Aristotelian-Thomist eleven passions and/or the 
Ciceronian-Augustinian tetrachord of passions (where ‘passion’ is mostly meant as a 
condition of being acted upon or affected by external agency); and 
ii. involving – due especially to the Stoic and neo-Stoic influence – negative theologico-
moral associations such as perturbatio animi 
(trouble/vexation/perturbation/disturbance of the mind), vitium, (fault, defect, vice) 
and morbi (relating to disease). 
 
This broad, technical sense started to gradually gave way from 1600 to a different sense of 
‘passion’. This new sense did not exclude the broader, technical sense until the 19th century 
but the latter became increasingly confined to scholarly discourse113 and rearrangements 
began to take place even there in the late 17th century.  The new sense of ‘passion’ was partly 
more limited in the sense that it did not function any more as a collective term referring to the 
four or the eleven passions. It retained its characteristic reference to anger/choler with some 
changes in its moral evaluations114 but, even more importantly, it came to refer to ‘amorous 
feeling’, ‘passionate love’, even ‘mutuall affection’ understood as sympathy, fellow-
feeling115. But there is also another shift at work that could be described as a move away from 
a substantive (and collective) noun (a hyperonym) that refers to certain states of the mind or 
soul to an adverbial sense signifying a certain (excessive) level of any mental state. To put it 
briefly: from what to very. For example, this sense can be detected in Randall Cotgrave, A 
Dictionary of the French and English Tongues (1611) in the entry, ‘Ardamment’ (“Ardently, 
hotly, feruently; earnestly, eagrely, vehemently; with great heat; passion, or desire.”) where 
                                                 
113 Thus, for example, Thomas Wright, The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601, 1604, 1620); 
Nicolas Coffeteau, A table of humane passions (1621) translated into English by Edmund Grimeston;  
Edward Reynold, A Treaties of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man (London, 1640) 
114 For a thorough consideration of this issue and its relationship to Renaissance drama cf. Gordon 
Braden, Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition. Anger’s Privilege, New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1985. The subtitle of the book refers to King Lear 2.2.69-70.: “CORNWALL: 
You beastly knave, know you no reverence? / KENT: Yes, Sir, but anger hath a priviledge.” 
115 Randle Cotgrave, A Dictionary of the French and English Tongues (1611) “Sympathie: f. 
Sympathie; a symbolizing; naturall consent, or combination; mutuall passion, affection, disposition; a 
fellow-feeling.” 
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116‘passion’ is a quasi-synonym of ‘great heat’.  In his Defence of Poesie (1595), Sir Philip 
Sidney writes of “passsionat Sonets”: “They say the Lirick is larded with passionat Sonets, 
the Elegiack weeps the want of his mistresse, and that even to the Heroical, Cupid hath 
ambitiously climed.” Similarly, the adverb ‘passionately’ is given in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as:  
 
In a passionate manner. 1. With passion or intensity of feeling; enthusiastically, 
ardently; †zealously, with zealous attachment (obs.). [Earliest record in 1590] † 2. 
With sorrowful emotion, sadly. Obs. [Earliest record in 1599.] 3. With angry 
feeling, wrathfully; with heat. [Earliest record in 1665]. 
 
While the shift to ‘amorous love’ is a narrowing of the word, this “adverbial shift” could be 
characterized more as a loosening from the substantive meaning. The adverbial shift could be 
described as a synecdoche-like change where a part of the original substantive sense (and one 
that was marginal in the tradition), namely the excessive character of the mental states 
referred to came to predominate. The rhetoric figure best describing this change is a 
synecdoche (pars pro toto) whereas, the other change, of narrowing of the word could be seen 
as a totum pro parte synecdoche: one of the passions, namely ‘amorous love’, replacing the 
collective sense. 
 But of course this semantic shift did not mean that the Classical collective concept of 
the passion ceases to exist from the 17th century. In fact, there are numerous treatises on the 
passions in English as well as in French that continue in the same tradition concerning the 
their taxonomy. As late as 1841, Frederick A. Rauch in his Psychology still uses the Stoic 
tetrachord of passions as pleasure, pain, hope and fear as the foundational emotions from 
which compound ones arise. The end of the traditional catalogues of the passions was 
signalled by William James in his Principles of Psychology (1890) when he argued that  
 
…the merely descriptive literature of emotions is one of the most tedious parts of 
psychology. And not only is it tedious, but you feel that its subdivisions are to a 
                                                 
116 Similarly, in ‘fouge’, RANDALL, Ibid. 
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great extent either fictitious or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are 
a sham.117
 
Parallel to this process, the new meaning of ‘emotion’ is emerging that will ultimately replace 
the substantive, collective sense of ‘passions’ as a hyperonym for the set of ‘troubles of the 
mind’ ‘passions’ referred to. The emergence of the need for the new metaphorical vehicle and 
its semantic realisation in ‘emotion’ was a relatively slow process taking about two hundred 
years from 1600 to the 19th century that allowed for different senses of both ‘passion’ and 
‘emotion’ to coexist side by side as the 17th century examples for ‘emotion’ given above 
demonstrate. I believe that this fact does not put in doubt the existence and the scope of the 
semantic shift (both of ‘passion’ and of ‘emotion’ since these are concomitant phenomena) 
but rather, it signals the importance of the change and its truly watershed character. In chapter 
III.3, on Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s Essais, I shall address the issue of this difficult 
transition by way of tracking part of its textual history and by evoking certain theoretical and 
methodological problems it raises such as the polysemy of words, the slightly anachronistic 
nature of fixed-sense word definitions, early modern lexicographers practice, etc. 
This study is based on the premise that the semantic changes described above are 
symptomatic of underlying changes in ethical-moral as well as theological and mental 
attitudes that crystallise in the Early Modern context of late-Renaissance humanism as well as 
Protestantism with its Augustinian bent. In mapping this systematic pattern of beliefs and 
attitudes that determine and are intersected with changes in the ‘care for the self’ and semantic 
change, the intercultural context of Classical – Christian encounter has to be taken into 
account, with the Neo-Stoicism of the late 16th and early 17th century being a particular case 
in point. Inevitably, my study will not be able to give a full account of the elements that 
contributed to and underpinned the semantic change in this sense. The reason for this is that 
practically everything in the period can be seen as a cause of or contributing to this change. 
There are, however, certain configurations, so to say, where elements of the very change can 
be traced (Montaigne and Montaigne/Florio) or the import of the ongoing debates hinges 
precisely on those issues that may determine the sense of the semantic change. Therefore, I 
shall seek to expose the possible motivations of these changes by referring it to theological-
                                                 
117 William James, Principles of Psychology, XXV. “The Emotions” Cf. also his classic essay, “What 
is an Emotion?” (1884) various reprints, for e.g. The Nature of Emotion edited by Magda Arnold, 
London: Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968. 
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moral debates of the period (in particular the controversy among neo-Stoics and Christian-
Humanists about the role of the passions) I shall try to detect the changes on the move in the 
1603 Florio translation of Montaigne’s Essais into English. Besides the evident originality of 
Montaigne, the polyglot background and acute sensibility of John Florio to semantic problems 
invites special attention to his English Montaigne and to the linguistic accommodations he 
offers as eminent markers of the period. As an English translation of a French author (by 
someone of Italian origins) the case of The Essayes is also another illustration to how 
intercultural contexts and transfers can trigger off and contribute to new developments. 
Rather than an ingredient of the semantic change proper, the Bacon’s adaptation of the 
Ciceronian cultura animi, with some Aristotelian adjustments, shows how care for the self 
can receive its humanist adaptation.
I would like to emphasize however, that these explorations of the theme in different 
contexts and with different authors do not, either taken individually, or considered 
collectively, wish to give a full explanation to the phenomenon under consideration (namely 
the change of the meaning of ‘passion’) in terms of a strict cause-and-effect relationship. 
While my working assumption is that this semantic change is motivated by changes in moral, 
psychological, and theological assumptions and outlook in the period – and particularly 
around 1600 as the dates of first appearances of the word used in this sense as well as of first 
publications of the works under consideration indicate – these do not fully determine such 
change. Individual human inventions – for example that of Montaigne – that may not be fully 
reducible to historical cause-and-effect relationship add to this picture. For these reasons, I 
prefer to talk about Early Modern configurations in approaching the topic of the semantic 
change where configuration would suggest that the elements under consideration are the 
necessary conditions for the change but they do not fully explain it. 
There is also another aspect of my study relevant to this point that has been mentioned 
before but it should be emphasized in this context as well. Since the direction of the change in 
the meaning of ‘passion’ is a move away from its technical, Classical sense (be it a narrowing 
of its semantic, a shift of focus or an accentuation of certain aspects), it is necessary to assess 
the elements and composition of this Classical sense and to look at major steps of its 
development. This will set the scene for the Early Modern debate on the ‘passions’. Therefore 
I shall endeavour, in the next part of this study to present the major steps of the heritage of 
‘passion’, starting with the initial thematisation of path  in Ancient Greece (Plato and 
Aristotle), continuing with the radicalisation of the position in the Stoic teaching of the 
apatheia of the sage, (Chrysippus in particular), and Christian accommodations of the Stoic 
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ideal of apatheia (Augustine) in order to arrive, finally to the re-negotiation of these trends 






II. THE CLASSICAL HERITAGE OF ‘PASSION’ 
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‘Passion’ is not an innocent word but a term charged with a long and rich history 
already prior to the 16th century accumulating and connoting several layers of invested 
meaning of which the Early Modern authors were keenly aware. As the word could never 
become a purely descriptive concept, it carried a specific weight posing an anthropological 
and moral issue and calling for resolutions. The weight of authority and influence of the 
various Classical and Christian authors varied but familiarity with their teachings was 
widespread among the cultural elite and, to a lesser degree, among the less scholarly-minded 
readership with at least a grammar-school education. Therefore it is necessary to examine, 
even if in a rather summary fashion, the conceptual baggage ‘passion’ brings with it into 
Early Modern discourses. Of course, it is impossible to represent and assess within the 
confines of this study the full baggage involving the entire history of the concept. But the 
traditions that had the most weight and influence in the Early Modern period need to be 
presented briefly. This shall entail the exposition of the main tenets of Plato, of Aristotle, of 
the Stoics, and, from among Christian authors, Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas Aquinas 
concerning the passions. As all these traditions are present, in some form or another, in the 
Early Modern context, this chapter proposes a panorama of the Early Modern intellectual 
landscape with regard to the passions. From the perspective of the intercultural approach, the 
Early Modern articulation of the passions emerges as the result of the ongoing interactions 
between different cultural and philosophical traditions both entailing and proposing to the 
individual different practices and forms of care for the self. The coexistence and integration of 
Classical and Christian traditions in the Early Modern period is a millennial process by then 
that had started in the Greek-Hellenistic and Roman context in which the New Testament had 
been produced. In their commentaries on the Bible and other doctrinal works, the Church 
Fathers also relied on elements of Stoic philosophy as they built on the authority of Virgil and 
Seneca. For a person who completed at least grammar-school education in the late 16th 
century the problems and vocabulary of both of these traditions made sense and contained 
relevant meaning for his or her moral action and spiritual life. Indeed, the interaction between 
these traditions in the moral reflection of the period is a key component in understanding the 
Early Modern senses of ‘passion’. The diversity of origins, as well as the need for integration, 
became more evident in the European Renaissance as the return to the works of the Greco-
Latin Classical authors was confronting European culture with what was, in a way, outside it. 
This confrontation and self-interrogation lead to the formulation of new cultural codes and 
practices whose effects reach even to our own times. Therefore an assessment of the 
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developments taking place within the Early Modern context requires an overview of the 
period’s doxa about the passions. 
One of the most well-known cases of a literary character feeling passion in Classical 
literature is probably Achilles’ wrath in the opening pages of the Iliad. As an epilogue to 
centuries of meditations and exercises on and against anger, this début of Greek epical 
literature announces a theme of millennial importance to the culture of antiquity, to 
Christianity and to the English Renaissance as well. George Chapman (1559?-1634), in his 
Dedicatory Epistle to his translation of Homer’s Odysseys (1611) pairs the Iliad and the 
Odyssey in the following way: 
 
And that your Lordship may in his face take view of his mind, the first words of 
his Iliads is [...] wrath; the first word of his Odysseys [...] man: contracting in 
either word his each work's proposition. In one predominant perturbation; in the 
other overruling wisdom. In one the body's fervour and fashion of outward 
fortitude to all possible height of heroical action; in the other the mind's inward, 
constant, and unconquered empire, unbroken, unaltered, with any most insolent 
and tyrannous infliction.118
 
 The dying Achilles acknowledges that gall or anger is a source of strife among gods and 
mortals. Although it rises up in the soul of man as smoke, the taste of it is sweeter than honey: 
I wish that strife would vanish away from among the gods and mortals, 
and gall, which makes a man grow angry for all his great mind, 
that gall of anger swarms like smoke inside of a man’s heart 
119and becomes a thing sweeter to him by far than the dripping of honey.
                                                 
 
118 From “The Epistle Dedicatory” to the Earl of Somerset in: The Odysseys of Homer, translated 
according to the Greek by George Chapman; with introduction and notes by Richard Hooper, London: 
J.R. Smith, (1857). Chapman’s description of predominant perturbation is already tainted with the 
Platonic sense of the irascible (thumos) part of the soul, of which more below. Although the “Epistle 
Dedicatory” goes on to explain why Homer’s Odyssey is “preferred to his Iliads”, the heroic values of 
Achilles – his wrath notwithstanding or even included – are seen in positive terms by Chapman. The 
obvious proof of this is that his 1598 Preface to the "Seaven Bookes of the Iliades of Homere, Prince 
of Poets, &c." both small 4tos. "printed by John Windet, and are to be sold at the signe of the Crosse-
keyes neare Paules Wharffe." dedicated to Lord Essex, addresses his patron as "the most honored now 
living instance of the Achilleian virtues." 
119 Homer, Iliad, XVIII. 107-110. translated by Richmond Lattimore in The Iliad of Homer translated 
with an Introduction by Richmond Lattimore, Chicago & London, 1951. Referred to also in Tad 
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For the development of anger already within the Homeric oeuvre it is interesting to see 
Ulysses as the symbol of a civilisation aspiring to self-mastery, returning to his own palace 
and feeling anger but imposing a self-discipline on himself: “Patience, my soul” only to carry 
out his vengeance, calculated and cold, with all the more efficiency. As the rather 
undifferentiated Homeric and pre-Classical senses of the word unfold, the pre-Socratic 
philosophers form a negative judgement on pathos/ :  
 
It is hard to contend against passion, for whatever it craves it buys with its life. 
(Heraclitus120) 
 
Medicine heals diseases of the body, wisdom frees the soul from the passions. 
(Democritus121) 
 
The concern about the passions or emotions (path ) and on whether they should be moderated 
(metropatheia) or actually eradicated (apatheia) is already present with the Presocratics and 
the philosophy of both Plato and Aristotle have to come to terms with this issue. From Plato 
to Aristotle, from Theophrastus to Menander, but even more in Stoicism, the presence of 
reflections on self-mastery in face of anger becomes symptomatic. It has to be stated at the 
outset of the subsequent presentation of the theme of the passions in Plato, Aristotle and 
Stoicism, that, in the perspective of a history of ‘passion’, there is a marked contrast between 
Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions on the one hand and the Stoic position. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Brennan, “Stoic Moral Psychology” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, edited by Brad 
Inwood, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 276. 
120 http://evans-experientialism.freewebspace.com/heraclitus02.htm
121 The Presocratic Philosophers: a Critical History with a Selection of Texts, by G. S. Kirk and J. E. 
Raven, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.  
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II. 1. 1. Platonic Containments: Alliances and Canalisations 
 
Plato is often credited for a strict dualism of soul and body where soul is the thinking, 
rational self in direct opposition to the passions, pleasures and sensations associated with the 
body. But this extreme dualism, present in the Phaedo, is not his final word on the issue. In 
The Republic (Book IV)122 Plato proceeds from the assumption that whenever there is a 
conflict of intentions arising in the subject, these differences are the result of different forces 
within the soul. Upon close examination, and as a response to the logical problem caused by 
the existence of the conflicts within the soul, Socrates and his interlocutor establish that there 
are three different forces each having its own object: the appetitive or concupiscible part 
(epithumia), the irascible part (thumos) and the rational part (nous). To its appetitive part are 
ascribed the bodily desires; the irascible part is the passionate element in virtue of which we 
feel anger, fear, etc. What distinguishes the irascible (thumos) part from the appetitive part 
(epithumia) is that it can be an ally of the rational, controlling part (nous) in subjugating the 
appetites, however, its impetuousness can also be a danger to the rule of reason. For Plato, 
passionate impulses are an occasion of conflict within the individual between different parts 
of the soul. The differentiation between the irrational part of the soul into thumos and 
epithumia opens the possibility of a positive affective force that can be the ally of reason. The 
problem of anger receives a theoretical disposition in Plato’s philosophy: as anger belongs to 
the irascible part of the soul (thumos), it can be an ally of the higher, rational part when a 
conflict emerges with the lower, appetitive part. The tripartite division of the soul comes in to 
explain the existence of conflict between passion and appetite, for example, when a man is 
angry with that in himself which prompts him to do something shameful. This thumos is an 
inner force that rouses Homeric warriors to action and is synonymous with being ambitious, 
competitive123, living for victory and honour. It is distinguished from the merely physical, 
                                                 
122 For the following discussion cf. Plato, The Republic, Book IV. 436-444. Also Republic, 580d – 
581b and Timaios, 69c-71e in Plato in Twelve Volumes, with an English translation by R. G. Bury, 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; William Heinemann: London, 1984. Quotations 
from Plato are from this edition unless indicated otherwise. 
123 Plato, Republic, 9.7. 581a-b5. Cf. also Gordon Braden, Ibid, pp. 11ff 
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124bodily appetites by its indifference to pain and death but it is in itself non-rational  and is 
concerned with being better rather than with being good. The combative instinct of the thumos 
can be an ally of reason in the party politics of the soul.125 The radical dualism of the Phaedo 
gives way to a strategy of canalisations of psychic powers through alliances among the 
different parts of the soul and within the soul. Instead of a strict dualism between soul and 
body (where passions would be directly opposed to reason), there is the possibility of 
containment of passions. But since passions are not rational, the task of virtue is to lead 
passions towards the rational part. Also, by reinforcing the rationally-motivated desires, it is 
possible to consolidate the domination of the rational part of the soul by making the different 
forces coincide. This is why beauty can be a means to refine and purify the thumos of the 
guardians whose reason is capable of dominating their lower desires but whose reason is yet 
enmeshed in agonistic conflicts of honour and glory.126
This dichotomy and tension within the irrational part of the soul is also represented in 
the Platonic myth of the winged chariot where the two horses of the harness may evoke the 
irascible and the appetitive parts, while the coachman may represent reason. If the two horses 
are oriented towards the same goal, the coachman will certainly be taken away in the wrong 
direction. The passionate horse is a clean, upstanding creature which follows the guide of 
reason, whereas its fellow horse is a shaggy, recalcitrant beast which tries to drag the chariot 
down from its heavenly course. 
 
Suppose that a man thinks he has done a wrong to another, the nobler he is the 
less able is he to feel indignant at any suffering, such as hunger, or cold, or any 
other pain which the injured person may inflict upon him --these he deems to be 
just, and, as I say, his anger refuses to be excited by them.  
     True, he said.  
     But when he thinks that he is the sufferer of the wrong, then he boils and 
chafes, and is on the side of what he believes to be justice; and because he 
suffers hunger or cold or other pain he is only the more determined to persevere 
and conquer. His noble spirit will not be quelled until he either slays or is slain; 
or until he hears the voice of the shepherd, that is, reason, bidding his dog bark 
no more. […] You remember that passion or spirit appeared at first sight to be a 
                                                 
124 Republic, 3.18. 411d. Cf. G. Braden, ibidem. 
125 Republic, 4.15. 440 b,e; 5.13, 465d. Cf. G. Braden, ibidem 
126 Cf. Republic, 3. 400e, 402a. 
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kind of desire, but now we should say quite the contrary; for in the conflict of the 
soul spirit is arrayed on the side of the rational principle.127
 
Virtue is thus both a question of knowledge and a result of the balancing of the respective 
energies of the soul in order to orient them, under the supremacy of reason, towards the right 
action. 
The tripartite structure as solution to these conflicts within the soul also indicates that 
there is a natural hierarchical relationship among the parts because what is at steak in this 
conflict is the mastery of the self and the recognition that the rational part is more worthy to 
command than any other. Thus the soul is divided into two main parts, one superior 
(logisticon), the other inferior (alogisticon). In the Timaeus a new aspect is given to this 
division within the perspective of the origin of the world and of human beings. Here too, 
epithumia and thumos form the lower parts of the soul and are qualified as mortal in strong 
opposition to the rational, eternal part that is located in the head. The inferior part is located in 
the chest (passion) and in the belly (appetite) and it has its own principle of movement with its 
own dynamic.128 This gives a psychic visibility to passionate phenomena: they are not 
excluded from the psyche (as they will be in the case of the Stoics). Thus the assignment of 
                                                 
127 Republic, 440c-d (italics mine) Cf. also Plato, Republic, 439e – 440a (italics mine): “Then let us 
finally determine that there are two principles existing in the soul. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it 
a third, or akin to one of the preceding? Then we may fairly assume that they are two, and that they 
differ from one another; the one with which man reasons, we may call the rational principle of the 
soul, the other, with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other 
desire, may be termed the irrational or appetitive, the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions? Yes, 
he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin 
to one of the preceding? I should be inclined to say -- akin to desire. Well, I said, there is a story which 
I remember to have heard, and in which I put faith. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, 
coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies 
lying on the ground at the place of execution. He felt a desire to see them, and also a dread and 
abhorrence of them; for a time he struggled and covered his eyes, but at length the desire got the better 
of him; and forcing them open, he ran up to the dead bodies, saying, Look, ye wretches, take your fill 
of the fair sight.  
I have heard the story myself, he said. The moral of the tale is, that anger at times goes to war with 
desire, as though they were two distinct things.” 
128 Cf. Timaeus, 70a-71b. 
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different parts of the soul to different parts of the body has more of a metaphorical function 
because the body is not the origin of any kind of soul. These correspondences between bodily 
parts and parts of the soul inaugurate a certain physiology of passions that will have a long 
career passing through Galen to Descartes and including also the theory of the humours so 
important in the Renaissance. The soul is defined in Phaedrus as a principle of movement129 
and it has the source of its own movement within it. The determination of an element of the 
soul as the principle of passions also implies that passions are not of bodily origin even if they 
arise on the occasion of the body. If they are left without the surveillance of the rational part 
they can cause disturbances both in the individual and in the polis. This double perspective or 
analogy between the individual psychic level and the public-political sphere inaugurates130 
and runs through Plato’s discussion of the passions and their containment in The Republic. 
The respective parts of the soul correspond to respective layers of society with differing ways 
of life making up the polis. Just as harmony in the state is the result of a balance and hierarchy 
among the three classes (artisans, soldiers, and guardians), so it is with the categories of the 
psychology of the individual. Harmony and justice of both the soul and of the society are thus 
closely related: 
 
Why, because temperance is unlike courage and wisdom, each of which resides 
in a part only, the one making the State wise and the other valiant; not so 
temperance, which extends to the whole, and runs through all the notes of the 
scale, and produces a harmony of the weaker and the stronger and the middle 
class, whether you suppose them to be stronger or weaker in wisdom or power or 
numbers or wealth, or anything else. Most truly then may we deem temperance 
                                                 
129 Cf. Phaedrus, 245c – 249b.  
130 Cf. Republic, 429b – 435d in particular 434d –435a: “First let us complete the old investigation, 
which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice 
on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual. That larger 
example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing 
well that in the good State justice would be found. Let the discovery which we made be now applied to 
the individual --if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will 
come back to the State and have another trial of the theory. The friction of the two when rubbed 
together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then 
revealed we will fix in our souls.” 
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to be the agreement of the naturally superior and inferior, as to the right to rule 
of either, both in states and individuals.131
 
When such harmony is broken and there is disorder in the soul it leads to vices. A link is 
thereby established in the Platonic heritage between passions and vices on the one hand 
and health and disease on the other hand. 
  
And now, I said, injustice has to be considered.  
     Clearly.  
     Must not injustice be a strife which arises among the three principles --a 
meddlesomeness, and interference, and rising up of a part of the soul against the 
whole, an assertion of unlawful authority, which is made by a rebellious subject 
against a true prince, of whom he is the natural vassal, -- what is all this 
confusion and delusion but injustice, and intemperance and cowardice and 
ignorance, and every form of vice?  
     Exactly so.  
     And if the nature of justice and injustice be known, then the meaning of 
acting unjustly and being unjust, or, again, of acting justly, will also be perfectly 
clear?  
     What do you mean? he said.  
     Why, I said, they are like disease and health; being in the soul just what 
disease and health are in the body.  
     How so? he said.  
     Why, I said, that which is healthy causes health, and that which is unhealthy 
causes disease.  
     Yes.  
     And just actions cause justice, and unjust actions cause injustice?  
     That is certain.  
     And the creation of health is the institution of a natural order and government 
of one by another in the parts of the body; and the creation of disease is the 
production of a state of things at variance with this natural order?  
     True.  
     And is not the creation of justice the institution of a natural order and 
government of one by another in the parts of the soul, and the creation of 
injustice the production of a state of things at variance with the natural order?  
     Exactly so, he said.  
     Then virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice the 
disease and weakness and deformity of the same?  
     True.  
     And do not good practices lead to virtue, and evil practices to vice?  
132     Assuredly.
                                                 
131 Republic, 432a 
132 Republic, 444b – 444e 
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The links between health and disease on the one hand and vices and virtues on the other hand, 
as well as the idea of governance within the soul in analogy with that of society will become 
key-words of both Stoic and Christian doctrines. As we shall see, these elements will have 
important developments and repercussions in both Stoicism and Christianity with differing 
ramifications. Plato’s analogy between the psychic and the political make-up implies, 
however, that just as in society there can be different forms of life with differing objectives, in 
a similar fashion, the soul too can be home to contesting forces that may be at war but have, 
nevertheless, rights of citizenship – to stretch the political analogy a step further. There are 
two adjectives in particular that Plato uses in the Timaeus to characterise the passions: the 
pathe are  / deina and  / anagkaia: dreadful (or formidable) and inevitable. In 
the overall structure of the soul they can be canalised towards the higher, rational parts, their 
energy can be used as power, in particular that of the irascible part (thumos). 
 Plato gives a rather graphic account of such a situation in Laws, Book VI. The 
Athenian stranger describes how “with men [rather all humans] all things depend on a 
threefold need and desire”133. These are enumerated as food, drink and lust, the most 
vehement among them, and Plato characterizes the state in which one is when overcome by 
these needs as “three morbid states” (  ). The word  / noséma and its 
derivative used by Plato here and also in the Symposium134 means ‘disease’ on the first place 
and has the metaphoric sense of ‘passion, vice’ as well as of ‘any grievous affliction’135 The 
                                                 
133 Plato, Laws 782E – 783A in Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. X. with an English translation by R. G. 
Bury, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts; William Heinemann: London, 1984, p. 
492-495. 
134 Cf. Plato, Symposium, 207A, where the context is specifically the “disease of Love”, that “awful 
state” (  )  into which all animals fall. Being in the grip of this sexual desire is 
qualified as . Here, I follow the translation of Alexander Nehamas and Paul Woodruff in 
Plato, Complete Works, edited, with Introduction and Notes by John M. Cooper, Hackett Publishing 
Company: Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1997, p. 490. “What do you think causes love and desire, 
Socrates? Don’t you see what an awful state a wild animal is in when it wants to reproduce? Footed 
and winged animals alike are plagued by the disease of Love.” 
135 Cf. A Greek-English Lexicon, compiled by Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, Clarendon 
Press: Oxford, New York, 1996 (18431), entry “ ” p. 1181. 
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136Athenian stranger suggests how to check and canalise  these three desires, “morbid states” 
towards the supreme good: by “means of the three greatest forces - fear, law and true 
reasoning - reinforced by the Muses and the Gods of Games, so as to quench thereby their 
increase and inflow.”137 Basically all the elements of a long tradition of Classical, Christian as 
well as Christian-Humanist tradition of checking and canalising of the passions are there: fear 
(of punishment), Law, and logos understood both as truth and as right reasoning, the role of 
the Arts and Humanities, and even of a divine help and possible intervention. 
The hallmark of the Platonic conception of the passions is the idea that the soul is not a 
monolithic entity where the rule of only one force is possible or even desirable. There is an 
interior conflict within the soul that has to be handled by the higher faculties and according to 
a hierarchy. For Plato, the hierarchy of the three parts of the soul is also open to transversal 
forces such as love (eros) that can be canalised towards the higher rational part (logisticon). In 
the true philosopher, who is a lover of wisdom, all parts of the soul conspire together for a 
united good. Thus eros, inasmuch as it can link and bridge the rational and irrational parts, 
can become a unifying force.138 Although love (eros) is closely connected with the body, this 
passion, because of its moving force, becomes an invaluable means for grasping the truth. 
Following the ascending path of eros one can reach the Ideas: from the love of physical 
beauty to the charm of more noble objects and then to the love of Beauty and the idea of 
Beauty itself. Eros can bridge the gap between mortality and immortality, between the 
sensible and the intelligible and it is retained and valorised as a psychic force that can have its 
place even in the rational part. This approval of passion inasmuch as it is oriented towards the 
desire of the absolute, intelligible good is one of the hallmarks of Platonic philosophy and has 
a great impact in the Augustinian understanding of Christian doctrine (see below in chapter 
II.2.1.) as well as in Neo-Platonic thought in the Renaissance.  
                                                 
136 Cf. E. R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational, University of California Press: Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, and London, 1951. Dodds claims that in the context of the Republic, “the passions are no 
longer seen [unlike in the Phaedo] as an infection of extraneous origin, but as a necessary part of the 
life of the mind as we know it, and even a source of energy, like Freud’s libido, which can be 
‘canalised’ either towards sensuous or towards intellectual activity.” p. 213. 
137 Laws, 783A, p. 495. in R. G. Bury’s translation. Italics mine, G.S. 
138 Cf. Banquet, 191d where love (eros) is presented as a restoring, remedying power that heals human 
nature and as the desire for the original fullness. 
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In case of an open conflict between irrational and rational forces, Plato recommends 
temperance and a form of self-mastery to control the irrational parts.139 This latter aspect will 
receive particular emphasis (even to the point of excluding the other, canalising model of 
treating the passions) in the Stoic approach to the passions. 
 
II. 1. 2. Aristotelian Adjustments 
 
 
Aristotle discusses the passions in many different contexts. In the Metaphysics, pathos 
is defined  
(1) as a quality in respect of which a thing can be altered […] (2) The already 
actualized alterations. (3) Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and 
                                                 
139 “Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is 
curiously enough implied in the saying of 'a man being his own master' and other traces of the same 
notion may be found in language. No doubt, he said. There is something ridiculous in the expression 
'master of himself'; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes 
of speaking the same person is denoted.  
     Certainly. The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse 
principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; 
and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, 
which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse -- in this case he is blamed 
and is called the slave of self and unprincipled.  
     Yes, there is reason in that.  
     And now, I said, look at our newly created State, and there you will find one of these two 
conditions realised; for the State, as you will acknowledge, may be justly called master of itself, if the 
words 'temperance' and 'self-mastery' truly express the rule of the better part over the worse.” 
Republic, IV, 430e – 431b 
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above all, painful injuries. (4) Experiences on a large scale are called 
affections.140
 
In On the Soul and in biological works, he takes a scientist’s interest in the emotions. In 
the Rhetoric and in the Poetics he is concerned with orators and poets who want to achieve an 
effect by capitalizing on the emotions of their audience. Rhetoric discourse addresses the 
judging capacity of the human being but, in order to be effective, the orator must know the 
passions (pathos) and morals (ethos) of the audience. Thus Book 2 of his Rhetoric gives an 
empirical description and analysis of fourteen passions the purpose of which is to provide a 
valuable tool in the tactics for persuasion. The study of the passions in this context is required 
because “[they] are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and 
that are also attended by pain and pleasure”141 The good orator composes with the listeners’ 
passions that he must be able to kindle or to appease in order to sway his audience. Also one 
has to know how to deal with an audience that feels hatred or anger: the arguments to be 
employed must take into account their psychic states. Aristotle’s discussion relies on the 
prevailing doxa about the passions and thus the context of the Rhetoric does not require a 
theoretical treatment of the passions but are discussed rather as something well-known and 
only as an aspect of practical, applied anthropology and social psychology. Passions arise 
within the social and political framework of the polis as citizens are the subjects and objects 
of these feelings. For the ethical consideration of the passions and their respective place with 
regard to virtue one has to turn to the Nichomachean Ethics. While the Rhetoric concerns the 
arousal and management of pathe for efficient persuasion, the Nichomachean Ethics deals 
                                                 
140 Metaphysics, , 1022 b 15-21 in The Complete Works of Aristotle. The Revised Oxford 
Translation, edited by Jonathan Barnes, vol. 2. “Bolingen Series” LXXI, Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, New Jersey, Chichester, West Sussex, 61995, p. 1615. (W. D. Ross translation) Prior to the 
Barnes edition cited here, the Ross-translation was as follows: “'Affection' means (1) a quality in 
respect of which a thing can be altered, e.g. white and black, sweet and bitter, heaviness and lightness, 
and all others of the kind. -(2) The actualisation of these - the already accomplished alterations. - (3) 
Especially, injurious alterations and movements, and, above all painful injuries. -(4) Misfortunes and 
painful experiences when on a large scale are called affections.” 
http://classics.mit.edu//Aristotle/metaphysics.html, The Internet Classics Archive by Daniel C. 
Stevenson, Web Atomics. 
141 Rhetoric, 1378 b 21-22. Barnes, vol. 1, p. 2195. (R. Kassel translation) 
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with the role of pathe within the economy of acting according to our habits and desires as 
moderated by reason.  In both cases pathe are treated as susceptible to rational influence and 
voluntary action, although not directly subject to choice. Even in the context of the 
Nichomachean Ethics, however, the passions are not studied for themselves but in 
relationship to a definition of virtue. The perspective of the study of virtue and happiness is 
put in the context of politics understood both as political theory and as its application by the 
statesman who “wishes to make his fellow citizens good and obedient to the laws”.  Therefore 
“[T]he true student of politics, too, is thought to have studied virtue above all things”142. 
Furthermore, since virtue and happiness are an activity of the soul143, “the student of politics 
must know somehow the facts about soul, as the man who is to heal the eyes or the body as a 
whole must know about the eyes or the body.”144 The discussion of the passions enters the 
ethical domain proper inasmuch passions are one of three kinds of things that are found in the 
soul. 
As there are two parts of the soul (rational and irrational), there are two kinds of 
excellences or virtues such as intellectual or dianoetical virtues and moral virtues. Aristotle 
gives the following definition of excellence (virtue): 
 
Excellence, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean 
relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man 
of practical wisdom would determine it.145
Aristotle arrives at this conclusion by way of excluding two other options. As there are three 
kinds of things in the soul: passions (  / pathos), faculties (  / dunameis) and 
dispositions (or “states of character” in W. D. Ross’s translation, ), virtue must be one of 
these. If neither passions, nor faculties can be called virtues then what remains is the 
“dispositions”. A list of eleven passions146 is given such as “appetite, anger, fear, confidence, 
                                                 
142 Ethica Nicomachea, I. 13. 1102a 5. 
143 “By human virtue we mean not that of the body but that of the soul; and happiness also we call an 
activity of soul.” I. 13. 1102a 15 (my emphasis, G.S.) 
144 Ethica Nicomachea,. I. 13. 1102a 15f 
145 Ethica Nicomachea, II. 6. 1106 b 36 
146 Whereas in the Rhetoric the list contained fourteen passions: love, hatred, fear, confidence, calm, 
anger, shame, impudence, compassion, emulation, envy, friendly feeling, indignation, and contempt. 
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envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are 
accompanied by pleasure or pain.” The faculties are “the things in virtue of which we are 
said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity”. 
Whereas “states of character [are] the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with 
reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or 
too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other 
passions.” It is important to have in mind this context for the definition of virtue because the 
definition has far-reaching implications for the ethical consideration of the passions. Aristotle 
himself makes it explicit when he claims that  
 
neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or 
bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues 
and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions 
(for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply 
feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues 
and our vices we are praised or blamed. Again, we feel anger and fear without 
choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect 
of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the 
vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way. For 
these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, 
nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we 
have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have 
spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all 
that remains is that they should be states of character.147
Aristotle’s ultimate claim for not considering the passions as object of praise or blame is that 
the soul is passive with regard to them as they affect the soul from outside.148 “Since 
happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue”149, virtue cannot depend on 
a passive state. Instead, it is an “activity of the soul”, a certain way of being (state of character 
or disposition) reflected and realised in concrete situations and in concrete actions. 
Aristotle’s definition of virtue also states that it is “a state of character concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean,” or in other words, it is also a matter of custom and habit. It is not 
sufficient than to know the good in order to do it because passions may interfere with this 
knowledge and hinder its realisation. Socratic intellectualism is thus ruled out since virtue is 
                                                 
147 Ethica Nicomachea, II. 5. 3-5. 1105b 29 – 1106a 12 
148 Cf. Metaphysics, , 1022 b 15-21 cited above. 
149 Eth. Nic. I. 13. 1102a 5 (my emphasis, G.S.). Cf. also I. 13. 1102a 15f quoted above. 
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not only a matter of logos but of pathos and ethos as well implying the making of right 
choices. In a more modern idiom, we could say that moral education must introduce reason 
even in the affective domain by forming the right habits. 
Another important element of the definition is the reference to the “rational principle” 
(orthos logos) that implies that virtue is rational. But there is also a contextual reference to 
“the man of practical wisdom” (phronimos) that indicates that a general definition of ethical 
conduct is not possible given the diversity and unpredictability of concrete situations in 
human life. In order to judge what is virtuous in each case, one needs prudence and 
discernment that can only be obtained by experience or based on counsel from a person with 
authority on this matter.150
Even more important from the point of view of the passions is Aristotle’s doctrine of 
the mean as a norm of ethical behaviour: virtue lies in the avoidance of two vices, of which 
one is excess, the other a defect or lack. Thus there is a moderate use of passions, for e.g. in 
the case of anger, it is virtuous to feel irritated when and how it is appropriate. Thus it is 
possible to feel passions according to reason, and prudence consists in feeling them “at the 
right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, 
and the right way”. “[It] is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of 
virtue.”151 Aristotle also points out that not all passions admit such a mean  
 
for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, 
and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike 
things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or 
deficiencies of them.152
 
 In summary, in Aristotle’s ethics, except for passions implying badness by their very 
name, passions per se do not come under ethical judgement: they are neither blamed nor 
                                                 
150 Cf. Chapter III. 3. on Bacon’s adaptation of cultura animi where I propose to further discuss this 
issue. For ‘prudence’ as a vantage point for understanding Aristotle’s moral philosophy cf. Pierre 
Aubenque, La prudence chez Aristote, Paris: Quadrige / Presse Universitaire de France, 1963. 
Aubenque demonstrated that for Aristotle, prudence (  / phronesis) belongs to opinion (  / 
doxa) and implies an opposition with the field of science proper (  / episteme) to which 
wisdom (  / sophia) belongs. 
151 Eth. Nic. II. 5. 1106 b20ff 
152 Ibid. II. 6. 1107 a5ff 
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praised. They provide opportunity for the rational faculty so that by deploying prudence, the 
right mean should be found and realised in all concrete situations. As the Aristotelian ethical 
framework is oriented toward happiness in the polis, in a society that forms a political 
community, it is necessary to persuade and temper the passions that are psychic states 
stemming from the irrational part of the soul. The success of this persuasion requires the 




II. 1. 3. The Stoic Programme of Extirpation 
 
 
Presenting the Stoic conception of the passions in a summary fashion raises a number 
of difficulties. The teachings of Stoic philosophers spans six centuries and the doctrine 
concerning the passions grew, changed and was channelled in different directions at the hands 
of different exponents.153 The present chapter will highlight the most important elements in 
the Stoic concept of passion, in particular, the ones that were most decisive for the history of 
the concept and most closely and directly attributed to the Stoic tradition by posterity. A 
separate chapter will be devoted to the Christian perception and accommodation of the Stoic 
teaching about the passions. 
 The most important elements of the main Stoic view of the passions are the 
following154: 
1) The Stoics have a determinist cosmology according to which all events in the 
universe are permeated and governed by the divine logos. This means that the universe is 
                                                 
153 Cf. Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2 vols (Leiden: 
E. J. Brill, 1985) vol. 1. p. 21. 
154 I am distilling these elements of a synthetic summary mostly from the discussions found in M. 
Colish, Ibid (1985), as well as R. Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind. From Stoic Agitation to 
Christian Temptation. The Gifford Lectures, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000; and 
T. Brennan in Inwood, Ibid (2003). 
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reasonable and everything in it is organised according to the rational law of nature: events are 
bound by the strict rules of cause and effect.155
2) This determinist cosmology underpins their psychological monism: “just as the divine 
logos permeates and orders the whole universe, so the human logos or pneuma permeates 
man’s entire being and accounts for all his activities.”156 Thus there is no mind-body split in 
this psychology and even the instincts are on a continuum with conscious rational behaviour. 
Neither instinctual, or sensuous behaviour is seen as arising from a body, as distinct from the 
logos. One and the same reason rules - or should rule - all human behaviour and neither is 
there a division within the soul as with Plato. (Cf. below, the idea of hegemonikon, citadel.) 
Such monistic view of the human soul leaves no room for the passions since all faculties of 
the soul are permeated by the rational pneuma: passions are thus not merely sub-natural but 
anti-natural in the sense that they should have no status at all. In the soul, reason should be the 
sole sovereign and “an ethics in which reason rules all human behaviour is a descriptive ethics 
as well as a normative one.”157 Another commentator notes that for the Stoics, ethics and 
psychology are but one: 
 
There is never an initial stage in which ethics sets up an ideal that is distinct 
from or in any conflict with the true nature of human psychology; rather, the two 
disciplines study the same object from different vantage points. This is why their 
results are guaranteed to agree, and this is why the discipline of moral 
psychology is coherent from the start. Or so the ancient view would have it.158
 
 
If life is to be lived in accordance with nature, and all events in the universe are governed by a 
cosmic rational order, then the ethical fulfilment of the individual life can only consist in 
conforming to the rational order of the universe. As Cicero writes in De officiis “moral 
rectitude (honestatis) is the one in which we find considerateness and self-control, which give, 
as it were a sort of polish to life (ornatus vitae); it embraces also temperance, complete 
                                                 
155 Colish, Ibid, p. 22ff, 31-32. 
156 Colish, Ibid. p. 27. referring to Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, ed. Hans von Arnim, 3 volumes, 
Stuttgart, 1903-5; vol. iv (indexes) by Maximilian Adler, Stuttgart, 1924. Abbreviated commonly as 
SVF, 1, 134-143, 216-223, 518-526; 2, 773-789, 823-849; 3, 544-656. 
157 Marcia L. Colish, Ibid, p. 28. 
158 Tad Brenan, “Stoic Moral Psychology” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, edited by Brad 
Inwood, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 259. 
 75
159subjection of all the passions, and moderation in all things.”  The only things that have 
ethical relevance are the things within our control, for all the rest, it is not appropriate to feel 
the slightest emotion or passion. 
3) This explains also the intellectualist-cognitive stance of the Stoics: they insist that all 
motivations should be analyzed as forms of belief 160 or judgements concerning certain states 
of affairs and they are, in fact, false mental judgements. It has to be noted that not all Stoics 
agree on this point: this position is that of Chrysippus in contrast with the founder of the 
school, Zeno, who held that passions are a felt inner contraction or expansion. According to 
Chrysippus, however, such contractions and bodily changes follow the passions and are not 
their cause.161
4) Finally, as a corollary of these tenets, in their ethical teaching and practice, the Stoics 
limit the sphere of ethical relevance to those things within the subjective control of the 
individual: the ethical fulfilment of the individual and the rational law of the universe are fully 
integrated. The summum bonum is a life in accordance with nature, or life in accordance with 
reason, that is the same thing.162 Since vice springs from the passions, it is necessary to 
achieve a state of apatheia. 
This summary shows that is with Stoicism that we can see most clearly that the notion of 
passion was never a purely descriptive one: it always entailed value-judgements and 
conceptions about what it is to be human and what constitutes the good life. With the Stoics, 
passions will have a very bad reputation: instead of Platonic canalisations and Aristotelian 
adjustments but building partly on elements of both albeit in a new fashion, the Stoics 
radicalised the antagonism between reason and passion. First of all, the Aristotelian 
                                                 
159 (Italics mine, G.S.) The passage continues: “Under this head is further included what, in Latin, may 
be called decorum (propriety); for in Greek it is called .” And Cicero goes on in the same 
paragraph to identify the employment of reason - moral rectitude – propriety with one another. Cicero, 
On Duties, with an English translation by Walter Miller, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1997, (1913), I. xxvii, p. 94-97. 
160 Cf. Tad Brennan, Ibid. p. 259-260. 
161 Cf. Richard Sorabji, Ibid, p. 2. The question of the causal/temporal sequence between error of 
judgement and the manifestation of passions will also be discussed below in connection with a passage 
from Francis BACON, The Advancement of Learning. 
162 Colish, p. 36. 
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understanding of passion as passivity is replaced by a sense of perturbation, loss of balance 
and disorder; hence passion receives a strong pejorative colouring. Passions are obstacles to 
wisdom: they are both an obstacle to and disturbance of the rational train of thought. The idea 
of being taken away by one’s passion implies here less passivity than a form of activity that 
puts conscience outside itself. 
Unlike Plato who related the passions to a domain of the soul having its own principle 
of operation, in Stoic thinking the pathe are expelled from the soul, from what constitutes the 
soul proper: there is no dynamis, power within the soul that would correspond to the 
passionate impulse. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle who made room for the manifestation of 
an irrational aspect of the soul, the Stoics regarded passions as perversion and not as the 
expression of a normal affective/pathetic function. But what, exactly, constitutes this 
perversion or disturbance? It is a question of the free use of our representation (fantasia): all 
movements in the soul are the result of the representations that it assimilates and gives its 
assent to. These representations themselves do not depend from us but the assent given to 
them involves an act of judgement and it is at this stage that the disorder or perturbation takes 
place. Passions repose on an erroneous opinion or judgement that takes place in the soul and 
as such they can only be bad: their origin makes them reprehensible as diseases of the soul. 
This is why Zenon holds passions “irrational mental contractions” 163: movement of the soul 
contrary to nature. This definition, reiterated by Cicero164, is also the basis of the Stoic 
classification of the passions according to which there are four primary passions, pleasure, 
desire, pain and fear, of which all the other passions are species. The mixture of two 
dichotomies yields the following quadripartite structure: the movement of the soul contrary to 




                                                 
163 Cf. Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VII. 1. 111. in Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, with an English translation by R. D. Hicks, two vols, “Loeb Classical Library”; 
Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press,1972 (1925) p. 217 
164 Cf. also Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV, 6. in Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, with an English 
translation by J. E. King, “Loeb Classical Library”; Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: 
Harvard University Press, 1966 (1927, rev. 1945) vol. XVIII. 
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OPINION 
   present    future 
good  excessive joy (laetitia)  lust, desire (libido, cupiditas) 
evil       distress (aegritudo)   fear (metus)    
 
Early modern authors derived their understanding of Stoicism mostly from Roman 
stoicism and, in particular, from the writings of Cicero and Seneca. It was Cicero, who in 
“teaching philosophy to speak Latin” translated the Greek word pathe as perturbatio – a 
translation that makes the Stoic teaching about the passions part of the very name. He gave 
the following explanation to his translation: 
Moreover the emotions of the mind [perturbationes animorum], which harass 
and embitter the life of the foolish (the Greek term for these is pathos, and I 
might have rendered this literally and styled them ‘diseases’ [morbos], but the 
word ‘disease’ would not suit all instances; for example, no one speaks of pity, 
nor yet anger, as a disease, though the Greeks term these pathos. Let us then 
accept the term ‘emotion’ [perturbatio], the very sound of which seems to 
denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural 
influence.165
 
The Stoic-Ciceronian equivalence between perturbatio and pathos is a token of their 
interpretation and appraisal of the passions. The Ciceronian translation of pathe as perturbatio 
is a biased transposition of the Greek word into Latin: it puts into the very word the evaluation 
the Stoics attach to it. Richard Sorabji notes that Cicero “overtranslates” the word and 
misguidedly makes part of the meaning of the word the Stoics’ substantive thesis about the 
emotions, namely that they are perturbing.166 Following Cicero, Roman Stoics employ the 
term perturbatio with its negative connotation when speaking about the passions. The word 
suggests that passions are not a proper part of ourselves. Furthermore, Stoic ethics identifies 
the good life with virtue and both good life and virtue with self-sufficiency, i.e. that which is 
intrinsically good has to be proper to us and fully within our control. The passions are, 
                                                 
165 Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum, with an English translation by H. Rackham, “Loeb 
Classical Library” Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1994 
(1914), III. 10., pp. 254-255. It has to be added that the modern translator’s solution to translating 
perturbatio as ‘emotion’ does not help to clarify Cicero’s meaning. The word ‘disturbance’ or 
‘perturbation’ would be closer to Cicero’s meaning. 
166 Richard Sorabji, Ibid, p. 208. 
 78
however, responses to external events, outside of our control and thus have no place in the life 
of the Stoic sage. 
167In Cicero’s definition  of the four perturbations of the soul, distress (aegritudo) is a 
newly formed belief of present evil, inducing depression or shrinking of the soul; excessive 
delight (laetitia) is a newly formed belief of present good arousing rapture; fear (metus) is a 
conviction of threatening evil which to the affected person seems insupportable; lust (libido, 
cupiditas) is a belief in a prospective good, good in the sense that the individual considers its 
possession advantageous.168 It must also be noted that the Stoic condemnation of passionate 
affectivity as a form of disorder leading to dependences and alienations makes room for three 
legitimate affections (eupathia or tranquilitas animi) that are considered non-passionate. The 
search of the good is natural and insofar as it is in conformity with reason it is legitimate. 
Thus simple joy (gaudium) is opposed to excessive delight (laetitia) that is the “transport of 
the soul deprived of reason”, to disordered desire will (voluntas) is opposed which is a 
“tendency where desire accompanies reason”, and circumspection (cautio) is opposed to 
fear.169 (Distress has no positive pair since present evil is only in the imagination (fantasia) as 
a false representation to which no consent should be given. Thus the possibility of a rational 
grief is excluded.) 
The soul is not home to the passions and they are the result of a false opinion in the 
soul to which it gives consent. All passions imply an act of judgement, an opinion concerning 
our representation of the world, or event of the world. It is interesting to take the classical case 
of Achilles’ anger in this regard: according to Epictetus, the cause of his weeping is not the 
death of Patroclus but that he wanted to grieve, thus of an act of consent involving decision.  
                                                 
167 Cicero’s definition and the quadripartite structure repeated the division of Chrysippus (3rd century 
B.C.) who was the principal systematizer of Stoic philosophy and its cofounder with Zeno. In 
Chrysippus’ division the terms are pleasure (hedoné), pain (lupé), desire (epithumia), fear (phobos) cf. 
Diogenes Laertius, Ibid, VII. 6. 
168 Tusculan Disputations, IV. 6-9. Cf. also the summary of Rolf Soellner, “The Four Primary 
Passions: A Renaissance Theory reflected in the Works of Shakespeare”, in Studies in Philology, vol. 
55 (1958) Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, p. 550. Cf. also Anthony Levi, S.J., French 
Moralists. The Theory of the Passions from 1585 to 1649, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964. 




[B]ut it is enough for us to be convinced that, if what the philosophers say is 
sound, we ought not to look for the motive anywhere outside ourselves, but that 
in all cases it is one and the same thing that is the cause of our doing a thing or 
of our not doing it, of our saying things, or of our not saying them, of our being 
elated, or of our being cast down, of our avoiding things, or of our pursuing 
them - the very thing, indeed, which has even now become a cause of my action 
and of yours; yours in coming to me and sitting here and listening, mine saying 
these things. And what is that? Is it, indeed, anything else than that we wanted to 
do this? - Nothing. And supposing that we had wanted to do something else, 
what else would we be doing than that which we wanted to do? Surely, then, in 
the case of Achilles also, it was this that was the cause of his grief – not the 
death of Patroclus (for other men do not act this way when their comrades die), 
but that he wanted to grieve.170
 
 
For Epictetus, passions involve an act of volition involving a decision. Since they are the 
result of a loss of the clear vision of the world, they have to be extirpated. The Stoic ideal of 
the sage entails impassivity: apathy that is the absence of and freedom from all passions, 
apatheia, must characterise the sage.171 This state can be achieved, on the first place, by 
knowing what passions are and how they originate. Having understood that they depend from 
our opinion, it is a further step to eliminate them by means of a therapy consisting of the right 
use of the will and reason.172 The wrong opinion has to be corrected: what gives birth to 
desire and pleasure are not real goods, neither are the evils that lead to fear and distress. The 
false opinion has to be separated from the correct one and the passion is extinguished. There 
is always an element of opinion involved in the process that can thus be arrested by the 
                                                 
170 Epictetus, Discourses, I, 21. 28-31. (italics mine, G.S.) in Epictetus, The Discourses as Reported by 
Arrian, the Manual, and Fragments, with an English translation by W. A. Oldfather, in two volumes, 
“Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 
1989 (1925), p. 87. 
171 It has to be noted that the ideal of apatheia was not shared by all Stoics, or rather, it did not mean 
the same for all Stoics. It meant different things to Chrysippus, Zeno and Posidonius to name only 
three of the main Stoic figures. But it was the Chrysippian radical position that became the canonical 
view and the one most well-known in the Renaissance. For Chrysippus, apatheia meant freedom from 
all emotions except a small range of eupatheiai that are enjoyed only by the sage. Cf. Richard Sorabji, 
Ibid, (2000) p. 195-196. 
172 Cicero, Tusc., IV, 38. 83. 
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exercise of the will and reason. It is an intellectualising conception of the passions and thus 
the remedy of the perturbations of the soul is a matter of the intellect as well. Philosophy thus 
becomes a medicine of the soul and leads to a form of self-mastery and ethical self-
sufficiency. Cicero writes: 
 
what bodily diseases can be more serious, pray, than these two diseases of 
distress (aegritudo) and desire (cupiditas)? […] souls which have been ready to 
be cured and have obeyed the instructions of wise men, are undoubtedly cured? 
Assuredly, there is an art of healing the soul – I mean philosophy, whose aid 
must be sought not, as in bodily diseases, outside ourselves, and we must use our 
utmost endeavour, with all our resources and strengths, to have the power to be 
ourselves our physicians.173
 
The radicalism of the Stoic position concerning on the passions rests on two associated 
tenets, one may be called anthropological, the other ethical. The former concerns the nature of 
the soul that is seen as commanded by a central part (hegemonikon) and functions as a citadel 
of reason, a fortified acropolis wherein reason is the only native element. Since there is no 
room for the passions within the soul, it is not possible to deploy the canalisations in the 
Platonic way or the Aristotelian adjustments. Whereas with Plato, the structural analogy runs 
between the psyche and the polis, with the Stoics, this analogy can be established between 
psyche and a kind of acropolis. The Platonic structure, although hierarchical in its layers, was 
capable of horizontal negotiations between its parts. The Stoic system is strictly vertical and 
reason only must be in the soul and has to fully dominate it. This allows no mediation or 
canalisation of the thumos between the acropolis of reason and passions and desires. Their 
origin in a false judgement precludes the possibility of a middle ground (an Aristotelian 
metropatheia) or a graduation of the passions. All passions are failings of reason (ratio lapsa) 
and as such they cannot be tolerated because they constitute a perturbation and disease of the 
soul. This psychological-anthropological outlook sets the possibility of the extirpation of the 
passions and this is the second, ethical tenet. If passions are a question of reason’s absolute 
supremacy then it is in our power to forestall the passions. 
 
                                                 
173 Cicero, Tusc., III. 3. 5-6. 
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For my part I think that the whole train of reasoning which is concerned with the 
disorders of the soul turns upon the one fact that all disorders are within our 
control, are all acts of judgement, are all voluntary.174
 
The governing principles of this ethics of autarchy are power and control over the 
soul’s operations. There is also an analogy between diseases of the body and diseases of the 
soul: one should not tolerate either: 
 
For the Peripatetics, friends of ours as they are and unequalled in 
resourcefulness, in learning and in earnestness, do not quite succeed in 
convincing me of their ‘mean’ or moderate states either in disturbances or of 
diseases of the soul. For every evil, even a moderate one, is an evil. But our 
object is that there should be no evil at all in the wise man. For as the body, 
even if moderately ailing, is not healthy; so in the soul the so-called mean or 
moderate state is without health.175
 
The restriction of the desires establishes a zone of non-contradiction within which the 
agent has full control. “Imperare sibi maximum imperium est”: “Self-command is the greatest 
command of all.” (also: empire over yourself is the greatest empire) writes Seneca176. 
Similarly, following the Stoic tradition of distinguishing between things under our control and 
things not under our control, Epictetus writes: 
 
Some things are under our control, while others are not under our control. Under 
our control are conception, choice, desire, aversion, and, in a word, everything 
that is our own doing; not under our control are our body, our property, 
reputation, office, and, in a word, everything that is not our own doing. 
Furthermore, the things under our control are by nature free, unhindered, and 
unimpeded; while the things not under our control are weal, servile, subject to 
hindrance, and not our own. Remember, therefore, that if what is naturally 
slavish you think to be free, and what is not your own to be your own, you will 
be hampered, will grieve, will be in turmoil, and will blame both gods and men; 
while if you think only what is your own to be your own, and what is not your 
own to be, as it really is, not your own, then no one will ever be able to exert 
compulsion upon you, no one will hinder you, you will blame no one, will find 
                                                 
174 Cicero, Tusc., IV, 31, 65, (italics mine, G. S.) 
175 Cicero, Tusc, III. 10. 22. (italics mine, G.S.) 
176 Seneca, Epistles, 113. 31 in Seneca in ten volumes, vol. VI Ad Lucilium epistulae morales with an 
English translation by Richard M. Gummere in three volumes, “Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, 1989 (1925), p. 299. 
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fault with no one, will do absolutely nothing against your will, you will have no 
personal enemy, no one will harm you, for neither is there any harm that can 
touch you.177
 
If the aim is such imperturbability, then it is a matter of defining the boundaries of the self: 
the narrower one defines what constitutes the self and human life, the more chances there are 
that perturbations, hindrances and the attendant turmoil cannot reach it. From the perspective 
of the passions it means that their very causes should be extirpated: by rightly defining what is 
under our control, one should not give ground and occasion for their very appearance. 
It is plausible to argue that the concept of “passion” reached its richest, most complex 
sense in Antiquity with Stoicism: not only are passions seen as perturbations of the soul but 
all perturbations are assimilated to passions. The expression can be found in the writings of 
Stobaeus, doxographer of the 5th 178 century.  This extensive concept of “passion” implies that 
all disruptive mental phenomena are conceived as passion and in need of control and even 
extirpation by the help of another instance, namely reason, which is considered hierarchically 
superior and more valuable. What differentiates Stoicism from the Aristotelian-Platonic 
traditions is its radical separation of this rational faculty as forming the citadel of the soul 
proper and allowing no room for an irrational force within the soul. Instead of a hierarchy of 
forces within the soul, Stoicism opted for a fortress of reason ruled or hegemonikon that is 
often translated as “ruling reason”. 
Since this study is not aimed at exposing the origins and the reasons of the increasing 
popularity of Stoic thinking in the Hellenistic period, let it suffice to indicate broadly that 
most commentators and historians of Classical philosophy find the causes of this inward turn 
and the wish to eradicate the passions in the change of social structures from the Greek polis 
to Roman imperium.179 Gordon Braden argues that the psychic structure of the hegemonikon 
                                                 
 
177 Epictetus, The Encheiridion, or Manual, 1-4 in The Discourses as Reported by Arrian, the Manual, 
and Fragments, with an English translation by A. O. Oldfather, in two volumes, “Loeb Classical 
Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: Harvard University Press, II. 1989 (1928) p. 
483. 
178 Quoted in Jean-Paul Dumont, Elément d’histoire de la philosophie antique, Paris: Nathan, 1993, p. 
625. 
179 Cf. Rémo Bodei, Géometrie des passions. Peur, espoir, bonheur : de la philosophie à l’usage 
politique, traduit de l’italien par Marilène Raiola, Paris : Presses Universitaires de France, 1997; cf. 
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that is at the basis of Stoic ethics reflects a process of internalisation of monarchic power in an 
attempt to recreate that power more securely within the self. The autarchic self-sufficiency of 
the Stoic ethical outlook is a calculus of adaptation to unchangeable realities. In A. A. Long’s 
expression, it is a “revisionist” attitude about happiness: we want what we have instead of 
striving to have what we want and thus we revise our hopes to coincide with the given. 180 
Criticism of the radicalism of the Stoic position about the passions will go hand in hand with 
the condemnation of this self-sufficient attitude in the Early Modern period. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
also Gordon Braden, Ibid; as well as Michel Meyer, Le Philosophe et les passions. Esquisse d’une 
histoire de la nature humaine, Paris : Livre de poche, Librairie Générale Française, 1991. 
180 This moral outlook is well described by A. A. Long as revisionism in the sense of internalising the 




II. 2. MEDIEVAL CHRISTIAN ACCOMMODATIONS 
 
181In his seminal study on prudence in Aristotle , Pierre Aubenque remarks that the 
original sense of the Delphic injunction of ‘Know thyself’ (  ) was taken to mean 
almost its contrary in Stoicism. The injunction originally called for getting to know one’s 
limitations as a mortal. With Stoicism, the ultimate aim of introspection is to make oneself 
invincible (cf. the ideal of the hegemonikon and of the citadel) that would have been a 
sacrilege for the Greeks of the Classical era. Thus Epictetus explicitly refers to the injunction 
of the ancients and (mis)uses to mean it as a tool and aid for becoming and invincible: 
 
our losses and our pains have to do only with the things which we possess. ‘But 
the tyrant will chain ----‘ What? Your leg. ‘But he will cut off ----‘ What? Your 
neck. What, then, will he neither chain nor cut off? Your moral purpose. 
[  / proairesin] This is why the ancients gave us the injunction, ‘Know 
thyself.’ […] Who, then, is the invincible man? He whom nothing that is outside 
the sphere of his moral purpose can dismay. I then proceed to consider the 
circumstances one by one, as I would do in the case of the athlete. […] The man 
who passes all these tests is what I mean the invincible athlete.182
 
Similarly, in Cicero’s De republica, Scipio in his dream hears the following advice: “Know, 
then, that you are god, [deum te igitur scito esse] if a god is that which lives, feels, 
remembers, and foresees, and which rules, governs, and moves the body over which it is set, 
just as the supreme God above us rules this universe. And just as the eternal God moves the 
universe, which is partly mortal, so an immortal spirit moves the frail body.”183 I shall return 
to the globalism implicit in this kind of analogy and even isomorphism between the divine 
and the human governance of the world and of the body respectively. For the present 
argument, the salient point about the Stoic traits in Epictetus and Cicero is the fact that they 
both depict a god-like, invincible human being as their ideal. Christianity can be seen as a 
                                                 
181 Pierre Aubenque, Ibid, p. 167. n. 1. 
182 Epictetus, Discourses, I. 18-26 (italics mine, G.S.) in Epictetus, Ibid, vol. I. p. 1126-129. 
183 Cicero, De re Publica, VI. 24. in Cicero, De re Publica. De legibus, with an English translation by 
Clinton Walker Keyes, “Loeb Classical Library”, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard 
University Press, 1994 (1928) p. 279-280. 
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return to the restrictive sense of the Delphic injunction although in a different sense than that 
of the Classical Greeks. What’s more, the debate over human limitations takes various forms 
within Christianity as well and Augustine’s battle against what became the Pelagian heresy 
can also be seen as a case in point: Pelagianism is a form of denying human limitations 
inasmuch as for Pelagius, redemption is achievable by human effort and human acts. 
An assessment of Christian adaptations of Greek philosophy and Stoic doctrine is 
naturally far beyond the scope of this study. Large volumes of the history of philosophy and 
of theology describe the conceptual and terminological translations and accommodations that 
Christian authors – starting already with Saint Paul’s oration about the “unknown God” to the 
Athenians184 - had to make in order to articulate the content of their faith in the context of 
                                                 
 
184 Cf. Acts, 17: 16 – 33 “Now while Paul waited for them at Athens, his spirit was stirred in him, 
when he saw the city wholly given to idolatry. Therefore disputed he in the synagogue with the Jews, 
and with the devout persons, and in the market daily with them that met with him. Then certain 
philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, encountered him. And some said, What will this 
babbler say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto 
them Jesus, and the resurrection. And they took him, and brought him unto Areopagus, saying, May 
we know what this new doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is? For thou bringest certain strange things to 
our ears: we would know therefore what these things mean. (For all the Athenians and strangers which 
were there spent their time in nothing else, but either to tell, or to hear some new thing.) Then Paul 
stood in the midst of Mars' hill, and said, Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too 
superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, TO 
THE UNKNOWN GOD. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you. God that 
made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in 
temples made with hands; Neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing, 
seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; And hath made of one blood all nations of men 
for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the 
bounds of their habitation; That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find 
him, though he be not far from every one of us: For in him we live, and move, and have our being; as 
certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring. Forasmuch then as we are the 
offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven 
by art and man's device. And the times of this ignorance God winked at; but now commandeth all men 
every where to repent: Because he hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in 
righteousness by that man whom he hath ordained; whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in 
that he hath raised him from the dead. And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some 
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Hellenistic and Roman culture. The demonstration of such adaptations is often coloured with 
a critical tone towards Christianity, for example in the case of Nietzsche who claimed that 
Christianity was but “a form of vulgarised Platonism”185. While acknowledging that the case 
of the concept of ‘passion’ is part of this larger scheme of translating and negotiating elements 
of the Classical heritage that formed the surrounding culture to the Christian context, the 
present chapter will only focus on this single element and will do it primarily from a 
semantic-linguistic point of view. Moreover, as the early Christian teaching about the 
passions evolved primarily as a response to the Stoic legacy, my discussion will focus on this 
particular case of semantic adaptation and transfer. The reasons why Stoicism was a 
privileged source for Christian authors when dealing with practical ethical matters were 
briefly indicated in Chapter I. 2. Besides the enormous prestige of Virgil for Christian authors, 
one could also refer to the Christian veneration of Seneca and the forged correspondence 
between Seneca and Saint Paul186 as well as to the adaptations of Senecan propassio / pro-
patheia to interpreting Christian temptations187. But on a more general level, the reasons of 
the attraction of early Christian authors to the Stoics was probably the fact that the latter had a 
fairly elaborated set of moral teaching that, by virtue of its focus on human interiority and by 
its ideal of a moral autarchy could provide ready-made precepts to Christians - even if 
Christianity and Stoicism turned out to be faux-amis on the long run… 
Although this study is not concerned with the history of interaction of Stoicism and 
Christianity, it seems necessary to signal, even if in a shorthand fashion, the general thrust of 
                                                                                                                                                        
mocked: and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter. So Paul departed from among them.” 
(King James Version) 
185 “But the fight against Plato, or, to put the matter in a way more intelligible to ‘the people,’ the fight 
against the thousands of years of pressure from the Christian church — for Christianity is Platonism 
for ‘the people’ — created in Europe a splendid tension in the spirit, something unlike anything 
existing before on earth before. With such a tensely arched bow, from now on we can shoot for the 
most distant targets.” (Italics mine, G.S.) in F. W. Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), 
“Prologue” (of 1885). 
186 Cf. Colish, (1985) pp. 16ff. 
187 Cf. R. Sorabji, ibid, p. 8. and 343-419. Sorabji demonstrates how “the Stoic theory of how to avoid 
agitation was converted by early Christians into a theory of how to avoid temptations” through 
adaptation of the Senecan term of propassio by Philo, Origen, Didymus the Blind, Evagrius, St. 
Jerome and by St. Augustine. 
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this encounter prior to the Early Modern period. While continuities exist between Stoicism 
and Christianity there was also a trend within Christianity to oppose such infiltration of Stoic 
doctrines. Gordon Braden sums up the point in a shorthand way by saying that “the tradition 
of distinguishing Stoicism form Christianity is as durable as the wish to assimilate them.”188
When looking at it from a broad perspective, it appears that the general tendency of this 
influence was an infiltration by Stoicism of Christian ethical and, in some cases, spiritual 
practice - if not Christian doctrine itself. The impact of Stoicism on Christian culture well 
antedates Early Modern humanism: Seneca's works have found their way to the teachings of 
the early Church Fathers, a development that was both facilitated and is attested by the near-
consecration of Seneca due to his supposed (and faked) correspondence with St. Paul. 
Furthermore, Stoic ethical precepts were often accommodated for Christian use by the Church 
fathers in their commentaries to the Bible. Jerome considered that of all philosophical schools 
the Stoics have the most in common with us.189 Epictetus’ Encheiridion was several times 
adapted for use as a monastic handbook for their psychological efficiency. In addition, certain 
passages of the Pauline letters seemed to point towards a Stoic ethical position and objective: 
the ideal of autarcheia. Thus in 2 Corinthians 9:8, in Philippians 4:11, and in 1 Timothy 6:6 
 / autarcheia / sufficientia is used in a positive sense. Also, the “inward man”  
 / eso anthropos / interiorem hominem as the province of an inmost self radically 
separate from the externals of its conditions is referred to in Romans 7:22 and in Ephesians 
3:16. 
 
II. 2. 1. Saint Augustine 
 
 
The choice of Augustine among early Christian authors, while self-evident to some 
extent given his enormous influence on Christianity is also motivated by the fact that Early 
Modern authors and Protestants in particular, will refer to him and cite from his works in the 
debate with neo-Stoics about the passions. This is understandable given the vogue of 
Augustinianism in the 16th century that is also said to be one of the inspirational forces of 
                                                 
188 Gordon Braden, Ibid, p. 92.  
189 In Isaiam 4.11; Patrologia latina 24:147D quoted by Gordon Braden, Ibid, p. 70. I am taking the 
some of the following examples from this book. 
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190Protestantism (and later of Jansenism  in France) as opposed to Rome’s advocacy of the 
strands of pure Thomism of Saint Thomas Aquinas with its synthesis of theology and 
Aristotelian philosophy, of the modified dissent from Thomism of Duns Scotus (via antiqua), 
and of the Nominalism of William of Ockham (via moderna). The “rigorous tradition of St. 
Augustine […] came to be the chief weapon of sixteenth-century Protestantism against the 
stultified scholasticism of the dying middle ages”191 Therefore, the Augustinian position and 
his linguistic accommodations of path  into (Christian) Latin merits special attention. 
That the translation of  into Latin and its adaptation to the specifically Christian 
context was an issue that merited special consideration for Augustine is evident from the fact 
that in The City of God he raises the issue of this translation and the uses to which pathos can 
be put several times. This in Book VIII, Chapter 17: 
 
For perturbatio (disturbance) is what the Greeks call pathos [ ], and this is 
why he [Apuleius] chose to call the demons passive […], because the word 
passio [ ] for the Greek word pathos means a mental movement which is 
contrary to reason.192
 
And, in a slightly different context again in Book IX, Chapter 4: 
 
There are two opinions among philosophers as to those motions of the mind 
which the Greeks call pathe. (Some of our writers, such as Cicero, call 
disturbances [perturbationes], others call them affections [affectiones] or affects 
                                                 
190 Cf. Cornelius Jansen (1585-1638) whose Augustinus was published in 1640 and condemned by the 
Catholic Church. 
191 G. R. Elton, Reformation Europe 1517-1559, Oxford, and Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1999 
(1963), second edition with an Afterword by Andrew Pettegree, “Blackwell Classic Histories of 
Europe”, p, 134-135 
192 City of God, VIII. 17. in “The Loeb Classical Library”, with an English translation by David S. 
Wiesen, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, London: William Heinemann Ltd, 
1988, p. 79. (Henceforth referred to as “Loeb”) Translation slightly modified because, in my view, the 
Translator put his own gloss on the text, namely, the identification of passio with modern ‘emotion’ 
into Augustine’s text. It also omits to reproduce the Greek spelling in Augustine’s Latin in the English 
text. 
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[affectus], others again, like Apuleius, call them passions [passiones] which 
expresses the Greek word more closely.193
 
 
There are two opinions among the philosophers concerning the mental emotions 
(animi motibus), which the Greeks call path , while certain of our fellow 
countrymen, like Cicero, describe as disturbances [perturbationes], others as 
affections [affectiones] or affects [affectus], and others again, like Apuleius, as 
passions [passiones], which renders the Greek word more explicitly.194
 
As noted above, the Ciceronian translation of pathe as perturbatio is a biased transposition of 
the Greek word into Latin: it puts into the very word the evaluation the Stoics attach to it. 
Augustine opts for Latin passio as the translation of path  and reserves perturbatio for the 
derogatory senses of pathe. Passio was, after all, the term applied to the “Passion of Christ” 
(on this issue see also below), which although a kind of suffering, could hardly be taken as 
vicious, or even as morally neutral, kind. It can be said in general, that Augustine did not 
disparage the passions as such, despite an increasingly tragic view of the human condition 
over the course of his career. What’s more, there is a subcategory of passio that is of 
particular importance for the Christian philosopher, namely ‘love’ in all its senses amor, 
caritas, and even eros and cupiditas. In considering this issue Augustine rewrites the 
Ciceronian tetrachord of passions as modifications of love which is both a passion and a form 
of will. 
 
A right will is therefore good love and a wrong will is bad love. Hence the love 
that is bent on obtaining the object of its love is desire (cupiditas), while the love 
that possesses and enjoys its object is joy (laetitia); the love that avoids what 
confronts it is fear (timor), and the love that feels when it strikes is grief 
(tristitia). Accordingly, these emotions are bad if the love is bad, and good is 
love is good.195
 
                                                 
193 Augustine, City of God, IX. 4. in Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, edited and 
translated by R. W. Dyson, “Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought”, Cambridge, New 
York : Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 361-362. The underlined phrase is the translators’ 
rendering of animi motibus, my underlining, G.S. 
194 Augustine, The City of God Against the Pagans, IX. 4. “Loeb”, p. 156-7. 
195 City of God, XIV. 7. “Loeb”, p. 290-291. 
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For Augustine, there are virtuous and vicious loves depending on their object and the way that 
object is loved: for its use or for its mere enjoyment. Without going into further details of 
Augustine’s love theology, it is important to highlight that ‘love’ as a subcategory of passion 
(passio) does not by this very fact come under a negative judgement.  
Coming back to the issue of passions more generally and in reviewing the teachings of 
the Platonist, Peripatetics, and Stoics about the passions, the major question, for Augustine, is 
whether such disturbances are admissible in the life of a Christian. At a certain stage of his 
argument, Augustine dismisses the Stoic versus Platonist-Aristotelian controversy about the 
admissibility of passions as a mere verbal debate that does not concern the heart of the 
matter.196
 
Hence it seems to me that here too, when the question is asked whether mental 
passions (passiones animi) affect the wise man, or whether he is a complete 
stranger to them, they [the Stoics] are again basing their argument on words 
rather than on facts. For I judge that the Stoics themselves hold exactly the same 
view as the Platonist and Peripatetics, in so far as the gist of the matter is 
concerned and not the mere jingle of words (vocabulorum sonum).197
 
Such sweeping remarks notwithstanding – which, by the way, refer not to the word passiones 
itself but to distinctions between “goods” and “advantages”198 – Augustine seems rather 
preoccupied by the question of the passions. Besides his detailed attention to diverging Latin 
translations of , Augustine devotes several chapters in The City of God to develop his 
position about the passions and to assess them from a Christian perspective. A full account of 
his position and of how it is embedded in his teaching on Christian doctrine is far beyond the 
scope of this chapter and has already been done by Colish (1985) as well as Sorabji (2003) to 
mention only two of those who approached Augustine’s handling of the theme with an 
emphasis on the Stoic legacy. In line with the overall framework of the present study, I shall 
limit my consideration of this issue to the semantic aspect, which, by the way, seems to 
preoccupy Augustine himself as well. Thus I would like to see how, in Augustine’s Latin, 
modifications are introduced with regard to the scope of passiones and its internal divisions.  
                                                 
196 City of God, “Loeb”, IX. 4., p. 158-159. 
197 City of God, “Loeb”, IX. 4., p. 158-159. 
198 Augustine is in fact following Cicero who claimed that Stoic preferables were, in practice, the same 
as the bodily goods admitted by the Aristotelians. Cf. Colish (1985), II. p. 208  
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For Augustine, the overall criterion for judging mental states remains their conformity 
with reason in a regulating sense:  “these emotions attend upon right reason” (cum rectam 
rationem sequantur istae affectiones).199 While he maintains the overall regulating sense of 
reason in judging the affections, Augustine introduces another distinction and thereby carries 
out a semantic re-arrangement: he distinguishes between “impulses and emotions that derive 
from love of the good and holy charity” (Hi motus, hi affectus de amore boni et de sancta 
caritate) on the one hand, and “diseases and vicious passions” (morbos seu vitiosas passiones) 
on the other hand.200 In order to ground his argument in the authority of the Holy Scripture 
and of St. Paul in particular, when demonstrating the goodness inhering in what he means by 
the former, Augustine gives a catalogue of the motions (motus) and affects (affectus) St. Paul, 
a Biblical exemplar of virtue, has had.201
Thus he keeps motus (motion) and affectus (affects) in a neutral and even positive sense 
for designating certain emotional states. By this semantic operation, Augustine begins to 
break up the unified collective sense of passiones and introduces a qualitative distinction 
within perturbationes.202 There can be and, indeed, there should be affective states of the soul 
that are legitimate and are in conformity with Christian faith. His reference to Christ is 
revealing: even the Lord showed these human emotions (humanus affectus).203 Augustine 
cites ample evidence from the Gospels to prove that Christ  
 
was grieved and angered (cum ira constristatus sit) at the Jews’ hardness of 
heart (Mark 3:5); that he said: ‘For your sake I am glad (gaudeo), so that you 
may believe’ (John 11:15); that as he was about to rouse Lazarus, he even shed 
tears (lacrimas fuerit) (John 11:35); that he earnestly desired (concupiverit) to 
eat the Passover with his disciples (Luke 22:15); that as his passion drew near, 
                                                 
199 City of God, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-11. italics mine. Cf. also “because their love is right, all these 
feelings of theirs are right.” (quia rectus est amor eorum, istas omnes affectiones rectas habent.) XIV. 
9, p. 304-305. 
200 City of God, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311, italics mine, translation slightly modified. 
201 City of God, XIV. 9., “Loeb”, 306-311. 
202 This does not change the fact that he keeps the Ciceronian quadrivium of passions on a more 
general level and even when he argues against the Stoic general condemnation of the passions, he 
keeps the quartet of pleasure, pain, desire and fear (laetitia, tristitia, cupiditas or amor, metus or timor) 
as will be the case below when enumerating the affectus Christ experienced. 
203 City of God, XIV, 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311. 
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his soul was grieved (tristis fuerit anima eius) (Matthew 26:38), there is no 
falsehood in these reports. Rather, he assumed these emotions (ille hos motus) in 
his human mind for a definite providential purpose when he chose, just as he had 
become a man when he so chose.204
 
It should be added, however, that this passage, besides loosely following the Ciceronian 
quartet of passions, uses the formulation “when he chose” that further accentuates the Stoic 
resonances. I take it is meant to imply that the Lord was not impelled to have these emotions 
but consciously chose to do so. For the Stoic sage is capable withholding such assent to 
passion so that they should not inhibit the proper activity of mind and reason. Such a situation 
is explained in Book IX. 4. of the City of God when Augustine recalls the Attic Nights by 
Aulus Gellius that refers to the fifth (lost) Discourse of Epictetus.205 But such nuances put 
aside, the relevance of this passage is in Augustine’s consistent use of affectus and motus to 
designate what the Stoic tradition would have named path  (Greek), passiones, perturbationes 
(Cicero).  
The Ciceronian “overtranslation” (Sorabji) of pathos as perturbatio does not mean for 
Augustine that they should be proscribed. The fact that they are disturbances does not 
immediately qualify them in an ethical sense: the mental phenomenon of affective agitation 
begins to be subdivided into the morally acceptable “impulses and emotions that derive from 
love of the good and holy charity” and the morally unacceptable “diseases and vicious 
passions” cited above.206 It is the teleology of the passions that is the arbitrator about their 
righteousness: the Christian may rightly manifest even what the Stoics call passions if these 
passions are ordered to the love of God and neighbour. Thus the collective sense of passiones 
receives an inflection in Augustine’s usage of the word: although Augustine is credited for 
having mediated the Ciceronian tetrachord of passions to Medieval Christianity, we can see 
that he also meant to rewrite them as versions of love and, what’s more, he limited the 
negativity in the connotation of passiones as perturbationes: emotional disturbance itself is 
not the problem, it is the teleology of such disturbance that matters. Thus even if passions are 
                                                 
204 City of God, XIV, 9., “Loeb”, p. 310-311. 
205 City of God, IX, 4., “Loeb”, p. 158-163. The expression “give assent to the emotions or to yield to 
them” (adprobari ista eique consentiri) is on pp. 162-163. 
206 I am aware that the Stoics too made a distinction between pathe and eupatheia (good emotions). 
But they did not admit that the latter, too, were perturbations. 
 93
disturbances, they are not always and necessarily vitiae (faults) and morbus (diseases). 
Augustine objects to a blanket suppression and condemnation of the passions and affirms the 
potential appropriateness of misericordia (rejected by Seneca) and other feelings and affects 
as well: 
 
Consequently, in our system we do not so much ask whether a religious mind 
will become angry, but rather what should make it angry, nor whether it will be 
sad, but what should make it sad, nor whether it will be afraid, but what should 
make it afraid. For instance, anger with a sinner in order to reform him, or 
sadness on behalf of one who is distressed in order to relieve him, or fear for one 
in danger, to save him from death – with such feelings I hardly suppose that 
anyone of sane and thoughtful mind would find fault. No doubt the stoic practice 
is to condemn even pity, but how much more honourable it would have been for 
the stoic […] to be deeply moved by pity for a fellow-creature in order to save 
him than by fear of being shipwrecked.207
 
As Gordon Braden comments, refusal of the perturbationes can be a refusal of the chance and 
impulse to do something good, a rejection of God’s purposes in using human emotions to his 
own end. Christian doctrine “subordinates the mind itself to God, to be governed and 
succoured by him, and puts the passions into the keeping of the mind, to be so regulated and 
restrained as to be converted into servants of righteousness.”208  
Augustine makes a further claim about affectiones: he states that, after all, “they belong 
to this present life, not to the one we hope will come, and we often yield to them even against 
our will. Thus at times, though we may be stirred not by blameworthy desire, but by 
praiseworthy charity, we weep even while we would not. It follows then that we possess these 
emotions by reason of the weakness of our human condition.”209 Thus, in his consideration of 
the affectiones, and, by the same token, of passions in general, Augustine introduces a localist 
perspective that allows for different regimes: there is our current fallen state, the weakness of 
the human condition and there is “that perfect wisdom which is promised us at the end, when 
we are freed from our present mortality”210 His gesture makes room for emotional 
disturbances – they are not to be and cannot be, eradicated. He even adds that living without 
                                                 
207 City of God, IX.5 “Loeb” p. 167-168. italics mine 
208 City of God, IX.5. “Loeb” p. 167. 
209 City of God, XIV, 9. “Loeb”, p. 312-313. 
210 City of God, VIII. 17. “Loeb”, p. 78-79. 
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emotions (sine affectione) is not to live a proper life and refers again to St. Paul (Romans 
1:31). But Augustine also reviews his position from the other perspective: from the Stoic ideal 
of apatheia which he translates as impassibilitas (impassibility).211 The same localist gesture 
is at work here: although Augustine admits that it is a desirable state as long as it means 
“living without those emotions which come contrary to reason and agitate the mind”. 
However, this is not for our present state either: the Stoic ideal of impassibilitas is neither 
practical nor desirable212. And Augustine even goes further in his exegesis of the Gospel of 
John: 
 
These are certainly four of what they call passions (perturbationes): fear and 
sorrow, love and joy (timor et tristitia, amor et laetitia). And the minds of the 
Christians have just cause for feeling them, if not the Stoic philosophers and 
whoever else like them agrees with this error. For they indeed enlarge their 
vanity to the extent that they deem it a verity, thus regarding insensibility as 
soundness (stuporem deputant sanitatem), ignoring that the soul of man, just as 
the members of his body, is the more gravely ill when it has lost even the 
capacity to feel pain.213
 
Augustine’s quarrel with the Stoic conception of virtue, vice and good life extended beyond 
terminology when and was explained in more detail when it came to his debate with Pelagius. 
For Augustine, the only true earthly happiness lies in the hope of salvation and the eternal life 
of the blessed, and that requires God’s grace as a gift. As such, the Stoic insistence on self-
sufficiency and the ideal of the apatheia are wrong-headed from the start as it is a version of 
the primal sin of Adam, who “choosing to be sufficient unto himself suffers a deficiency in 
lapsing from the one who is truly sufficient for him.”214
 
If apathy is that condition in which there is neither fear to frighten nor pain to 
distress, we must avoid it in our present life if we wish to live in the right way, 
that is, according to God.215
 
                                                 
211 City of God, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 312-313. 
212 Except for such Schadenfreude as lust and pride. These are discussed in detail by R. Sorabji (2003). 
213 Tract. in Ioan. 60.3. quoted by Colish, (1985) II. p. 223. 
214 City of God,  XIV. 13. “Loeb”, p. 341. 
215 City of God, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 315. 
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The good life is not a do-it-yourself project in which one can attain full control of his or her 
behaviour and dispositions. Even unhappy passions such as longing, pain, fear and mourning, 
have enormous value for us, for “if we were to feel no such emotions at all while we still bear 
the weakness of our present life, then rather should we not live a proper life. For the Apostle 
berated and denounced certain persons who, he also said, lacked natural affection [sine 
affectione].”216
 
A note on ‘The Passion of Christ’ and human passions 
 
The Augustinian linguistic manoeuvres with affetcus, motus, passiones can be rendered more 
plastic by contrasting “the passion of Christ” with human passions. The first meaning of 
‘passion’ originating in Latin passio and arriving in Middle English through Old French 
mediation is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “the sufferings of Jesus Christ on 
the Cross (also often including the Agony in Gethsemane)” (1.a) or the “narrative of the 
sufferings of Christ from the Gospels Passion of Christ as a set narrative told by the Gospels” 
(1.c). Clearly, it is a reserved and specific sense of the word, although the one that appears by 
far the most often in vernacular European languages until the Early Modern period.217 These 
meanings are related, even if distantly but primarily, to that of Aristotle as defined in 
Metaphysics, , 1022 b 18. where pathos is defined as “[e]specially, injurious alterations and 
movements, and above all, painful injuries.” The narrative of the Passion of Christ is a 
sequence of sufferings that happens to and is assumed by Christ but, unlike the Aristotelian 
(and, to some extent, the Thomist218) negative association of path  / passiones, Christ’s 
passion is, for the Christian believer, far from being morally or ontologically negative. The 
narrative has its specific place in human history seen in a Christian perspective (Salvation 
history, Heilsgeschichte) and, as the act of Redemption of man, it is the ultimate source of 
joy. The passions of man are different…When ‘passions’ (mostly in Plural) are used in 
                                                 
216 City of God, XIV. 9. “Loeb”, p. 312-313. 
217 Diller, Ibid (2004), p. 176. notes that only one-sixth of the occurrences of ‘passion’ in Medieval 
English do not refer to the Passion of Christ or a martyr. 
218 For Aquinas, passions in the strict sense involve change for the worse and, more generally, they are 
ranked with the passive and not fully actualised entities existing on the lower, degraded rungs of the 
ontological ladder. 
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relationship to humans, they refer to certain affective states and go back to Classical 
psychology and ethics. Whereas the context of the Passion of Christ is always theological, 
liturgical and is related to Salvation history, the contexts of man’s passions are psychological, 
moral, and anthropological and are often the subject of ethical and pastoral counsel. But there 
is an interesting development that takes place within Christianity that could perhaps be 
metaphorically described as the Gethsemane turn whereby these two, distinctive uses and 
senses of ‘passion’ are getting closer, at least on a conceptual-metaphoric level, although they 
never fully overlap. In the Garden of Gethsemane, Christ is beginning to experience painful 
human passions219 (tristitia) as a human person and as part of his “Passion”. Also, in 
Christian discussions of the passions, the actual passions/affections experienced by Christ 
(and not his Passion as such) are sometimes evoked: his affection for Lazarus (grief, sorrow), 
the fear in the Garden of Gethsemane, as well as the more apparent love for his disciples and 
for all humans. Even if the fixed sense of ‘Passion of Christ’ does not change and remains 
constant throughout the history of ‘passion’, there is, however, a conceptual/metaphoric level 
where the ‘Passion of Christ’ and the actual affections of Christ are getting closer. 
Considering that these are close to the very ‘passions’ proscribed by the Stoics and inherited 
from Virgil and Cicero (quadrivium), the Christian approval of such ‘passions’ in certain 
cases amounts to an anti-Stoic turn. The point is made with clarity and considerable 
vehemence by Augustine in his exegesis of the Gospel of John when exploring the unique and 
exemplary merits of the Passion of Christ. As Colish notes “Christ himself suffered in mind 
and body. This fact, says Augustine, makes vain the wisdom of the world, here typified as the 
Stoics: ‘Down with the arguments of the philosophers who deny that the wise man can suffer 
perturbations of the soul.’”220
But leaving the actual doctrinal tenets aside – where, notwithstanding, ambiguities 
prevail – and focusing more on the semantic nuances of the word in the Christian context, it 
can be argued that a new field is being delimited within ‘passions’ that is different from the 
eupatheia enjoyed by the Stoic sage. There can be affective perturbations that are legitimate. 
And it is here that Saint Augustine’s linguistic manoeuvres with motus, passiones, 
perturbationes, affectus are most revealing and where Augustine’s debate with Pelagius is 
                                                 
219 Of course, there are other examples prior to it as sorrow, grief, anger, joy (cf. above) but the case in 
the Garden of Gethsemane is of a particularly important point in the history of redemption…  
220 Colish, (1985) II. p. 223. The passage quoted by Colish is from Tract. in Ioan. 60.3 
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decisive: if passions cannot be eradicated then to wish so would be not only inhuman but a 
rebellion against god. This entails that Pelagianism vindicates too much for man: to will 
someone’s own salvation and justification is an act of self-pride that leaves no room for 
prevenient grace (gracia preveniens). 
 
 
II. 2. 2. St. Thomas Aquinas 
 
 
As the Aquinian anthropology and anatomy of the passions was used or often implied in 
the passion treatises of the Early Modern period, I shall expose elements of it in Chapter III.1. 
I am focusing below on some of its basic elements and his taxonomy of the passions that I 
find most pertinent for assessing the Classical and medieval Christian legacy of the passions. 
St. Thomas Aquinas’ treatise on the passions in Summa Theologiae, II-1.22-48 is part of 
his monumental synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian thought in. In his treatise, he 
assimilated many features of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Augustinian accounts of the “passions 
of the soul”. For him, in line with his faculty psychology approach, passions (passiones) are 
acts or movements of the sensitive appetite which are caused by external objects apprehended 
by the “estimative” or “cogitative” power. Passions of the soul also entail bodily changes for 
example changes in bodily temperature, alterations in the movements of the heart. Passions 
thus belong to the soul-body composite and they belong to the soul only “accidentally”. 
Passio presupposes materiality and this is why it cannot be predicated of God.221 Since 
human cogitative or estimative power is susceptible to reason, so are human passions, too. 
They are also subject to moral evaluation; they are good if they are in accord with reason, and 
are thus “moderate”, and they are evil if they flout reason, or are excessive. This way, 
Aquinas adopted a fundamentally Aristotelian position with regard to the passions: moderate 
passions are good and can even be functional by spurring appropriate action, whereas 
excessive passions are bad. He elaborated a new classificatory scheme of the passions 
although using a distinction that was present already in Plato’s Timaeus, suggested by 
Aristotle, and given physiological grounding by Galen. It is the distinction between 
                                                 
221 Deus sine passione amat, Thomas Aquinas, De veritate, 26.1 cf. also Summa Theologiae, I, xx, 1, 
ad 1. 
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concupiscible and irascible passions. He produced a taxonomy of eleven basic kinds of 
passions: six passions stemming from the concupiscible appetite and five from the irascible. 
 
Concupiscible: (inclination away or toward an object; good/evil) 
love     hate 
desire     aversion 
joy      pain 
 
Irascible: (related to the circumstances surrounding concupiscible passions and their objects, 
caused by movement toward good or away from evil) 
 
hope     despair 
fear     daring  
   anger 
 
Aquinas’s evaluation of the passions was mixed. On the one hand, moderate passions 
serve the ends of human and animal life. On the other hand, since he took passions to involve 
change for the worse, and more generally, ranked passions with the passive and not fully 
actualized entities existing on the lower level of the ontological ladder. 
II. 2. 3. Conclusion: Localism / Globalism 
 
 The title of this chapter was the Classical Heritage of ‘Passion’ and it sought to survey 
with a rather broad sweep the ancient and early Medieval senses of ‘passion’ taking into 
account the different ethical, anthropological and theological concerns implied. While it 
seems to be legitimate to talk about the a classical heritage of ‘passion’, such a designation is 
not meant to suggest, as I hope it became evident from the above discussions, that there had 
been a shared univocal meaning of the word among authors as diverse as Homer, Plato, 
Chrysippus or Saint Augustine. The “classical sense” itself is best understood as a certain 
richness of meaning in ‘passion’: the Classical heritage itself consists of multiple strands that 
are often in conflict with each other. Thus one can identify a Platonic-Aristotelian tradition on 
the one hand, and the radical Stoic tradition on the other hand. 
I have been using the word-pair localism/globalism in this chapter in the very specific 
sense to distinguish between two ways of conceiving the world and the human condition. 
Thus, even at the cost of simplifying matters a bit, as a heuristic device, I suggest to set up a 
rough typology of anthropological, moral and, ultimately, ontological attitudes in order to 
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highlight the stakes behind changes in the meaning of ‘passion’. I used the word globalism to 
refer to a conception of the world that sees homogeneity, a deeply seated unity of mode of 
being and hence proposes a singular model to follow for all beings and in all contexts. Closest 
to the globalist attitude are the Stoics (in particular the Stoicism of Chrysippus) with their 
psychological monism, their advocacy of moral autarchy (hegemonikon), their insistence on 
the supremacy of reason, judgement and free will, and, underpinning these, a deterministic 
universe animated in all its parts by a singular logos.222 This monolithic globalist view can be 
contrasted with the localism of heterogeneity, of diversity of mode of being, of different 
regimes of ethical concern that – in its Christian version – may even entail a renouncement to 
moral autarchy and considers it as blasphemous and contrary to the nature of the soul and to 
the workings of divine grace. The localist attitude regards being as heterogenous without 
seeking to unify the different modes of being. Rather it allows them to exist in a spatially and 
temporally displaced manner and seeks ways of transitions between them. Accordingly, it 
accepts that different ethical thrusts and psychic needs may prevail in different modes of 
being: in  For Plato there is a dualism of body and soul and also room for the irrational within 
the human soul (thymos) and thus Plato can call for a canalisation of the irrational towards the 
rational. Furthermore, the tripartite human anthropology is analogous / isomorphic to the 
social-political make-up of society, of the polis. Both the human soul ‘within’ and the polis 
‘out there’ makes room for non-rational, affective content. There is thus room for different 
regimes to exist both within man and within the universe. 
The Aristotelian position is also closer to the localist perspective with its 
acknowledgement of human finitude and it cognitive consequences. Besides the obviously 
contextual nature of finding the mean in specific contexts and in any given situation, 
Aristotle’s distinction between ‘prudence’  / phron sis and  / sophia is 
illustrative and revealing in this regard. For the Stoics, judgement must be the result of and 
take part in sophia and should be based on knowledge (  / epist m ) that is necessary 
and is related to the divine world. In the Stoic universe, animated in all its parts by the same 
logos, there is no place for a distinction within intellectual virtues as one contingent in a 
sublunary world and as one necessary in the divine world.223 For Aristotle, prudence and the 
kind of knowledge it can provide (  / doxa) is a human substitute of a wisdom that is 
                                                 
222 Cf. also the passage cited above from Cicero, De republica (deum te igitur scito esse…) VI. 24. 
223 Cf. Pierre Aubenque, Ibid, p. 185. 
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unattainable in the ordinary sublunary world. Thus we can see that in contrast with the 
Aristotelian teaching about human knowledge and the kind of behaviour that can be based on 
it and which is a form of localism inasmuch as it allows for different types of knowledges to 
coexist, the globalism of Stoic teaching, based on the monolithic and homogeneous rule of the 
one and the same divine logos everywhere, does not allow for such distinctions. We shall see 
later, that Christians will refute this Stoic position on ethical as well as ontological grounds: 
man is not and cannot be fully master of himself (saving divine grace must intervene), and the 
human finitude forbids such aspirations. 
Early Medieval Christianity, Saint Augustine in particular, is closer to the Platonic-
Aristotelian strand but, given its historical position, it can assimilate and adapt to Christian 
use Stoic elements as well. But if one has to place it on the globalist / localist scale, it would 
certainly fall under the latter category. Augustine clearly delimits the here of human life from 
the hoped there: our fallen state versus the blessed, eternal life; life as is and life as will be: 
the human city and the City of God. Just as there are two worlds in the Platonic universe, one 
superlunary and one sublunary so are there two realms in the Christian universe (although the 
structure is perhaps even more important temporally than spatially) and, particularly, in 
Christian psychology and ethics: one before and one after Redemption and justification by 
grace.224
In a way, the diverging senses of ‘passion’ (implying the semantic shift as well as the 
appearance of ‘emotion’) are already present in Augustine in their embryonic form, 
sometimes explicitly thematized as in City of God, XIV. 9., but more often implicit in his uses 
of motio and passio (with different implications of perturbation and agitation). But it is the 
modern, vernacular (French as well as English) context that triggers the change from this 
                                                 
224 To further illustrate the localist attitude, Blaise Pascal could be evoked. He gives a full-fledged and 
philosophically seminal (cf. S. Kierkegaard, M. Heidegger, E. Levinas) development of such kind of 
localism (albeit in a non-Platonic sense) in the 17th century in Les Pensées (first published 1670). He 
distinguishes among three orders: l’ordre de la chair (the order of the flesh), l’ordre de l’esprit (the 
order of the mind), and l’ordre du coeur (the order of the heart) with ethical regimes and outlooks 
corresponding to each of them. Although his existential-Christian philosophy cannot be reduced to a 
reception of Augustine, it may be worth noting that he was close to the Janzenist circles of the Port-
Royal and Janzenism itself developed on the basis of a thorough re-reading of the works of Augustine 
in the 17th century. 
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potential. And, as we shall see in chapter III.3 on Florio’s Montaigne, the translation from one 
language to the other – which adds a further axis to contexts of interculturality: between 
vernaculars and between the Classics and the Early Moderns… Chapters III.1-3 will seek to 
explore the different configurations how linguistic innovations are symptoms of and are 
interlaced with conceptual changes and perhaps even vice versa. It is also the reason why I 
have dealt with Aquinas in an even more summarily fashion than with the other authors. 
Because the argument I wish to put forward in the subsequent chapters will situate the 
problem of the semantic change of ‘passion’ at the intersections of Augustinianism, 
Renaissance humanism, Neo-Stoicism and Protestantism, tendencies which, one might say, 
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III. 1. The Passions in the Humanist Agenda 
 
In England, the Early Modern period produced a large number of treatises and didactic 
poems dealing with the passions that were inspired both by a Classical wish for self-
knowledge Nosce Teipsum ('Know Thyself'), and by Christian self-inspection for the purposes 
of moral and psychological therapy. Many of them were written in English (for e.g. T. 
Rogers, T. Bright, J. Davies, Davies of Hereford, A. Dixon, T. Wright, R. Burton) but there 
were also several translations from Latin (mainly Cicero and St. Thomas Aquinas) and French 
Neo-Stoics (La Primauday, Charron).225 Although not written specifically as treatises on 
passions, the conduct-books of the period also spell out some of the implications of the place 
passions should occupy in appropriate behaviour. The keen interest of Elizabethan society for 
such kind of literature is also attested by the popularity of such conduct-books as Sir Thomas 
Elyot, Book named the Governor (1531) and Sir Thomas Hoby’s translation of the Italian 
Baldassare Castiglione’s Il Corteggiano (1528) published in 1561 as The Book of the 
Courtier. These conduct books can be taken as the Renaissance development of a medieval 
genre (the “mirror for princes”), which in turn goes back to ancient models.226 The topic is 
also duly discussed in the age's most important programmatic work for science and 
philosophy, in Sir Francis Bacon's The Advancement of Learning. Of course, the English stage 
is no exception to the general preoccupation with man's and woman's passion: revenge plays, 
comedies and tragedies both ancient (cf. translations of Seneca’s tragedies starting from 
1560s227) and modern centre around and colour the understanding and experience of the 
                                                 
 
225 Cf. Appendix 2 and above. 
226 Cf. J. B. Trapp, “Education in the Renaissance” in Background to the English Renaissance – 
Introductory Lectures, foreword by J. B. Trapp, London: Gray-Mills Publishing, 1974, p. 87. 
227 At the Inns of Court, students and fellows (such as Jasper Heywood, Alexander Neville, John 
Studley) translated Seneca’s dramas and performed a series of Senecan and neo-Senecan plays from 
1559. In the 1580s and 1590s, after a decade-long break in the performance and publication of Seneca, 
Thomas Newton compiled the first English anthology of the Tenne Tragedies (1581). Seneca’s Early 
Modern English reception has a rich critical literature recently re-assessed by Jessica Winston, 
“Seneca in Early Elizabethan England” in Renaissance Quarterly, Spring 2006. The critical literature 
includes, among others, T. S. Eliot, "Seneca in Elizabethan Translation." in Selected Essays, London, 
1932; Lathrop, H. B. Translations of the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman, 1477-1620 
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passions of the soul. The remark of the English scholar Anthony Levi, S.J. about French 
culture from 1585 to 1649 is also valid for England: 
 
The theory of the passions was central to the moral debates of the period. The 
passions could be overcome, moderated, eradicated, or stimulated by reason, 
will, or grace.228
 
As some of the books on the passions mentioned above were translations from French, the 
interest in this issue was shared on the two sides of the Channel with perhaps a more 
accentuated theoretical interest in Early Modern French culture. As Levy suggests, the issues 
involved with regard to the passions concern not only their definition and nature but also and, 
perhaps even more importantly, the ways to pre-empt, to eradicate or to use them. 
The importance of the theme of the passions in Early Modern culture can be explained 
on several grounds. As a broader context of this topic, Early Modern humanism has to be 
taken into account as the broader intellectual movement preparing and accompanying the 
Renaissance in Europe from the 15th to the 17th century. It is within the context of this 
movement that issues about the nature of man, about the exercise of his will, the uses of 
learning and the possibilities of education come into the forefront of debates. Compared to 
Medieval views of man that allowed relatively little room for the flexibility of the subject, the 
Early Modern period presented a more dynamic view of man and his place in the universe. In 
general, Medieval thinkers held human nature to be unalterably fixed: medieval doctrines of 
                                                                                                                                                        
(New York, 1967, (reprint of 1933); Hunter, G. K. "Seneca and the Elizabethans: A Case-Study in 
'Influence.'" in Shakespeare Survey 20 (1967): pp. 17-26.; Frederick Kiefer, "Seneca Speaks in 
English: What the Elizabethan Translators Wrought." Comparative Literature Studies 15 (1978b), pp. 
372-87; Gordon Braden, Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition: Anger's Privilege (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985). For a broader perspective on Stoicism and English 
Renaissance Literature cf. Gilles D. Monsarrat, Light from the Porch. Stoicism and English 
Renaissance Literature (Paris: Didier-Erudition, 1984).  
228 Anthony Levi, S.J., French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions from 1585 to 1649, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1964, p. 4. Cf. also Carole Talon-Hugon, Descartes ou Les  Passions rêvées par la 
raison – Essai sur la théorie des passions de Descartes et de quelques-uns de ses contemporains, Paris : 
Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2002. By way of introduction to an analysis of Descartes’s 
understanding of the passion, Talon-Hugon provides, in the first chapter of her book, an overview of 
the doxa on the passions in the first half of the 17th century in France. 
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personality attributed an unalterable thisness (haecceitas) to each separate creature, a thisness 
that the individual was unable to modify.229 In contrast to Medieval scholasticism that 
regarded man’s position in essentially static, hieratic terms, the Renaissance stressed man’s 
dynamic, operative potential for restoration of the divine image as well as the possibility for 
irremediable bestialisation.230 Intimately related to this conception of humanity is the idea of 
an almost chameleon-like indeterminacy and malleability of man where passions may lead 
towards degeneration. For perhaps the most famous exposition of this latter point in 
Renaissance philosophy can be found in Giovanni Pico della Mirandola’s Oration on the 
Dignity of Man (1486). In his praise of man Pico shows the indeterminacy of his nature, his 
vertical flexibility and hence the prime importance of the free will in moulding himself in 
whatever shape he prefers: brutish or divine. (In the words of 20th century existentialists, man 
is distinguished by the fact that for him existence precedes essence.) Man may determine to 
fashion (effingere) himself into the form of life he prefers. This is Pico’s version of the 
Creation of Adam: 
 
At last the best of artisans ordained that that creature to whom He had been able 
to give nothing proper to himself should have joint possession of whatever had 
been peculiar to each of the different kinds of being. He therefore took man as a 
creature of indeterminate nature and, assigning him a place in the middle of the 
world, addressed him thus: ‘neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone 
nor any function peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that 
according to thy longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and 
possess what abode, what form, and what functions thou thyself shalt desire. The 
nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws 
prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own 
free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits 
of thy nature. We have set thee at the world’s center that thou mayest from 
thence more easily observe whatever is in the world. We have made thee neither 
of heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, so that with freedom of 
choice and with honour, as though the maker and molder of thyself, thou mayest 
fashion (effingere) thyself in whatever shape thou shalt prefer. Thou shalt have 
                                                 
229 Cf. Thomas Greene, “The Flexibility of the Self in Renaissance Literature” in The Disciplines of 
Criticism. Essays in Literary Theory, Interpretation and History, ed. by Peter Demetz, Thomas 
Greene, and Lowry Nelson, Jr., New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968,  p. 242-243. 
230 Cf. Charles Trinkaus, “Renaissance Idea of the Dignity of Man” article in The Dictionary of the 
History of Ideas, vol. 4, p. 140. Electronic version maintained by: The Electronic text Center at the 
University of Virginia Library, 2003, Gale Group. 
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the power to degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish. Thou 
shalt have the power, out of thy soul’s judgement, to be reborn into the higher 
forms, which are divine. 231
 
This Renaissance discourse about the dignity of man builds on a complex of notions inherited 
from ancient thought and literature such as the praise of man as the inventor of the arts and 
crafts, as a microcosm, as being distinguished by speech and reason. Pico’s influential 
Oration on the Dignity of Man is also characteristic of subsequent humanist attitudes in that it 
gives to philosophy and to humanist learning more generally, a special place in man’s ascent 
towards the higher forms of life. This conception of the human dignity has its roots in Cicero 
who defines the dignity of the human race in the following terms:  
 
But it is essential to every inquiry about duty that we keep before our eyes how 
far superior man is by nature to cattle and other beasts: they have no thought 
except for sensual pleasure and this they are impelled by every instinct to seek; 
but man's mind is nurtured by study and meditation; he is always either 
investigating or doing, and he is captivated by the pleasure of seeing and 
hearing. […] From this we see that sensual pleasure is quite unworthy of the 
dignity of man and that we ought to despise it and cast it from us.232
 
Human dignity resides in the possibility of developing man’s mind by study and 
reflection. Thus for the humanist program, understood as the promotion of studium 
humanitatis, the quality of being most truly human is to be acquired through the study of 
liberal arts. As the nobility and dignity of man is grounded in his mind as the seat of reason, 
as the fountainhead of right action, and of improvement, the “passions of the mind” represent 
a particular danger.233 Passions pose a threat, as they are potentially disruptive to this 
humanist wish to improve human life by applying the fruits of studies, of learning. Humanism 
                                                 
231 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, trans. by E. L. Forbes in The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. by E. Cassirer, P. O. Kristeller, J. H. Randall, Jr., (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1948) pp. 224-225. (paragraph 3 of the Oration). 
232 Cicero, De Officiis, I. 30. (my emphasis, G.S.) in Cicero, On Duties, “Loeb” p. 107. 
233 For the idea that “the notion of man as mind is one of the hallmarks of Renaissance thought” 
Barbara L. Parker, A Precious Seeing. Love and Reason in Shakespeare’s Plays, New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1987, pp. 44-49 who cites P. O. Kristeller (Renaissance Thought 
and Its Sourrces, ed. Michael Mooney, New York: Columbia University Press, 1979) in support of 
this position. 
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must find a way to treat the passions also because it is predicated on a view of man that prizes 
human reason and intellect and sees it as the seat of human mind and as a means to moral 
improvement. Also, in the early modern encounter between Stoicism and Christianity 
humanist discourses on the dignity of man have to be refined and to be revised in order to 
better accommodate corporeal and affective aspects in human nature. I wish to argue that this 
will entail and, in fact, contribute to the semantic change of passion – a point to which I shall 
return further below. 
A fine example, although presented a contrario, of the centrality of the mind and of 
reason as well as of the threat that passions pose to moral rectitude and spiritual well-being is 
Sir Philip Sidney’s “Sonnet 18” in Astrophil and Stella. 
 
With what sharp checkes I in myself am shent 
 When into Reason’s audit I do go, 
 And by iust counts my selfe a banckrout know 
Of all those goods, which heaven to me hath lent; 
Unable quite to pay even Nature’s rent, 
 Which unto it by birthright I do owe; 
 And which is worse no good excuse can show, 
But that my wealth I have most idly spent. 
 My youth doth waste, my knowledge brings forth toys, 
My wit doth striue those passions to defende, 
Which for reward spoil it with vain annoys. 
I see my course to lose myself doth bend: 
 I see and yet no greater sorrow take, 
234 Than that I lose no more for Stellas sake.
 
 
The poem presents a persona who, in a despondent state, and in a moment of self-inspection, 
registers his bankruptcy due to his inability to show forth the positive use of the talents Nature 
has lent him, namely, the use mental virtues of which the seat is the mind. The italicised line 
explicitly names the context where the (lost) battle with the passions is taking place. The final 
couplet of the sonnet aims to trivialise such loss when it suggests that all is bearable for 
Stella’s stake provided that there is an exit from this state of loss toward her. Notwithstanding, 
the basic pattern of a battle within the mind, the use of “wit” (reason) as the source of a moral 
                                                 
234 Sir Philip Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, “Sonnet 18” in The Norton Anthology of English Literature, 
Volume 1, M. H. Abrams, (general editor), New York, London: W. W. Norton and Co., p. 18. (italics 
mine) 
 108
and mental faculty in combating the passions is there. In the same sequence, “Sonnet 64” goes 
much further in this direction of presenting the love of Stella as the remedy of his loss. 
Ultimately, it identifies Stella with wit and virtue and sacrifices everything for her by 
invoking a series of adversities upon himself: 
 
No more, my deare, no more these counsels trie, 
 O give my passions leaue to run their race: 
 Let Fortune lay on me her worst disgrace, 
Let folke orecharg'd with braine against me crie, 
Let clouds bedimme my face, breake in mine eye, 
 Let me no steps but of lost labour trace, 
 Let all the earth with scorne recount my case, 
But do not will me from my Love to flie. 
 I do not enuie Aristotle’s wit, 
Nor do aspire to Cæsars bleeding fame; 
Nor ought do care, though some aboue me sit, 
Nor hope, nor wish another course to frame, 
 But that which once may win thy cruell hart: 
235 Thou art my wit, and thou my vertue art.
 
He is also ready to renounce the faculty and merit most prized in the humanist context: wit 
and fame. The sacrifice implied in the calamities invoked and in the faculty renounced 
increase the stakes of Stella as their renouncement further warrant the value of Stella, and 
ultimately of his own love toward her. 
When considering lines two and eight, it is noticeable that “passions” are not referred to 
in the sense of ‘erotic love’ or ‘love’ but rather in the general sense of ‘disorder, disease; 
violent commotion of the mind’. In the series of calamities the speaker invokes in lines 2-7, 
the first item is passions running their race (line 2) but in line 8, love is retained: being close 
to his Love (Stella). (Even if “my Love” here means a person, Stella, and not love as such, the 
idea of loving is involved.)  
As we shall see in Chapter III.3, Bacon’s “Georgics of the Mind” or cultura animi  - of 
Ciceronian origin as well - can also be understood in terms of the humanist agenda to apply 
the fruits of studies to moral advancement. Even more emblematic is the image Bacon evokes 
by referring to the myth of Orpheus in the Advancement of Learning in the following terms: 
                                                 
235 Sir Philip Sidney, Astrophil and Stella, “Sonnet 64” in The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney, edited by 
William A. Ringler, Jr., Oxford University Press, 1962. (italics mine) 
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Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences 
which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the 
necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth by the 
ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus' theatre, where all beasts and birds 
assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, 
some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to the airs and accords of 
the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder 
noise, but every beast returned to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the 
nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of 
profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to 
religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, 
of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments 
be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve 
into anarchy and confusion.236
 
Orpheus’s theatre can be taken as a metaphor of the role humanism set for itself: to alter 
human behaviour by the force of learning, rhetoric, understood as “the eloquence and 
persuasion of books”. 
In a more succinct formulation, Erasmus' dictum about the importance of education and 
fashioning - homines non nascuntur, sed figuntur: men are not born, but made or fashioned - 
well expresses the centrality of education for the humanists. Erasmus’ case helps to highlight 
the broadness of this humanist agenda insofar as the aspiration to human dignity (understood 
as an ascent) can encompass both secular and divine studies. As Thomas Greene notes: 
“Nothing is more typical of the Christian humanist in Erasmus than his faith in the moral 
fashioning of the self through sacred study, a fashioning which leads directly to moral 
transformation.”237 In his Paraclesis or Exhortation to his first edition of the two volumes of 
the New Testament (1516) Erasmus writes: 
 
Let us all, therefore, with our whole heart covet this literature, let us embrace it, 
let us continually occupy ourselves with it, let us fondly kiss it, at length let us 
                                                 
236 The Advancement of Learning in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition of the Major Works, Edited by 
Brian Vickers, “The Oxford Authors” (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 154. 
237 Th. Greene, Ibid. p. 255. 
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die in its embrace, let us be transformed in it, since studies are transmuted into 
morals.238
 
239Ultimately, for Erasmus, “a man without education has no humanity at all,”  since lacking 
the arts of good speech, a person’s affections cannot be educated into the patterns of feeling 
that sustain moral perception.  
Education in a broad sense involving the humanist curriculum and propagating 
appropriate conduct in society (cf. books of conduct) was also a matter of prime importance 
for the Early Modern monarchic state which for the administrative consolidation of royal 
power relied on a pool of educated men who could serve as councillors, secretaries, clerks, 
Justices of Peace, and spies.240  
The discourse about the dignity of man finds resonates throughout the Early Modern 
period; it is reassessed by various authors and receives different colourings. Pico’s Neo-
Platonic conception of what is to be truly human is contested within humanism itself by such 
an author as Michel de Montaigne. 
 
To this so religious conclusion of a heathen man I will only add this word, taken 
from a testimony of the same condition, for an end of this long and tedious 
discourse, which might well furnish me with endlesse matter. 'Oh, what a vile 
and abject thing is man (saith he) unlesse he raise himselfe above humanity!' 
Observe here a notable speech and a profitable desire; but likewise absurd. For 
to make the handful greater than the hand, and the embraced greater than the 
arme, and to hope to straddle more than our legs length, is impossible and 
monstrous: nor that man should mount over and above himselfe or humanity; for 
he cannot see but with his owne eyes, nor take hold but with his owne armes. He 
shall raise himself up, if it please God to lend him his helping hand. He may 
elevate himselfe by forsaking and renouncing his owne meanes, and suffering 
himselfe to be elevated and raised by meere heavenly meanes. It is for our 
                                                 
238 Desiderius Erasmus, Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings, ed. John C. 
Olin, (New York, Evanston, and London, 1965) p. 105. quoted by Th. Greene, Ibid, p. 255-256. 
(italics mine, G.S.) 
239 Erasmus, A Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children, trans. by Beert C. 
Verstraete, in The Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 26, ed. by J. K. Sowards (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1985) p. 298. quoted by Donald R. Wehrs, “Touching Words: Embodied Ethics in 
Erasmus, Shakespeare, and Contemporary Theory.” Modern Philology 104, 1 (2006) p. 10. 
240 Elizabeth Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) p. 18. 
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Christian faith, not for his Stoicke vertue, to pretend or aspire to this divine 
Metamorphosis, or miraculous transmutation.241
 
Although the quotation in Montaigne’s text is from Seneca, Montaigne’s opposition to human 
aspirations to go beyond what is genuinely human apply equally to Pico’s program of vertical 
mobility. But the French philosopher’s refusal pertains to the means of this ascent and not to 
its possibility as such: he acknowledges the possibility of superhuman metamorphosis but 
firmly maintains that such ascent is not in our capacity to attain but is only possible through 
“heavenly meanes”. In fact, Pico’s assertion about the indeterminacy of man gives an accrued 
importance to the will in human metamorphosis. Montaigne’s refusal to adhere to such a 
doctrine can be taken as symptomatic of a Christian refusal to grant superhuman powers to 
man. It is at this point that the similarity between Pico’s model and Stoic self-sufficiency can 
be gauged: the psychic autarchism (hegemonikon) or self-rule that Stoicism gives pre-
eminence to the human will and advocates the blanket suppression of the passions. By 
refusing the Stoic aspirations to go beyond humanity, Montaigne refuses, by the same token, 
the radical optimism of a certain humanist agenda about the malleability of man and his 
capacity for vertical mobility. This does not mean, of course, that Montaigne would be 
opposed to change: his very activity of an essay-writer – and perhaps the most original in that 
for having established the genre – is based on his being in the “passage”.242
Montaigne’s self-exploration can also serve as a link to another issue to which the 
problem of the passion is closely linked in the period. The great popularity of Early Modern 
passion-treatises can be well inscribed in the practice proposed by the famous Delphic motto 
of   “Know thyself” or Nosce teipsum as it was more often referred to in the 
period. Treatises on the passions most often explicitly referred to this injunction that can 
perhaps be taken as the motto of popular philosophy in the Renaissance. For example, 
Thomas Rogers, in the preface of his A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the 
minde (1576) professes to be writing for those readers whose "chiefest though not only care is 
                                                 
241 Michel de Montaigne, “An Apologie of Raymond Sebond” in The Essays of Michael Lord of 
Montaigne, 1580, 1597. Translated by John Florio, (1603) in 3 volumes, (London: Frowde, World's 
Classics Edition, 1904) Vol. 2. p. 367-368. (italics mine, G.S.) 
242 Michel Montaigne, “Of Repenting” in The Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597. 
Translated by John Florio, 1603. World's Classics edition. 3 volumes, Vol. 3. (London:  Frowde, 1904) 
p. 20. 
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to know themselves". These exercises in self-knowledge can be related to forms of “care of 
the self” as presented above in Chapter I.3. And just as the ancient Delphic precept of ‘Know 
thyself’ was but one aspect and concrete application of taking care of one’s self, similarly, we 
may assume that Early Modern passion-treatises were not only written with this perspective in 
mind but they were also received in such a way by the less scholarly-minded reading public. 
In the perspective of knowing oneself, reading moral treatises on the “anatomy of the mind” 
may be taken as a “practice of the self”, as part of an exercise (askesis) aimed at 
understanding and transforming one’s self and what we would term today as psychic 
behaviour. Of course, we must be aware that such a category as psychic behaviour implying 
purely psychic phenomena was not available in the period under consideration; all psychic 
phenomena were intimately linked to both moral categories and to interrelated elements of the 
world within (microcosmos) and without (macrocosmos). The work of Thomas Rogers shows 
the prevailing tendency in the period of presenting the passions in a moral framework. He was 
a scholar and divine of Christ Church, Oxford and his book is representative of a type of 
moral philosophy in the Renaissance that deals with passions as important elements in man's 
quest for virtue by becoming more rational. They can be either properly used for a good cause 
or improperly allowed to subvert virtue by hindering the process of reason. Thus he divided 
his book in two parts; the first part is of “Perturbations (and discourseth of that parte of the 
minde of man which is voide of reason)” and the second part treats of “Moral virtues (so 
called because it is of that parte of the minde which is endued with reason)”.243 The first part 
deals with man himself, his soul and physical nature and the passions are called 
“perturbations”. Four passions are listed as primary following Cicero: pleasure, lust, fear, and 
sorrow. The second book concerns moral virtue and deals minutely with the preservation and 
exercises of goods of fortune, nature and the mind. Thus Rogers’ treatise exhibits one of the 
current notions of moral virtue as having to do with the conflict between reason and unreason 
where the passions are denied rationality: a discussion of man’s physical and animate nature 
(presenting man as a microcosm of the larger creation) is followed by another discussion of 
his moral nature and his exercise of moral virtue. The concern he and his readers have with 
the passions is fundamentally moral. While Thomas Rogers’ approach to the problem of the 
passions with a moralistic bias is the more widespread in the period, it is not the exclusive 
                                                 
243 Thomas Rogers, A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the minde (1576) quoted by 
Lily B. Campbell, Shakespeare’s Tragic Heroes. Slaves of Passion, London: Methuen, 1930. 
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bent of analysis. Similarly to Rogers, Bartholomaeus Anglicus (of Bartolomew of 
Glanville)244 245 246 247, Pierre La Primaudaye , Sir John Davies , Pierre Charron , Anthony 
Dixon248 249 250 251, John Davies of Hereford , Thomas Wright  Nicolas Coffeteau  approach the 
problem of the passions from the point of view of the soul and their main concern are moral 
issues. Physicians at some points in their careers such as Levius Lemnius252, Timothy 
Bright253 254 and Juan Huarte  see human beings more in terms of humours, spirits, 
complexions, temperaments and natural heat as informed by Galenic medicine. They start the 
discussion of the nature of man from the physical basis. As Galenic medicine treats bodily 
phenomena and moral issues in a holistic manner, the moral questions and opinions are not 
neglected by Renaissance physicians either but their approach to passions usually reveals the 
physical bias of their calling. Their treatises answer to the basic dilemma and a probable cause 
of anxiety as to whether human passions are mechanistically determined by the flux of 
humours and blood, the motions of the vital spirits, bodily temperature and other physical 
factors. Thus Timothy Bright describes the government of the passions as essentially 
                                                 
244 He wrote De proprietabus rerum in the 14th century a popular medieval treatise that was many 
times published on the continent. It was published in English in 1582 as Batman vppon Bartholome, 
his booke De proprietabus rerum. 
245 The French Academie ((Books 1 and 2:1586, 1594) translated by Thomas Bowes. Five editions of 
Bowe’s translation appeared by 1614 and three more editions, of different translators from later French 
editions were put out between 1594 and 1605; Book 3 was translated by Robert Dolman, (1601). Book 
4 by W(illiam?), P(ihilippe?) (1618) - the whole work was published in 1618. 
246 Nosce Teipsum (1599) – a didactic poem on the nature of man’s soul. Four more editions appeared 
by 1622. 
247 Of Wisdome, translated into English by Sampson Lennard, 1606. (First published in Bordeaux, in 
1601.) 
248 The Dignitie of man, (1612). 
249 Microcosmos, the discovery of the little world, (1603) – a didactic poem on the nature of man. It 
was reissued twice in 1611. 
250 The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) (1604) (1620). 
251 A Table of Humane Passions (1621) translated into English by Edmund Grimeston. 
252 A Touchstone of Complexions, translated into English by Thomas Newton in 1576. 
253 A Treatise of Melancholie (1586) 
254 The Examination of Mens Wits, translated by Richard Carew, 1596 
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rhetorical: “a civill subjection ruled by counsel and restraint”. In The Passions of the Mind, 
Thomas Wright attempts to tread a middle ground in order to achieve a comprehensive 
treatment. He keeps his readers informed of the physical processes that accompany and in 
some case initiate passions. Thus he allows the humours a natural role in moving the passions 
but only insofar as they are sympathetic with the soul’s operations. Movement of the soul 
arises from the “purer spirits” flowing from the brain, the residence of the imagination. Those 
spirits act upon the sympathetic responses of the heart. But at the same time he preserves a 
moral and religious stance commensurate with his ecclesiastical background as a Jesuit priest 
in stressing the sinfulness of passionate excess. 
Early Modern authors base their work concerning the anatomy of the passions on a 
long-term synthesis of philosophical and theological thought culminating in the work of 
Thomas Aquinas. It is understood that only man has immortal soul that is created by God and 
soul is the very life of a human being. The human soul is the lowest form of immaterial 
spiritual substance; it is below the angels in the scale of existence which extends from man at 
the lower end to God at the highest point. The soul itself has three parts: the vegetative, 
sensory, and rational souls which are all components of the one indivisible entity. The 
vegetative part is the lowest form of soul, it is found in all living things: it drives and governs 
processes of nourishment, growth, and reproduction. The sensory part is common to animals 
and humans: it is the medium of sensation and empowers man to apprehend stimuli from 
within or without, and to desire. It acts under the control and guidance of reason, and the 
sensory soul's proper end is to apprehend and desire sensory good. Apprehending and desiring 
functions are further divided into two powers; the apprehending is composed of internal and 
external powers: the external one (“outer wits” or “utter wits” in Wright’s book) gather sense 
impressions from the network of the five senses, and deliver them to the brain where they are 
received by the “inner wits”. The four inner wits of the sensory soul are common sense, 
imagination or fantasy, instinct, memory. These reside in the brain that has four cavities: two 
in front (common sense, imagination), one in the middle (the judging powers: instinct and 
rationality) one in the rear (memory). They operate as common sense receives sense data from 
without and presents them simultaneously to imagination, which has the power to retain data 
for some time. Imagination presents data to judging faculties; the lower judging faculty reacts 
automatically, but is ruled by the higher judging faculty (ratio particularis). Imagination can 
also present data from memory; instinct stores data presented to it unselectively. Common 
sense, imagination, instinct, and memory are the inner wits or faculties belonging to the 
sensory soul. Particular reason is the important controlling faculty of the rational soul. 
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Rational judgement of man can control instinct; it can commit to memory and will, and can 
control sensory appetite and the passions that arise out of it. 
The desiring soul is divided into two appetites: the concupiscible and the irascible. 
When an appetite is either the desire of some perceived good or the hatred of some perceived 
evil it is called concupiscence; when consists in a desire to attack or overcome whatever 
threatens or stands in the way of that good, it is an irascible appetite. Whereas the 
concupiscible appetite is directed toward the thing itself, the irascible appetite is aiming 
toward the circumstances surrounding the thing. Wright uses the terms “coveting” and 
“invading” to concupiscible/irascible. 
Rational soul is common to humans and angels, the wit or intellective power 
understands and judges whereas the will desires the good. Wit seeks to know the highest and 
most perfect truth, while will desires metaphysical or moral goodness. Wit and will are true 
leaders of man's commonwealth - often impugned and corrupted by the effects of inordinate 
passions, to the increase of vice and fall of virtue. 
Man is understood as a microcosm, a little world in which the components and 
hierarchical relationships of the larger universe were reflected. As God and lesser spiritual 
powers ruled over the world of matter, so the divine quality of reason is perceived as the 
rightful ruler over the lower sensory and vegetal functions, and the soul, captained by its 
rational part, rightfully exercises sovereignty over the body.  The body itself is also a 
microcosm of physical nature and is composed of the four basic elements: earth, air, water, 
fire intermixed in delicate compounds. Each of these elements has well-defined qualities: 
earth is cold and dry; air is hot and moist; water is cold and moist, fire is hot and dry. The 
balance of these elemental properties is important in determining an individual's temperament. 
The chemical processes of the body are affected by fluids or humours in the blood. These 
humours are four in number: blood, phlegm, choler (or red bile), and melancholy (black bile). 
Blood is the purest and most life-giving humour, associated with air (heat, moisture). Phlegm 
and choler, identified with the cold and moist properties of water and the hot and dry 
properties of fire, are humours more neutral in themselves.  
The spirits provide link with the soul through which the body itself or its various 
processes are activated. There was much disagreement as to exact nature and function of 
bodily spirits which is the highest and most refined state of matter. There are three types: 
natural (produced in liver), vital (produced in heart), animal (further refining of vital spirits in 
brain). The three types of spirits are associated with the three types of souls:  natural spirits 
empower vegetative operations; vital spirits govern motions of blood and humour surrounding 
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the heart; animal spirits move the whole body and are the media of sensation, whose 
operations properly, but not necessarily, are under the control of reason. Animal spirits can be 
considered the most important link between body and soul; vital spirits figure in the motions 
of humours about the heart, where passions are produced. Passions, or affections, or emotions, 
are both the operations themselves of the sensory soul's appetitive or desiring faculties and the 
effects thereby produced in the body. 
Writers on the passions are mainly concerned with the soul's sensory powers through 
which the body is moved and the rational power communicates with the physical world, and 
over which the rational power must exercise control to allow the progress of moral virtue. 
Although there are passions in the rational soul too but rational appetite, will, deals mainly in 
abstractions, affecting the body only though the sensory faculties. As they are the operations 
of our sensory appetite, we perceive passions almost every moment in our lives, when we 
love, hate, fear, enjoy, or desire anything; we feel them not only in our minds but in our 
bodies as well. The immediacy and the potential strength of passions pose a threat to the 
ordered working of the little worlds of our bodies and souls; the authority of our higher 
rational powers may be undermined and perverted from their proper roles as guardians of our 
spiritual nature. For these reasons Wright and others treat passions with the utmost 
seriousness, considering an understanding of their natures and tendencies as vital to 
preserving physical and spiritual health. 
The location of the passions' influence in the body is agreed to be the heart. Ancient 
opinion differed over the question of whether this organ or the brain were the more important, 
but finally the proposition that the brain was the seat of sensation and the mental faculties, and 
the heart the seat of vital processes, gained acceptance. 
 The basis of analogy between microcosm and macrocosm that structures the anatomy 
of the soul is the exercise of power by a higher entity: God over the universe, reason over the 
body. Early Modern writers often use similar structures in a horizontal sense when describing 
human behaviour. The social model of governance is applied to the behaviour of the 
individual. This mode of governance applied to the soul, while it underpins all Renaissance 
discourse about the passions, is explicitly spelled out in Erasmus, The Manual of the Christian 
Knight (1501) and in Sir Thomas Elyot's manual for conduct, The Governour (1531). 
 In exposing the need for a concord between the soul and the body, Erasmus refers to 
the original sin and presents it in terms of a corrupted governance: 
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[…] but sin hath evil-corrupted and decayed that which was well created, sowing 
the poison of dissension between them that were honestly agreed, for before that 
time both the mind ruled the body without business, and the body obeyed 
without grudging. The order between them is so troubled, the affections or 
appetites of the body strive to go before reason, and reason is in a manner 
compelled to incline and follow the judgement of the body. Thou mayst compare 
therefore a man properly to a commonalty, where is debate and part taking 
among themselves. Which commonalty for as much as it is made of sundry 
kinds of men gathered together, which be of diverse and contrary appetites: it 
cannot be avoided that much strife shall arise therein, and parts taken often 
times, unless the chief rule and authority be in one. And he himself be such a 
fellow that will command nothing but that which shall be wholesome and 
profitable for the commonwealth.255
 
Erasmus further develops this theme by exposing the Platonic teaching about the different 
parts of the soul (“two kinds of souls, the one kind spiritual and immortal, the other as it were 
mortal”) and the Platonic topology of logisticon, thymos and epithymia.  
Elyot’s parallel between interior and exterior governance is more straightforward: 
 
It is to be noted that to hym that is a gouernoure of a publike weale belongeth a 
double gouernaunce, that Audacity and Timidity is to saye, an interior or 
inwarde gouernaunce, and an exterior or outwarde gouernaunce.  The firste is 
of his affectes and passions, which do inhabite within his soule, and be subiectes 
to reason.  The seconde is of his children, his seruauntes, and other subiectes to 
his autoritie.256
 
This passage also shows the link that exists between governance of the self and governance of 
others and hence the isomorphism between the private mental sphere and the political. This 
idea of the relationship between the two spheres of life is reminiscent of the teleology of the 
care for the self analysed by Foucault with regard to Alcibiades (cf Chapter I.3.). In Elyot’s 
text too, the mastery over one’s own self is explicitly linked to the mastery over others as 
“interior or inward governance” is explicitly linked to “exterior or outward governance”. 
Although Elyot does not present his ideal of governance in an educational framework in the 
very passage quoted above, this scheme can be deduced from the overall structure of the book 
that is aimed as a guidebook on how to educate children for governance. Thus the title of 
                                                 
255 The Manual of a Christian Knight (1501) (London: Meuthen and Co., 1905) Chapter IV. p. 56-57. 
http://oll.libertyfund.org
256 Sir Thomas Elyot, The Boke named The Governour, III. 8. Everyman edition. (London: J. M. Dent 
& Co; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1907) p. 225. (emphasis mine, G.S.) 
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Book One Chapter Four is “The education or fourme or bringing up of the childe of a 
gentilman, which is to haue authoritie in a publike weale” and the ensuing chapters elaborate 
on the various aspects required for such purpose. Comparing education to the “the policie of a 
wyse and counnynge gardener” Elyot writes: 
 
Semblable ordre will I ensue in the fourmynge the gentill wittes of noble mennes 
children, who, from the wombes of their mother, shal be made propise or apte to 
the gouernaunce of a publike weale.257
 
Just as in the Alcibiadic type of relation to the governance of the self, for Elyot and Erasmus, 
too, governance of the self is linked to and is analogous with the governance of “a publike 
weale”. The underlying assumption behind the governance-model is that we can gain control 
over the passions that are linked mainly to the sensory part of the soul and to the flesh by 
addressing the rational, discursive power of the mind. Passions are interior phenomena that 
arise from one's material nature spontaneously or as a consequence of the material connection 
to externality. To tame and overcome such perturbations of the soul a certain education is 
needed to exercise control over them. The question is of course, how such control is possible. 
Classical heritage offered different models ranging from the Platonic channelling of the 
passionate (alogos) towards logos, the search for Aristotelian adjustments whereby the 
rational part of the soul persuades the irrational part. At the opposing end of the spectrum is 
the radical Stoic dualism between the fortress of reason and the assaults of passions. Elyot’s 
reliance on Aristotle for his moral outlook is implied by the very title of the chapter within 
which the above passage on inward and outward governance occurs: "Of the noble vertue 
fortitude, and of the two extreme vices, Audacitie and Timerositie". He frames the moral 
situation as consisting of extremes to be avoided and the search for a middle ground in the 
following terms: 
 
To the one and the other is required the vertue morall called fortitude, whiche as 
moche as it is a vertue is a Mediocritie or meane betwene two, extremities, the 
one in surplusage, the other in lacke.  The surplusage is called Audacitie the 
lacke Timorositie or feare.  I name that Audacitie whiche is an excessife and 
inordinate truste to escape all daungers, and causeth a man to do suche actes as 
are nat to be ieoparded.  Timorositie is as well whan a man feareth suche thinges 
as be nat to be feared, as also whan he feareth thinges to be feared more than 
                                                 
257 T. Elyot, Ibid, I. 4. p. 19. 
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nedeth.  For some thynges there be whiche be necessary and good to be feared, 
and nat to feare them it is but rebuke.  Infamie and reproche be of all honest men 
to be dradde.  And nat to feare thynges that be terrible, agayne whiche no powar 
or witte of man can resiste, is foole hardynesse, and worthy no praise, as erthe 
quakes, rages of great and sodayne flodes, whiche do bere downe before them 
mountaynes and great townes, also the horrible fury of sodayne fire, deuourynge 
all thing that it apprehendeth.  Yet a man that is valiaunt, called in latyne Fortis, 
shall nat in suche terrible aduentures be resolued into waylinges or desperation. 
But where force constrayneth him to abide, and neither powar or wisedome 
assayed may suffice to escape, but, will he or no, he must nedes perysshe, there 
dothe he paciently sustayne dethe, whiche is the ende of all euilles, And lyke as 
an excellent Phisitioun cureth moste daungerous diseases and dedely woundes, 
so dothe a man that is valiaunt auaunce himselfe as inuincible in thinges that do 
seme moste terrible, nat unaduisedly, and as it were in a bastely rage, but of a 
gentill courage, and with premeditation, either by victorie or by dethe, 
wynnynge honour and perpetuall memory, the iuste rewarde of their vertue.258
 
The moral virtue of fortitude consists in avoiding audacity or fear that are both considered as 
affects or passions consisting in giving inappropriate responses to situations. Elyot’s 
description of the behaviour of the valiant man who has “Fortis” receives a certain Stoic 
colouring as the passage evolves towards a sense of impassibility of the valiant man who 
“patiently sustains” even death amidst natural catastrophe. But the end of the passage brings 
back again the social context of moral action: just as for Aristotle ethics was bound up with 
life in the polis including the citizen’s reputation, so too Elyot’s last words are about honour 
and perpetual memory won by and the just reward of virtue. 
 
Discourse about the passions in the 16th century builds on rather traditional themes that 
were developed in the Middle Ages and find their most complete expression in St. Thomas 
Aquinas’ monumental synthesis of Aristotelian and Christian thought. More specifically, his 
treatise on the passions in Summa Theologiae, II-1.22-48. Aquinas assimilated many features 
of the Aristotelian, Stoic and Augustinian accounts of the “passions of the soul”. Due to 
Cicero’s influence and in particular by the mediation of Saint Augustine, the doctrine of the 
four passions as perturbations of the soul and of the three rational states of affectivity were 
transmitted to the Middle Ages and to the Renaissance. The psychological and physiological 
descriptions given in Early Modern passion-treatises derive from St. Thomas Aquinas even if 
the classification of passions themselves into four principal passions is Ciceronian in origin 
                                                 
258 T. Elyot, Ibid., III. 8. p. 225-226. 
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often through the mediation of St. Augustine. The centrality of the rational faculty, its 
hierarchic pre-eminence is also a constant, historically continuous feature of these treatises. 
The role of reason is, in one way or another, to govern the passions so that human behaviour 
may conform to virtue and avoid vices, sins and sensual excesses. Passions require regulation 
in order to secure moral advancement. Although the passion-treatises in the Early Modern 
period continue to build on the Thomist idiom, these issues receive renewed importance in the 
perspectives opened by the humanist programme of moral and spiritual advancement. What 
may be seen as new in these passion-treatises can perhaps be better grasped from the side of 
their reception. Their great number and their popularity is indicative of a psychic, moral and 
cultural need in response to both social changes and, more generally, to the potentialities 
opened by humanism. Treatises on moral philosophy and on the passions more specifically 
were not written and read exclusively by highly educated people such as university men, the 
clergy, physicians and lawyers. The general populace, understood as the “less scholarly-
minded reading public”, seemed to read and enjoy books on moral philosophy. This indicates 
the breadth of interest in the nature of man and self-exploration among Elizabethans and 
Jacobeans. The ubiquity of the issue of passion may reflect a concern with making personal 
behaviour more self-conscious in order to be able to better regulate and govern one’s action in 
a more and more centralised society that, in England, underwent several religious and political 
upheavals in the span of seventy years starting with the abrupt break with the Roman Catholic 
Church (1534), followed by adaptation to a radical form of Protestantism under Edward VI 
(1547-1553), then restoring Roman Catholicism by Mary I (1553-1558) and finally to a 
moderate (Anglican) Protestantism under Elisabeth I (1558-1603). On the social plane, it can 
be argued that the popularity of the theme of passions in Elizabethan and later in Jacobean 
England reflects a need for an appropriate self-governance and self-transformation in the 
stratified hierarchical social relations: efficient social interactions require the taming and the 
good use of the passions.259
                                                 
259 Gilles D. Monsarrat (1984, p. 3.) sees the period of the reign of Elizabeth, James and Charles I as 
“One of peace and prosperity” especially compared to the bitter wars that ravaged France and the 
Netherlands during the second half of the sixteenth century.  
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The importance of passion-treatises in Early Modern culture can also be grasped from 
the perspective of Norbert Elias’s influential theory of progressive emotional containment.260 
In his understanding of history, the domestication of human affectivity comes about in the 
course of regularisation of emotions. He sees the development of European civilisation in 
terms of a process of dissemination and interiorisation of “good manners” conducive to a 
more pacified society. The power and exercise of force is concentrated in the sovereign, in the 
initially absolute and then constitutional state. Accordingly, collective psychology undergoes 
a radical transformation: singular individuals in all social classes interiorise the “good 
manners” of members of the court, who were first to renounce force in the sovereign’s favour. 
Thus the passions are no longer strong and open as in the Middle Ages, social control of 
behaviour increases as society models more and more the subjects’ affective behaviour. 
Whereas in medieval times, despite all regional and social differences, the norms of good 
manners changes very little, Early Modern social upheavals induce changes in this field as 
subjects feel, much more than before, the need for imposing self-control on themselves 
leading to changes in norms of behaviour. According to Elias, the Renaissance is a transition 
period in a fluctuating process whereby existence loses its vivacity and colour but gains 
security and formalisation in the modern era and he regards it as a process accompanied by a 
lessening intensity of experience. The result is the interiorisation of constraints leading to the 
civilisation i.e. to the historical transformation and often to the repression of our affective 
culture. 
On the individual level, the renewed popularity of the theme of self-knowledge (Nosce 
teipsum) is attested in the agenda of passion-treatises as cura sui or   / 
epimeleia heautou and cultura animi. The Delphic injunction and the techniques of self-care 
and self-exploration that it implies gain a new vibrancy in this context. Hence the importance 
also of a humanist education and of books of conduct in a society which for the administrative 
consolidation of royal power relies on a pool of educated men who could serve as councillors, 
                                                 
260 Über den Prozess der Zivilisation (1939, 1969) in English: The Civilizing Process: The History of 
Manners (1939) – I had access to the French translation. Cf. in particular, La civilisation des moeurs, 
traduit de l’allemand par Pierre Kamnitzer, (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1973), chapters « La mutation du 
comportement à la Renaissance » pp. 150-180. et « Les relations sexuelles » pp. 371-418.  « Les 
modifications de l’agressivité » pp. 419-449. 
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261secretaries, clerks, Justices of Peace, and spies.  Understanding the social relevance of 
books about the passions in these terms is also in line with Stephen Greenblatt’s focus on self-
fashioning in the Early Modern context. In the very first paragraph of his book Renaissance 
Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare in the perspective of a justification for the 
seeming boldness of the topic of 'self-fashioning', Greenblatt writes: 
 
Moreover, there is a considerable empirical evidence that there may well have 
been less autonomy in self-fashioning in the sixteenth century than before, that 
family, state, and religious institutions impose a more rigid and far-reaching 
discipline upon their middle-class and aristocratic subjects. Autonomy is an 
issue but not the sole or even the central issue: the power to impose a shape 
upon oneself is an aspect of the more general power to control identity - that of 
others at least as often as one's own.262
 
Greenblatt also invokes the Classics of Renaissance historiography, namely Jacob Burckhardt 
and Jules Michelet to support his claim that “there is in the early modern period a change in 
the intellectual, social, psychological, and aesthetic structures that govern the generation of 
identities. This change is difficult to characterize in our usual ways because it is not only 
complex but resolutely dialectical.”263 As components of this change, Greenblatt singles out 
the new stress on the executive power of the will, the new social mobility, the new assertion 
of power by family and state to determine all movement within society, the awareness of the 
existence of alternative modes of social, theological, and psychological organization, and a 
renewed dedication to the imposition of control upon those modes. 
 
Perhaps the simplest observation we can make is that in the sixteenth century 
there appears to be an increased self-consciousness about the fashioning of 
human identity as a manipulable, artful process. Such self-consciousness had 
been widespread among the elite in the classical world, but Christianity brought 
growing suspicion of man's power to shape identity: ‘Hands off yourself’, 
Augustine declared. Try to build up yourself, and you build a ruin.’” (Sermon, 
169) This view was not the only one available in succeeding centuries, but it was 
influential, and a powerful alternative began to be fully articulated only in the 
                                                 
261 Elizabeth Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) p. 18. 
262 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning From More to Shakespeare, (Chicago, London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1980.) p. 1.; emphasis mine. G.S. 
263 S. Greenblatt, Ibidem. 
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early modern period. […] As a term for the action or process of making, for 
particular features or appearance, for a distinct style or pattern, the word has 
long been in use, but it is in the sixteenth century that fashion seems to come 
into wide currency as a way of designating the forming of a self.264
 
Reading passages like this one may wonder what Foucault and Greenblatt would have to say 
to each other on the issue of self-fashioning and care for the self. That they were not 
completely unaware of each other’s work can be deduced from the fact that they refer to each 
other albeit in very short footnotes. Thus in the context of a complex methodology for the 
examination and formal cleansing of conscience developing after the Fourth Lateran Council 
of 1215 Greenblatt refers to the Foucault’s Histoire de la sexualité 1: La Volonté de savoir 
(published in 1976) as “powerful speculations”.265 Michel Foucault, in the second volume of 
his History of Sexuality, L’Usage des plaisirs (published in 1984) writing about the arts of 
existence and practices of the self with a view to the transformation of the self in the 
Renaissance (as underlined also by Burckhardt), refers in a footnote to “an interesting analysis 
in the recent book of Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning, (1980).266 Greenblatt 
seems to have arrived at the ideas of control mechanism (such as plans, recipes, rules, 
instructions) and to the complex interactions of meaning in a given culture in the shaping of 
one’s identity through Clifford Geertz.267 What Foucault’s and Greenblatt’s versions of the 
early modern self have in common is the foregrounding of the practice of certain practices of 
the self - understood as forming an integral part of ethics for Foucault and, not independently 
of it, taken to form part of a cultural system of meanings that creates specific individuals by 
governing the passage from abstract potential to concrete historical embodiment for 
Greenblatt. What is most relevant here in their respective findings is the stress on the 
generation of identities and the power to control identity which, in Foucault’s term, is part of 
care for the self. In this configuration, the semantic change of ‘passion’ may be a marker of 
the change in the ethical modes of how early modern subjects understood the need to impose 
shape upon their mental lives, as part of their ethical practice. From the intercultural 
                                                 
264 S. Greenblatt, Ibid. , p. 2. 
265 S. Greenblatt, Ibid, p. 85 and footnote. 
266 Michel Foucault, L'Usage des plaisirs. Histoire de la sexualité 2. Paris: Gallimard, 1984, p. 16 and 
footnote. 
267 Cf. Greenblatt, Ibid. p. 2-4. 
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perspective of the present study, understood as the encounter and interaction between 
Classical and Early Modern humanisms, our focus is on the way such ethical practices are 
modified in the course of this encounter and how this contributes to and takes part in the 
semantic change of ‘passion’. Greenblatt’s characterisation of medieval Christianity in the 
passage cited above – and quoting St. Augustine – seems to flatten the dialectic at work at the 
heart of Christian experience and of Christian techniques of the self. Certainly, Christianity, 
especially the way it was understood in medieval times, does not aggrandize individuality. 
But because faith and salvation are inherently personal, Christianity requires attention to the 
self. One is tempted to say, in Greenblatt’s terms, that there is a Christian fashioning of the 
self – which is a version of the techniques of the self – but its orientation is towards salvation 
and not to worldly ends. But the relation to the self is there at its base and it involves minutely 
developed practices of the self in the Western monastic tradition for example. Foucault 
understood Christian spiritual practice as techniques of the self: 
 
Everyone in Christianity has the duty to explore who he is, what is happening 
within himself, the faults he may have committed, the temptations to which he is 
exposed. Moreover everyone is obliged to tell these things to other people, and 
hence to bear witness against himself. These two ensembles of obligation - those 
regarding faith, the book, the dogma, and those regarding the self, the soul and 
the heart - are linked together.  A Christian needs the light of faith when he 
wants to explore himself. Conversely, his access to the truth can't be conceived 
of without the purification of the soul. […] I would like to underline that the 
Christian discovery of the self [unlike in Buddhism] does not reveal the self as 
an illusion. It gives place to a task which can't be anything else but undefined. 
This task has two objectives. First, there is the task of clearing up the illusions, 
temptations and seductions which can occur in the mind, and discovering the 
reality of what is going on within ourselves. Secondly, one has to get free from 
any attachment to this self, not because the self is an illusion, but because the 
self is much too real. The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the more 
we have to renounce ourselves; and the more we want to renounce to ourselves, 
the more we need to bring to light the reality of ourselves. That is what we could 
call the spiral of truth formulation and reality renouncement which is at the heart 
of Christian techniques of the self.268
 
Greenblatt’s reference to the notion of fashioning (effingere) as a term receiving wider 
currency for designating the forming of the self in the 16th century is certainly valid (cf. also 
                                                 
268 Michel Foucault and Richard Sennett, "Sexuality and Solitude" in London Review of Books, 
Volume 3, Number 9, 21 May to 3 June 1981. p. 5. 
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Pico’s Oration cited above) but it is questionable whether it was really a “powerful 
alternative” to earlier practices of the self. It could be argued that Christian practices of the 
self, such as the examination of conscience of confession, prepared the way for such a 
fashioning of the self. 
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III. 2. The Role of the Stoic - Christian Humanist Encounter in the 
Semantic Shift of ‘Passion’ 
 
 
The change in the understanding of ‘passion’ comes about at the junction of Stoic 
thought with Christianity and this development – that I termed as semantic shift – further 
contributes to the elaboration of interiority. The theological underpinnings of this encounter 
between a revived Stoicism in the late 16th century and Christianity contributes to the 
semantic transformation of the word ‘passion’. This encounter can also be described as the 
contestation of different kinds of authorities: the one having traditional, religious grounds (the 
Bible and the Church as the context of its interpretation including the Church Fathers), the 
other having the authority of humanist discourse building on the writings of ancient 
philosophers regarded as capable of giving guidance to human behaviour. The conflict of 
these diverging authorities can be attested in several key writings of the period and they have 
their antecedents in patristic literature. I wish to contend that the relevance of this encounter 
for the semantic change of ‘passion’ is that the confrontation with the radical Stoic 
anthropology and model of self-control in the Early Modern Christian-Humanist context 
triggered off a demarcation from this anthropology and model of ethical behaviour. Therefore 
the Stoic movement (sometimes referred to as Neo-Stoicism) of the late 16th century, in 
particular the reactions against it, are of crucial importance in the bringing about the semantic 
change of ‘passion’. It is neither to say that Stoicism did not interact with Christianity before 
(just to the contrary, cf. above Chapter II. 2.), nor to pretend that Stoicism did not persist in 
influencing and tainting Christian practice after this confrontation. However, it is in the 
intercultural context of early modern humanism and, in particular, in the Reformation 
tradition, that the attack on Stoicism is most advanced.269 Adapting Foucault’s terminology to 
this situation, it can be described as a change in what is considered as the “ethical substance” 
                                                 
269 For the same view, cf. William J. Bouwsma, “Renaissance and Reformation: An Essay on Their 
Affinities and Connections” in A Usable Past. Essays in European Cultural History (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1990) pp. 225-246. and R. Strier “Against the Rule of 
Reason: Praise of Passion from Petrarch to Luther to Shakespeare to Herbert” in Reading the Early 
Modern Passions. Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion, edited by Gail Kern Paster, Katherine 
Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004, p. 29. 
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in the relation to one’s self. My claim is that the change in the “ethical substance” induced a 
change in the vocabulary. In the remaining part of this chapter, I shall present some textual 
instances of this Stoic – Early Modern Christian-Humanist encounter in order to show how 
the reaction to Stoic autarchy prepared the way for the semantic change of ‘passion’. I shall 
also try to elicit, albeit briefly, their philosophical and theological underpinnings. 
270The vogue of Stoicism (sometimes referred to as Neo-Stoicism ) emerged in France 
and spread to England in the second half of the 16th century and first of all it implies modern 
editions and translations of ancient Stoic authors. The most influential figures of this 
movement were continental writers: Justus Lipsius271 272 and Guillaume du Vair , and Pierre 
Charron273 but some of the Stoic ideas were also taken by Michel de Montaigne. The reading 
public demanding such works was a wide one, not confined to those trained in the classical 
languages, thus translations of these ancient authors into the vernacular tongues were 
required. “Thomas James, the translator of Du Vair, was impressed by the way in which 
‘Christians may profit by the Stoicks’, for he asserted that ‘no kinde of philosophie is more 
profitable and neerer approaching unto Christianitie… then the philosophie of the Stoics’ and 
urged Christians to follow them as farre foorth as they have followed the trueth’.”274 In 
England, the movement is also attested by the vogue of Seneca in the literary circles and his 
growing influence in the school curriculum of the period (cf. the publication of translations of 
Seneca's prose by Robert Whyttynton275 276, and of his tragedies ) and by translations of 
                                                 
 
270 For the problems with the terms such as “Neostoicism”, “Neostoic” “Christian Stoicism” cf. 
Monsarrat (1984), pp. 77-80: lack of contours and no precise dogmatic content.  
271 Justus Lipsius (1547-1606) published De Constantia in 1584 and it was translated into all the major 
European languages (went through over eighty editions in the next three centuries). It was translated 
into English as Two Books of Constancy Englished by Sir John Stradling in 1594. 
272 La Philosophie Morale des Stoïques, (1585); The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks, (1598, London) 
Englished by Thomas James. 
273 De la sagesse (1601, Bordeaux); Of Wisdome in three books, London 1606 (with a dedication to 
Prince Henry) and 1612, translated into English by Sampson Lennard 
274 Rudolf Kirk in The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks, 1598 Englished by Thomas James, London, 
edited with Introduction and Notes by Rudolf Kirk, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New 
Jersey, 1951, p. 3-4. 
275 Lucii Annei Senacae ad Gallioneni de Remedis Fortuitorum. The remedyes agaynst all casuall 
chaunces. Dialogue inter sensum et Rationem. A dialogue betwene Sensualyte and Reason. Lately 
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277Cicero . In England, indeed, most of the Stoic works were available in the native language 
by the early 17th century and there was a “widespread awareness of Stoicism among the 
educated classes of early seventeenth-century England”.278 This awareness is also reflected in 
and was responsive to the dramatic literature of late sixteenth – early seventeenth century as 
the plays of Shakespeare, Marston, Chapman, Ford and Massinger attest to it. 
The basic motivation of this movement was, beside the obvious point of making 
available the Greek and Latin texts and translating these works into the modern languages, to 
explain Stoicism in Christian terms, to make it understood by and palatable to orthodox 
Christians, to create, in short, what is known to us as Neo-stoic philosophy.279 Thomas James, 
the translator of Du Vair, was impressed by the way in which “Christians may profit by the 
Stoicks”, for he asserted that “no kinde of philosophie is more profitable and neerer 
approching unto Christianitie … Than the philosophie of the Stoicks,” and he urged 
                                                                                                                                                        
translated out of Latyn into Englyshe by Robert Whyttynton poet Laureat and nowe newely 
Imprynted. Modern edition: Seneca's De Remedis Fortuitorum and the Elizabethans. An essay on the 
influence of Seneca's ethical thought in the sixteenth century, together with the newly-edited Latin text 
and English translation of 1547, by Ralph Graham Palmer, Chicago, Illinois: Institute of Elizabethan 
Studies, 1953. 
276 Seneca His Tenne Tragedies, translated into English between 1559-1581 by Jasper Heywood and 
others and edited by Thomas Newton, in 1581. Cf. also William Cornwallis, Discourses upon Seneca 
the Tragedian (1601) consisting of meditative commentaries on eleven sentences drawn from the 
tragedies. 
277 De Amicitia and De Senectute translated already in 1481 but De Officiis is translated in 1534 by 
Robert Whyttynton, and by Nicholas Grimald in 1553. Tusculanae Disputationes is translated by John 
Dolman in 1561. 
278 Monsarrat, (1984, p. 7.) According to Monsarrat (p. 45), there were two main periods for the 
translation of classical Stoic texts: 1560 to 1580 and 1610 to 1636. The main representatives of the 
Stoic revival on the Continent – Lipsius, Du Vair, and Charron – were translated into English between 
these two main periods.  
279 Guillaume du Vair, La Philosophie Morale des Stoiques, 1585 (France) The Moral Philosophy of 
the Stoicks, 1598 Englished by Thomas James, London, edited with Introduction and Notes by Rudolf 
Kirk, New Brunswick, New Jersey : Rutgers University Press, 1951, p. 4. 
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280Christians to “follow them as farre foorth as they have followed the trueth.”  For the 
Elizabethans faced with the “slings and arrows of outrageous fortune”281, the religious and 
political upheavals of the century, the particular appeal of Stoic precepts can also be explained 
by the kind of autarchic selfhood they promoted and presented as attainable. 
The Stoic revival foregrounded a certain strain of Classical ethics that promoted a 
rigorous self-control of the self because what it valued the most was a certain impassibility 
achieved through rational self-control. The self could find its peace and freedom in its 
hegemonikon: the citadel of reason shielded from the vagaries of the external world. This 
model of self-sufficiency came under attack from various angles. In his ambivalent and 
changing attitude to Stoicism, Early Modern sceptics like Montaigne, questioned the power of 
reason to be the arbitrator in matters of human behaviour. Thus in his essay “How one ought 
to governe his will” Montaigne voices his sympathy for those, like himself, who cannot attain 
to the impassibility advocated by the Stoics.282
But Stoic self-sufficiency went against more orthodox Christian notions about human 
inwardness and the nature and motivations of ethical behaviour as well. As Chapter II.1.3. 
sought to demonstrate above, Stoicism put great emphasis on the power of the will in 
achieving self-control and following the rule of reason. It promoted an autarchic self that 
requires no external help for its spiritual advancement. In the Early Modern encounter 
between Christianity and Stoicism, when addressing the issue of passion and the Stoic ideal of 
the sage free from all passions, some Christian authors – often informed by Augustinian 
notions of pathos, grace and salvation and/or by Neo-Platonist notions of love as “a cosmic 
phenomenon informing the universe and apparent in nature”283 - refute both the anthropology 
inherent in this ideal and its moral and theological implications. At this stage it may be helpful 
to employ Foucault’s terminology for describing the issues at stake in terms of differences in 
respective cares for the self. For the Stoics, the telos of the care for the self is self-rule and the 
                                                 
280 Thomas James’s “Preface” to Guillaume du Vair, The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks, in Du Vair, 
Ibidem. 
281 Hamlet, III. 1. 58. 
282 Michel de Montaigne, “How one ought to governe his will” Chapter 3.X in Ibid., vol. 3. p. 308. 
283 Leonard Forster, The Icy Fire: Five Studies in European Petrarchism, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969, p. 21. quoted by Mary Beth Rose, The Expense of Spirit. Love and Sexuality in 
English renaissance Drama, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 20. 
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284attainment of self-sufficiency.  From a Christian perspective such self-sufficiency is sinful 
since it leaves no room for the workings of divine grace. The emphasis on inwardness and on 
care for the self in both Stoicism and Christianity leads to diverging ends although, 
historically, that emphasis was often taken as a mark of proximity between Christian and 
Stoic ethics and ethical practices. 
This dialogue within early modern humanism is part and parcel of its intercultural 
nature as set out in the introduction of this study. For the historian W. J. Bouwsma, the 
“tension between Stoicism and Augustinianism was a perennial element in the career of 
Renaissance humanism” and he conceives these as ideological poles “designating antithetical 
visions of human existence” in complex interaction.285 The Stoic vision places man in the 
rational order of nature determined by a rational cosmic order: a microcosm in the 
macrocosm. As the same laws pertain to both, the rational order of the universe extends to the 
notion of man and his link to God is his reason and rational capacity. Hence happiness is best 
achieved by the conquest of fear and desire through prudence, will and fortitude, basically, 
through man’s own powers. This elevation of reason implied the denigration of other 
dimensions of the personality, especially the passions and the body, which threatened to 
challenge the sovereignty of reason. This attitude can be traced, with variations in intensity in 
the writings of Petrarch, Vives, Lipsius, Calvin.286
But even before the vogue of Stoicism in late 16th century, the debate about the 
legitimacy and desirability of passions – covering a wide range of affects as understood in the 
Classical vocabulary - can be traced in Petrarch, De Ignorantia (De sui ipsius et multorum 
                                                 
284 A. A. Long describes the Stoics’ relationship to happiness as revisionism in the sense that they 
internalise the goods of which happiness consists. In this sense all the goods a person needs for 
happiness are internal and consist in a virtuous character. Cf. A. A. Long, Stoic Studies (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
285 W. J. Bouwsma, “Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought” 
in A Usable Past, p. 20-22. 
286 Cf. Bouwsma, Ibid. pp. 31ff. I am indebted also to Monsarrat (1984) in particular “Part I Stoicism 
and the Renaissance Christian” for a detailed presentation and assessment of the Stoic – Christian 
encounter in the context of English Renaissance. I shall single out some instances of this early modern 
encounter that, I wish to suggest contributed to the semantic shift of “passion” through a reassessment 
of ethical practice in light of Christian doctrine. 
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287ignorantia)  in which he stresses the importance of the emotional and affective in life and in 
the exchange of letters between the Florentine Collucci Salutati and Peregrino Zambeccari288. 
One of the leading motifs of subsequent discussions is formulated in this letter, namely the 
inhumanness of having no passions: 
 
If there were such a person, and he related to other people like this [remaining 
unmoved and without grief and even anger at the news of destruction of his 
homeland] he would show himself not a man but a tree trunk, a useless piece of 
wood, a hard rock and obdurate stone.289
 
The stringent control over one’s passions implies for the Renaissance imagination and 
for its received notions about the body a degree of physical control over one’s humours (we 
would perhaps call it our vegetative system today) that is inhuman. Having passions becomes 
thus a mark of being human for Macilente in Ben Jonson’s play, Every Man out of his 
Humour (1599), Macilente asks "but, Stoque, where (in the vast world) / Doth that man 
breathe, that can so much command his bloud, and his affection?"290 Such Stoic practice is 
criticised if successful in wiping out the affections but it is also blamed when the telos of 
ethical behaviour is not achieved. In this case, the charge of ingenuity is levelled against it as 
in John Marston’s The Malcontent (1604) when Pietro Jacomo dismisses of Seneca in these 
terms: "Out upon him! He writ of Temperance and Fortitude, / yet lived like a voluptuous 
epicure, and died like an / effeminate coward"291. 
The argument that having no passions is a sign of lack of humanity was taken up later 
by several Renaissance authors as well, in particular by Erasmus. In The Praise of Folly 
(1511-16) he acerbically criticises that "double-strength Stoic, Seneca" who strips his wise 
man of every emotion:  
 
                                                 
287 Petrarch, On His Own Ignorance, and That of Many Others, trans. Hans Nachod, in The 
Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Erns Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller, and John Herman Randall, 
Jr, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1948.  
288 The letters are quoted and analysed in Richard Strier, “Against the Rule of Reason” in Reading the 
Early Modern Passions. pp. 24-26. 
289 Quoted by R. Strier, “Against the Rule of Reason” in Reading the Early Modern Passions. p. 25. 
290 Ben Jonson, Every Man out of His Humour, I.1.2-4. 
291 John Marston, The Malcontent, III.1. 26-28. 
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Yet in doing so he leaves him no man at all but rather a new kind of god, or 
demiurgos, who never existed and will never emerge. Nay, to speak more 
plainly, he creates a MARBLE SIMULACRUM OF MAN, A SENSELESS 
BLOCK, completely alien to every human feeling.292
 
The god-like self-sufficiency of the ideal Stoic sage leads to a godlessness because it 
dispenses with divine grace and leaves no room for its workings. Similarly, a common verbal 
pun in Renaissance English assimilates the Stoics with 'stocks': a wooden carving, an 
imitation of men, not the ones God made.293 In humanist terms – to recall Pico’s Oration – it 
is a parody of the vertical mobility of man294: instead of opening the self to vertical impulses 
and helping it ascend in the hierarchy of beings, it closes it up into one of its faculties (reason) 
that is certainly its precious but not the only gift from its Maker. I wish to present and 
comment on some instances of hostile reactions to this Stoic ideal of senselessness. 
In the ironic context of the Encomium that employs multiple rhetorical modes, Dame 
Folly accepts the “Stoic definition” according to which “wisdom consists in nothing but being 
led by reason”, and, conversely, that “folly is defined as being swept along at the whim of 
emotion”.295 Against this definition of wisdom, which limits human life to the non-affective, 
                                                 
292 Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, p. 39. Frankly, I lost track of the source of this translation but cf. the 
translation quoted by Strier, (Ibid. p. 28.), and Braden (1985) p. 94. “He [Seneca] is left with 
something that cannot be called human; he fabricates some new sort of divinity that never existed and 
never will … he sets up a marble statue of a man, utterly unfeeling and quite imperious to all human 
emotion.” Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven, Conn.: 
Yale University Press, 1979) p. 45. 
293 Cf. Shakespeare, The Taming of the Shrew, I.1.31. Let’s be no Stoickes, nor no stockes I pray” For 
the basic form of the pun cf. Euphues, in John Lyly, Complete Works, ed. R. Warwick Bond (Oxford, 
1902) 1:190. Thomas Thorpe tries to turn the joke around in the preface to John Healey’s translation 
of Epictetus his Manuall (London, 1610; STC 10424): “He is more senceles than a stocke, that hath no 
good sence of this Stoick.” (sig. A4r) – quoted by Braden, 1985, p. 240 n69. cf. also Gilles D. 
Monsarrat, 1984, passim. 
294 For the Erasmian echo of Pico’s Oration cf. The Manual of a Christian Knight, Chapter IV. “In our 
minds verily we be so celestial and of godly capacity that we may surmount above the nature of 
angels, and be unite, knit and made one with God.” 
295 Desiderius Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, trans. Clarence H. Miller (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 1979) p. 28. 
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having passions becomes a sign of folly and thus Folly gains a considerable part of human 
life: having the foolishness necessary to overlook our friends faults, to be fond of babies, to 
surrender to the charm of youth, to be kind to one’s wife, becomes a token of human 
sociability.296 Not having this kind of foolishness would turn one into a monster: 
 
Who would not flee in horror from such a man, as he would from a monster… a 
man who is completely deaf to all human sentiment … no more moved by love 
or pity than a chunk of flint … who never misses anything, never makes a 
mistake, who sees through everything … never forgives anything, who is 
uniquely self-satisfied, who thinks he alone is rich, he alone is healthy, regal, 
free.297  
 
 In a similar vein and outside the ironic context of the Encomium, Erasmus – in the 
Augustinian tradition of resistance to Stoicism298 - aligns himself rather with a position he 
attributes to the Peripatetics and “considers emotional impulses … as tutors, attached to souls 
striving toward virtue”.299 Aspiring to inhuman clear-sightedness and especially to the kind of 
emotional impassivity advocated by the Stoics blocks the self not only from fellow humans 
but from the workings of divine grace as well. It is for this reason that such senselessness of 
the Stoic sage is attacked also by Calvin and Luther300. Although before being a convert to 
Reformation, Calvin contributed to the renewed interest in Stoicism and published, in 1532, a 
                                                 
296 The Praise of Folly, Chapter XXX and passim. 
297 The Praise of Folly, p. 45-46. 
298 For the importance of Augustine for the Renaissance advocacy of affectivity cf. Deborah K. 
Shuger, Sacred Rhetoric: The Christian Grand Style in the English Renaissance (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1988). 
299 Erasmus, Antibarbari, translated by Margaret Mann Philips, in The Collected Works of Erasmus, 
vol. 23, ed. by Craig R. Thompson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), p. 62. Similarly in 
The Manual of a Christian Knight (1501) Chapter V : “Peripatetics teach the affections not to be 
destroyed utterly, but to be refrained, and that the use of them is not utterly to be refused, for because 
they think them to be given of nature, as a prick or a spur to stir a man to virtue: as wrath maketh a 
man bold and hardy, and is a matter of fortitude.” 
300 The theme that Stoicks are blockish and senseless and that their philosophy is stone- or iron-like 
and hence should be refused is ubiquitous in the literature of the period. Monsarrat (1984) p. 74ff 
present instances from Heinrich Bullinger, Decades, (appeared in English, in 1577); Pierre de La 
Primaudaye, French Academie (in English 1586). 
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commentary on Seneca’s De Clementia and pointed out certain similarities between Stoicism 
and Christianity but already at this time, he denounced the chimerical apathy of the Stoic 
sage.301 In the Institutes, Calvin’s hostility to Stoicism and in particular to its ideal of human 
nature as an imprint or replica of universal Reason is even more straightforward. Against the 
Stoic view of patience that is beyond all passions, Calvin suggests that  
 
This conflict which believers maintain against the natural feeling of pain, while 
they study moderation and patience, Paul elegantly describes in these words: 
‘We are troubled on every side, yet not distressed; we are perplexed, but not in 
despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; cast down, but not destroyed,’ (2 Cor. 4:8, 
9). You see that to bear the cross patiently is not to have your feelings altogether 
blunted, and to be absolutely insensible to pain, according to the absurd 
description which the Stoics of old gave of their hero as one who, divested of 
humanity, was affected in the same way by adversity and prosperity, grief and 
joy; or rather, like a stone, was not affected by anything.302
 
Calvin goes on to further substantiate his point with texts taken from the New Testament and 
with examples of how Christ endured passions: 
 
Now also we have among Christians a new kind of Stoics, who hold it vicious 
not only to groan and weep, but even to be sad and anxious. These paradoxes are 
usually started by indolent men who, employing themselves more in speculation 
than in action, can do nothing else for us than beget such paradoxes. But we 
have nothing to do with that iron philosophy which our Lord and Master 
condemned--not only in word, but also by his own example. For he both grieved 
and shed tears for his own and others' woes. Nor did he teach his disciples 
differently: ‘Ye shall weep and lament, but the world shall rejoice,’ (John 
16:20). And lest any one should regard this as vicious, he expressly declares, 
‘Blessed are they that mourn,’ (Mt. 5:4). And no wonder. If all tears are 
condemned, what shall we think of our Lord himself, whose ‘sweat was as it 
were great drops of blood falling down to the ground?’ (Luke 22:44; Mt. 26:38). 
If every kind of fear is a mark of unbelief, what place shall we assign to the 
dread which, it is said, in no slight degree amazed him; if all sadness is 
condemned, how shall we justify him when he confesses, ‘My soul is exceeding 
sorrowful, even unto death?’303
                                                 
301 Cf. G. D. Monsarrat (1984) p. 70-71. and the critical literature cited by Monsarrat as well as Braden 
(1985) p. 92. 
302 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, A New Translation, by Henry Beveridge, Esq 
Printed at London by Arnold Hatfield, for Bonham Norton, (1599) III. 8. 9. (italics mine) 
(http://www.reformed.org/master/index.html?mainframe=/books/institutes/)  
303 Calvin, Institutes, III. 8. 9. (italics mine) 
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Being able to endure passions draws us nearer to Christ himself and may reinforce our faith. 
Unlike the Stoic sage who becomes virtuous by his reliance on his own reason alone (itself a 
replica of universal Reason) without any external aid, the Christian, having a corrupt intellect 
and will, must not block himself from the workings of divine grace.304 Thus Christian practice 
ethical practice involves passionate, affective content. Moreover, such affective content that 
expresses itself in inter-human relationships has as its ultimate source, openness to the 
workings of divine grace. 
 
Behold, from faith thus flows forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a 
joyful, willing, and free mind that serves one’s neighbour willingly and takes no 
account of gratitude and ingratitude.305
 
The “joyful, willing, and free mind” has its source in the love of God based on faith, and it is 
such a disposition that constitutes the freedom of a Christian.  
It is not the place to go into the details of Luther’s theology of grace but I would like to 
highlight a major element in his disagreement with Erasmus where Luther takes the 
anthropological consequences of his theology (and of his reading of the Bible) to their 
ultimate point. Although Erasmus accords affections woven of the intercourse of mind and 
body a pivotal role in engendering the capacities for love, ethics, and meaning that open the 
soul to grace,306 he nevertheless retains a Platonic vocabulary when interpreting St. Paul. 
Thus in the Enchiridion he makes the following equivalences: 
 
That the philosophers call reason, that calleth Paul, sometime the spirit, 
sometime the inner man, other wile the law of the mind. That they call affection, 
he calleth sometime flesh: sometime body: another time the outer man, and the 
law of the members. Walk (saith Paul) in the spirit, and ye shall not accomplish 
                                                 
304 Cf. Institutes, II. 3. “Every Thing Proceeding From The Corrupt Nature Of Man Damnable” and II. 
3. 7-12. where Calvin explicitly refers to Augustine and to his theology of grace developed in his 
debate with Pelagius. 
305 Martin Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, trans. By W. A. Lambert, revised by Harold J. Grimm 
in Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings edited by John Dillenberger (Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday, 1961) p. 75-76. 
306 Cf. Erasmus, A Discussion of Free Will trans. Peter Macardle in The Collected Works of Erasmus 
vol. 76., ed. Charles Trinkaus (University of Toronto Press, 1999) 23-25 and passim. 
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the desires and lusts of the flesh, for the flesh desireth contrary to the spirit, and 
the spirit contrary to the flesh.307
 
Thus Erasmus interprets the Pauline letters through the lenses of a Platonic dualism. For 
Luther, however, “flesh” and “spirit” are not to be taken in the Platonic sense and are not 
equivalent to body and soul. His exegesis of Letter to the Romans brings out that both body 
and spirit can behave according to the “flesh”: 
 
FLESH and SPIRIT must not be understood as if flesh had only to do with moral 
impurity, and spirit only with the state of our hearts. Rather, flesh, according to 
St. Paul, […] means everything that is born from the flesh, i.e. the entire self, 
body and soul, including our reason and all our senses. This is because 
everything in us leans to the flesh. It is therefore appropriate to call a man 
‘carnal’ when, not having yet received grace, he gibbers and jabbers cheerfully 
about the high things of the spirit in the very way which Galatians 5 [:19f] 
depicts as the works of the flesh, and calls hypocrisy and hatred works of the 
flesh.308
 
Not having received grace, man is in a phase of total depravity including his mental faculties. 
Therefore neither the Platonic canalisation through the logisticon, nor (and even less!) the 
Stoic reliance on one’s rational faculty can lead to righteousness in the Christian sense. Luther 
further explores this point in his exegesis of Galatians 5:19 referred above: 
  
As I have already indicated briefly, this passage provides us with the greatest 
possible comfort when it tells us that it is impossible to live without any desires 
and temptations of the flesh, in fact, without sin. It admonishes us not to act like 
the men of whom Gerson writes, who labored to rid themselves of any 
awareness of temptation or sin, in other words, to become nothing but stones. 
The sophists and monks had the notion about the saints that they were merely 
logs and blocks, utterly lacking in any feeling. Surely Mary felt a great sorrow in 
her mind when her Son was lost (Luke 2:48). Throughout the Psalms David 
complains that he is being almost swallowed up by the great sorrow that came 
from the magnitude of his temptations and sins. Paul also complains that he feels 
“fighting without and fear within” (2 Cor. 7:5), and that with his flesh he serves 
the law of sin (Rom. 7:25). He says that he suffers “anxiety for all the churches” 
(2 Cor. 11:28), and that God had mercy on him by restoring Epaphroditus to life 
when he was near to death, lest he should have sorrow upon sorrow (Phil. 2:25–
27). And so the saint as defined by the sophists resembles the wise man as 
                                                 
307 Erasmus, The Manual of a Christian Knight, Chapter VI. 
308 Luther, “Preface to the Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans” in Martin Luther: Selections from His 
Writings (1961) p. 25. (italics mine) 
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defined by the Stoics, who invented a kind of wise man that has never existed in 
the universe. With this foolish and wicked notion, which was born of their 
ignorance of this Pauline doctrine, the sophists brought themselves and 
innumerable others to the brink of despair. […] But now that the light of truth is 
shining, we see with utter clarity that Christ and the apostles designate as saints, 
not those who lead a celibate life, who are abstemious, or who perform other 
works that give the appearance of brilliance or grandeur but those who, being 
called by the Gospel and baptized, believe that they have been sanctified and 
cleansed by the blood and death of Christ. Thus whenever Paul writes to 
Christians, he calls them saints, sons and heirs of God, etc. Therefore saints are 
all those who believe in Christ, whether men or women, whether slaves or free. 
And they are saints, on the basis, not of their own works but of the works of 
God, which they accept by faith, such as the Word, the sacraments, the suffering, 
death, resurrection, and victory of Christ, the sending of the Holy Spirit, etc. In 
other words, they are saints, not by active holiness but by passive holiness.309
 
 
Given that the most advanced form of the theology of grace in the period is that of Martin 
Luther, it is no wonder that the most full-fledged criticism of the Stoic position and the most 
advanced praise of affectivity (although not of “passions” as such, see below) comes from 
him. As Strier puts it: “Luther gives Folly’s horror theological underpinnings.”310 According 
to Luther, the “righteousness” that is required for salvation is imputed to the believer as a gift 
                                                 
309 Martin Luther, “Lectures on Galatians” trans. Jaroslav Pelikan, in Luther's works, vol. 27, edited by 
Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter Hansen, (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1984) p. 81-82.
310 Strier, Ibid, p. 29. The question whether Stoicism and anti-Stoicism had more of a Catholic or 
Protestant bent in the Renaissance has been an issue of hot debate since the seminal study of Léontine 
Zanta, La Renaissance du stoïcisme au XVIe siècle, (H. Champion, Paris, 1914, "Bibliothèque 
Littéraire de la Renaissance") who, despite claiming that Reformation and Stoicism were incompatible 
in spirit, saw rationalism as a common ground between the two and several points of convergence 
(deterministic pantheism and divine omnipotence, an identical formalism (faith and a correct will)). It 
was perhaps the seeming proximity of the two that prompted most Reformist thinkers, including their 
English disciples, readers and commentators, to distance themselves from Stoicism, their faux-ami. 
However, as Monsarrat notes (p. 70), Zanta’s analysis sometimes reads like a Catholic indictment of 
Reformation and her conclusions have invited further debate (for eg.M. Spanneut, Permanence du 
Stoïcisme (Gembloux, 1973) p. 231f). I agree with Monsarrat’s conclusion that although both Puritans 
and Stoics were called “precise”, “if we look beyond what may be called daily ethics, at the 
fundamental problems of salvation, merit, and the nature of man there is undoubtedly a radical 
opposition between the Porch and the Reformation.” (p. 77) 
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311of God : it is not by one’s works, by one’s merits that one can become righteous, nor is it by 
reliance on one’s reason like the path to the bliss of the Stoic sage. Being righteous does not 
mean some kind of elimination of human affectivity as the examples of David, Mary, and 
Paul in the passage above show. Thus Luther too condemns the ideal of Stoic senseless: 
 
Formerly the monks made senseless logs and stones out of men, and Satan 
wanted the special commendation to be published about his saints that they were 
not disturbed by affections of any kind, were stolid men, and Stoics seven times 
over. But grace and the Holy Spirit do not strip human nature of its emotions in 
such a way that Jacob, the father, does not lament the death of his son. For this 
would conflict with nature, which has been created in such a way by God that it 
has affections.  
A few years ago we saw schismatic spirits trying to introduce apathy of this kind 
into the church. Münzer strove to express it in his life and ways as outstanding 
sanctity. For when the birth of a son was announced to him, he stood before the 
altar as if he were deaf and dumb. He did not rejoice, give thanks, or make any 
reply. It was his purpose to show that he was a log and a stock. Afterwards he 
had boasted that his nature was completely changed and slain. This was really 
fanaticism far worse than the delirium of the Stoics. For God wants nature to be 
preserved, not abolished. But He orders that it be corrected, in order that it may 
become purer and that the emotions may be adjusted better in the godly than in 
the heathen, who do not control them by the fear of God and by confidence in 
Him but are dragged along rashly by them and without the sure rule of God’s 
Word. 
Therefore you see described in this example the sanctity of the most saintly 
fathers, who had the same emotions, although these were fewer and more 
moderate. They also have the same passions and infirmities that other men 
have.312
 
However, for Luther, textually, “passion”, unless it refers to the Passion of Christ, appears 
most often in negative contexts such as “our sinful passions” (Rom. 7:5)  
 
                                                 
311 “At last, by the mercy of God, meditating day and night, I gave heed to the context of the words, 
namely, ‘In it the righteousness of God is revealed, as it is written, ‘he who through faith is righteous 
shall live’ There I began to understand that the righteousness of God is that by which the righteous 
lives by a gift of God, namely by faith.” Luther, “Preface to Latin Writings” in Martin Luther: 
Selections from His Writings (1961) p. 11. 
312 M. Luther, Lectures on Genesis: Chapters 38-44 trans. Paul P. Dahl in Luther's Works, vol. 7 edited 
by Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter Hansen, (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1965) p. 315.
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While we were living in the flesh, without grace, our sinful passions, our desires, 
inclinations, and drives toward evil, which make up our old man and man in his 
unconverted state, aroused by the Law,313  
 
Thus semantically, Luther subscribes to the Classical, negative sense of “passion”. 
 
Of course, there remains also in the regenerated a resistance, of which the 
Scriptures say that the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and likewise that 
the passions of the flesh wage war against the soul, and the law in our members 
is at war with the law of our mind.314
 
Luther’s contribution to the semantic shift is therefore less in an explicit defense of the 
passions315 but rather in his structural allowance for the possibility that different regimes may 
be at work at the same time even in the regenerated, redeemed person. In the overall design of 
regeneration by faith, the passions remain present in the members. His thesis of simul justus et 
peccator (at once righteous and a sinner) is particularly relevant here:  
 
Therefore I am at the same time a sinner and a righteous man, for I do evil and I 
hate the evil which I do. So then it is no longer I, as a spiritual man in the Spirit, 
that do it, that is, lust, but sin, both the tinder of sin and concupiscence, which 
dwells within me, through my whole life.316
 
 
The Stoic ideal is that of a hegemonikon or imperium, itself modelled on a political 
formation: a process of internalisation of monarchic power within the individual and to gain 
autarceia, autonomy within that sphere. The Augustinian strain of Christianity refuses such 
                                                 
313 M. Luther, Lectures on Romans Glosses and Scholia in Luther's Works, vol. 25 edited by Hilton. C. 
Oswald (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1972) trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (on Romans 7:5) p. 
59. 
314The Formula of Concord: 2, II, 84 in The Book of Concord : The Confessions of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church translated and edited by Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959) 
315 Beside exegetical reasons, one of the factors that may have prompted him not to go in this direction 
was perhaps that Luther himself was a passionate and vehement person as he himself relates his 
experiences. 
316 M. Luther, Lectures on Romans  in Ibid p. 65. 
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317self-sufficiency which it compares to the sin of Adam , and Christian authors of the early 
modern period had the arguments of the Augustinian resistance to Stoicism at their hand. 
Indeed, a thorough exploration of Stoic influence on Christian ethical thought and resistance 
to this influence could bring to light unexploited dimensions of Christianity. 
My overall claim with these examples of anti-Stoic reactions is that they help to bring 
about the semantic transformation of “passion”: the debate within humanism (between 
Augustinian Christianity and a revived Stoicism) problematised the role of affects in human 
life. The clashes brought to the surface that the classical idiom of “passion” can no longer 
serve as a collective term for all affects taken especially in a negative sense implying 
irrationality. In my view, given that the antagonism between the two poles in the debate 
cannot be reconciled or subsumed by any lasting synthesis318, the debate could not be 
definitely resolved by a rearrangement of the semantic field of “passion”. Nevertheless, the 
debate contributed to the process whereby “passion” gradually ceased to function as a 
substantive (and collective) noun (a hyperonym)  covering all affective states and shifted to an 
adverbial sense of excess of any given mental state but especially that of love. (I tried to 
describe and document the overall process in Chapter I.4.) 
The causes why these two poles of humanism cannot be reconciled have been 
formulated by many of the authors cited above (W. J. Bouwsma, G. Braden, etc.) but it can 
also be restated in a loosely adapted Foucauldian vocabulary. The Stoic and Christian inward 
turn is motivated by different ethical concerns. For Stoicism the ethical practice and askesis is 
deployed for securing an interiority for power and rule: the Stoic wants to find nothing else in 
the self but a zone of none of no contradiction (rational self-mastery). Gordon Braden notes 
that “throughout Stoicism the operative values are, time and again, power and control: we 
restrict our desires less because they are bad in themselves than in order to create a zone in 
which we know no contradiction.”319 Christianity, in its early modern confrontation with this 
model of rational self-mastery, insisted on the irreducibility of the human soul to such a 
monolithic (globalist) entity. The debates brought to light that “passions” as a collective term 
cannot be taken as one side of the dualism opposed to “reason” where the latter has absolute 
primacy over former. If the aim of ethical practice is not the achievement of rational self-
                                                 
317 City of God, XIV. 13. and its broader Augustinian context as discussed above in Chapter II.2.1 
318 Cf. Bouwsma, Ibid. p. 64.  
319 Gordon Braden, Ibid., p. 20. 
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mastery whereby all passionate, affective aspects are to be eliminated, but on the contrary, 
affective elements are integrated into the potential realms of care for the self, then the 
vocabulary should match this constellation and make room for them as legitimate ethical 
substance by a semantic rearrangement of such affective contents. For the Christian, the 
inward turn in not an end in itself, it is not the telos of ethical practice although there may be 
similarities in the techniques of the self, in Christian and Stoic askesis. Whereas for the Stoic 
sage interiority is without exit, for the Christian believer the inward turn paves the way to 
spiritual ascent through self-abandonment by making room for the working of the spirit and 
divine salvation. Thus the self is not the telos of its care, the purpose of askesis is to make it 
permeable to divine intervention. Both Christian and Stoic askesis values self-discipline but 
for the Christian, the point is not to stop there, let alone to achieve a self-ruling state and value 
it for its own sake. Rather it is to lose oneself in order to find it, to surrender one’s own self 
and will and let the Spirit occupy the space. 
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III. 3. Vernacular Innovations: The Significance of Montaigne, Les 




The relevance of discussing John Florio’s translation of Montaigne’s Les Essais in a 
study that concerns the semantic change of ‘passion’ around 1600 is twofold and the two 
points are interconnected. 
1. Montaigne (1533-1592) has a special and sometimes ambiguous attitude to 
humanism. As we saw in the previous chapter, he maintained a sceptical position towards the 
aspirations and ideals of humanism. However, if one considers the humanist program as the 
promotion of studium humanitatis and bears in mind the Erasmian call to wholeheartedly 
“covet this literature, let us embrace it, let us continually occupy ourselves with it, let us 
fondly kiss it, at length let us die in its embrace, let us be transformed in it, since studies are 
transmuted into morals”320 then Montaigne’s biography and the very composition of the 
Essais, may well be an illustration of this ideal and a particular case in point. The Essais were 
composed over a span of eighteen years from 1570 when Montaigne quit his function of city 
counsellor of Bordeaux, retires to his castle and consecrates himself to studies. The first 
edition the Essais is published in 1580 containing the first two volumes. Then follows a travel 
to Italy321 and two mandates as mayor of Bordeaux (1582-1585). He then retires definitively 
from public life and consecrates himself entirely to his studies and to the writing of his Essais 
that he publishes again with a third volume and with six hundred additions made to it in 1588. 
Between 1588 and his death in 1592 he continues to make additions322. These elements of his 
biography clearly show somebody for whom studium humanitatis was indeed a personal issue 
that went far beyond the mere study of ancient literature and Hugo Friedrich can rightly say 
                                                 
320 Desiderius Erasmus, Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Selected Writings, ed. John C. 
Olin, (New York, Evanston, and London, 1965) p. 105. quoted by Th. Greene, Ibid, p. 255-256. 
321 Cf. Journal de voyage de Michel de Montaigne en Italie par la Suisse et l’Allemagne en 1580 et 
1581 (Le Jay : Rome, Paris, 1774) 
322 These are almost all additions and not deletions as he himself says: “J’ajoute, mais je ne corrige 
pas.” (III. 9.) 
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323that Montaigne belonged to what Friedrich calls “the second humanism” . The “first 
humanism of the 14th th – 15  centuries was the ideal of language and rhetoric as the depository 
of human dignity. The idea was that language is constitutive of civilization and of culture, 
law, morality, and state and it raises man above the animal state. Thus the study of ancient 
literature (studium litterarum) raises man to the level of culture adequate to his dignity. From 
the second half of the 15th century there was a reaction against and a shift away from this ideal 
and practice in the favour of personal human experience, and toward attention to language as 
speculum animi. (Friedrich cites Pico della Mirandola and Erasmus as the main figures of this 
orientation.) In this perspective, the Classics still hold their important place as sources for 
studium humanitatis. Montaigne makes his point clear in one of his essays and links 
immediately the issue of learning, the example of ancient authors and passion: 
 
J'aymerois mieux m'entendre bien en moy, qu'en Ciceron. De l'experience que 
j'ay de moy, je trouve assez dequoy me faire sage, si j'estoy bon escholier. Qui 
remet en sa memoire l'excez de sa cholere passee, et jusques où ceste fievre 
l'emporta, voit la laideur de ceste passion, mieux que dans Aristote, et en conçoit 
une haine plus juste. Qui se souvient des maux qu'il a couru, de ceux qui l'ont 
menassé, des legeres occasions qui l'ont remué d'un estat à autre, se prepare par 
là, aux mutations futures, et à la recognoissance de sa condition. (III. 13. “De 
l’expérience”, - italics mine) 
 
I had rather understand my selfe well in my selfe then in Cicero. Out of the 
experience I have of my selfe I finde sufficient ground to make my selfe wise 
were I but a good proficient scholler. Whosoever shall commit to memory the 
excesse or inconvenience of his rage or anger past, and how farre that 
fittransported him, may see the deformity of that passion better then in Arisiotle, 
and conceive a more just hatred against it. Whosoever calleth to minde the 
dangers he hath escaped, those which have threatned him, and the light 
occasions that have remooved him from one to another state, doth thereby the 
better prepare himselfe to future alterations and knowledge of his condition. 
(Florio, III. 13. “Of Experience” – italics mine) 
 
 
So far for Montaigne’s general attitude and the particular hindsight he offers to humanism and 
the humanist agenda. 
                                                 
323 Hugo Friedrich, Montaigne, traduit de l’allemand par Robert Rovini, Paris: Gallimard, 1968. pp. 
94ff. The German original was published in 1949, rev. 1967 at A. Francke Verlag AG. 
 144
2. As regards the more specific question of the semantic change of ‘passion’, I wish to 
contend that the new psychological sense in which Montaigne used émotion324 was both 
instrumental in and indicative of the change undergoing in the words referring to human 
affectivity325, ‘passion’ included of course. The first occurrence of this new sense of 
‘emotion’ in English can be found in Florio’s translation of the Essais. As I noted in the 
broader historical argument chapter, it is the first attested occurrence in English (as well as in 
French) of the word in the psychological sense. (I shall go later into the finer nuances of its 
meaning.) My assumption is that there is a connection between the appearance of this new 
sense of the word and the synecdochic change of ‘passion’ as described above. This 
connection can tentatively be described in the following way: Given the evolution of the 
meaning of ‘passion’ in the adverbial and excessive sense (that, by the way, can also be 
observed in Montaigne/Florio), and given the ‘naturalisation’ of certain affective states, there 
was a need for another word that can occupy the space left by ‘passion’. Thus, in my view, the 
semantic shift of ‘passion’ and the appearance of the psychological sense of ‘emotion’ 
(which, by the way, is also a semantic shift: from social political to psychological) are 
concomitant phenomena or even two sides of the same phenomenon. Another way of putting 
it, building on a suggestion of Hans-Jürgen Diller in the context of the search for a pre-history 
326of the category ‘emotion’ , is to say that the Montaigne/Florio provides the textual traces of 
that transition from one metaphorical device referring to affective states to another. Therefore 
I propose to investigate the most significant occurrences of these two words in Montaigne’s 
Essais (1595) and in Florio’s translation published in 1603 with special regard to those 
instances where both words appear in proximity. Before I carry out this comparative linguistic 
analysis, three introductory remarks have to be made concerning the texts, translation practice 




                                                 
324 The spelling varies in Les Essais: it can be ‘esmotion’ or ‘émotion’ as well. 
325 Of course, these semantic changes and innovations are not limited to ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’; in a 
more inclusive and systematic study of the changes in early modern affectivity ‘appetite’, ‘movement’ 
should also be considered.  
326 Cf. Diller, (2006) cited above. 
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Florio’s translation of Les Essais 
 
The first remark is textual and concerns the two texts to be compared. Florio’s modern 
biographer, Frances A. Yates suggests that he began work on the translation of the Essais of 
Montaigne in 1598.327 The dates of 1580 and 1597 on the title page of the modern World’s 
Classics edition328 confirms this assumption as well as the fact that Florio was translating the 
fullest available text of the Essais, namely the one based on the Exemplaire de Bourdeaux 
(Bordeaux Copy). It was published in 1595 in Paris, for two different booksellers (Michel 
Sonnius and Abel L’Angelier). The edition was made with the help of Montaigne’s adopted 
daughter, Marie de Gournay, who incorporated all the manuscript additions that Montaigne 
made (between the summer of 1588 and September 13 1592, the date of his death) to a printed 
copy of the last edition published during his the lifetime (1588, Paris, L’Angelier). This part 
manuscript, part printed book contains about one third of manuscript additions when 
compared to the printed text of 1588 is called the Bordeaux Copy and is kept in the 
Bibliothèque municipale de Bordeaux. It should also be mentioned that the 1580 date refers to 
the first publication of the Essais in Bordeaux, having only the first two volumes of the 
Essais. So far for the textual history of Florio’s source.329  
                                                 
327 Frances A. Yates, John Florio. The Life of an Italian in Shakespeare's England, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1934; and New York: Octagon Books, 1968. 
328 I am using electronic versions of the modern edition of Florio’s translation: Michel Montaigne, The 
Essays of Michael Lord of Montaigne, 1580, 1597. Translated by John Florio, 1603. World's Classics 
edition. 3 volumes, London:  Frowde, 1904. available at http://www.stoics.com/index.html and 
http://www.uoregon.edu/~rbear/montaigne/#p1 I am also cross-checking it with an online digital 
facsimile of the 1603 edition. I will henceforth refer to Florio’s translation as “Florio”. 
329 The translator makes the following comment in his preface “To the curteous Reader” on the 
complicated textual setup he had to cope with: “Howsoever, the falsenesse of the French prints, the 
diversities of copies, editions and volumes (some whereof have more or lesse then others), and I in 
London having followed some, and in the countrie others; now those in folio, now those in octavo, yet 
in this last survay reconciled all.” Warren Boutcher, in his PhD thesis demonstrated that Florio started 
to translate Montaigne from the 1588 edition (namely I.26. “Of the institution and education of 
children” possibly together with I. 25.) but that he squared this text more or less with the 1595, 1598 
and 1600 editions. 
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The second remark concerns the general characteristics of Florio’s translation as seen in 
the context of translation habits in the English Renaissance. That context consists of 
translations from the Classics and from ‘dead languages’ on the one hand, and from 
translations from other vernacular languages, mainly French and Italian. In the former case, 
translators “cheerfully translated translations of translations”330 like in the case of Thomas 
Nicolls who translated Thucydides from the French of Claude de Seyssel who himself made 
his version not from the original Greek but from the Latin of Laurentius Valla. Similarly, 
between Thomas North and Plutarch stands the gracious figure of Jacques Amyot and the 
examples could be further enumerated… As for translation from other vernacular languages, 
direct translation from the original is more common than in the case of the classics but is far 
from being exclusive. For example, Sir Geoffrey Fenton’s Certaine Tragicall Discourses 
written out of Frenche and Latin (1567) were drawn from Belleforest’s French translation of 
Bandello. A more complex case of intercultural misunderstanding is Machiavelli’s Prince that 
had a profound influence on the thought and policy of Tudor England and was referred to 
with fear and indignation although it was not translated until 1640. Those who did not read Il 
Principe in Italian derived their knowledge from the Contre-Machiavel, a hostile treatise in 
French331 and the name of the Italian author was quickly assimilated to “much evil”. But such 
exceptions apart, direct translation form the vernacular source language is most often the case 
especially with French that was better known in England than Italian. Florio’s Montaigne was 
preceded by the translation of another French classic, Thomas Danett’s Historie de Commines 
(1596), the Mémoires of the French-speaking Fleming, Philippe de Commines. The Concise 
Cambridge History of English Literature states that “translators of Elizabeth’s age pursued 
their craft in the spirit of bold adventure which animated Drake and Hawkins. It was their 
ambition to discover new worlds of thought and beauty.”332 Moreover, translation was not an 
exclusive craft pursued in the narrow spirit of mere scholarship and many of the most 
                                                 
330 The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature by George Sampson, third edition revised by 
R.C. Churchill, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995 reprint, (1941 first edition, 
1970 third edition) p. 145. 
331 Namely the Discours sur les moyens de bien gouverner et maintenir en bonne paix un Royaume ou 
autre Principauté…Contre Nicholas Machiavel Florentin (1576) written by Innocent Gentillet, a 
French Huguenot, translated in 1602 by Simon Patericke. 
332 Ibidem. 
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ingenuous craftsmen were men of the world, who made their translations in the span of the 
leisure time snatched from the conduct of affairs. For example, Sir Thomas Hoby (translator 
of Il Corteggiano as The Courtier) and Danett were ambassador and diplomat respectively; 
Thomas North a magistrate, etc. John Florio is somewhat special in this regard: he is perhaps 
more akin to the scholarly Philemon Holland with his special interest in language and 
lexicography although Florio distances himself from “schollers” and from those who would 
want “Learning be wrapt in a learned mantle”.333 He is also distinguished by his bilingual 
background, being the London-born son of an Italian Waldensian pastor who fled persecution 
in Italy and married an Englishwoman. Besides his translation from the French, he published 
an Italian-English dictionary, A Worlde of Wordes (1598) that was substantially expanded and 
published again in 1611 as Queen Anna's New World of Words, or Dictionarie of the Italian 
and English tongues, Collected, and newly much augmented by Iohn Florio, Reader of the 
Italian vnto the Soueraigne Maiestie of Anna, Crowned Queene of England, Scotland, France 
and Ireland, &c. And one of the Gentlemen of hir Royall Priuie Chamber. Whereunto are 
added certaine necessarie rules and short obseruations for the Italian tongue. Thus I find it 
difficult to concur with the general assessment of The Concise Cambridge History of English 
Literature that translators of the age pursued their job without much reflection on what they 
were doing.334 While this statement may be true of the first generation of translators in the 
Elizabethan period, the second generation looked more self-consciously and sometimes 
apologetically at what they were doing. Thus Chapman, in the preface to his “Seaven Bookes 
of the Iliades of Homere, Prince of Poets, &c.Homer” (1598) lucidly describes what should be 
the ambition of the translator:  
                                                 
333 Florio, “To the curteous Reader” 
334 In fact, the general tenor of The Concise Cambridge History of English Literature is but a tamed 
version of The Cambridge History of English and American Literature. An Encyclopaedia in Eighteen 
Volumes ed. by A.W. Ward, A.R. Waller, W.P. Trent, J. Erskine, S.P. Sherman, and C. Van Doren; 
New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons; Cambridge, England: University Press, (1907–21). Which says: “As 
their interest lay chiefly in the matter of their originals, they professed little desire to illustrate a theory 
of translation. They had neither the knowledge nor the sense of criticism, which should measure 
accurately the niceties of their craft. They set about their work in a spirit of sublime unconsciousness. 
In their many prefaces, and they delighted in prefaces, there is scarce a hint that they are pursuing a 
delicate art.” (My italics) 
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The work of a skilfull and worthy translator is to observe the sentences, figures 
and formes of speech proposed in his author, his true sence and height, and to 
adorn them with figures and formes of oration fitted to the originall in the same 
tongue to which they are translated.   335
 
336That Florio, working on his translation at the same time  shares a similar ideal of translation 
can be inferred from his preface to his translation entitled “To the curteous Reader”. This 
piece is also informative about the motivations why he set out to translate Montaigne and why 
translation is important for him in general. He puts forward a general apology of translation as 
the fountainhead of culture: the sciences having their origin in Greece and “the Greekes drew 
their baptizing water from the conduit-pipes of the Egiptians, and they from the well-springs 
of the Hebrews or Chaldees”. Translation serves a democratic ideal of knowledge (Translata 
proficit) and asks “Why but the vulgar should not knowe at all” and “Why but Learning 
would not be made common” instead of having it as a privilege of some “Schollers”. He 
invokes “that every language hath it's Genius and inseparable forme” in order to make 
allowance for the difficulties of translation. Such consciousness of the problem of translation 
is certainly not of someone who does translation in a “spirit of sublime unconsciousness” and, 
just as his argument proceeds (“let confession make half amends”), it indicates that he does 
have a standard of translation. He admits that “some errors are mine, and mine are by more 
then translation.” Besides possible faults in grammar, orthography, syntax, he mentions the 
case of “some uncouth termes; as entraine, conscientious, endeare, tarnish, comporte, efface, 
facilitate, ammusing, debauching, regret, effort, emotion, and such like; if you like them not, 
take others more commonly set to make such likely French words familiar with our English, 
which well may beare them.” (italics mine) Needless to say, all the words in the list are words 
of French origin just making their way into the English language . The further specificity of 
‘emotion’ is - as noted in the chapter on the broader historical argument – that the new, 
                                                 
335 Preface to "Seaven Bookes of the Iliades of Homere, Prince of Poets, &c." both small 4tos. "printed 
by John Windet, and are to be sold at the signe of the Crosse-keyes neare Paules Wharffe." 1598 
336 Florio started his translation of Montaigne in 1598-99 after the publication of his Italian-English 
dictionary, A Worlde of Wordes; The Essayes or Morall, Politike and Millitarie Discourses were first 
published in London in 1603. For dating the debut of the translation, I am indebted to Warren 
Boutcher whose PhD thesis was on Florio’s Montaigne. (His The School of Montaigne: Enfranchising 
the Early Modern Reader is foreseen for 2009) 
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psychological sense given to it by Montaigne was an innovation in the French original as 
well. As Diller notes, in the evolution of ‘emotion’, the same pattern of transfer from the 
socio-political to the psychological sense can be traced in French as well as German.337 . 
However, according to the entry in Le Robert, the use of ‘emotion’ by Montaigne is limited to 
the physiological sense as a movement that affects the individual and takes away his 
equilibrium. As much as I can concur with Le Robert that the first meaning of émotion in the 
Essais is social-political as in the phrase “l’émotion de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du Dormir”) 
translated, correctly and consistently by Florio as “the commotion of Catiline” (I. 44. “Of 
Sleeping”) I find it difficult to concur with Le Robert suggesting that Montaigne only uses 
émotion in the physiological sense. While I can admit that the in passage quoted from 
Montaigne in the French dictionary the sense of émotion may verge between the physiological 
and the psychological338, there are other cases of usage of émotion in the Essais where the 
                                                 
 
337 Diller (2005), Ibid. p. 155-156. Cf. Paul Robert, Le Grand Robert de la langue française, 2e édition 
par Alain Rey, Le Robert : Paris, 1994 and Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm 
Grimm, Neubearbeitung ed. by Brandenburgische Akademie der Wissenschaften and Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Göttingen. Vol. 7: E – Empörer. Stuttgart and Leipzig: Hirzel, 1993.  
338 The passage quoted by Le Robert is as follows: “Nous mesmes, pour bien faire, ne devrions jamais 
mettre la main sur noz serviteurs, tandis que la cholere nous dure : Pendant que le pouls nous bat, et 
que nous sentons de l'esmotion, remettons la partie : les choses nous sembleront à la verité autres, 
quand nous serons r'accoisez et refroidis. C'est la passion qui commande lors, c'est la passion qui 
parle, ce n'est pas nous.” (Essais, II, 31. “De la colère”) Florio’s translation is as follows: “Our selves 
(did we well), during the time of our anger, should never lay hands on our servants. So long as our 
pulse panted, and we feele any concitation, so long remit we the partie: and things will seeme far 
otherwise unto us if we once come to our senses again, and shall better bethinke us. Then is it passion 
that commandes. It is passion that speaketh, and not we.” (Florio, II. 31. Italics mine) The full entry 
émotion of Le Robert is reproduced in Appendix 3. The reason why I would claim that it is a 
borderline case between the physiological and the psychological sense is that the textual context in 
which émotion is used here by Montaigne suggests that it is meant as a proxy for colère and passion – 
precisely those psychological senses the word is starting to take as a new hyperonym (of colère for 
example), or will partly replace (passion). But the translation of this passage by Florio actually 
supports more the claim of Le Robert: it is one of those rare occasions where Florio does not use 
‘emotion’ for émotion but ‘concitation’ which, according to John Palsgrave’s Lesclarcissement de la 
Langue Francoyse (1530) means the “Styrryng of ones mynde” which may be taken to be closer to a 
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meaning is certainly psychological as we shall see below. As I shall argue in more detail 
below, but already his apology for the “uncouth term” implies, Florio was well aware of the 
innovation he was making in English when he decided to introduce the new, modified sense 
into English. Prior to his translation, the word had meant “a political, social agitation; a 
tumult, popular disobedience” as recorded by the Oxford English Dictionary.  The date of the 
first recorded occurrence of the word in this sense is 1579 in the Oxford English Dictionary 
under sense 3, in Sir Geoffrey Fenton, The historie of Guicciardini, conteining the warres of 
Italie, ii, “There were ... great stirres and emocions in Lombardye”.339 It is notable that this 
first occurence of the word in English in this social-political sense is (an dthus the first shift of 
meaning from the physical to the social-political sense) was also in a translation from another 
vernacular language. It is all the more interesting since Fenton did not translate directly from 
the Italian original of Francesco Guicciardini. As Fenton was better versed in French, he did 
                                                                                                                                                        
physiological sense. Robert Estienne’s Les mots francoys selon l'ordre des lettres, ainsi qu'il les faut 
escrire, tournez en latin pour les enfans (Lyon, 1567) defines French e motion as “animi concitatio, 
agitatio spiritus, coagitatio, permotio” that is roughly the equivalent of “Styrryng of ones mynde” and 
hence of ‘concitation’. Cf. also Thomas Cooper, Thesaurus linguae Romanae & Britannicae (London, 
1584) where Furor is defined as a “vehement concitation or stirring of the minde”, as well as Randall 
Cotgrave, A Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues, (London, 1611) where French concitation 
is the equivalent of “concitation; inciting, vrging, prouoking; a raising, rousing, stirring, or quickning, 
vp vnto.” (For some reasons, there is no entry either émotion or esmotion in Montaigne’s 
contemporary’s, Jean Nicot’s (1530?-1600?) dictionary, Thrésor de la langue françoise tant ancienne 
que moderne. Exact et très facile acheminement à la langue françoise (Paris, 1606). 
339 As in Chapter I.4. and in Diller (2005) p. 155, the new usage by Florio is conspicuously missing in 
the Oxford English Dictionary which gives the first record of ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense in 
Jeremy Taylor, Ductor Dubitantium (R.), “The emotions of humanity… the meltings of a worthy 
disposition” in 1660. The OED defines it as “4.a. fig. Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, 
passion; any vehement or excited mental state”. In 1692 John Locke still uses ’emotion’ in the sense 
defined as “† 2. A moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in physical sense). Obs.”. “When exercise 
has left any Emotion in his Blood or Pulse.” (in Locke, Some thoughts concerning education, 7). For 
ease of reference, the Oxford English Dictionary entry ’emotion’ is reproduced in Appendix 1. The 
omission of the English Montaigne is all the more surprising because Florio’s translation had three 
editions (1603, 1613, 1632) and a new translation by Charles Cotton was published in 3 volumes in 
1685-86 that, of course, also used ‘emotion’ in the psychological sense. 
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not use the 1561 Italian edition of Storia d'Italia for his translation but the French version of 
the Storia by Jerôme Chomedey340, just as he used Belleforest’s translation for his Certaine 
tragicall discourses (1567). In any case, the Italian original does not have emozione, so the 
word was either suggested by the French translation of Guicciardini’s work or was a genuine 
invention of Fenton. That the second transfer of the meaning from the socia-political to the 
psychological sense was truly an invention of the Montaigne/Florio, and hence an import 
from the French, can also be attested by the fact that, in the same year as the publication of 
Florio’s Montaigne, Richard Knolles uses the word still in an “archaic”, physical sense in his 
History of the Turks (1603) defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “1. a moving out, 
migration, transference from one place to another. Obs.”.341 In apologising for the “uncouth 
term” Florio is making a conscious choice of introducing a modification in the sense of the 
word, moreover, a modification that he must have judged useful and desirable. (This is a point 
I advance here but will look at it in more detail when comparing the French and English text.) 
His sympathy for Montaigne and for his thoughts are evident not only from the mere fact of 
performing such an enormous task of translating three volumes of French into English but 
also from the apologetic stance he adopts in the preface “To the curteous Reader”. Although 
he admits that Montaigne may have some faults, after all his is “but a French with ferdillant, 
                                                 
340 The French translation of Storia was first published in Paris, in 1568 (L'Histoire d'Italie, de messire 
François Guicciardin,... translatée d'italien en françois... par Hiérosme Chomedey, Paris : B. 
Turrisan, 1568) but was reedited with the new title Histoire des guerres d’Italie in 1577 (Histoire des 
guerres d'Italie, écrite en italien par M. François Guicciardin et traduite en françois par Hierosme 
Chomedey, revue et corrigée de nouveau, Paris: J. Kerner, 1577, there was also a publication at M. 
Sonnius in the same year.) Judging from Fenton’s English title (The historie of Guicciardini, 
conteining the warres of Italie), he must have used the 1577 or both French editions. For the European 
reception of Guicciardini’s works cf. Vincenzo Luciani, Francesco Guicciardini e la sua fortuna 
europea, Firenze : Olschki, 1949; also « Lectures françaises de Guichardin : vérités de l’Histoire et 
ébauches d’une raison d’Etat à la française » in  La circulation des hommes et des oeuvres entre la 
France et l’Italie à la Renaissance, Paris, CIRRI, 1992, p. 165-187, republished also as annex to F. 
Guiccciardini, Histoire d’Italie, J.-L. Fournel and  J.-C. Zancarini (eds), vol. II, p. 710-729. As well as 
Jean-Louis Fournel, “Guicciardini historien florentin, ‘français’ et  européen” to be published as 
Proceedings of the conference, Convegno sulla storiografia in Toscana tra Cinquecento e settecento, 
(Pisa 2008) at Franco Angeli, Milan.
341 Knolles’ phrase cited in the OED is: “The divers emotions of that people [the Turks].”  
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legier, and extravagant.” Nevertheless, Florio invokes the authority of “that judicious 
Counsellor (honourable Sir Edward Wotton)” for affirming the merits of Montaigne. When it 
comes to concrete criticism that may be levelled against Montaigne, Florio sends them to the 
essay “Of Vanitie” “where he [Montaigne] himself preventeth their carping, and foreseeing 
their critikisme answereth them for me at full.” 
The third remark concerns Florio’s translation as a whole. Without entering into a 
general assessment of Florio’s Montaigne – which is by far beyond the scope of this study - it 
should be mentioned that the translation, just as Chapman’s Homer,342 stood the test of the 
time as can be seen from the fact that, three hundred years after its first publication, it was 
republished in England in 1904 in the World's Classics series as well as in the Everyman’s 
Library (1910) and was also used for the publication of a selection of Montaigne’s Essays in 
1907 in the United States. A reviewer of the latter book in the New York Times notes that 
“the translation is that of John Florio, edition of 1603 – all things considered, and allowance 
made for his many minor defects and its occasional audacious meddling with the original, 
distinctly the best for English readers, and especially the readers of to-day, to whom the 
flavour of Florio conveys some of the peculiar charm of Montaigne’s own style.”343  
 
344Montaigne and the passions / émotions, esmotions
 
I wish to argue that Montaigne’s linguistic innovation of ‘esmotion’ can be explained 
by and is consistent with the general thrust of his thought and with the nature of the enterprise 
he set out to do in his Essays. While it is beyond the scope of the present study to interpret 
                                                 
342 Praised two centuries later by John Keats, “On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer” as well as 
Swinburne for its "romantic and sometimes barbaric grandeur," its "freshness, strength, and 
inextinguishable fire." George Saintsbury (1845-1933) wrote: "For more than two centuries they were 
the resort of all who, unable to read Greek, wished to know what Greek was. Chapman is far nearer 
Homer than any modern translator in any modern language."  
343 Review in The New York Times, September 7, 1907 by Edward Cary of Montaigne for English 
Readers edited by Adolphe Cohn published in the “Putnam’s French Classics for English Readers” 
series. (Italics mine.) 
344 As noted above, there are variations in spelling. The spelling varies in Les Essais: it can be 
‘esmotion’ or ‘émotion’ as well.  
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Montaigne’s Essays and to give a general assessment of Montaigne, a brief summary of the 
most salient point underpinning his linguistic innovation is necessary. I shall provide more 
detailed analysis when discussing specific passages as translated by Florio. 
First of all, his scepticism concerning the capacities of human judgement has to be taken into 
account. If, according to Montaigne, there are legitimate doubts concerning the use of reason 
(as demonstrated by the Apologie de Raimond Sebond, II. 12.), then the Stoic perspective of a 
hegemonikon, of moral autarchy cannot be a wished ideal. If the absolute supremacy of such 
higher faculty is put in doubt, it also follows that human affectivity has its legitimate space to 
deploy.  
 
Le jugement tient chez moy un siege magistral, au moins il s'en efforce 
soigneusement : Il laisse mes appetis aller leur train : et la haine et l'amitié, voire 
et celle que je me porte à moy mesme, sans s'en alterer et corrompre. S'il ne peut 
reformer les autres parties selon soy, au moins ne se laisse il pas difformer à 
elles : il faict son jeu à part. (III. 13. “De l’expérience”) 
 
Judgement holds in me a presidentiall seate, at least he carefully endevours to 
hold it; He suffers my appetits to keep their course, both hatred and love, yea 
and that I beare unto my selfe, without feeling alteration or corruption. If he can 
not reforme other parts according to himselfe, at least he will not be deformed by 
them; he keepes his court apart. (Florio, III. 13. “Of Experience”) 
 
345Right judgement is more a matter of custom  and of habituation that has to be exercised and 
kept in good health but it is not an absolute monarch or sovereign to which all others parts of 
the personality are or should be subordinated. Montaigne was sceptical not only about our 
faculties concerning knowledge and rational judgement but also about the very possibility of 
reforming human nature. He looked critically at those who wanted to transform human 
behaviour by precepts and he considered that education can at best reinforce and strengthen 
natural dispositions but it cannot radically change them: 
 
Les inclinations naturelles s'aident et fortifient par institution : mais elles ne se 
changent gueres et surmontent. Mille natures, de mon temps, ont eschappé vers 
la vertu, ou vers le vice, au travers d'une discipline contraire. […] On n'extirpe 
pas ces qualitez originelles, on les couvre, on les cache […] Ceux qui ont essaié 
de raviser les moeurs du monde, de mon temps, par nouvelles opinions, 
reforment les vices de l'apparence, ceux de l'essence, ils les laissent là, s'ils ne 
                                                 
345 For custom in Montaigne cf. Zsolt Almási, Angelic Monster – Custom in Early Modern Context, 
(The Edwin Mellen Press, 2003) pp. 71-99.  
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les augmentent : Et l'augmentation y est à craindre. […] Regardez un peu, 
comment s'en porte nostre experience. Il n'est personne, s'il s'escoute, qui ne 
descouvre en soy, une forme sienne, une forme maistresse, qui lucte contre 
l'institution : et contre la tempeste des passions, qui luy sont contraires. De moy, 
je ne me sens gueres agiter par secousse : je me trouve quasi tousjours en ma 
place, comme font les corps lourds et poisans. Si je ne suis chez moy, j'en suis 
tousjours bien pres : [these italics mine] mes desbauches ne m'emportent pas fort 
loing : il n'y a rien d'extreme et d'estrange : et si ay des ravisemens sains et 
vigoureux. (III. 2. “De repentir”) 
 
 
 Naturall inclinations are by institution helped and strengthned, but they neither 
change nor exceed. A thousand natures in my time have a thwart, a contrary 
discipline escaped toward vertue or toward vice. […]These originall qualities are 
not grubd out, they are but covered and hidden. […] Those which in my time 
have attempted to correct the passions of the world by new opinions, reforme the 
vices of apparance; those of essence they leave untouched if they encrease them 
not. And their encrease is much to be feared. […] Looke a little into the course 
of our experience. There is no man (if he listen to himselfe) that doth not 
discover in himselfe a peculiar forme of his, a swaying forme, which wrestleth 
against the institution, and against the tempests of passions, which are contrary 
unto him. As for me, I feele not my selfe much agitated by a shocke; I commonly 
finde my selfe in mine owne place, as are sluggish and lumpish bodies. If I am 
not close and neare unto my selfe, I am never farre-offe; [these italics are mine] 
My debauches or excesses transport me not much. There is nothing extreame 
and strange; yet have I sound fits and vigorous lusts. (Florio, III. 2. “Of 
Repenting”) 
 
Endeavours to reform human nature are doomed to failure and are best to be avoided. One 
should rather stick to his own natural disposition, remain as close as possible to one’s self, to 
his “peculiar” and “swaying forme” (“une forme sienne, une forme maistresse”) that will 
always resist instruction but will also stand against “the tempests of passions”. Being “close 
and neare unto [one’s] selfe” (chez soy) is more reliable against extremities than setting out to 
reform oneself or others. It is also remarkable that this description takes on board the body as 
such, the body in its very specificity as his “sluggish and lumpish” body and its legitimate, 
“sound fits and vigourous lusts”.346  
                                                 
346 It seems to me that the hendiadys-like “sound fits and vigorous lust” is an addition of Florio: 
Montaigne has only one noun, ravisement, at the end of that sentence. Also, Florio is accentuating the 
morally negative judgement about the ‘passions’ when he translates raviser les moeurs du monde in 
the passage above as “to correct the passions of the world”. 
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 Montaigne’s passage is also interesting when considered in recent debates about the 
self, moral discipline and the place of the body. Much of recent work on the European 
Renaissance focuses on the links between the material and the intellectual, and on the 
interplay between body and identity has been a critical focus for much recent work on the 
European Renaissance.347 Stephen Greenblatt claimed that “the self is at its most visible, most 
expressive … at moments in which the moral will has ceded place to desires that constitute 
the deepest stratum of psychic experience”.348 Michael C. Schoenfeldt, in a discussion of the 
importance of the Galenic theory of the humours for English Renaissance literature, takes 
issue with this claim and argues that Renaissance selves are defined, not through moments of 
crisis, when the moral gives way to the physiological or sexual, but through the very strategies 
of discipline through which the body and the psyche are held in balance. As Schoenfeldt 
writes: “The Renaissance seems to have imagined selves as differentiated not by their desires, 
which all more or less share, but by their capacity to control these desires.”349 Timothy 
Hampton summarizes as follows: “For Schoenfeldt the Renaissance self is defined – pace 
Bakhtin – through careful control and monitoring of a self always in flux.350 I would certainly 
not wish to extrapolate from Montaigne’s case (after all, his Essais are indeed an innovation 
in the period and reflect more a deviation from standard practice than its endorsement) but it 
seems to me that the project of writing the Essais and the state of mind it reveals certainly is 
in a flux but that does not wishes to control itself in the usual way: 
 
                                                 
347 Cf. Timothy Hampton, “Strange Alteration: Physiology and Psychology from Galen to Rabelais” in 
Reading the Early Modern Passions. Essays in the History of Emotion edited by Gail kern Paster, 
Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, University of Pennsylvania Press: Philadelphia, 2004, pp. 
272-293 for the evocation of this issue and the Greenblatt – Schoenfeldt debate (in particular pp. 
274ff). 
348 Stephen Greenblatt, “Psychoanalysis and Renaissance Culture” in Literary Theory/Renaissance 
Texts, edited by Patricia Parker and David Quint (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
p. 215.   
349 Michael G. Schoenfeldt, Bodies and Selves in Early Modern England: Physiology and Inwardness 
in Spenser, Shakespeare, Herbert, and Milton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 17. 
also quoted by Timothy Hampton, Ibid. p. 275. 
350 Timothy Hampton, Ibid. p. 275.  
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Les autres forment l'homme, je le recite : et en represente un particulier, bien 
mal formé : et lequel si j'avoy à façonner de nouveau, je ferois vrayement bien 
autre qu'il n'est : mes huy c'est fait. Or les traits de ma peinture, ne se 
fourvoyent point, quoy qu'ils se changent et diversifient. Le monde n'est qu'une 
branloire perenne : Toutes choses y branlent sans cesse, la terre, les rochers du 
Caucase, les pyramides d'Ægypte : et du branle public, et du leur. La constance 
mesme n'est autre chose qu'un branle plus languissant. Je ne puis asseurer mon 
object : il va trouble et chancelant, d'une yvresse naturelle. Je le prens en ce 
poinct, comme il est, en l'instant que je m'amuse à luy. Je ne peinds pas l'estre, je 
peinds le passage : non un passage d'aage en autre, ou comme dict le peuple, de 
sept en sept ans, mais de jour en jour, de minute en minute. Il faut accommoder 
mon histoire à l'heure. Je pourray tantost changer, non de fortune seulement, 
mais aussi d'intention : C'est un contrerolle de divers et muables accidens, et 
d'imaginations irresoluës, et quand il y eschet, contraires : soit que je sois autre 
moy mesme, soit que je saisisse les subjects, par autres circonstances, et 
considerations. Tant y a que je me contredis bien à l'advanture, mais la verité, 
comme disoit Demades, je ne la contredy point. Si mon ame pouvoit prendre 
pied, je ne m'essaierois pas, je me resoudrois : elle est tousjours en 
apprentissage, et en espreuve. (III. 2. “Du repentir” – italics mine) 
 
Others fashion man, I repeat him; and represent a particular one, but ill made; 
and whom were I to forme a new, he should be far other than he is; but he is now 
made.  And though the lines of my picture change and vary, yet loose they not 
themselves. The world runnes all on wheeles.  All things therein moove without 
intermission; yea, the earth, the rockes of Caucasus, and the Pyramides of 
Aegypt, both with the publike and their own motion. Constancy it selfe is 
nothing but a languishing and wavering dance.  I cannot settle my object; it 
goeth so unquietly and staggering, with a naturall drunkennesse; I take it in this 
plight as it is at the instant I ammuse my selfe about it, I describe not th' essence 
but the passage; not a passage from age to age, or as the people reckon, from 
seaven yeares to seaven, but from day to day, from minute to minute.  My 
history must be fitted to the present.  I may soone change, not onely fortune, but 
intention.  It is a counter-roule of divers and variable accidents or irresolute 
imaginations, and sometimes contrary; whether it be that my selfe am other, or 
that I apprehend subjects by other circumstances and considerations. Howsoever, 
I may perhaps gaine-say my selfe, but truth (as Demades said) I never gaine- 
say. Were my mind setled, I would not essay, but resolve my selfe:  It is still a 
Prentise and a probationer. (Florio, III. 2. “Of Repenting”, Italics mine.) 
 
Being “a prentise and a Probationer”, “always in passage” is a state not to be regretted but to 
be candidly admitted and welcome by the author of the Essais. Being at home, chez soy351, 
near to oneself even in terms of his own body, is a human condition wished and celebrated by 
                                                 
351 I take there is a play on this French expression in the passage above in chez moy well-captured by 
Florio. 
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Montaigne and one that by itself is – according to him – a more efficient vanguard against 
vices than any conscious effort or discipline could provide: 
 
Pour dire un mot de moy mesme : J'ay veu quelque fois mes amis appeller 
prudence en moy, ce qui estoit fortune ; et estimer advantage de courage et de 
patience, ce qui estoit advantage de jugement et opinion ; et m'attribuer un tiltre 
pour autre ; tantost à mon gain, tantost à ma perte. Au demeurant, il s'en faut tant 
que je sois arrivé à ce premier et plus parfaict degré d'excellence, où de la vertu 
il se faict une habitude ; que du second mesme, je n'en ay faict guere de preuve. 
Je ne me suis mis en grand effort, pour brider les desirs dequoy je me suis trouvé 
pressé. Ma vertu, c'est une vertu, ou innocence, pour mieux dire, accidentale et 
fortuite. Si je fusse nay d'une complexion plus desreglée, je crains qu'il fust allé 
piteusement de mon faict : car je n'ay essayé guere de fermeté en mon ame, pour 
soustenir des passions, si elles eussent esté tant soit peu vehementes. Je ne sçay 
point nourrir des querelles, et du debat chez moy. Ainsi, je ne me puis dire nul 
grand mercy, dequoy je me trouve exempt de plusieurs vices : […] 
Je le doy plus à ma fortune qu'à ma raison : Elle m'a faict naistre d'une race 
fameuse en preud'hommie, et d'un tres bon pere : je ne sçay s'il a escoulé en 
moy partie de ses humeurs, ou bien si les exemples domestiques, et la bonne 
institution de mon enfance, y ont insensiblement aydé ; ou si je suis autrement 
ainsi nay ; […] 
Mais tant y a que la pluspart des vices je les ay de moy mesmes en horreur. (II. 
11. “De la Cruauté”, italics mine.) 
 
But to speake a word of my selfe: I have sometimes noted my friends to terme 
that wisdome in me which was but meere fortune, and to deeme that advantage 
of courage and patience that was advantage of judgement and opinion; and to 
attribute one title for another unto me, sometimes to my profit, and now and then 
to my losse. As for the rest, I am far from attaining unto that chiefe and most 
perfect degree of excellences, where a habitude is made of vertue, that even of 
the second I have made no great triall. I have not greatly strived to bridle the 
desires wherewith I have found my selfe urged and pressed. My vertue is a 
vertue, or to say better innocencie, accidentall and casuall. Had I been borne 
with a lesse regular complexion, I imagine my state had been verie pittifull, and 
it would have gon hard with me: for, I could never perceive any great constancie 
in my soule, to resist and undergoe passions, had they been any thing violent. I 
cannot foster quarels, or endure contentions in my house. So am I not greatly 
beholding unto my selfe, in that I am exempted from many vices:  
[…] 
I am more endebted to my fortune than to my reason for it: Shee hath made me 
to be borne of a race famous for integritie and honestie, and of a verie good 
father. I wot not well whether any part of his humours have descended into me, 
or whether the domestike examples and good institution of my infancie have 
insensibly set their helping hand unto it; or whether I were otherwise so borne:  
[…] 
But so it is, that naturally of my selfe I abhorre and detest all manner of vices. 





To refer back to Greenblatt’s description of when the self is most visible, then Montaigne is 
not an Epicurean who identifies himself with his desires or one that contrasts such desires 
with a moral will and a self conscious following a moral code against his desires. In fact, such 
contradictions are pushed in the background by an insistence on the priority of inherited 
complexion and humours, of “domestike examples and good institution” that allow him to be 
and to behave in an “accidentall and casual” manner. Just as there is no “moral will” erected 
into a sovereign principle of the self, so is there not a “stratum of   psychic experience” to be 
resisted or to be suppressed. Montaigne’s perspective on human existence is not motivated by 
the will to instruct, by a desire to improve the deficiencies of human nature as if there was a 
higher order and ideal to which human existence had to conform. When it comes to judgment, 
the best source is one’s own experience352 anyway: experience is more faithful to the 
complexity of life than some conceptual structure deemed coherent on its own. Another 
important element beside his scepticism and the priority he gives to experience can perhaps be 
termed as Montaigne’s human phenomenology353. The knowledge that he gains from what the 
ancients and Seneca in particular diagnosed as the moral diseases, Montaigne makes use to 
describe human nature, and his own first of all, as such in a perspective that is more 
psychological-anthropological than moralist. Montaigne’s modern “moral science”, is based 
                                                 
352 Cf. also above, as “second humanism”. 
353 I am using ‘phenomenology’ of course in a broad sense of a description that seeks adherence to 
facts, to what is given to human perception both within the subject (in psychological introspection) 
and in society at large as observed by and from the vantage point of a particular subject anchored in its 
own idiosyncrasies – that is, of someone who has a rich experience of public life (cf. elements of 
Montaigne’s biography mentioned above) but does not pretend to detain some universal omniscient 
knowledge about the state of affairs in society. Montaigne’s project is also faithful to the exigencies of 
a phenomenological epokh  ( ) in suspending judgement: his adherence to what is given means 
that his descriptions are neither subordinated to tacitly posited ideals (as in forms of Platonism), nor 
are they projected towards a teleological perspective (as in Augustinian-Christian doctrine). There is, 
of course, another epokh : that of the sceptics; but the scope of Montaigne’s scepticism is a limited 
one and concerns primarily the power of human reason to reach truth unless it was aided by human 
grace cf. A. H. T. Levi, “The relationship of Stoicism and scepticism” in Humanism and Early 
Modern Philosophy, edited by Jill Kraye and M. W. F. Stone, London and New York: Routledge, 
2000, “London Studies in the History of Philosophy”, pp. 98ff. 
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on his fideism and his criticism of knowledge aims to expose man as it is. For Montaigne the 
object of his description, himself, the human subject, does not have a predestined and fixed 
nature to which it should conform. If the perspective of redemption as well as that of a 
profane ethics put in brackets for the sake of knowing man as it is then a descriptive science 
may take the place to observe the antinomies, paradoxes and diversities that the human 
condition offers. Thus Montaigne will look at the richness of human existence inasmuch as it 
is problematic but he does it in a perspective of affirmation and not humiliation. While 
Augustine made room for the passions in a soteriological perspective because they were part 
of our human condition that had to be redeemed anyway, for Montaigne, in lack of such 
apparent teleological perspective, they form part of a descriptive science of man. But if there 
is no hierarchy of the kind that would distinguish and oppose, as in Classical and Christian 
anthropology and ethics, a higher, rational faculty to a lower affective layer, then the 
evaluative and conceptual grouping of the passions as perturbationes animi loses some of its 
significance. While the word can be maintained, it is necessary to introduce a more neutral 
term that does not entail value-judgements. 
There are remnants of Stoic legacy of the perturbationes animi as errors of judgement in 
the first essays like “Of Sadness or Sorrow” (I. 2.) and “Of Fear” (I. 17.) But the development 
of the Essays goes rather in the direction of descriptive analysis and adherence to one man’s 
particularity rather than therapeutic domination of the passions by reason (as in Stoic teaching 
and practice).354 In order to experience our humanity, we must experience and endure 
passions to the last.355  
 
Les passions, me sont autant aisées à eviter, comme elles me sont difficiles à 
moderer. Abscinduntur facilius animo, quam temperantur. Qui ne peut atteindre 
à cette noble impassibilité Stoique, qu'il se sauve au giron de cette mienne 
stupidité populaire. Ce que ceux là faisoyent par vertu, je me duits à le faire par 
complexion. La moyenne region loge les tempestes ; les deux extremes, des 
hommes philosophes, et des hommes ruraux, concurrent en tranquillité et en bon 
heur. (III. 10. “De mesnager sa volonté”) 
 
Passions are to me as easy to be avoyded as they are difficult to be moderated.  
Excinduntur facilius animo, quam temperantur: 'They are more easily rooted out 
of the minde than brought to good temper.' He that cannot attaine to this noble 
                                                 
354 Cf. Monsarrat (1984) p. 70. for a similar position. 
355 Montaigne also finds reinforcement of the idea of living in harmony with one’s passions in 
Plutarch, De virtute morali. Cf. H. Friedrich, Montaigne pp. 183ff. 
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Stoicall impassibility let him shrowd himselfe in the bosome of this my popular 
stupidity.  What they did by vertue I inure my selfe to doe by Nature.  The middle 
region harboureth stormes; the two extreames containe Philosophers and rurall 
men, they concurre in tranquility and good hap. (Florio, III. 10. “How one ought 
to governe his will”) 
 
For Montaigne, similarly to Erasmus, Luther, and Calvin a philosophy that suppresses 
emotions does not bring about grandeur but inhumanity, with its lies and pretension. 
Although Montaigne implicitly employs the traditional classifications of passions, 
when he uses it in a collective sense he most often implies the Ciceronian tetrachord, but his 
whole enterprise is less conceptual but rather phenomenological. Even if he shares the general 
assessment of the passions as dangerous, he is ready to admit certain forms of them as part of 
his nature and, consciously or not, but, faithfully to what he observes, he introduces the new 
word émotion to refer to them in various contexts. 
  If I wanted to situate the Montaignian attitude to human existence with the terms I 
used in Chapter II.2.3. (globalist / localist) then it perhaps can be best described as a radical 
localist with his criticism of knowledge, with his affirmation of the human condition and with 
his happy egocentrism: 
 
Je propose une vie basse, et sans lustre : C'est tout un, On attache aussi bien 
toute la philosophie morale, à une vie populaire et privee, qu'à une vie de plus 
riche estoffe : Chaque homme porte la forme entiere, de l'humaine condition. 
Les autheurs se communiquent au peuple par quelque marque speciale et 
estrangere : moy le premier, par mon estre universel : comme, Michel de 
Montaigne : non comme Grammairien ou Poëte, ou Jurisconsulte. Si le monde se 
plaint dequoy je parle trop de moy, je me plains dequoy il ne pense seulement 
pas à soy. (III. 2. “Du Repentir”) 
 
I propose a meane life and without luster; 'Tis all one. They fasten all Morall 
Philosophy as well to a popular and private life as to one of richer stuffe. Every 
man beareth the whole stampe of humane condition. 
Authors communicate themselves unto the world by some speciall and strange 
marke; I the first, by my generall disposition; as Michel de Montaigne, not as a 
Grammarian, or a Poet or a Lawyer. If the world complaine I speake too much 




                                                 
356 A. H. T. Levi (2000), p. 99-100. italics mine. 
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Rather than relating the details of human life to “some speciall and strange marke”, and 
to some wished (and debatable) ideal, Montaigne opts for describing his and the human 
condition on its own terms. Of course, these “own terms” are partly distilled from the 
teachings of Classical authors as their texts are tested against his own personal (and as I shall 
attempt to show below, his bodily) experience: the corpus of the ancients and of his own. This 
does not mean that his description would be amoral since he is aware of the moral standards 
and ethical precepts both of the ancients and of the (early) moderns but his moral and 
psychological insight comes to serve not a prescriptive ethics but a moral science anchored in 
the Classical texts and observation. If globalism wants to surrender everything to one single 
force (logos, ruling reason, etc.), and localism was ready to acknowledge the existence of 
separate realms with different laws corresponding to them and with mediation among them, 
then Montaigne’s radical localism is distinguished by the fact that it admits the existence of 
different realms but does not wish to mediate among them. 
According to A. H. T. Levi, “When, in 1580, Montaigne did allow elements of Stoic 
ethics and a strong relativist outlook on cultural values to permeate at least the earlier chapters 
of Les Essais, he felt impelled to present his work as a self-portrait, which in 1588 it scarcely 
even pretended to be.” (italics mine) I would slightly disagree with this claim. While Levi is 
probably right in claiming that the famous preface “Au Lecteur” of 1580, claiming that “je 
suis moy-mesmes la matiere de mon livre” may be a kind of excuse for the highly subjective 
observations and nonchalant tone, his claim that the 1588 edition would have done away with 
this program does not seem to be warranted by the text. The quotation above is from the third 
volume contained in the 1588 edition, and it can hardly be said that it plays down the card of 
the self-portrait: the ostentatious reference to “I the first, by my generall disposition; as 
Michel de Montaigne, not as a Grammarian, or a Poet or a Lawyer” accentuates the self-
portrait character of the work. Montaigne’s avowedly first-person singular focus, and the idea 
that his self, as communicated in writing, is willed as it is in its eccentricities, must have been 
a source of confirmation for F. Nietzsche in formulating his central slogan “How one becomes 
what one is”, the subtitle of his intellectual autobiography Ecce Homo. This may explain his 
enthusiasm for the French author when, in the context of the “Third Untimely Meditation: 
Schopenhauer as Educator”, where the phrase “Be what you are!” (werde der du bist) first 
occurs, he writes about Montaigne:  
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I know of only one writer whom I would compare with Schopenhauer, indeed 
set above him, in respect of honesty: Montaigne. That such a man wrote has 
truly augmented the joy of living on this earth.357
 
In an interesting meditation on the figure of Socrates in Western culture, Alexander 
Nehamas358 considers the references to and possible echoes of Montaigne in Nietzsche’s 
oeuvre. 359 360 According to Nehamas, Nietzsche makes a lot of the idea of the Socratic -
Montaignian inward turn and care for the self. Thus Montaigne’s focus on the “smallest and 
most everyday things”, our own habits and needs found a sympathetic echo in Nietzsche who 
regretted that the world teaches us to turn away from these and ultimately, from ourselves.361 
Montaigne’s insistence on being chez moy, “in mine owne place”, “close and neare unto my 
selfe” and his “sluggish and lumpish body (!)” found an echo in Nietzsche’s anti-universalist 
                                                 
357 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, (1874) edited by Daniel Breazeale, translated by R.J. 
Hollingdale; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
358 Alexander Nehamas, The Art of Living. Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, Berkeley, Los 
Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1998. and for aperspective on Nietzsche’s work as a 
mode of self-fashioning cf. also A. Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985. For a criticism of Nehamas’s position cf. Váradi 
Péter, “Barátság és önértelmezés Nietzschénél” in Lábjegyzetek Platónhoz 4. A barátság szerk. 
Dékány András és Laczkó Sándor, Szeged: Pro Philosophia Szegediensi Alapítvány, Librarius, 2005. 
pp. 132-141. 
359 As in Ecce Homo: “I have in my spirit – who knows? perhaps also in my body – something of 
Montaigne’s sportiveness.” (Quoted by Nehamas, Ibid. p. 237 n.8) It is also revealing to see the 
reference to his own body as in Montaigne above. 
360 As Nehamas notes, Nietzsche’s description of that inward turn in the case of Socrates differs 
significantly from that of Xenophon’s inasmuch as Nietzsche’s Socrates does not attend to “the benefit 
of the human race”, as Xenophon’s did. Nehamas, Ibid. p. 130. 
361 Cf. “Priests and teachers, and the sublime lust for power of idealists of every description, the cruder 
and the more refined, hammer even into children that what matters is something quite different; the 
salvation of the soul, the service of the state, the advancement of science, or the accumulation of 
reputation and possessions, all as the means of doing service to mankind as a whole; while the 
requirements of the individual, its great and small needs within the twenty-four hours of the day, are to 
be regarded as something contemptible or a matter of indifference.” Nietzsche, Human All-Too-
Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, quoted by Nehamas, Ibid., p. 130. 
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outlook. A key passage in Montaigne, “Of Experience” (III. 13.) must have deeply resonated 
in the German philosopher:   
 
C'est une absoluë perfection, et comme divine, de sçavoir jouyr loyallement de 
son estre : Nous cherchons d'autres conditions, pour n'entendre l'usage des 
nostres : et sortons hors de nous, pour ne sçavoir quel il y faict. Si avons nous 
beau monter sur des eschasses, car sur des eschasses encores faut il marcher de 
nos jambes. Et au plus eslevé throne du monde, si ne sommes nous assis, que sus 
nostre cul. (III. 13. “De l’expérience”) 
 
It is an absolute perfection, and as it were divine for a man to know how to enjoy 
his being loyally. We seeke for other conditions because we understand not the 
use of ours, and goe out of our selves forsomuch as we know not what abiding 
there is. Wee may long enough get upon stilts, for be wee upon them, yet must we 
goe with our owne legges. And sit we upon the highest throne of the World, yet 
sit we upon our owne taile. (Floiro, III. 13. “Of Experience”) 
 
 
The elements I have highlighted of Montaigne’s Essays, his focus on the diverse states of the 
self in its specific needs and including the body in a descriptive-phenomenological rather than 
moralistic attitude, point towards and call for a rearrangement of the very terms of care for the 
self. I agree with Diller that Montaigne is probably the first European writer to have used 
‘emotion’ in the psychological sense -a claim that is contested by the entry of Le Robert 
inasmuch as it traces only the social-political and the physiological senses of émotion in 
Montaigne, cf. above. However, a few words of precaution are necessary concerning the 
scope of Montaigne’s originality. First of all, the different senses of émotion still coexist in 
Les Essais and Montaigne does not want to erect his linguistic innovation into a conceptual 
paradigm say by replacing ‘passions’ with ‘emotions’. In fact, such a gesture would be most 
alien to his phenomenological enterprise that aims to describe what the human condition is in 
all its diversity and with the so-called passions and emotions included. Even though he 
progressively distances himself from the positions of the Stoics362 he retains the humanist 
                                                 
 
362 I agree with H. Friedrich that the famous Stoic period of Montaigne does not exist. There is, in the 
first essays, some pastiches of Stoic maxims and it happens also that some late additions complement 
this picture.  But the ‘Stoicism’ of Montaigne is more literary than personal. It is a misunderstanding 
of his contemporaries, of Justus Lipsius in particular, to see in him a Stoic. By turning Seneca’s moral 
philosophy into a descriptive moral science, Montaigne distances himself from the neo/Stoic 
movement of the 16th and 17th century. This line of neo-Stoic trend is continued by Du Vair, 
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ethos infused with the knowledge of the ancients. This ethos does not encourage the 
discarding of the accumulated knowledge and vocabulary of the Classical authors whose 
psychological insights remain valid for Montaigne even if their moralistic and teleological 
approach is sometimes bypassed. This synthetic and innovative attitude results in a richness 
of vocabulary and meanings that is also a characteristic of both Early Modern French and 
English, and which, among other things, resembles the language of that playwright across the 
Channel... He can thus comfortably use both ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’: the former both in the 
old senses and associations of the Classical heritage363, the latter in the old physical sense, the 
relatively recent social-political364 365 sense as well as the new physiological  and 
psychological senses given to it by himself. Montaigne’s Essais thus provide rich material to 
study the transition from one metaphorical device referring to affective states to another. 
There is, however, an important caveat that has to be borne in mind when approaching Early 
Modern texts with a view to the polysemous character of the words employed in them. Ian 
Lancashire put into doubt the very concept of a fixed-sense referential definition of word 
sense. In substantiating his claim, he refers to both the practice of early modern dictionary-
writers who typically composed bilingual or polyglot dictionaries and to the late appearance 
of the word ‘definition’ as referring to words and of the practice of giving fixed-sense 
definition of words (as popularised by Samuel Johnson in 1755). Thus Early Modern speakers 
                                                                                                                                                        
Quevedo, Descartes and Corneille. See Hugo Friedrich, Ibid. p. 78. For the confirmation of Friedrich’s 
point cf. also A. H. T. Levi (2000) in Jill Kraye and M. W. F. Stone (2000), Ibid., p. 98-99.   
363 Thus Montaigne can refer to anger as a passion in II. 31. “De la colère”: “Il n'est passion qui 
esbranle tant la sincerité des jugements, que la cholere.” Florio II. 31. “Of Anger and Choler” “There 
is no passion so much transports the sinceritie of judgement as doth anger.” 
364 Like in the phrase “l’émotion de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du Dormir”) translated by Florio as “the 
commotion of  Catiline” (I. 44. “Of Sleeping”). 
365 Like in the phrase « et s'estant laissé surprendre aux esmotions premieres des passions, s'armer et se 
bander pour arrester leur course, et les vaincre” (II. 11. “De la cruaté”) where esmotions probably 
means the first movements of the passions (both in he mind and the body). The phrase is correctly 
translated by John Florio as “And having suffred himselfe to be surprised by the first assaults of 
passions, to arme and bandie himselfe, to stay their course and to suppresse them” (II. 11. “Of 
Crueltie”) where the English translator is consistent again in not translating esmotion by ‘emotion’ 
when the sense is not the new psychological. Cf. the case of “l’émotion de Catilina” (I. 44. “Du 
Dormir”) translated by Florio as “the commotion of  Catiline” (I. 44. “Of Sleeping”) cited above. 
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must have understood the question ‘what does this word mean?’ as a request for a translation, 
an etymology, or a gesture pointing to something in the world denoted by that word.366 
Lancashire’s findings have repercussions concerning not only the indeterminacy of meaning 
and the polysemy of certain words but also concerning legitimate methods for re-establishing 
their meaning. As for the former issue, chapter I.4 presented a comparison of the meanings of 
‘emotion’ and ‘passion’ and showed that as ‘emotion’ started to occupy the semantic space of 
‘passion’ these two words (and possible others as well) were in a kind of limbo: they referred 
to affective states from different vantage points paralleling systematic patterns of beliefs and 
attitudes.  
Concerning legitimate methods for re-establishing meaning (and I admit that my 
method of establishing the meanings of these words slightly err, even if for heuristic purposes, 
on the side referential, fixed sense definitions – after all, one must start from somewhere and 
the OED even with its rigid categories and eventual shortcomings is a useful tool for 
crystallising one’s initial hypothesis even if only for starting research…) I take that there are 
two, interrelated consequences: one is to understand meaning as the rule of its usage, i.e. the 
word or even sentence means something in a given context, situated among other words and 
other significations. While this concept of meaning is modern, we cannot but employ it given 
our historical position in time: even if could fully reconstitute the early modern understanding 
                                                 
366 Ian Lancashire, “An Early Modern English Dictionaries Corpus 1499-1659” in CH Working Papers 
[Online], September 1996, [Online] 1:1. Available: 
http://journals.sfu.ca/chwp/index.php/chwp/article/view/B.17/87 p. 7-10 passim, in particular 8-9. I 
think, however, that the picture is more complex than the way it is presented by Ian Lancashire in this 
article. In fact, Francis Bacon does talk about definition of words when, exposing the “Idols of the 
Market Place” he suggests a corrective to the dead-end of certain disputes: “Whence it comes to pass 
that the high and formal discussions of learned men end oftentimes in disputes about words and 
names; with which (according to the use and wisdom of the mathematicians) it would be more prudent 
to begin, and so by means of definitions reduce them to order.” Although it is true that Bacon himself 
is somewhat sceptical about the use of such definitions because he continues: “Yet even definitions 
cannot cure this evil in dealing with natural and material things, since the definitions themselves 
consist of words, and those words beget others. (Novum Organum, XLIII, italics mine). Bacon’s 
scepticism notwithstanding, the very idea of the definition of a word does not sound alien to his 
thought about language and meaning. It is the ultimate utility of such definitions that he casts doubt 
on. 
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of meaning, I am not sure it would have much relevance for us. The meaning of ‘meaning’ 
developed in this sense over the last four hundred years and this is the lens (or at least one of 
the possible lenses) through which we look back in time. Lancashire’s conclusion seems to 
point in this direction as well when, in putting up with linguistic untidiness, semantic 
indeterminacy (I would rather say instability or – in a more positive tone - flexibility) and the 
lack of early modern referential word definition, he concludes:  
 
If there are no fixed senses in the first place, there is nothing lexical in the word 
that is determinable. The lexical problem gives away to one of understanding 
human purpose and the world in which it operates.367
 
 
The other, more practical consequence for establishing the meanings of an early modern 
English word for the kind of “prototype Renaissance monolingual dictionary that never 
actually existed” (suggested by Lancashire368) is, probably, to proceed by early modern 
translations of preferably other early modern texts and to see how the translator implicitly 
assigns meaning to English words (and, retroactively, to the words in the text of his source 
language) in the course of relating them to the words of his source language.369
 These conceptual and methodological insights and considerations prompt me to turn to 
Florio’s translation of Montaigne. Of course, when doing such a comparative “meaning 
search” one is exposing himself to multiple dangers: if, after all, meaning can be determined 
from contexts within a language and the best further guide to meaning is translation form one 
language into another, then one has to consider the contexts in both the source text/language 
and in the target text/language. I am also aware that such a back and forth zigzag between 
contexts and languages for establishing the meaning of ‘emotion’ / émotion may, in fact, lead 
to a mis-en-abîme370… 
 Therefore bearing the richness of Montaigne’s text in mind, and the possible dangers of 
‘getting lost in translation’ I shall look at Florio’s translation in order: 
1. to examine how consistent is Florio in translating passion and émotion; 
                                                 
367 Lancashire, Ibid. p. 17. 
368 Ibid. p. 3. 
369 The suggestion is that of Ian Lancashire (1996) Ibid. p. 3. but it is amended and adapted to my 
perspective. 
370 Such a back and forth reference between contexts and languages may account for a mis-en-abîme 
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2. to assess more concretely whether Florio, in making his translation, is aware of the 
Montaignian idiolect in the usage of émotion and of the ramifications and 
underpinnings the new sense of émotion and of ‘emotion’ entail 
3. and to see to what extent is Florio’s English text engages in that transition between 
systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes on the one hand, and between 
metaphorical devices (‘passion’  ‘emotion’) used to express affective states on the 
other hand. 
 
Of course, the three questions are closely interrelated and even presuppose each other and it is 
somewhat artificial to separate them. I must also admit that the analysis of the Essais and of 
the Florio/Montaigne I am offering is far from being complete. A mere count of the number of 
instances ‘passion’/passion, ‘emotion’/esmotion, emotion, émotion appear in the two bodies of 
texts shows that such an enterprise can be subject of a whole book. There are 171 occurrences 
of ‘passion’ in Florio’s text (27 ‘passionate’ included, 15 ‘compassion’ not counted;) and 13 
occurrences of ‘emotion’ (not counting the one in “To the Curteous Reader”) in a total of cca. 
516000 words. In Montaigne’s original, there are 29 occurrences of émotion (in various forms 
such as esmotion (14), emotion (10), and émotion (5)) and 175 occurrences of passion (not 
counting compassion (16)) in a total of cca. 438000 words. This turnout of ‘passion’ is 
comparable to the occurrences of the word in Bacon, The Essays or Counsels Civill and 
Morall (1601) which has 14 occurrences of ‘passion’, (including two ‘compassionate’) in a 
total of cca. 53500 words but, volumes borne in mind, significantly surpasses that of The 
Advancement of Learning (1605) which has 13 occurrences of ‘passion’ (including one 
‘passionate’) in cca. 84700 words. However, neither The Essays nor The Advancement has 
‘emotion’ – a fact that further highlights the originality and idiolect of Montaigne and of the 
Montaigne/Florio.  
Given Montaigne’s aim to give a portrait of himself (“myselfe am the groundworke of 
my booke”371) and through himself of the human condition (“Every man beareth the whole 
stampe of humane condition.”372) in all its peculiarities implies that the stuff of which 
‘Human, All-Too Human’ life is made, namely our affective states, will occupy a major part. 
In this sense, as we shall see, Montaigne is more attentive to subjective states of minds, 
                                                 
371 Florio, “The Author to the Reader” 
372 Florio, III. 2. “Of Repenting” 
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idiosyncrasies than Bacon in either his programmatic attitude to science and learning (The 
Advancement) or in his more generalist approach to moral issues in The Essays. Of course, 
given the specificity of Montaigne’s use of émotion I shall therefore focus mainly on 
occurrences of ‘emotion’ in the Montaigne/Florio and will select a number of passages I deem 
crucial and symptomatic in order to address the issues raised above.  
 
 
Analysis of some loci with passion / émotion / esmotion / emotion 
in Les essais / The Essayes 
 
1) From II. 11. “De la cruauté”/ “Of Crueltie” 
 
Comme ont bien d'autres, que je trouve avoir surpassé par effect les regles 
mesmes de leur discipline : Tesmoing le jeune Caton :Quand je le voy mourir et 
se deschirer les entrailles, je ne me puis contenter, de croire simplement, qu'il 
eust lors son ame exempte totalement de trouble et d'effroy : je ne puis croire, 
qu'il se maintint seulement en cette desmarche, que les regles de la secte Stoique 
luy ordonnoient, rassise, sans esmotion et impassible : il y avoit, ce me semble, 
en la vertu de cet homme, trop de gaillardise et de verdeur, pour s'en arrester là. 
 
As also others have, whom ill effect finde to have exceeded the verie rules of 
their discipline; witnesse Cato the younger; when I see him die, tearing and 
mangling his entrails, I cannot simply content my selfe to beleeve that at that 
time he had his soule wholly exempted from all trouble or free from vexation: I 
cannot imagine he did only maintaine himselfe in this march or course which the 
rule of the Stoike sect had ordained unto him, setled, without alteration or 
emotion, and impassible. 
 
Given the Ciceronian-Stoic context and the explicit reference to “the rule of the Stoike sect”, 
‘impassible’ must mean ‘to be immune from passions’ (ataraxia) in accordance with the Stoic 
ideal.  The three words rassise, sans esmotion et impassible are thus synonyms all denoting 
the state ordained by “the rule of the Stoike sect”. Sans esmotion is just midway between 
rassise (‘setled’) and impassible and is an equivalent of impassible: without ‘passion’. 
Florio’s translation is interesting because he does not simply translate sans esmotion literally 
as ‘without emotion’ but interjects ‘alteration’: ‘without alteration or emotion’ i.e. Cato does 
not experience either alteration or emotion. I would suggest that Florio is not only translating 
but also interpreting the expression sans esmotion for the contemporary English reader who 
might have associated the social-political sense with ‘emotion’ (as in “There were ... great 
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373stirres and emocions in Lombardye”).  Florio’s insertion ‘alteration’ anchors the sense of 
‘emotion’ in the mental-psychological field. In fact, the three/four words rassise, sans 
esmotion et impassible / “without alteration or emotion, and impassible” mirror the earlier 
phrase in the sentence eust lors son ame exempte totalement de trouble et d'effroy / “his soule 
wholly exempted from all trouble or free from vexation”. In the latter phrase, the reference to 
Classical ‘passions’ is obvious: trouble, perturbation of the soul and effroy (“fright, fear, 
dread” according to Cotgrave (1611)) is one (metus or timor) of the four Ciceronian-
Augustinian passions. Florio’s translation dramatizes the freedom from all trouble by spelling 
it out explicitly as both “exempt from trouble” and as “free from vexation”. It thus contrasts 
all the more apparently that, in the second part of the sentence, he takes sans emotion as 
‘being without passion’. I conclude then that Florio registers that emotion can be a hyperonym 
for troubles/vexations of the soul that is the consecrated reference, at least since Cicero-
Augustine, to the passions.  
 
In further commenting on the death of Cato the younger, Montaigne remarks: 
 
Il me semble lire en cette action, je ne sçay quelle esjouyssance de son ame, et 
une esmotion de plaisir extraordinaire, 
 
 In which action me thinks I read a kinde of unspeakable joy in his minde, and a 
motion of extraordinary pleasure, 
 
 
Florio translates by ‘motion’ the esmotion of Montaigne; again the context contains references 
to Classical ‘passions’: esjouyssance is “joy, mirth, glee, reioycing, gladness” in Cotgrave 
(1611) as well as plaisir / pleasure (laetitia or gaudium). Florio’s avoidance of translating 
esmotion as ‘emotion’ may be due to the positive sense in which the word is used here. 
Cotgrave (1611) gives “An emotion, commotion, sudden, or turbulent stirring; an agitation of 
the spirit, violent motion of the thoughts, vehement inclination of the mind” for esmotion. 
Thus perhaps the translator of the Essais is diverging from the Cotgravean sense by his 
implication that ‘emotion’ is either a hyperonym for certain passions or, when the reference is 
                                                 
373 In a similar way, Florio also interjects “march or course” in the same sentence when the French 
only has desmarche. 
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more to the experience of a particular emotion (such as pleasure), then the physiological 
connotation of ‘motion’ (as bodily experience) is more appropriate.  
 
2) From II. 12. « Apologie de Raimond de Sebonde” / “An Apologie of Raymond Sebond” 
 
Les Prescheurs sçavent, que l'emotion qui leur vient en parlant, les anime vers la 
creance : et qu'en cholere nous nous addonnons plus à la deffence de nostre 
proposition, l'imprimons en nous, et l'embrassons avec plus de vehemence et 
d'approbation, que nous ne faisons estans en nostre sens froid et reposé. 
 
Preachers know that the emotion which surpriseth them whilst they are in their 
earnest speech doth animate them towards belief, and that being angrie we more 
violently give our selves to defend our proposition, emprint it in our selves, and 
embrace the same with more vehemencie and approbation than we did being in 
our temperate and reposed sense. 
 
The context of “emotion” here is that of preaching, oration and the focus is not on the 
audience as in Aristotle’s Rhetoric (discussed above, chapter II.1.2) but on the orator, 
preacher himself. “Emotion” here functions as a synonym for a classic example of passion, 
anger. Its use may be motivated by the neutrality of the term compared to “passion” and the 
wish to focus on the energy that anger may provide rather than letting any moral valuations 
prevail. After all, anger while speaking is not anger directed against anybody concrete and the 
emotional impulse it furnishes may function, as it is suggested in the text, as an aid to faith, as 
reinforcement to stick to and advance one’s position in words. Although emotion “surprises” 
preachers, they do not passively endure it (as the classical sense of pathos suggests) but can 
manipulate it in linguistic, dramatic contexts and interhuman relations. The position that 
emotions can be spurs to virtue is also shared by Erasmus:  
 
Peripatetics teach the affections not to be destroyed utterly, but to be refrained, 
and that the use of them is not utterly to be refused, for because they think them 
to be given of nature, as a prick or a spur to stir a man to virtue: as wrath maketh 
a man bold and hardy, and is a matter of fortitude.374
 
The crucial difference between “passion” and “emotion” and probably the underlying reason 
for the use of the latter is in the sense that one can take stock and ownership of such mental 
phenomena (here anger) rather than simply be a passive victim of it. 
 
                                                 
374 The Manual of a Christian Knight (1501) Chapter V 
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3) From III. 2. “De repentir” / “Of Repenting” 
 
Le langage Latin m'est comme naturel : je l'entens mieux que le François : mais 
il y a quarante ans, que je ne m'en suis du tout poinct servy à parler, ny guere à 
escrire. Si est ce qu'à des extremes et soudaines esmotions, où je suis tombé, 
deux ou trois fois en ma vie : et l'une, voyant mon pere tout sain, se renverser sur 
moy pasmé : j'ay tousjours eslancé du fond des entrailles, les premieres paroles 
Latines : Nature se sourdant et s'exprimant à force, à l'encontre d'un si long 
usage : et cet exemple se dit d'assez d'autres. 
 
The Latine tongue is to me in a manner naturall; I understand it better then 
French: but it is now fortie yeares I have not made use of it to speake, nor much 
to write; yet in some extreame emotions and suddaine passions, wherein I have 
twice or thrice falne, since my yeares of discretion, and namely once, when my 
father being in perfect health, fell all along upon me in a swoune, I have ever, 
even from my very hart uttered my first words in latine: nature rushing and by 
force expressing it selfe, against so long a custome; the like example is alleadged 
of divers others. 
 
This passage is particularly interesting as Florio translation is a quasi gloss on Montaigne’s 
text. He translates “extremes et soudaines esmotions” as “extreame emotions and suddaine 
passions” and thus adds a noun. This amendment of the French text creates a pair, a kind of 
hendiadys, in the English where “extreame emotions” come as synonyms of “suddaine 
passions”. The context of the emergence of such states of mind is described by Montaigne as 
being of such emotional intensity that self-control was not sustained despite several years of 
custom and practice (that is, the non-practice of his “naturall Latine”). It is notable that Florio 
feels the need to introduce “passions” to describe such an extreme situation and to qualify 
“emotions” as well as “extreame” – thus turning it into a synonym of passion as we would 
understand today, a matter of intensity and not only of content. 
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Figure 4: Evolution of semantic and associated fields of “passion” and “emotion” 
 
I am proposing the above figure as a tentative (indeed, very tentative) illustration of 
the interlaced manner in which changes in semantic fields are reflected in the evolution of the 
meaning of “passion” and “emotion”. My understanding is that the Montaigne/Florio is at a 
crucial moment of this evolution. Montaigne raises ‘motion’ from the physical-physiological 
level to the psychological level. He turns ‘motion’ into the vehicle of the metaphor in which 
the emotions are the tenor375, or to put it in another way: motion becomes the vehicle for 
certain mental phenomena. The implicit leitmotif (it can hardly be said a metaphor) of 
‘passions’ in the Classical sense and usage was being subject to, or exposed to something; 
both to grief and pleasure according to the etymology of pathos/  as well as to the gods, 
fortune, injuries, needs and desires in the Classical Greek period. This leitmotif was slightly 
altered by Cicero when he translated the Greek term as perturbatio animi and it was later 
adopted (with some accommodations and changes) by Augustine, Boethius, etc. It can be 
argued, however, that in the Classical usage of ‘passion’, ‘motion’ was always implicit: in the 
Aristotelian tradition, passions are motions of the sensitive soul, for Aquinas they are acts or 
                                                 
375 I am using the terms employed by I. A. Richards in The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936). 
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movements of the sensitive appetite. It was also employed by Augustine when he referred to 
the passions as animi motibus (‘mental emotions’ or ‘motions of the mind’).376  For Thomas 
Wright, an adherent of the Thomist tradition, “the inordinate motions of the passions” are 
“thorny briars sprung from the infected root of original sin”.377 In the medieval medical 
tradition deriving partly from Galen, these motions are humoural movements within the body: 
liquids heaving and frothing, eager to be let out.378 Thus ‘motion’ is an important component 
in the Classical sense of ‘passion’ and, furthermore, even perturbatio could be seen as a form 
of motio. And yet the move from one to the other took some sixteen hundred years because of 
the systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes the slight difference between the two 
metaphors entail: a small step for word meaning yet a big and a long-time hesitant step for 
Western European languages and cultures… And, after all, there aren’t that many sêma that 
could be turned into metaphoric vehicle to describe mental phenomena – or so we think, at 
least… What really happens is that the direction of the ‘motion’ begins to change: in Classical 
‘passion’, this movement is “suffered” (Aristotle), it is caused by external objects (Aquinas). 
In the modern perspective of ‘emotion’, the movement comes from the subject itself.379  
It is a sort of irony of the semantic change that the metaphoric vehicle of ‘motion’ is in 
fact based on the Aristotelian-Thomist theories of motions of the sensitive soul or appetite, on 
the movement of animal spirits in the blood and Galenic psychology and physiology. It is 
beyond the scope of this study but it would be interesting to further trace whether ‘motion’ as 
the vehicle of the metaphor is not a trickle down effect of these theories. The process would 
                                                 
376 Augustine, City of God, IX. 4 and motus (‘motions’) City of God, XIV. 9. 
377 The Passions of the Minde in Generall (1601) 
378 For a summary, see Nancy G. Siriasi, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction 
to Knowledge and Practice, Chicago, 1990, pp. 104ff. In the context of an overview of the 
historiography of emotions, Barbara H. Rosenwein qualifies this model of the emotions as “hydraulic” 
and suggests that it underpins the grand narrative of the history of emotions (Huizinga, Febvre, Bloch, 
Elias) as well as popular conceptions and our everyday language about the emotions. She considers 
that this model is no longer tenable because new, cognitive and social constructionst theories of the 
emotions since the 1960s have dethroned the hydraulic model. Cf. Barbara H. Rosenwein, “Worrying 
about Emotions in History” in The American History Review Vol. 107, Issue 3. As my study concerns 
the semantic evolution of “passion” and its partial replacement by “emotion”, I am content to register 
the metaphoric changes and transfers that take place in this evolution. 
379 Cf. Diller (2005), p. 187. 
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then look like this: the theories invent the vehicle (‘motion’) but in Classical ‘passion’ it is 
used in a literal-physiological sense for the motions of the soul and, due to changes in 
systematic patterns of beliefs and attitudes regarding mental phenomena, the physical sense is 
turned into a metaphor and its direction is reversed: from world to subject, to movement 
coming out of the subject itself. 
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III. 4. Francis Bacon’s Strategy of the 




 The purpose of this chapter is to assess Bacon’s adaptation of the Ciceronian cultura 
animi as a humanist’s adaptation of the care for the self. My focus here is not on presenting 
and analysing the semantic change of passion proper but rather to present the Baconian 
‘regiment of the mind’ as a preoccupation that underpins the early modern understanding of 
the passions and the mainstream program of providing means for their treatment. Bacon is 
also emblematic in the sense of blending different philosophical and theological traditions 
(Stoics, Aristotelian, Christian) and thus illustrating the intercultural context of early modern 
humanism. It seems necessary to situate briefly the problem in Bacon’s oeuvre and to see how 
his study of human nature fits into his overall program of the reform and advancement of 
knowledge. Bacon shares many of the major humanist assumptions about the nature of man 
and about the use of learning and erudition. His fundamental approach to the passions is that 
of a humanist working for the betterment of mankind, and advocating the use of learning to 
relieve man's estate and implying a close connection between moral culture and the rational 
faculties of the mind. 
  In the history of ideas Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) is credited for his wholesale 
revaluation of knowledge and his restructuring of traditional learning resulting in his 
proposition of a new system based on induction supported by observation and experiments 
and gave an impetus to the active development of new arts and inventions. Bacon also put 
forward his ideal of a research centre and scientific community and ultimate goal of his 
system was the production of practical knowledge for “the use and benefit of men” and the 
“relief of man’s estate” and “furthering “the advancement of the glory of God.” His cultural 
legacy is usually taken to consist mostly of contributing to the foundation and triumph of 
technology and the progress of science in the modern world. But Bacon’s program of science 
contains other dimensions that he deems essential to practical knowledge, which, however, do 
not fit into the outlook of modern positive science. His new approach to learning invited also 
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380an alteration in the conception of the learned man: a new science for a new scientist.  He 
was also concerned with what could be called as the affective culture of man and with the 
development and culture of his ethical faculties. His seminal 1605 treatise The Proficience 
and Advancement of Learning makes room for the development of the ethical faculties in the 
program of science. In his assessment of learning there is an important subset under 
philosophy (answering to the faculty of reason according to the Galenic division) devoted to 
the human will. Its program of the progress of science and learning in general as set out in 
Book 2 proposes a “culture or regiment of the mind” the topics of which will be flashed out in 
the Essayes or Counsels Civill and Moral. This procedure of setting the ground for further 
work is very much the spirit of The Advancement of Learning as a whole as it is an 
“encyclopaedia of lacunae” that identifies “gaps in our knowledge to be filled, a list of 
desiderata that will demand much labour over many years”381.  
 
“Wherefore I will now attempt to make a general and faithful perambulation 
[tour] of learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie fresh and waste 
[uncultivated], and not improved and converted [transformed] by the industry of 
man; to the end that such a plot [plan, outline] made and recorded to memory 
may both minister light to any public designation, and also serve to excite 
voluntary endeavours [the generosity of private persons subsidising research]. 
Wherein nevertheless my purpose is at this time to note only omissions and 
deficiencies, and not to make any redargution [refutation] of errors or 
incomplete prosecutions [unfinished investigations]; for it is one thing to set 
forth what ground lieth unmanured, and another thing to correct ill husbandry in 
that which is manured.”382
 
Bacon’s program for the advancement and dissemination of knowledge is part and 
parcel of his overall aim of using science and learning pro bono publico. In fact, these 
endeavours are motivated by the Renaissance ethos - Ciceronian in its origin - of combining 
                                                 
380 Cf. Moody E. Prior, “Bacon’s Man of Science” in Journal of the History of Ideas, 1954 (XV) pp. 
348-370. 
381 Brian Vickers’ introduction to The Advancement of Learning in Francis Bacon - A Critical Edition 
of the Major Works, Edited by Brian Vickers, “The Oxford Authors”, Oxford, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1996, p. 581. Quotations from Bacon – unless otherwise indicated - are cited from 
this edition and will be henceforward referred to as The Advancement. Textual glosses between 
parentheses are those of B. Vickers. 
382 The Advancement, p. 174. 
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vita contemplativa and vita activa. Just as natural philosophy for Bacon must work for the 
"relief of man's estate" - one must look for the real transformation of the human condition 
through scientific progress - so it is with Moral Philosophy that should seek the reformation of 
man. Since moral knowledge cannot remain a theoretical knowledge, cultura animi occupies a 
central place in Bacon’s strategy concerning the use of learning for moral improvement and 
hence for the treatment of the passions. The structural partition of Book Two of the 
Advancement of Learning answers to the various faculties of the mind according to the 
Galenic division such as History (memory), Poesy (imagination), and Philosophy (reason). 
Rather than erecting a science devoid of practical use for human beings, Bacon’s very 
discussion of the different branches of learning are correlated to and engage the human 
mind’s different faculties. Bacon’s humanist conviction in the therapeutic capacity of learning 
and rhetoric for the treatment of the passions is given an emblematic image when he provides 
"human proofs" for the "evidence concerning the true dignity and value of learning". He 
evokes the myth of Orpheus in the following terms: 
  
Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, in repressing the inconveniences 
which grow from man to man, much inferior to the former, of relieving the 
necessities which arise from nature; which merit was lively set forth by the 
ancients in that feigned relation of Orpheus' theatre, where all beasts and birds 
assembled; and, forgetting their several appetites, some of prey, some of game, 
some of quarrel, stood all sociably together listening to the airs and accords of 
the harp; the sound whereof no sooner ceased, or was drowned by some louder 
noise, but every beast returned to its own nature: wherein is aptly described the 
nature and condition of men, who are full of savage and unreclaimed desires of 
profit, of lust, of revenge; which as long as they give ear to precepts, to laws, to 
religion, sweetly touched with eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, 
of harangues, so long is society and peace maintained; but if these instruments 
be silent, or that sedition and tumult make them not audible, all things dissolve 
into anarchy and confusion.383
 
Bacon establishes a parallel between human society and the assembly of animals and suggests 
that without the discipline and guidance of laws, books of learning and exercises of rhetoric 
human society would inevitably collapse into anarchy and confusion. It is because people in 
their natural condition are full of passions and it is learning that creates bonds of sociability 
among them. Learning here carries the sense of precepts, laws, and religion mediated by the 
“eloquence and persuasion of books, of sermons, of harangues” (that is rhetoric and dialectic). 
                                                 
383 The Advancement, p. 154. 
 178
Further on the enlightened king endued with learning is meant to have notions of “religion, 
policy and morality”. There is, however, a slight difference between this classical humanist 
conception of learning that is anchored in the power of language and rhetoric and Bacon’s 
“Georgics of the mind”. The former is grounded on the belief that humaniores litterae, 
symbolised here by Orpheus’ lyre, can domesticate human behaviour. Bacon’s method of 
cultura animi and Regiment of the Mind starts with the study of human nature, a catalogue of 
human dispositions somewhat in the manner of studying physical nature in an empirical 
manner. Whereas the former intervenes by rhetoric, the latter wishes to amend by pre-empting 
or medicining the mind’s diseases. Bearing in mind Bacon’s wish to advance the status of 
learning, his insistence on the moral and therapeutic capacities partakes of a strategy to 
increase learning’s credentials. If science is a moral undertaking, its patronage can be all the 
more appealing to the monarch.384
In summary Bacon’s argument is that passions can be best pre-empted by learning and 
eloquence: by increasing the power of the mind, the storm of passions can be prevented since 
they are caused by errors of judgement. In this optimistic humanist outlook, increase of 
knowledge is an increase of power over the self: we can rule over passions. 
 
Bacon’s treatment of the passions is embedded in his “culture of the mind” that is itself 
part of his moral philosophy embedded in the revived Classical tradition of self-knowledge: 
 
We come therefore now to that knowledge whereunto the ancient oracle 
directeth us, which is the KNOWLEDGE OF OURSELVES; which deserveth 
the more accurate handling, by how much it toucheth us more nearly.385
 
It is also a segment of what Bacon calls Human Philosophy or Humanity, the study of human 
nature and the study of “man segregate” and “man congregate”.  
 
With this reservation therefore we proceed to human philosophy or humanity, 
which hath two parts: the one considereth man segregate or distributively; the 
other congregate or in society. So as human philosophy is either simple and 
                                                 
384 For the idea of science as a moral undertaking, albeit in a different perspective, cf. Ian Box, 
“Bacon’s Moral Philosophy” in The Cambridge Companion to Bacon, edited by Markku Peltonen, 
Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 260ff. 
385 The Advancement, p. 205. 
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particular, or conjugate and civil. Humanity particular consisteth of the same 
parts whereof man consisteth; that is, of knowledges which respect the body, and 
of knowledges which respect the mind. But before we distribute so far, it is good 
to constitute. For I do take the consideration in general and at large of human 
nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a knowledge by itself: not so much in 
regard of those delightful and elegant discourses which have been made of the 
dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state and life, and the like adjuncts of his 
common and undivided nature; but chiefly in regard of the knowledge 
concerning the sympathies and concordances between the mind and body, which 
being mixed cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.386
 
Bacon proposes to take the object of his inquiry human nature as such both in a descriptive 
way and by providing specific means for its improvement. In doing so Bacon makes an 
oblique critical remark concerning the familiar humanist discourses about the dignity of man. 
Although the remark is not fully developed in this context we may infer from Bacon’s overall 
attitude that he probably found those discourses somewhat flamboyant and hanging in the air 
because lacking in methodical discussion and practical advice about how to proceed 
concretely. Bacon does not question the onto-theological underpinnings of such discourses 
about man (divine, angelical nature, etc.) Instead, he proposes to fledge out the knowledge 
necessary for achieving those high ends, to elaborate a knowledge or science of human nature. 
As it emerges from The Advancement of Learning and the Essays this knowledge concerns 
both the moral principles but even more the practical ways of how to achieve them and it calls 
for an individual practice: the culture of the mind. 
Rather than taking a frontal approach to the passions, Bacon’s culture of the mind 
engages with human nature as a whole both in its individual and social dimensions. The 
theme of the passions is enmeshed in a multitude of topics that thematise human existence and 
behaviour such as habit, custom, education, anger, etc. These issues all offer opportunities for 
a regiment of the mind.  
  The role of Baconian science with regard to the passions is first to provide help to 
diagnose the particularities of “the diversity of complexions and constitutions”, second to 
identify the diseases and then propose the cures (The Advancement,. p. 258-259.) It is in the 
perspective of such guidance and advice that Bacon could give the subtitle to his 1625 edition 
of the Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral and it apparently was very popular given the 
                                                 
386 The Advancement, p. 205-206. emphasis mine 
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Renaissance vogue of self-improvement. Bacon’s essay “Of Counsel” gives his own 
understanding of this activity. 
 
The greatest trust between man and man is the trust of giving counsel. For in 
other confidences men commit the parts of life; their lands, their goods, their 
child, their credit, some particular affair; but to such as they make their 
counsellors, they commit the whole: by how much the more they are obliged to 
all faith and integrity. […] Things will have their first or second agitation: if they 
be not tossed upon arguments of counsel, they will be tossed upon waves of 
fortune; and be full of inconstancy, doing and undoing, like the reeling of a 
drunken man.387
 
The function of the Essays as counsels forming part of the project of cultura animi suggests a 
reciprocal engagement from the reader. They bring observation to experience at the 
crossroads of psychology, ethics and politics and other sciences (broadly speaking at the 
intersections of private and public) inviting, as all counsels do, an engagement from their 
reader. Thus the practice they propose to the reader does not stop at their reading but is meant 
to resonate further.388 As they are part of the “Regiment of the Mind”, their intention is to 
help the reader achieve “health and good estate” in a certain way; not by merely putting forth, 
in a prescriptive manner, examples of virtue but to assist the reader in identifying his own 
state and assisting him or her in working on himself or herself. Of course, this is done in an 
oblique manner by putting forth personal experience at the intersection of psychology and 
ethics and combining it with observation. In this spirit the Essays invite personal meditation 
from the part of the reader in a context that Bacon himself compares to Seneca’s Epistles to 
Lucilius in his dedication to Prince Henry. In this dedication Bacon compares the Essays to 
grains of salt giving appetite to the prince rather than offending him with satiety.389 The 
                                                 
 
387 “Of Counsel” in Brian Vickers (ed.), p. 379-380. 
388 Bacon’s recalling of the marriage of Jupiter and Metis (Counsel) – “a monstrous fable” – carries the 
metaphorical sense of pregnancy: being pregnant with counsel (“begetting, impregnation”), devouring 
counsel (Jupiter eating Metis). Cf. “Of Counsel”, Vickers, ed. (1996) p. 380.  We shall return later to 
the idea present also in this passage of the link between government (“empire”) and the “Regiment of 
the Mind”. 
389 “To write just treatises requireth leisure in the writer and leisure in the reader, and therefore are not 
so fit, neither in regard of your Highness’ princely affairs, nor in regard of my continual services; 
which the cause that hath made me choose to write certain brief notes, set down rather significantly 
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comparison suggests the open-ended nature of their reading; the Renaissance reader, be it 
prince, courtier or simple subject is implicitly called to active engagement with his or her self. 
In this way, the Essays provide an accompaniment for the culture of the mind as they are 
“observances and exercises” for “fixing the good hours of the mind” in order to restore “the 
mind unto virtue and good estate” (The Advancement, p. 262.). And the effect of “medicining 
the mind” is not limited to the essays dealing specifically with a passion like “Of Revenge”, 
“Of Envy”, “Of Love”, “Of Ambition”, “Of Anger”. Inasmuch as “the diseases and infirmities 
of the mind, which are no other than the perturbations and distempers of the passions” (The 
Advancement, p. 259.) may affect all spheres of social and private life, an adequate Regiment 
of the Mind must also take into account these diverse fields of experience. In this regard 
Bacon distinguishes himself on the one hand from Aristotle whom he considers as not having 
provided guidance for curing the diseases of the mind and, on the other hand, from the Stoics 
who are lacking “active and ample descriptions and observations” (p. 259). For Bacon, the 
Stoics are somewhat better in that they provide some discourses on the affections “as of 
anger, of comfort upon adverse accidents, of tenderness of countenance, and other”.  
As part of a culture of the mind, the act of reading considered as dispersed 
meditations, “grains of salt” furnishes the reader not with explicit precepts in the sense of 
giving ready-made answers on how to behave390 but with an askesis in Foucault’s broad sense 
of a technique that agents practice on themselves to make themselves into the persons they 
want to be. I agree with Zsolt Almàsi’s analysis that this practice concerns not the 
internalisation of precepts but is rather a “phase of preparation” in that they address those very 
faculties which, if given training and kept in good condition, can yield “the excellencies of the 
mind”: Beauty (graceful behaviour), Health (freedom from the diseases of the mind) and 
Strength (the virtues of liberality, fortitude, magnanimity). Reading the Essays in the sense 
“grains of salt” and “dispersed meditations” are exercises for the individual to train himself or 
herself to become a certain sort of person. It is part of a certain fashioning of the self that in its 
                                                                                                                                                        
than curiously, which I have called Essays. The word is late, but the thing is ancient, for Seneca’s 
Epistles to Lucilius, if one mark them well, are but Essays, that is dispersed meditations, though 
conveyed in the form of Epistles. These labours of mine I know cannot be worthy of your Highness, 
for what can be worthy of you? But my hope is, they may be as grains of salt, that will rather give you 
an appetite that offend you with satiety.” Quoted by Brian Vickers (1996), p. 677-678. 
390 On why “Bacon remains silent on specific moral instruction” cf. Zsolt Almàsi, Ibid. p. 117-119. 
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nature is similar to other practices like confession, keeping Lent but is a less orthodox method 
of self-care. The quotation from Proverbs 4:23 put at the beginning of the section on the “Will 
of man” strengthens this image of the heart/mind as the basis of all moral action. In Bacon’s 
handling, this ethical substance includes the background of shared understanding of what it is 
to belong to a particular community and to aspire in practice to being a good person there. In 
this sense, the socio-politico-institutional context provides the broader framework for the 
individual askesis. 
Set against this background, Bacon’s objections to certain forms of learning can be 
better appreciated. In Book One of The Advancement of learning Bacon identifies “three 
vanities in studies, whereby learning hath been most traduced” (p. 138.) The three diseases 
(“distempers”) of learning are “fantastical [fanciful] learning”, “contentious [quarrelsome] 
learning”, and “delicate [affected, obsessed with style] learning”. In the present context, 
Bacon’s condemnation of “delicate learning” is most relevant because it brings out most 
pointedly his opposition to a kind of imitation of the ancients. Bacon reproaches to a number 
of Renaissance humanist authors lumped together for their stylistic imitation of Cicero that 
they suffer from the distemper of learning in “studying word and not matter”.391 Therefore it 
is particularly noteworthy that Bacon takes up the effective side of the humanistic heritage, 
namely the “culture of the mind” from Cicero. Whereas others “hunted more after words than 
matter”, Bacon seizes on the practical aspect of the Ciceronian program (on the verba) and 
inserts it in his program of learning. Comparing the culture of the mind and the improvement 
of affective culture to the teaching of writing, Bacon also reproaches to previous authors that 
they “only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts, or 
directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters”. (p. 244.) They do not 
provide mental tools and exercises for the attainment of “Good, Virtue, Felicity”:  
 
how to attain these excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of 
man to become true and comfortable to these pursuits, they pass it over 
altogether, or slightly and unprofitably.392
 
                                                 
391 The Advancement, p. 139. On Bacon’s alleged “anti-humanism” cf. Brian Vickers, “The myth of 
Francis Bacon’s ‘anti-humanism’” in Humanism and Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Jill Kraye 
and M. W. Stone, Routledge: London and New York, 2000 
392 The Advancement, p. 244. 
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He suggests that behind this omission is a reluctance to engage with the “ordinary and 
common matters” and he proposes his Georgics of the Mind which embraces ordinary matters 
and builds on a “husbandry and tillage” of the mind that is rooted in human relations. This 
expansion of the sphere of a culture of the mind, while retaining Bacon’s grandiose project 
concerning knowledge393, takes moral philosophy as a natural/positive science combined with 
guidance for self-care: ordinary matters providing subject-matter. 
The passions enter the picture inasmuch as they are “diseases of the mind” affecting 
the Health of the Mind. In this chapter we shall consider in turn i) what does Bacon mean by 
the word “passion”; ii) what place does the “culture of the mind” (cultura animi or cultus 
animi394) occupy in his program for the advancement of learning.  
i) Passion as disease of the mind
 
 Bacon’s definition of the passions is constant and fundamentally Stoico-Ciceronian in 
its inspiration even if in his proposed treatment does not adhere to the Stoic precepts. Thus he 
does not embrace the Stoics’ opinion about the necessity of their extirpation and the merits of 
apatheia and considers concurrent philosophical (mainly Aristotelian) treatments and a 
Christian approach in dealing with them.  
 
The Stoics were of the opinion that there was no way to attain to this even 
temper of the mind but to be senseless [lacking feeling], and so they sold their 
goods to ransom themselves from their evils; but not only Divinity, our 
schoolmistress, doth teach us the effect of grace, but even Philosophy, her 
handmaid, doth condemn our want of care and industry if we do not win very 
much upon [get better of] ourselves.395
 
As this passage shows, Bacon is keenly aware of the theological underpinnings of different 
approaches in the treatment of the passions and separates the Stoic and Christian points of 
view. He disapproves of the Stoics’ voluntarism manifest in their attempt to suppress the 
passions and contrasts it with a theology of saving divine grace on the one hand and with a 
                                                 
393 Cf. his “Letter to Lord Burghley”: “Lastly, I confess that I have as vast contemplative ends as I 
have moderate civil ends: for I have taken all knowledge to be my province;”. In Vickers (1996) p. 20. 
394 Cf. The Advancement, p. 255.ff and Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels, [henceforward 
Advice] in Vickers, Ibid (1996) Letter I, p. 69. respectively. 
395 Advice, p. 70. 
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philosophy of self-care and industry. The Baconian approach to the passions will be 
elaborated along such lines of self-care and industry as part of a broader strategy of a culture 
of the mind and advancement of learning. We shall come back to this point in more detail 
below. 
396In the same letter Bacon defines passions as "sicknesses of the mind".  Also, in 
various places in The Advancement of Learning, passions are described again and again as 
"diseases and infirmities of the mind" or "perturbations and distempers of the affections"397. 
As such they are associated to imperfections in kings (The Advancement, p. 155.) that lead to 
"continual mutinies and seditions" (The Advancement, p. 239) against reason. Even if this 
definition has a Stoic colouring, Bacon does not propose a blanket suppression of them. In his 
essay “Of Regiment of Health” he approaches the question from the aspect of health and 
although he advises the avoidance of certain passions (such as envy, anxious fears, anger 
fretting inwards,398 etc.) he proposes other, one could say mellower passions such as hope, 
mirth, wonder and admiration.399
 
As for the passions and studies [concerns] of the mind: avoid envy; anxious 
fears; anger fretting inwards [suppressed, corrosive]; subtle and knotty 
[complicated] inquisitions [investigations]; joys and exhilarations in excess; 
sadness not communicated [released]. Entertain [cultivate] hopes; mirth rather 
than joy; variety of delights, rather than surfeit of them; wonder and admiration, 
and therefore novelties; studies that fill the mind with splendid and illustrious 
objects, as histories, fables and contemplations of nature.400
 
It is also worth noting that in the context of this essay by Bacon on the control or regiment of 
health, almost all passions, whether recommended or not, are qualified in one way or another. 
With the exception of ‘envy’, in order to judge about the healthiness of a given passion, it 
                                                 
396 "The gifts or excellencies of the mind are the same as those are of the body; Beauty, Health, and 
Strength. … Health consisteth in an unmovable constancy and a freedom from passions, which are 
indeed the sicknesses of the mind." Advice, p. 69. (emphasis mine) 
397 For e.g. Advancement, p. 165, p. 258-9 and passim. 
398 Cf. the Aristotelian passions not admitting a mean in the discussion above on Aristotle, Chapter 
II.1.2. and  Eth. Nic. Ibid. II. 6. 1107 a5ff. 
399 Where a mean according to Aristotle is possible. 
400 Bacon, “Of Regiment of Health”, in Vickers (1996) p. 404. 
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must receive some sort of qualification such as ‘anxious fears’, ‘anger fretting inwards’, etc. 
Bacon was consistent in his discussion of the passions in keeping the vocabulary of health and 
disease throughout his career. In The Advancement of Learning, the book of central concern 
for our topic and the main focus of this chapter, Bacon suggests a number of dispositions and 
tools "to recover or preserve the health and good estate of the mind".401 What is particularly 
interesting is how the theme of health is conjugated with that of learning in this part of the 
book and how this will inform much of what Bacon has to say about the passions later in his 
career. Although the passions are never explicitly assimilated to any of the Idols, the attitude 
towards them, calling them “diseases of the mind” gives them the colouring of Idols of the 
Tribe in the sense that they are part of the natural weaknesses and tendencies common to all 
human nature. Thus the definition of the passions as “diseases of the mind” in the passage 
cited above invites the association of learning with metaphors of healing, remedying, purging, 
etc.402 and makes the treatment of the passions part of Bacon’s overall strategy of 
counteracting the Idols. This outlook on the passions is present also in the Advice to the Earl 
of Rutland on his travels:  
 
Health consisteth in an unmovable constancy and freedom from passions, which 
are indeed the sicknesses of the mind. […] To attain to health of mind, we must 
use the same means that we do for the health of our bodies; that is, to take 
observation what diseases we are aptest to fall into, and to provide against them, 
for physic [medicine] hath not more medicines against the diseases of the body, 
than reason hath preservatives [medicines protecting against disease or infection] 
against passions of the mind.403
 
This medical analogy emblematically contains Bacon’s approach to the passions: if freedom 
from the passions is a matter of the rational faculty in man than one must strengthen and 
cultivate this faculty in order to pre-empt the ascendancy and the harmful effects of the 
passions. Just as bodily sicknesses can be avoided by strengthening one’s, the health of the 
                                                 
401 The Advancement, p. 260. 
402 Cf. also the device Of Tribute (1592): "Is it not knowledge alone that clear the mind of all 
perturbations"? B. Vickers, (1996) p. 34. 
403 Advice, p. 69-70 
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404mind can be maintained by its proactive cultivation.  We shall now discuss in detail Bacon’s 
proposed method for doing so. 
 
ii) The Georgics of the Mind 
 
Bacon addresses the issue of a culture of the mind in Book Two of The Advancement 
in the context of providing the means “how to subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of 
man” to the “Exemplar or Platform of Good”.405 It is significant how Bacon situates his own 
approach in matters of moral philosophy. First of all he admits that “the cure of men’s minds 
belongeth to sacred Divinity, […]: but yet Moral Philosophy may be preferred unto 
[recommended to] her as a wise servant and humble handmaid.”406 While he is keen to 
elaborate his “husbandry of the mind” with a view to “subdue, accommodate [adapt] the will 
of man" he does not question the pertinence and efficiency of faith and charity in this regard. 
Nowhere does he want to present his contribution to moral philosophy as if it was an 
alternative or rival route to achieve the high ends of virtue.407 In other words, there is no 
                                                 
404 That Bacon was aware of the possible positive use of the passions is indicated by the following 
addition, in the De Augmentis, to the text of The Advancement: “The will is governed by right reason, 
seduced by apparent good, having for its spurs the passions, for its ministers the [bodily] organs and 
voluntary motions.” (Emphasis mine) Quoted by B. Vickers (1996), p. 648. 
405 The Advancement, p. 245. 
406 The same, commonplace, relationship between theology and philosophy occurs in the Advice as 
well, cf. the passage quoted above, from Advice, p. 70. and elsewhere in The Advancement, p. 262 and 
passim. 
407 Cf. “The obliteration of evil hath been practised by two means; some kind of redemption 
[atonement for an offence] or expiation of that which is past; and an inception [beginning] de novo 
[anew] for the time to come. But this part seemeth sacred and religious, and justly; for all good Moral 
Philosophy (as was said) is but an handmaid to religion.” The Advancement, p. 262. Also: “But these 
be heathen and profane passages [observations], having but a shadow of that divine state of mind 
which religion and the holy faith doth conduct men unto, by imprinting upon their souls Charity, [in 
the sense of agape] which is excellently called the bond of Perfection, because it comprehendeth 
[includes] and fasteneth all virtues together. […] so certainly if a man’s mind be truly inflamed with 
charity, it doth work him suddenly into greater perfection than all the doctrine of morality can do, 
which is but a sophist [pretender] in comparison of the other.” Ibid. p. 263. 
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question of establishing an autonomous morality, independent of religion. The purpose of 
Bacon is rather to supplement moral philosophy in the sense of identifying certain gaps or 
lacunae left previous authors – the avowed purpose of The Advancement of Learning. In this 
regard, his work appears to engage more specifically and chiefly with Aristotle whose ethics 
he finds deficient in showing how to attain the Platform or Exemplar of Good. This 
orientation present both in the Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels and in The 
Advancement of Learning shows that Bacon is more inclined to engage in discussions of the 
"how" (or modus operandi) of moral action than of the "what" of moral ends given that the 
latter, the Platform of Exemplar of the Good he finds unproblematic. Revealed religion gives 
enough guidance on this matter and Bacon does not hesitate to quote the Scripture and to refer 
to Divinity to make his point clear or to dissipate any ambiguity that might arise from his 
reliance on heathen authors.408 Without questioning his sincerity on this point, it was also an 
important strategic issue not to appear contentious when setting forth a program for the 
advancement of science and learning that was meant to be realised as a public endeavour and 
thus requiring the open support of the King and of the Church as well.  
Where Bacon finds much to contend and supplement in Aristotle is a kind of modus 
operandi of moral behaviour or more precisely a methodical improvement of the mind’s 
faculties as the source of moral agency. For Aristotle ethical virtue is dependent on the 
capacity of phronesis ( )409 hence virtuous action requires an intellectual effort when 
it comes to decide on moral rectitude and right reason (  ). The rational part of the 
soul must persuade the irrational part to obey reason. This persuasion requires the intellectual 
virtues (wisdom, intelligence and prudence) so that the ensuing behaviour may embody 
certain moral dispositions like liberality and moderation called moral virtues by Aristotle.410 
When it comes to the passions, no one can be blamed for having them on the first place. In the 
perspective of the De anima they are seen as psychic states involving the body. In the 
Rhetoric, they are useful tools for the orator for swaying his audience. From an ethical 
perspective, the question is to what degree a man aspiring to virtue may feel passions. The 
answer to this question involves several points of Aristotle’s ethics to which we can only refer 
                                                 
408 Cf. for e.g. p. 264. where Bacon quotes The Gospel according to St. Matthew 5: 44 and Luke 6: 27-
28. as well as Psalms 145: 9. 
409 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, II, 2, 1103 a34f; VI. 13, 1144 b27; I, 13, 1103 a6. 
410 Cf. Ethica Nicomachea, I, 13. 1103 a3-10.  
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to briefly (cf. also above, Chapter II.1.2.). Virtue is a mean that is manifested in feelings 
avoiding excess and defect, according to an intermediate standard that is also the best (to 
ariston). In the human soul, passions are in the desiring element of the irrational part of the 
soul. Although irrational, this part can be opened to reason and may listen to it. Thus passion 
may obey reason and can agree with its right rule. Thus it is possible, for Aristotle, to feel 
passions according to reason, and prudence consists in feeling them “at the right times, with 
reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and the right 
way”. It “is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue.”411 
Aristotle also points out that not all passions admit such a mean “for some have names that 
already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, 
theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are 
themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them.”412
How can one achieve moral virtue? What is the general rule for human conduct? To 
these questions, Aristotle’s answer seemed rather elusive to Bacon. Aristotle’s answer, in the 
context of the Ethica Nicomachea is that the general rule has to be discerned by reason and set 
up within man’s soul by habituation. But this correct intermediate state with regard to the 
passions is difficult to attain and a peculiar kind of knowledge is necessary to attain the right 
way of acting. It can be called a practical insight or phronesis. 
It seems that in Bacon’s understanding of Aristotle, the pursuit of happiness and of 
virtue requires an intellectual faculty but Bacon reproaches to Aristotle not to have furnished 
such a mental training. Excepting of course Aristotle’s emphasis on habit and custom, a topic 
Bacon elaborates at the end of his passage on the “Culture of the Mind” and later in his essay 
“Of Custom and Education”. After all, if moral virtue is dependent on intellectual capacities 
and faculties (intellectual virtues), then the way leading to virtue must begin with the 
development of the mental faculties – with the “culture or regiment of the mind” in Bacon’s 
terms. And this is what Bacon finds painfully lacking in Aristotle. Zsolt Almàsi has recently 
suggested that Bacon was probably using Aristotle’s Magna Moralia only and formulated his 
criticism concerning Aristotle’s ethics on this basis only, that is, disregarding the Ethica 
                                                 
411 Ethica Nicomachea,  II. 5. 1106 b21ff 
412 Ethica Nicomachea, II. 6. 1107 a5ff 
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413Nicomachea.  While the misunderstanding caused by Bacon’s unfamiliarity with the Ethica 
Nicomachea was crucial for his criticism of Aristotle’s handling of custom and habit, it 
seems, however, that Bacon would have upheld his reproaches to Aristotle concerning the 
lack of practical advice about the way to attain moral virtues even if he had read the Ethica 
Nicomachea. For Bacon, habit is only one of the factors entering the picture in his “culture of 
the mind” and Aristotle’s four pieces of advice about how to hit the mean414 would not have 
satisfied Bacon either. They may be considered as moral precepts but, in themselves, they do 
not contribute to the increase of the mind’s faculties necessary for the right moral choices and 
governing the will of man. 
What’s more, Aristotle also admits that there are no fixed rules, no scientific rigour in 
matters of conduct and it is always the task of the individual to determine what is the right 
course of action.415 Thus one has to adapt itself to each individual situation and find the right 
action without a general principle of morality.  
It seems that Bacon's career as moral philosopher and essayist has its origin in his 
intention to provide a technology or method in matters of ethics. In a way, his cultura animi is 
Bacon’s discourse on method for advancing in morality as the etymological sense of the 
Greek word methodos ( , hodos = way) implies.416 He reproaches to traditional moral 
                                                 
 
413 Cf. Zsolt Almàsi, Angelic Monster – Custom in Early Modern Context, The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2003, p. 103ff. 
414 Ethica Nicomachea, II. 9, 3-6, 1109a30 – 1109b13 referred to by Zsolt Almàsi, Ibid, p. 105. 
415 Ethica Nicomachea, II, 2 1104a 5f 
416 It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest a certain similarity of attitude between the situation Bacon 
intended to resolve and the intellectual predicament described by Irving Singer in 1966. "Since we live in an age 
that romanticism has permeated for two hundred years, the popular ideology of the Western world seems to 
concern itself with little besides love. Yet the word has been a fiery coal burning on the lips of even our greatest 
philosophers. Thus far the twentieth century has been a stone age in which new tools, new methods of analysis, 
have been invented but hardly used. In pragmatism, psychoanalysis, analytical philosophy, and certain aspects of 
existentialism the ground has been cleared of much of what was worthless in earlier thinking. But relatively little 
has been done toward reconstruction, toward building attitudes of feeling and of action that might sustain a 
human being in the contemporary world. This part of the enterprise may take several generations to complete. 
Ultimate success will depend upon an army of technical philosophers addressing themselves to the logic of 
affective discourse and the phenomenology of affective experience. From their investigations, and from related 
work in science and the humanities, will emerge new ideals, new values, new patterns of experience. In returning 
to concepts such as love, the new philosophy may be more rigorous and more empirical than in the past." (my 
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philosophy that it is deficient in developing an empirical body of knowledge on which to base 
an effective moral culture. His program set out in Book Two of The Advancement of Learning 
and fleshed out in the Essays intends to provide exactly this practical knowledge and it also 
implies a practice of self-care and industry. In doing so, Bacon foregrounds the ways and 
means of acquiring virtue. This forms what he calls cultura animi and it comes under the topic 
of the “Appetite and Will of Man” which itself is part of that branch of philosophy dealing 
with human matters. In Part Two of The Advancement of Learning Bacon’s intention is to 
show what human learning has achieved in this field that answers to the rational faculty in 
man and to point to and fill in the lacunae left by previous authors. 
 
We proceed now to that knowledge which considereth of the appetite and will of 
man: whereof Salomon saith, ante omnia, fili, custodi cor tuum; nam inde 
procedunt actiones vitae. In the handling of this science, those which have 
written seem to me to have done as if a man, that professed to teach to write, did 
only exhibit fair copies of alphabets and letters joined, without giving any 
precepts or directions for the carriage of the hand and framing of the letters. So 
have they made good and fair exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and 
portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; propounding them well described as 
the true objects and scopes of man's will and desires. But how to attain these 
excellent marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to become true 
and conformable to these pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or slightly and 
unprofitably. For it is not the disputing that moral virtues are in the mind of man 
by habit and not by nature, or the distinguishing that generous spirits are won by 
doctrines and persuasions, and the vulgar sort by reward and punishment, and 
the     like scattered glances and touches, that can excuse the absence of this 
part.417
 
The basic assumption underlying Bacon’s programmatic suggestions about the 
“culture of the mind” is that learning has to be at the service of the remedy of the mind in a 
practical way. In this sense the vocabulary of medicine and of health is applied to the benefits 
of learning in the context of a “Georgics of the Mind”, or intellectual husbandry which brings 
in another metaphoric field, that of agriculture. 
  It is noteworthy that he begins discussion of “the Appetite and Will of Man” with a 
biblical quotation from Proverbs 4: 23: “Above all, my son, keep thy heart, for out of it 
                                                                                                                                                        
emphasis) Irving Singer, The Nature of Love, vol. 1 Plato to Luther, Chicago, London: The Chicago University 
Press, 19842, (1966) p. xi-xii. Bacon would come across in this comparison as a kind of “technical philosopher” 
addressing himself to the “phenomenology of affective experience”.
417 The Advancement, p. 243-244. 
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proceed the actions of life.” This biblical passage, heading the entire section may also be 
taken as pivotal in the sense of anchoring the topic of the “Culture of the Mind” in this 
scriptural admonition inasmuch as the biblical ‘heart’ means roughly the same as what Bacon 
understands by ‘mind’. So the Ciceronian-Virgilian theme of cultura animi, “Georgics of the 
mind” and all its metaphorical exploration in terms of “tilling”, “manuring”, “regiment”, etc. 
receives a Christian underpinning or overtone that makes it easier for the reader to understand 
and assimilate. The medical metaphor is also retained throughout in terms like “human 
medicine”, “health and good estate”, “regiments”, “exercises of the mind”, etc. just as the 
metaphors of agriculture introduced with the idea of the “Georgics of the mind”. The 
combination of these two metaphors creates a context where the “exercises of the mind”, the 
“husbandry and tillage” carried out by the subject himself lead the mind unto “virtue and good 
estate”. 
 
It were too long to go over the particular remedies which learning doth minister 
to all the diseases of the mind; sometimes purging the ill-humours, sometimes 
opening [freeing] the obstructions, sometimes helping digestion, sometimes 
increasing appetite, sometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations [ulcers] 
thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will conclude with that which hath 
rationem totius, [‘the essence of the whole’ from Eccles. 12:13] which is, that it 
disposeth the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects 
thereof, but still to be capable and susceptible of growth and reformation. For the 
unlearned man knows not what it is to descend into himself [observe, criticize], 
or to call himself to account; nor the pleasure of that suavissima vita, in dies 
sentire se fieri meliorem. [‘That most happy state, to feel one’s self becoming a 
better man day by day.’] The good parts he hath he will learn to show to the full, 
and use them dexterously, but not much to increase them: the faults he hath he 
will learn how to hide and colour [conceal, or show in a favourable light] them, 
but not much to amend them: like an ill [bad] mower, that mows on still 
[constantly], and never whets his scythe: whereas with the learned man it fares 
otherwise, that he doth ever intermix the correction and amendment 
[improvement] of his mind with the use and employment thereof. Nay, further, 
in general and in sum, certain it is that VERITAS [truth] and BONITAS 
[goodness] differ but as the seal and the print [impression]: for Truth prints 
Goodness; and they be the clouds of error which descend [are precipitated by] in 
the storms of passions and perturbations.418
 
This dense passage is pivotal in that it contains in short Bacon's chief assumptions 
about the causes of the passions and the way to pre-empt them as much as possible. There is 
                                                 
418  The Advancement, p. 165. 
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the assumption about the coincidence of Truth and Goodness (Veritas and Bonitas). This 
coincidence prepares the ground for the utility and prestige of knowledge in matters of ethics. 
It is this emphasis on learning that is specifically Baconian and it also suggests a lot about 
both the kind of learning required and the sort of ‘descent’ that is understood. Book One of 
The Advancement of Learning deals with "the excellency of learning and knowledge". The 
metaphor of healing and medicine is applied to "the diseases of the mind" that learning is 
expected to cure. While these concepts and metaphors may sound almost self-evident, 
nevertheless, it is necessary to define more closely the precise content Bacon gives to 
‘learning’ as well as to the culture of the mind and the how the former may contribute to 
healing the diseases of the mind. 
What distinguishes the learned man from the unlearned is that the latter “knows not 
what it is to descend into himself, or to call himself into account”. All he can do is to exhibit 
ostentatiously the "good parts" and lets the faults stagnate. He lacks the knowledge necessary 
to improve and advance in the good because his scythe is blunt, that is, he lacks knowledge. 
More fundamentally, the lack of learning hinders the way from the experience of genuine self-
inspection which is a prerequisite to remedying the diseases of the mind that are the passions. 
A precise interpretation of the above metaphor of storm is revealing for this issue. “[…] and 
they be the clouds of error which descend [are precipitated by] in the storms of passions and 
perturbations." (I am not sure if the gloss given by Vickers to ‘descend’ in this sentence is 
correct.419) The question really is whether error precedes or follows from passions – what is 
the logical and chronological sequence between the two? Passion may hinder the exercise of 
reason420 in general, but the Stoico-Ciceroian approach that Bacon adopts here suggests rather 
that passions are the results of the errors of judgement, hence of the defects of the mind. This 
interpretation is also in line with the logic of the metaphor of storm: clouds come first and 
they cause and precipitate in storms. There is first a mental lapse, an error of judgement, a 
blunt scythe, to pick up another metaphor from Bacon’s text, which then causes a passion, 
                                                 
419 If ‘are precipitated by’ means that passions / storms come first and are followed by the clouds of 
errors, it is certainly against both the logic of the metaphor and of the causal and temporal sequence of 
how passions are understood in Stoic philosophy. 
420 Cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I. – II. 77. 2. “A man who is in a state of passion 
fails to consider in particular what he knows in general… [for] the reason is somehow fettered so as 
not to exercise its act freely, even as in sleep or drunkenness.” 
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perturbation. This is what motivates the Baconian outlook on passion in a treatise on the 
advancement of learning. Learning (a humanist leitmotif) can serve as a bulwark against 
passions. The learned man must engage in a self-care in order to be “capable and susceptible 
of growth and reformation” and to advance in "the amendment of his mind". One does not 
need to attack the passions directly but should rather work on the mind and thus reinforce the 
will. If knowledge and learning rules and clouds of errors are dispelled then passions can be, 
if not eliminated, at least contained, as the “will” can be subordinated by knowledge. 
 
But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet higher than the commandment 
over the will; for it is a commandment over the reason, belief, and understanding 
of man, which is the highest part of the mind, and giveth law to the will itself. 
For there is no power on earth which setteth up a throne or chair of estate [chair 
of government] in the spirits and souls of men, and in their cogitations, 
imaginations, opinions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning.421
 
 The "preservatives against passions of the mind" are further elaborated in The 
Advancement of Learning. In fact, Bacon's voices his practical and applied approach to 
morality when he begins to discuss the “Appetite and Will of Man.” He writes pejoratively 
about a merely descriptive presentation of morality that would "only exhibit fair copies of 
alphabets and letters joined, without giving any precepts of directions for the carriage of the 
hand and framing of the letters".422 He does not want simply to present "draughts and 
portraitures of Good, Virtue, Duty, Felicity" but to give practical advice, and to equip the 
individual with the necessary faculties to attain these ends. It is interesting to note the self-
image and self-understanding that emerges from this passage and the pages that follows in 
The Advancement. Bacon sets up himself against other writers (sometimes he portrays them 
unjustly, as in the case of Aristotle) who prefer eloquence and high themes which meet their 
own genius rather than helping the reader. As opposed to such vainglorious and self-
concerned intellectual behaviour, Bacon puts himself into the position of a practical guide 
                                                 
421 The Advancement, p. 166. italics mine, G.S. In his essay “On Nature in Men” Bacon indicates the 
possibility that one’s true nature [that is, his inclination] is best revealed “in passion, for that putteth a 
man out of his precepts”. (Vickers, ed., p. 418.) This is probably the case when “the highest parts of 
the mind” are not sufficiently fortified by learning. 
422 The Advancement, p. 244. 
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who helps the reader in achieving the high ideals that others were only painting with 
eloquence at best.423 This is why he writes in De Augmentis: 
 
I turn common labourer, hodman, anything that is wanted; taking upon myself 
the burden and execution of many things which must needs be done, and which 
others through an inborn pride shrink from and decline. … Moral philosophers 
in preferring rhetorical ornaments … have for the most part passed over those 
things which are of most use of practice.424
 
 In this spirit, his metaphor of the Georgics of the mind is no accident in the sense that 
agriculture is the most down-to-earth activity one can imagine and it comes last in the 
hierarchy of genres after the epic and the odes in Virgil's œuvre.  
 
And surely, if the purpose be in good earnest, not to write at leisure that which 
men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and active life, 
these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and tillage thereof, are no 
less worthy than the heroical descriptions of Virtue, Duty, and Felicity. 
Wherefore the main and primitive division of moral knowledge seemeth to be 
into the Exemplar or Platform of Good, and the Regiment or Culture of the 
Mind: the one describing the nature of good, the other prescribing rules how to 
subdue, apply, and accommodate the will of man thereunto.425
 
 The special Baconian accent in this paragraph is his emphasis on the Regiment or 
Culture of the Mind. Of course, the term is not new, it comes from Cicero's Disputationes 
combined with the Virgilian metaphor of the Georgics. The insistence on the practical, 
"instructional" aspects of the moral outlook that pushes Bacon to develop his thematic and the 
discourse corresponding to it in the Essays. He can rely not only on Cicero and Virgil but on 
Aristotle's Magna Moralia - that he quotes at length - in this orientation to discuss the means 
of acquiring virtue. The "Culture or Regiment of the Mind" (cultura animi) exposed in the 
next section of the Advancement of Learning outlines the means to attain the Exemplar or 
Platform of Good. It is within the scope of this culture of the mind that the approach to the 
passions receives further elaboration. 
                                                 
423 For a similar commentary on Bacon's practical approach to moral philosophy see Perez Zagorin, 
Francis Bacon, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 130ff. 
424 Quoted from De Augmentis by B. Vickers, (1996), p. 649. 
425 The Advancement, p. 245. 
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 The subsection De cultura animi is structured in the following way. Bacon announces 
the subject-matter of this discussion by a reference to Aristotle for the necessity of 
foregrounding the issue of how to attain virtue. After giving due regard to “the doctrines of 
Divinity” with which he does not want to enter into debate Bacon makes a distinction, 
motivated by the practical, applied focus of his endeavour, between “what is in our power and 
what is not” (The Advancement, p. 256.). He goes on to discuss the latter where “application” 
[adaptation] is necessary. These are “points of nature, and points of fortune” and concern the 
“several characters and tempers of men’s natures and dispositions”. Bacon claims that he 
“cannot sufficiently marvel that this part of knowledge […] should be omitted both in 
morality and policy.” (The Advancement, p. 257.) According to Bacon, such knowledge is 
dispersed in different fields such as astrology, history, poesy but they also form part of daily 
experience. (The Advancement, p. 258.) He reproaches to Aristotle and to Moral Philosophy 
in general that “these observations are handled in some scattered discourses; but they were 
never incorporate into Moral Philosophy” (p. 258.) In conformity with his overall intellectual 
strategy of seeking utility of knowledge and of studies Bacon compares and sometimes 
assimilates moral knowledge, or Moral Philosophy to medicine426 and moral guidance to a 
therapy or cure. Thus knowing the diversity of impressions (both of nature and of fortune) 
upon the mind is as important for Moral Philosophy as the "knowledge of the diversity of 
grounds and moulds" for agriculture and the "diversity of complexions and constitutions" for 
medicine. These impressions can be caused by nature or by fortune: 
 
Of much like kind are those impressions of nature, which are imposed upon the 
mind by the sex, by the age, by the region, by health and sickness, by beauty and 
deformity, and the like, which are inherent and not extern; and again, those 
which are caused by extern fortune; as sovereignty, nobility, obscure birth, 
riches, want, magistracy, privateness, prosperity, adversity, constant fortune, 
variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like.427
 
Bacon also lists under the thing not in our power the “affections” [passions]. This division 
itself marks his distance with regard to a voluntarist, radical stoic self-control of the passions. 
The very grouping of the passions under “things not in our power” marks a distance with 
                                                 
426 In fact, other metaphorical parallels include agriculture, cf. The Advancement, p. 165, 258 and 
passim. 
427 The Advancement, p. 258. 
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regard to radical Stoic doctrines about them. In Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations where the 
expression cultura animi comes from428 passions are defined as contrary to nature: “This is 
then Zeno's definition of disorder (perturbatio), which he terms , that it is an agitation 
of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature. (aversa a recta ratione [ ] 
contra naturam animi commotio).”429
Beside taking away much of the burden of a sense of guilt with regard to the passions, 
acknowledging that they are not in our power to start with but are part of points of nature, 
opens large the perspective of their cure. In medicining the passions, it is necessary then to 
know first the divers complexions and constitutions, second the diseases, and lastly the cures. 
(The Advancement, p. 258-259.) More explicitly, Bacon writes about the "diseases and 
infirmities of the mind" and the task of "human medicine" to "preserve the health and good 
estate of the mind.” (p. 260.) Aristotle is criticised again for his omission of the discussion of 
the passions and for his lack of practical advice on them. The Stoics are praised for some 
writings on anger, on comfort upon adverse accidents and on tenderness of countenance. (p. 
259.) But the palm goes to “poets and writers of histories who are best doctors [teachers] of 
this knowledge” (p. 259.) 
The discussion then continues with the point within our command that can be taken as 
a list of "cures" since these are the means that have "force and operation upon the mind to 
affect the will and appetite and to alter manners": 
 
those points which are within our command, and have the force and operation 
upon the mind to affect the will and appetite and to alter manners: wherein they 
ought to have handled custom, exercise, habit, education, example, imitation, 
                                                 
428 Although Bacon anchored this semi-heathen concept in Scripture as well with his opening 
quotation from Proverbs 4: 23 (“Above all, my son, keep thy heart, for out of it proceed the actions of 
life.”) and made it at once a Solomonian concept as well. 
429 Tusc. Disp. IV. 6. In tracing the Ciceronian-Zenonian origin of Bacon’s understanding of passion, 
and in referring to Stoic conceptions of the passions in general, I do not wish to suggest that all Stoics 
shared the same definition of passion. For the different appreciations of apathia and hence of passions 
cf. Somos Róbert, “Metropatheia és apatheia Alexandriai Kelemennél” in passim, Filozófiai folyóirat, 
2001. III. évfolyam, 1. szám, pp. 252-268, (in particular pp. 256-263 where Somos traces the 
ramifications of the doctrines of apatheia and of metropatheia) and the litarture cited in the article.  
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emulation, company, friends, praise, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, 
studies430
 
As Bacon himself points it out, the discussion is rather elliptic or programmatic: most of the 
themes announced here will be developed in the Essays of 1612 and 1625. Habit and custom 
are discussed within The Advancement of Learning, the other topics will become some of the 
major themes and titles the Essays of 1612 and 1625. This orientation and work plan were 
noted by modern commentators. R. S. Crane showed that the function of Essays was to 
provide treatment of the lacunae in knowledge identified in Book Two of The Advancement of 
Learning.431 Therefore I wish to argue that Bacon’s demarche can only be appraised and 
appreciated for what it is when this section of The Advancement of Learning and the Essays 
are taken as a continuum. This, it seems to me, is the self-understanding of Bacon himself: the 
gaps of knowledge identified in a sort of “encyclopaedia of lacunae” (in Vickers’ expression) 
are to be covered in later works of his own as well as inviting others to follow suit. I would 
slightly disagree with the appraisal of Zsolt Almàsi that a “context-shift” occurs between The 
Advancement of Learning and the Essays.432 If context-shift there is in the case of the topic of 
custom for example, it is because the individual-practical and the socio-political-institutional 
contexts are encoded, so to say, in the very concept of the Baconian cultura animi. The list of 
points given in The Advancement of Learning and quoted above indicates this coherence and 
built-in expansive scope of the concept of the cultura animi. It is probably a Baconian 
innovation on the Ciceronian theme that was more individualistic in its scope. 
 As the Advancement registered the lack of “active and ample descriptions and 
observations” (p. 259.) concerning the affections, in his Essays Bacon intends to provide such 
aids to the reader’s cultura animi. Rather than providing a theory of the passions, the pieces 
dealing with specific passions (such as revenge, love, envy) describe them, expose the 
vicissitudes and dangers they entails, the contexts within which they are likely to arise. Thus 
for example the pair of essays, “Of Envy” and “Of Love” (in the 1625 edition) present them 
as pairs and qualify them as the ones that “fascinate and bewitch” and have “vehement 
                                                 
430 The Advancement, p. 260. 
431 Cf. R. S. Crane, "The Relation of Bacon's Essays to His Program for the Advancement of 
Learning" in Essential Articles for the Study of Francis Bacon, (Hamden, Conn., 1968; London, 1972) 
pp. 272-292. The same view is reiterated in Brian Vickers (1996) p. 713-714. 
432 Zsolt Almàsi, Ibid, p. 99ff 
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wishes” and “make a man pine [long for]”. Both essays “On Envy” list the kinds of people 
most likely to fall victim to these passions and enumerate the situations within which these 
passions may rise.  
The Ciceronian topic of the cultus animi receives a broad sense in Bacon’s program: 
its scope is not only an individual cultura mentis but concerns also its significance in the 
public (“civill”) domain. The breadth of the meaning of cultura animi appears already in his 
“Advice to the Earl of Rutland on his travels” where he writes about the “the gifts or 
excellencies of the mind” involving Beauty, Health, and Strength. The Advice has to be read 
together with the part of the Advancement concerning the culture of the mind: while its Book 
Two determines the place of the culture of the mind in a program of learning, the Advice 
contributes to giving the contours of what is meant by this term.  These can be summarised in 
the following three points: 
1. [Cultura animi and behaviour] For Bacon “Beauty of mind” is manifested in 
graceful and acceptable behaviour. In Book Two of The Advancement of Learning he 
acknowledges that this part of “civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and therefore I 
cannot report it for deficient.” In fact, this “civil knowledge” of graceful behaviour is the 
subject-matter of fashionable and widely read Renaissance conduct-book like The Courtier (Il 
Corteggiano) of Castiglione (translated by Thomas Hoby). His essay “Of Ceremonies and 
Respects” shows that Bacon himself was also keenly aware of the importance of this topic, his 
shorthand version of a Renaissance conduct-book. It is no doubt that a life spent in public 
service and in close proximity to the royal court makes him receptive to this issue. In the spirit 
of his encyclopaedic embrace Bacon allots a place for such knowledge with a qualifying 
remark that the behaviour described and advised in the books of conduct can only be “the 
garment of the mind”. The metaphor of ‘garment’ occurs both in The Advice to the Earl of 
Rutland and in The Advancement of Learning: 
 
For behaviour is but a garment, and it is easy to make a comely garment for a 
body that is itself well-proportioned, whereas a deformed body can never be so 
helped by a tailor’s art but the counterfeit will appear; and in the form of our 
mind it is a true rule that a man may mend his faults with as little labour as cover 
them.433
 
                                                 
433 Advice, p. 70. 
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Similarly in The Advancement of Learning: 
 
Behaviour seemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to have the conditions of 
a garment. For it ought to be made in fashion; it ought not to be too curious 
[fastidious], it ought to be shaped so as to set forth any good making 
[conformation] of the mind, and hide any deformity; and above all, it ought not 
to be too strait [narrow] or restrained for exercise of motion.434
 
Apparently, without belittling the importance of public behaviour and acceptable manner, 
Bacon is concerned in the Advice and in The Advancement of Learning with what produces 
such behaviour. In the same way as a well proportioned body shows forth in a nice garment, 
the excellence of the mind appears in the sweetness of behaviour. Behaviour itself being 
sufficiently dealt with in the conduct-books, the task Bacon sets out for learning is to improve 
the mind as the origin and backbone of behaviour. Thus Bacon’s evocation of the Ciceronian 
topic and practice of cultus animi as “the tilling and manuring of the mind” enriched with the 
Virgilian-agricultural metaphors of Georgics embraces also the link between the state of the 
mind and behaviour. Cultus animi becomes at once an affair on the individual and the public 
plane. However, Bacon formally separates what he takes to be the two parts of “Human 
Philosophy or Humanity” that is the consideration of “man segregate [separately], or 
distributively” and men “congregate [collectively], or in society”. He calls the former “Simple 
and Particular” Human Philosophy and the latter “Conjugate and Civil”. But given that the 
ultimate object of his study is human nature as such, the two spheres are entwined and the 
topic of the cultus animi – taken in Bacon’s broad sense – invites precisely such 
interconnection. Cultura animi concerns both “man segregate” and “man congregate” as 
shown in his engagement with others. Cultus animi taken as an individual practice prepares 
the self for public action. To use Foucault’s terminology, it is one of the means by which the 
individual is invited to change and elaborate himself in order to become ethical subject. It is a 
self-forming activity or askesis in Foucault’s broad sense. Thus the Ciceronian topic is 
diverted from its original reclusive sense on an isolated individual’s cultura mentis and serves 
Bacon’s agenda of a moral philosophy bridging the private and the public. It provides a link 
between vita activa and vita contemplativa and makes room for a science aimed at practical 
knowledge pro bono publico. The “regiment of the mind” is also a form of self-care: it is a 
“husbandry and tillage” of the subject’s “natures and dispositions” (The Advancement, p. 
                                                 
434 The Advancement, p. 266. 
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257.) His intention with “the culture or cure of the mind of man” is to collect such 
observations in order to obtain “receits” [recipes] “for use of life.” As noted above, these 
observations and “receits” form the body of many of the Essays and as such they are at the 
intersection of the subject’s relations to itself and its relations in society. The purpose is “to 
instruct and suborn [furnish, equip] action and active life” by promoting the excellencies of 
the mind. The full title of the Essayes: Counsels Civill and Morall bears the mark of this 
twofold but unified concern with “man segregate” (the culture of the individual mind) and 
“man congregate” (“civill” or public matters). They involve both the civis or public life and 
the mores or behaviour of private individuals.435
2. The second excellence of the mind is health and the topic of the passions appears 
explicitly in this regard inasmuch as passions are the diseases of the mind. Just as the diseases 
of the body can be cured by “physic” [medicine] so the disturbances of the mind can be cured 
by reason. Although Bacon adopts the Ciceronian notion of passion as perturbatio animi he 
does not approve the radical Stoics’ doctrine of apatheia as an antidote to the passions. His 
remedy to the passions is reason as it operates in the cultus animi. 
3. A more complex treatment is required for the third excellence, the “Strength of the 
mind”. The fruits of the “Strength of the mind” are “liberality and magnificence, and fortitude 
or magnanimity” (Advice, p. 70-71). These virtues have a strong Aristotelian resonance and it 
seems that the purpose of Bacon is to provide guidance on how to achieve these qualities. 
“Clearness of judgement makes men liberal [generous]” and “custom makes the thing used 
natural as it were to the user”. In using reason, Bacon’s cultus animi entails the exercise of 
judgement and custom, the two forming a virtuous circle in the sense that the practice of 
fortitude becoming a custom increases our strength:  
 
And if custom be strong to confirm [strengthen] any one virtue more than 
another, it is the virtue of fortitude, for it makes us triumph over the fear which 
we have conquered, and anew to challenge danger which happily [successfully] 
we have encountered, and hold more dear the reputation of honour which we 
have increased.436
 
Bacon’s cultura animi embraces then not only the medicining of the mind for its health 
                                                 
435 Cf. B. Vickers (1996), p.713. 
436 Advice, p. 71. 
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but also the exercise of clear judgement and on that basis the development of custom for its 
strength. It must be noted that both of these hinge on the capacity of reason: to medicine 
against passions in one case and to sharpen judgement in the other. The virtuous circle of 
clear judgement and custom is noteworthy also for its explicit reference to how public 
perception and acceptance of the strength of mind gives a further impetus to the increase of its 
capacities. This intertwining of the culture of the mind and its consequences for the public 
domain is a recurring leitmotif in Bacon’s discussions of moral philosophy. The various 
modalities of cultus animi relating to Beauty, Health and Strength of mind together form what 
could be called in Foucault’s broad sense an asceticism of self-forming activity. 
The practice set out in The Advancement of Learning and given core in some of the Essays 
entails a mental procedure: the reader engages with specific topics of everyday life and, by the 
same token, with the culture of his mind as manifested in his public behaviour. (Cf. the 
excellencies of the mind and behaviour as garment.) A come and go is thereby implied 
between “man segregate” and “man congregate”, between an individual affective and moral 
culture and public, civil action. In this way, the advancement of Baconian learning increases 
the capacities of the individual “to descend into himself, or to call himself to account;” by 
disposing “the constitution of the mind not to be fixed or settled in the defects thereof, but still 










The main objective of this dissertation was an assessment of the early modern 
transformation of ‘passion’ in a context marked by intercultural accommodations between 
Classical and Christian traditions in the early modern humanist context. This entailed the 
tracking of a semantic change (that of “passion”) in its major stages with an analysis of some 
of the cultural, anthropological and theological underpinnings that this change reflects and to 
which it is also contributes to. The major stages of the semantic change were first examined 
along the lines of the Oxford English Dictionary entry of “passion” before trying to 
investigate in more detail the cultural narrative that informed and is also reflected in these 
changes. For a methodological inspiration I turned to the writings of the late Foucault; his  
analysis of ‘care of the self’ helped me to approach linguistic manoeuvres and semantic 
changes as indicative of changes in ethical concern and practice of the subject. Also Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and more particularly of the flesh (chair) encouraged 
me to address a seemingly linguistic problem (the semantic shift of passion) in terms of an 
ontology of human nature. Interestingly, such an approach is not completely alien to the 
literature on and of the period: a relatively recent book on Shakespeare by Harold Bloom 
attributes to him the genius of inventing us as modern humans.437
The early modern encounter between Stoicism and Christianity helped to refine and to 
revise the earlier humanist discourses on the dignity of man by accommodating corporeal and 
affective aspects in human nature. As this encounter concerned terms that have a long history, 
I reviewed the major stages of the development of “passion” from the Classical Greek 
heritage, to Hellenistic Stoicism and early Christianity. The kind of internal struggle within 
humanism as set out by Bouwsma between Stoicism and Augustinianism showed that the 
“Roman attitude” of cultural secondariness can generate internal tensions that contribute to 
revising the lexicon of terms. In this case, early modern humanism provided a context within 
which competing traditions interacted in a dynamic manner. My overall claim with these 
investigations was that the semantic shift of “passion” is inseparable and was partly enduced 
                                                 
437 Harold Bloom, Shakespeare. The Invention of the Human (London: Fourth Estate, 1999). Cf. also 
A. D. Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2007) 
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by this intercultural context that, similarly to the Enlightenment ethos advocated by Foucault 
(and pace Foucault), entails a reflexive attitude on historical contingencies inherent in certain 
words.  
Pre-modern (including early-modern) ‘passion’ covered a field that – important 
debates and distinctions kept apart - was felt to be ethically and psychologically continuous 
and could thus be designated by a single word. Due to significant changes in the 
understanding of human psychology and moral outlook (or what is implied in both, in what is 
to be human: anthropology) the homogeneity of the field covered by “passion” and the ethical 
judgements it entailed were contested. As some “passions” (or we could say today, “affects” 
and “emotions”) became legitimate, the single word “passion” could no longer denominate 
this morally heterogeneous field and the situation called for a semantic rearrangement or 
reconfiguration. In the double context of the Christian elaboration – and re-elaboration 
(Augustine and the Reformation) – of interiority and the return to Classical antiquity opened 
by the Renaissance the following rearrangements could be observed which, in my view, 
account for the semantic change of “passion”: Certain forms of ‘passion’ continued to be 
pathologised i.e. rendered morally negative (for some) and psychologically unsound either 
because of their very nature (like ‘lust’ for Augustine) or because of their intensity and 
excessive character. Henceforth, the ordinary word “passion” came to refer more to these 
pathologised passions (apologies for the seeming pleonasm). In the course of time, the moral 
evaluation underwent changes (cf. the Romantic cult of passion) but by and large, “passions” 
refer to exaggerated manifestations of affectivity or aspects of it that are considered to be in 
contrast with Christian doctrine. Pathologising some ‘passions’ legitimised others and 
legitimised the whole field of affectivity. Since the scope of meaning of “passion” narrowed 
down to cover those that come under negative ethical judgement, other forms of “passion” 
became legitimized inasmuch as they are non-excessive. Their manifestation becomes part of 
standard human affectivity and will in turn, by the 17th century be called “emotions” in a 
morally and psychologically neutral sense. I sought to express this development as a move 
from a “globalist” to a “localist” attitude, tendencies that are present in the history of 
“passion” but whose open clash around 1600 (between a revived Stoicism and Augustinian-
Lutheran Christianity) induces a semantic change. The globalist attitude supposes a globalist 
use of “passion”: the word is used as a hyperonym and as such it covers all affective states 
and defines them as contrary to reason. The localist attitude, by contrast, uses “passion” to 
express some sort of affective excess, eminently that of amourous-erotic excess. While 
globalism wants all spheres to be governed by a monolithic reason, localism allows for 
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different regimes to work in different contexts. Finally, localism makes room for “emotion”, 
for affective contents that are defined not by virtue of reference to reason or by a supposed 
irrational quality in them (as is the case with globalist “passions”). 
For a Stoic ethics that is based on an anthropology that prizes reason in man above all 
else, passions is a radical other, (alogon, perturbatio animi) that has to be extirpated even at 
the prize of amputation: cutting away what we (and probably early moderns too) would 
consider as constitutively human (emotions). The globalism of such Stoic apatheia of a 
senseless sage was a scandal to early moderns Christians. Christianity is not so radical in the 
appraisal of the passions: the ethical dividing line has been placed elsewhere: not between 
passion and its opposite, reason but within passions: the affective element gains ground, some 
passions are ethically admissible, some are even to be valued, some are to be condemned (and 
thus to be eradicated). One has to leave room for the working of love (of God and of fellow 
humans) and other affects in the seat of consciousness. Either because some passions are 
acceptable, or because the depravity of the human condition makes it impossible to get rid of 
our passions anyway, the subject cannot and therefore should not be modelled on a purely 
rational cosmic order (globalism) but should allow for different regimes to coexist (localism). 
Passions, the affective faculties can even serve us as spurs for ethical improvement and can 
also be the means or even the fruits of regeneration by faith. 
Since passions can be found on both sides of the ethical divide and call for different 
judgements, the utility of the very concept of the “passions” is called into doubts. As long as 
passions are used in the technical sense they can be treated together, value-judgements about 
the groups are valid: they fall under the same, negative, ethical consideration. However, once 
the unity of the concept is challenged (in the Platonic-Augustinian strain of early modern 
Christianity) on ethical, theological and anthropological grounds (implying a change in the 
ontology of human nature), the different mental states grouped under passion must be 
qualified in different ways. Passions are divided inside by an ethical division and the new 
word “emotion” appears in English to express affective content in morally neutral terms. I 
admit that the technical sense of “passion” in the broad, Classical sense persists long after this 
but it gradually becomes more and more scholarly, academic by the late 17th – early 18th 
century. In this regard, Shakespeare’s dominant use of the word in the sense of “passion-love” 
is decisive. It expresses the general thrust of late Renaissance poetry and drama towards the 
affective. A tendency underpinned by a century of neo-Platonic intimations of love as a 
cosmic force informing the universe and human nature, by the Petrarcan patterns of yearning 
love infusing the tradition of English sonnet (Spencer, Sidney, Shakespeare). According to 
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Denis de Rougemont, this tendency, infused with the cult of the Virgin Mary has been in 
preparation since the 12th century courtly love literature sung by troubadours in Southern 
regions of France and, on the long run, will contribute to the cult of passion-love in the West 
and to its conflict with the institution of marriage.438 It seems to be a fertile ground of further 
study to trace the articulation of the “lineage of love” (A. J. Smith439) on the semantic shift of 
“passion”, as it seems plausible to assume that a metaphysics of love, a blend of Platonic and 
Christian elements, as well as the “courtly love” tradition (of fin amor)440 contributed to this 
shift. A possible way-in to for such research could be the perspective offered by Niklas 
Luhman who explains the evolution of love as passion entails “the gradual inclusion of new 
problems”. Thus high ideals take on erotic connotations in the context of Medieval ‘courtly 
love’ and later, in the seventeenth century, “a paradoxicalisation of the semantics of love 
completed the gradual dissolution of the contrast between ‘higher’ and ‘sensual’ love and 
initiated the incorporation of sexuality into the code as an essential component of love.”441 
Apparently, the semantic change described in my study and the Early Modern transformation 
described in Luhman’s terms converge: his perspective is on love as passion whereas I tried to 
present and account for the semantic shift of passion toward (erotic) love. 
Three configurations of Early Modern interculturality were examined: Bacon’s case of 
synthesis of and innovation on Aristotle – Cicero - Seneca; the vernacular interculturality of 
Montaigne – Florio; and some elements of the Stoic – Christian debate. The example of 
                                                 
438 Cf. Denis de Rougemont, L’Amour en Occident, (Paris: Plon, 1972) 
439 Cf. A. J. Smith, The Metaphysics of Love. Studies in Renaissance Love Poetry from Dante to 
Milton, Cambridge, London, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1985. “Preamble: The 
Lineage of Love” pp. 1 – 12. 
440 Cf. Maurice Valency, In Praise of Love. An Introduction to the Love-Poetry of the Renaissance, 
New York: Octagon Books, 1975, in particular p. 25. where Valency comments on the first 
appearance of vernacular love-poetry (cca 1100) in a modern [European] tongue and calls it “romantic 
passion” in the sense of an “area of erotic activity somewhere between animal passion, on the one 
hand, and Christian charity on the other.” He also warns that “it would be a mistake to suppose that 
even here the epiteth has any precise application.” From the perspective of the evolution of “passion”, 
it is precisely such undifferentiated contents and articulations with “love” that would invite further 
research. 
441 Niklas Luhman, Love as Passion. The Codification of Intimacy, translated by Jeremy Gaines and 
Doris L. Jones, Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1986. 
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Francis Bacon showed that his encyclopaedic and programmatic work of Advancement of 
Learning (read as pointing to his Essays) combines Aristotle’s ethical outlook, his optimism 
in the force of habits, and a faculty psychology of Thomist inspiration with the Ciceronian 
practice of the cultura animi “Regiment of the Mind”. Although a critique of certain trends in 
humanism (mainly its focus on words rather than matter), his “Georgics of the Mind” aims to 
give a method (that he finds lacking in Aristotle) for ethics that relies ultimately on learning 
and eloquence in moving the will. Thus rhetoric and learning are instrumental in making the 
affections obedient. His Essays bring these general considerations to concrete human 
situations by engaging their reader in a “medicining of his mind” in a reciprocal relationship 
of counsel and self-inspection. Bacon’s example also showed the importance of discursive 
practice in the care for the self and the flexibility of adapting different cultural traditions to 
concrete, local human contexts. 
Montaigne can be seen as more radical in this sense: his adherence to concrete human 
situations, primarily that of his own, made him even more sensitive to the moral issues 
involved in the choice of words. His anti-universalism, his insistence on the particularities of 
his own, singular experience prompted him to experiment with new semantic fields as he tried 
to give an account of his own experience. This model of care for the self places a great value 
again on discursive practice because a faithful description of what actually happens to the 
subject is more important than conformity to some abstract ideal. The precision of the 
description called for new words, or rather, in the case of “emotion”, of giving new meaning 
to old words and thus reconfiguring the vocabulary of the affective sphere. Florio’s translation 
was successful in making available this new vocabulary in English and thereby contributing to 
the creation of a common European cultural language based on the different vernaculars that 
fuses Classical and Christian elements in an eclectic manner proper to humanism. 
These moments of renegotiation of the classical sense of “passion” responded to 
changing needs of care for the self: in turn, the shifting menaning also informs changes in the 
care of the self; the two are inseparable and they cannot be rendered in a relationship of 
simple causality. “Passion” was an issue of value and called for an ethical solution. It used to 
be extended to all affective manifestations but progressively a distinction appeared between 
violent emotions on the one hand (modern “passion”) and calmer affections that are 
completely compatible with an ideal of self-mastery.  There was an implicit ambiguity 
stemming from this duality that seems to have culminated and exploded in the Early Modern 
period in the context of Neo-Stoicism. The revival and popularity of Stoicism required an 
explicit encounter with the Classical (primarily Stoic) sense of the term in a Christian context. 
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This encounter resulted in the semantic shift: Christianity neutralised certain “passions”, it 
made them not only tolerable but even desirable (love, hope, certain senses of fear, pity,) 
rejected and countered the anti-social orientation of Hellenistic Stoicism. What is retained in 
“passion” is its intensity but it no longer covers the broad spectrum it used to have in Cicero 
and Aquinas. 
thBut, of course, the story does not end with the 17  century. Thus in Romanticism, 
'passion', in the sense of uncontrollable - often amorous - emotion, was highly charged with 
significance and was exalted. It meant the uncontrollable, the spontaneous, and as such it was 
a source of inspiration and energy for the outcast Romantic artist and genius. At the same 
time, the libidinal aspect cannot run amok in society, it needs control and governance. From 
the broad Classical meaning of “passion”, this word was maintained for that segment that was 
considered potentially dangerous, subversive for society in the conduct of the individual. 
Governance was maintained but limited in scope - not all passions (like fear, hatred, envy, 
etc.) required this special governance. But, at the same time, the ambiguity of control and 
exaltation persists. So there was in Romanticism and in post-Romantic culture a trend to see 
passion as the affirmation of the individual and the two “passions”, so to say, are not quite the 
same in the sense that they repose on different conceptual grounds and value judgements. In 
both Romantic aesthetics and life (which is often the same) there was an exaltation of passion 
as the distinctive mark of the individual, a determined thrive for all that is passionate, 
exceeding the limits of ordinary existence. (Cf. Sturm und Drang, the irrational side of 
Romanticism, the exaltation of love, etc.)  
 The definition of “passion” has always been understood in opposition to something 
else. It was defined by what it is not: namely passivity vs. activity, passion vs. reason. These 
contrasting pairs governed the understanding of passion until around the 18th century, when a 
major change occurred. This was a decline in the firm belief concerning the supremacy of 
reason and its direct link to the good. This change affected the understanding of the passions 
in that it abolished the strong reason to which the passions could be opposed. As a result, the 
evaluation of the passions underwent its most profound change, which still affects our current 
understanding of them. Passion was no longer conceived necessarily as a perturbation of the 
good use of reason. The irrationality, disorder, and obscurity of the former diminished in 
favour of its recognition as energy. Passionate activity was accentuated more than passivity, 
turning passion into a driving force, a resource, and even ardour. In the modern sense, passion 
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was not folly but rather something grand and even noble. Authors who contributed to this re-
interpretation are, among others, Claude-Adrien Helvetius , Bernard Mandeville442 443, Johann 
Gottfried von Herder , Johann Gottlieb Fichte  [1800] and Alexander Pope444 445 446 to some 
extent. The culmination of this trend is in Hegel who, in his Lectures on the Philosophy of 
World History, stated that "nothing great has been accomplished in the world without 
passion".447 (Although for Hegel, passion is ultimately a trick of reason: the world spirit uses 
passion for its own totalising ends…) 
                                                 
442 Claude-Adrien Helvetius, De l'esprit, (1758) texte revu par Jacques Moutaux, (Paris : Fayard, 
1988) III. 5-9; 
443Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees or Private Vices, Publick Benefits (1714) with a 
commentary Critical, Historical, and Explanatory by F. B. Kaye, (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 
edition of 1924, reprint 1988) Remark Q in particular 
444Johann Gottfried von Herder, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Outlines of a 
Philosophy of the History of Man) (1784-91) 
445 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen (The Vocation of Man) (1800) 
446 An Essay on Man, Epistle 1. 5.: "Better for us, perhaps, it might appear, / Were there all harmony, 
all virtue here; / That never air or ocean felt the wind; / That never passion discomposed the mind : / 
But ALL subsists by elemental strife; / And passions are the elements of life. / The general ORDER, 
since the whole began, / Is kept in Nature, and is kept in man." 
447 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History in The Hegel 








448The Oxford English Dictionary entry of ‘passion’ and ‘emotion’
 
 
passion, n. Also 2-6 -iun, -ioun, -yo(u)n, etc., 4 pascioun.  
[a. OF. passiun, passion, ad. L. passion-em suffering (Tertullian, etc.), n. of action f. pati, pass- to suffer. In L. 
chiefly a word of Christian theology, which was also its earliest use in Fr. and Eng., being very frequent in the 
earliest ME.]  
I. The suffering of pain.  
1. a. (Now usually with capital.) The sufferings of Jesus Christ on the Cross (also often including the Agony in 
Gethsemane). Formerly also in pl.  
Cross of Passion, in Heraldry: see quots. Instruments of the Passion, the cross, the crown of thorns, the nails, 
scourge, etc.  
c1175 Lamb. Hom. 119 Vre drihtnes halie passiun, Þet is his halie Þrowunge Þe he for mancunne 
underfeng.  
a1225 St. Marher. 1 Efter ure louerdes pine, ant his passiun.  
c1290 S. Eng. Leg. I. 15/472 RiŠt Þane wei Þat ore louerd Šeode toward is passioun.  
1340 Ayenb. 12 þe uerthe article belongeÞ to his passion.  
1382 Wyclif Acts i. 3 To which and he Šaf [1388 schewide] hym silf alyue after his passioun. [So all 
16-17th c. versions.]  
1526 Tindale 1 Pet. i. 11 The passions that shulde come vnto Christ.  
1547 Boorde Introd. Knowl. xxxix. (1870) 220 The mount of Caluery, where Iesu Chryst did suffer his 
passions.  
1548-9 (Mar.) Bk. Com. Prayer, Litany, By thy crosse and passion,..Good lorde deliuer us.  
1666 Pepys Diary 3 Nov., This morning comes Mr. Lovett, and brings me my print of the Passion, 
varnished by him.  
1682 J. Gibbon Introd. ad Lat. Blason. 76 A long Cross: Bara makes it like a Cross of Passion, that is, 
the Traverse beam a pretty deal below the top of the palar part.  
1725 Coats Dict. Her. s.v., Cross of the Passion..not crossed in the Middle but somewhat below the 
Top, with Arms short in proportion to the Length of the Shaft.
1754 Sherlock Disc. (1759) I. vii. 211 As if the Remission of our Sins was to be ascribed peculiarly to 
the Passion.
1839 Encycl. Brit. (ed. 7) XIX. 428/1 Pictured representations of the fourteen stages of our Lord’s 
passion.  
1845 G. A. Poole Churches vi. 48 The font of North Somercoats, Lincolnshire, has on two of its sides 
shields charged with the instruments of the passion.  
† b. Used allusively in asseverations; also transf. applied by persons to themselves, as in passion of me, my
heart, my soul. Obs.  
c1386 Chaucer Shipman’s Prol. 13 A-bide for godis digne passion.  
c1530 Hickscorner in Hazl. Dodsley I. 168 Help, help, for the passion of my soul.  
1570 Preston Cambyses I. 180 O’ the passion of God, I have done.  
1601 B. Jonson Ev. Man in Hum. (Q.) iii. iii. 127 Gods passion, and I had twise so many cares, as you 
haue, I’ld drowne them all in a cup of sacke.  
1601 Shakes. All’s Well v. ii. 43 Cox my passion, giue me your hand.  
1684 Meriton Yorksh. Dial. 477 Pashions a Life! here’st Land-lord just at deaur.  
1738 tr. Guazzo’s Art Conversation 24 Passion o’ me! Who will then carry my Corn to Mill?
c. The narrative of the sufferings of Christ from the Gospels; also, a musical or dramatic setting of this; cf. 
passion-play.  
a1300 Cursor M. 8844 þus sais sum opinion, Bot sua sais noght Þe passion.  
a1533 Ld. Berners Huon cxlix. 566 After that your deuyne seruyce be done, and the passyon of our 
lorde Iesu Chryste red.  
                                                 
448 Reproduced from OED2 on CD-ROM Version 1.14 © OUP 1994; © AND Software B.V., 1994. 
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1823 W. Hone Anc. Mysteries Described 169 In 1298, the passion was played at Friuli.  
1844 Lingard Anglo-Sax. Ch. (1858) II. ix. 64 That every deacon read two passions.  
1880 in Grove Dict. Mus. II. 664/2 Until the latter half of the 16th century the Passion was always 
sung..by the three Deacons alone.  
Ibid. 666/1 Bach[’s]..‘Passion according to S. Matthew’ is..the finest work of the kind.  
1903 E. K. Chambers Mediæval Stage II. xxii. 129 There were performances of Passions in Reading 
in 1508, in Dublin in 1528, [etc.].  
1962 R. Southern Seven Ages of Theatre 107 The Passion of Mons may well have run to ninety-eight 
separate representations of ‘scenes’.  
† d. Passion-tide or Passion Week. Obs.  
1297 R. Glouc. (Rolls) 10178 þe Sonenday of Þe passion.  
Ibid. 11330 WiÞinne Þe passion WiÞ is ost he wende uorÞ & arerde is dragon.  
2. a. The sufferings of a martyr, martyrdom. arch.  
a1225 St. Marher. 1 Her beginneð Þe liflade & te passiun of seinte margarete.  
1377 Langl. P. Pl. B. xv. 265 What penaunce and pouerte and passioun Þei [the saints] suffred.  
c1440 J. Capgrave Life St. Kath. v. 1668 The emperour commaunded..Thei shulde be led on-to her 
passyon.
1503 Gold. Leg. Colophon, The lyues passyons and myracles of many other sayntes.  
1672 Cave Prim. Chr. i. vii. (1673) 160 The great reverence they had for Martyrs. Their passions stiled 
their Birthday.  
1754-8 T. Newton Observ. Proph., Dan. xii. 204 Cyprian ordered the passions of the Martyrs in Africa 
to be registred.  
1901 T. R. Glover Life & Lett. 4th Cent. 250 With the martyrs came their relics, the tales of their 
passions, their tombs and their images.  
transf.  
1598 B. Jonson Ev. Man in Hum. iii. iv, A fasting-day no sooner comes, but..poore cobs they smoke 
for it, they are made martyrs o’ the gridiron, they melt in passion.  
b. A narrative account of the passion of a martyr.  
1904 T. Shearman Veneration of S. Agnes 90 Helen of Rossow, or Roswitha, a Benedictine nun of the 
Convent of Gandersheim, Saxony, wrote poems in the 10th century, ‘to replace,’ as she says in her 
preface, ‘the pagan passions which dishonour the profane drama, by the triumphs of the Christian 
heroines, the chaste spouses who are admitted to the Nuptials of the Lamb.’  
1913 E. R. Barker Rome of Pilgrims xiii. 183 In an eighth-century manuscript there is a note that 
Passions are to be read at Office in the Church of S. Peter.  
Ibid. xiv. 192 It is always the conventional version of a Passion which is reproduced in numerous 
manuscripts.  
Ibid. 195 For this saint..there exists not only the contemporary Passion, but also a series of records.  
1927 F. J. E. Raby Hist. Christian-Latin Poetry ii. 56 His poem was used as a basis for later prose 
passions of Cassian.  
† 3. Suffering or affliction generally. Obs.  
a1225 Ancr. R. 188 In all ower passiuns, Þencheð euer inwardliche up o Godes pinen.  
a1340 Hampole Psalter xv. 7 In wrangis & temptaciouns & passions.  
14.. in Tundale’s Vis. (1843) 130 Sche was exempt from all such passyon [of travail].  
1509 Hawes Conv. Swearers xliv, The wounde of synne to me is more passyon Than the wounde of 
my syde for thy redempcyon.  
1606 Shakes. Ant. & Cl. v. i. 63 Giue her what comforts The quality of her passion shall require.  
1656 H. Vaughan Thalia Rediv., Nativ. 15 Great type of passions! Come what will, Thy grief exceeds 
all copies still.  
4. a. A painful affection or disorder of the body or of some part of it. Obs. exc. in certain phrases, as colic, 
hysteric(al, iliac, sciatic passion, for which see the adjs.  
1382 Wyclif Lev. xv. 13 If he were helid, that suffreth siche a maner passioun [L. hujusmodi 
passionem].
1398-1856 [see iliac 1].
1460 J. Capgrave Chron. (Rolls) 40 Asa, Kyng of Juda..had sore feet, whech passioune our bokys sey 
it was podegra.  
1529 Wolsey in Four C. Eng. Lett. 10 Beyng entereyd into the passyon of the dropsy.  
1547 Boorde Brev. Health (1557) 33 In latyn it is named Ventralis passio. In English..the belly ache, or 
a passion in the belly.  
1563 T. Gale Antidot. ii. 29 It is of ryght good effecte in the passions of the ioyntes.  
1684 tr. Bonet’s Merc. Compit. xvi. 566 Thirst is a Passion of the Mouth of the Stomach.  
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1822-34 [see hysteric 1].  
† b. A violent access, attack, or fit of disease.  
1390 Gower Conf. III. 7 As a drunke man I swerve, And suffre such a Passion.  
1641 Hinde J. Bruen xlvii. 150 His fits and passions were much after this manner.  
II. The fact of being acted upon, the being passive.  
[Late L. passio, used to render Gr. .]  
5. a. The fact or condition of being acted upon or affected by external agency; subjection to external force: = 
affection n. 1; †an effect or impression produced by action from without. Now rare or Obs.  
c1374 Chaucer Boeth. v. met. iv. 130 (Camb. MS.) The passion, Þat is to seyn Þe suffraunce or the 
wit in the qwyke body goth byforn exitinge and moeuynge the strengthis of the thoght.  
1413 Pilgr. Sowle (Caxton 1483) v. xiv. 108 Al that is done withouten might, it lacketh the dignyte and 
the name of dede, but it is cleped passion.  
1530 Palsgr. 111 Verbes meanes..betoken neyther action nor passion.  
1610 J. Guillim Heraldry iii. iii. (1660) 109 The..brightnesse of these [Sun and Moon] is..subject to the 
passion of darkning or eclipsing.  
1668 Wilkins Real Char. iii. i. 303 That kind of word..adjoyned to a Verb, to signifie the quality and 
affection of the Action or Passion, is stiled an Adverb.  
1725 Watts Logic i. iv. §7 The word passion signifies the receiving any action, in a large philosophical 
sense.  
1846 Trench Mirac. xxxiii. (1862) 470 That work shall be the work of passion rather than of action.  
† b. A way in which a thing is or may be affected by external agency; a passive quality, property, or attribute; = 
affection 11, 12. Obs.  
1570 Billingsley Euclid i. xxxiv. 44 In this Theoreme, are demonstrated three passions or properties of 
parallelogrammes.  
1610 B. Jonson Alch. ii. v, What’s the proper passion of mettalls?  
1657 W. Morice Coena quasi  Diat. iii. 139 Frigidity is the proper passion of water, which is 
sometime accidentally hot.  
1690 Leybourn Curs. Math. 330 Of certain Passions and Properties of the Five Regular Bodies.  
1707 Floyer Physic. Pulse-Watch 209 The different Manners..produc’d by a particular hot or cold Diet, 
or Air, Exercise, and Passions peculiar to each Nation.  
III. An affection of the mind.  
[L. passio = Gr. .]  
6. a. Any kind of feeling by which the mind is powerfully affected or moved; a vehement, commanding, or 
overpowering emotion; in psychology and art, any mode in which the mind is affected or acted upon (whether 
vehemently or not), as ambition, avarice, desire, hope, fear, love, hatred, joy, grief, anger, revenge. Sometimes 
personified.  
c1374 Chaucer Troylus iv. 676 (704) As she Þat al Þis mene while brende Of oÞer passion Þan Þat 
Þey wende.
1526 Pilgr. Perf. (W. de W. 1531) 118 He wyll stere vp in his soule ye passyons of ire & impacyency.  
1528 Tindale Obed. Chr. Man Wks. (Parker Soc.) I. 246 A poor woman with child, which longed, and, 
being overcome of her passion, ate flesh on a Friday.  
1591 Shakes. 1 Hen. VI, v. ii. 18 Of all base passions, Feare is most accurst.  
1611 Bible Acts xiv. 15 We also are men of like passions with you.  
1647 Cowley Mistr., Passions i, From Hate, Fear, Hope, Anger, and Envy free, And all the Passions 
else that be.  
1710 Norris Chr. Prud. vii. 323 By the Passions I think we are to understand certain Motions of the 
Mind depending upon and accompanied with an Agitation of the Spirits.  
1732 Pope Ep. Bathurst 154 The ruling Passion conquers Reason still.  
1791 Mrs. Radcliffe Rom. Forest i, A man whose passions often overcame his reason.  
1797 Encycl. Brit. (ed. 3) XIV. 2/1 The common division of the passions into desire and aversion, hope
and fear, joy and grief, love and hatred, has been mentioned by every author who has treated of them.  
Ibid. 14/2 Passions, in painting, are the external expressions of the different dispositions and 
affections of the mind; but particularly their different effects upon the several features of the face.  
1843 Prescott Mexico vi. viii. (1864) 401 It were as easy to curb the hurricane in its fury, as the 
passions of an infuriated horde of savages.  
1872 Ruskin Eagle’s N. §169 Their reverence for the passion, and their guardianship of the purity, of 
Love.
b. Without article or pl.: Commanding, vehement, or overpowering feeling or emotion.  
1590 Spenser F.Q. i. v. 1 Such restlesse passion did all night torment The flaming corage of that 
Faery knight.
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1604 Shakes. Oth. iv. i. 277 Is this the Nature Whom Passion could not shake?  
1678 South Serm. (1697) II. x. 434 Passion is the Drunkenness of the Mind.  
1724 De Foe Mem. Cavalier (1840) 3 He told me, with a great deal of passion, that he loved me above 
all the rest.
1770 Wesley Lett., to J. Benson 5 Oct., Passion and prejudice govern the world.  
1901 H. Black Culture & Restraint iv. 106 Philosophy is a feeble antagonist before passion.  
c. A fit or mood marked by stress of feeling or abandonment to emotion; a transport of excited feeling; an 
outburst of feeling.  
1590 Spenser F.Q. i. i. 49 In this great passion of unwonted lust, Or wonted feare of doing ought amis, 
He starteth up.  
1599 Chapman Hum. Day’s Mirth Plays 1873 I. 92 Come, come, leave your passions, they cannot 
moove mee.  
1628 Hobbes Thucyd. (1822) 119 They sent these men thither in passion.  
1725 Pope Odyss. iv. 150 From the brave youth the streaming passion broke.  
1854 Milman Lat. Chr. vii. ii. (1864) IV. 98 Henry fell on his knees and in a passion of grief entreated 
her merciful interference.  
1856 W. Collins After Dark (1862) 214 She burst into an hysterical passion of weeping.  
d. A poem, literary composition, or passage marked by deep or strong emotion; a passionate speech or outburst. 
Obs. or arch.  
1582 T. Watson Centurie of Loue i. heading, The Authour in this Passion taketh..occasion to open his 
estate in loue.  
1590 Shakes. Mids. N. v. i. 321 Heere she comes, and her passion ends the play.  
1599 Massinger, etc. Old Law i. i. Wks. (Rtldg.) 416/1 These very passions I speak to my father. 
[Gifford note These pathetic speeches.]  
1614 T. Tomkis Albumazar ii. i. in Hazl. Dodsley XI. 327 Not a one shakes his tail, but I sigh out a 
passion.  
1871 Browning Balaustion 193 Now it was some whole passion of a play.  
7. a. spec. An outburst of anger or bad temper.  
1530 Palsgr. 320/1 Passyonate, inclyned sone to be in a passyon.  
1590 Spenser F.Q. ii. iv. 11 It’s eath..to..calme the tempest of his passion wood.  
1688 Miege Fr. Dict. s.v. Bring, To bring a Man in a passion [transporté de colère] to himself.  
1731 Gentl. Mag. I. 391/1 This put Bluster into such a Passion, that he quitted the Surgery in a Pet.  
1773 Johnson in Boswell 28 Aug., Warburton kept his temper all along, while Lowth was in a passion.  
1819 Metropolis II. 212 She chose, woman-like,..to fly in a passion and to abuse the sheriff’s officer.  
1842 Browning Pied Piper x, And folks who put me in a passion May find me pipe after another 
fashion.  
b. Without a: Impassioned anger, angry feeling.  
1524 Wolsey Let. to Knight in Strype Eccl. Mem. (1721) I. i. iv. 57 Whatsoever they might speak in 
passion or otherwise.  
1605 Chapman All Fooles iv. i. 125, I pray you good Gostanzo, Take truce with passion.  
1628 Hobbes Thucyd. (1822) 37 [To] undergo the danger with them and that without passion against 
you.
1729 Butler Serm. Resentm. Wks. 1874 II. 98 Passion; to which some men are liable, in the same way 
as others are to the epilepsy.  
1798 Southey Cross Roads xviii, Passion made his dark face turn white.  
1882 J. Parker Apost. Life I. 143 We can stifle the hot word of passion.  
8. a. Amorous feeling; strong sexual affection; love; †also in pl., amorous feelings or desires. Often tender
passion.  
1588 Shakes. Tit. A. ii. i. 36 My sword..shall..plead my passions for Lauinia’s loue.  
1590 Spenser F.Q. iii. v. 30 But, when shee better him beheld, shee grew Full of soft passion and 
unwonted smart.  
1592 Shakes. Rom. & Jul. ii. Prol. 13 Passion lends them Power, time, meanes to meete.  
1658 Phillips, Passion,..an affection of the mind,..in Poems and Romances it is more peculiarly taken 
for the passion of love.  
1710 Steele Tatler No. 128  4 Fairest Unknown..I have conceived a most extraordinary Passion for 
you.
1752 Fielding Amelia ii. i, I declared myself the most wretched of all martyrs to this tender passion.  
1855 Milman Lat. Chr. ix. viii. (1864) V. 413 Seized with a poetic passion for Eudoxia, wife of William.  
b. transf. An object of love, a beloved person.  
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1783 Lady Suffolk in Lett. C’tess S. (1824) II. 275 Lord Buckingham’s former passions go off very 
quickly: poor Lady Northampton is dead.  
1842 Thackeray Fitz-Boodle Papers Wks. (Biogr. ed.) IV. 295 Whenever one of my passions comes 
into a room, my cheeks flush.  
9. Sexual desire or impulse.  
1641 Wilkins Math. Magick i. i. (1648) 2 Which set a man at liberty from his lusts and passions.  
1667 Milton P.L. i. 454 Sions daughters..Whose wanton passions in the sacred Porch Ezekiel saw.  
1798 Malthus Popul. iii. iii. (1806) II. 132 Delaying the gratification of passion from a sense of duty.  
1842 Longfellow Quadroon Girl x, He knew whose passions gave her life, Whose blood ran in her 
veins.  
10. a. An eager outreaching of the mind towards something; an overmastering zeal or enthusiasm for a special 
object; a vehement predilection.  
1638 Baker tr. Balzac’s Lett. (vol. II.) 70 Concerning his passion of horses, which he calls his 
malady..never counsell him to cure it.  
1671 tr. Frejus’ Voy. Mauritania 1 A passion of meriting the esteem of a considerable Company of 
Merchants.  
1708 Swift Sentiments Ch. Eng. Man Wks. 1755 II. i. 61 That mighty passion for the church, which 
some men pretend [etc.].  
1780 Cowper Lett. 8 May, The passion for landscape-drawing.  
1838 Miss Mitford in L’Estrange Life (1870) III. vi. 89 My present passion is for indigenous orchises.  
1874 Green Short Hist. iv. §2. 169 The growing passion for the possession of land.  
b. transf. An aim or object pursued with zeal.  
1732 Pope Ess. Man ii. 261 Whate’er the Passion, knowledge, fame, or pelf.  
1856 Froude Hist. Eng. (1858) I. i. 69 The drama was the passion of the people.  
1874 Bancroft Footpr. Time i. 81 To rule was her passion.  
1883 H. Drummond Nat. Law Spir. W. i. i. (1884) 4 The pursuit of Law became the passion of science.  
Mod. Golf has become a passion with him.  
11. attrib. and Comb.  
a. simple attrib., as passion-fever, -fit, -monger, -pitch, -verse, -wave; objective and instrumental, as passion-
blazing, -breather, -kindling, -thrilling, and esp. with any pa. pple. of suitable sense, as passion-clouded, -
coloured, -dimmed, distracted, -driven, -filled, -frantic, -guided, -kindled, -led, -pale, -pastured, -plunged, -
ridden, -shaken, -smitten, -stirred, -stung, -swayed, -torn, -tossed, -wasted, -wearied, -winged, -worn; also 
passion-like, -proud adjs.; passion-wise adv.  
1894 Outing (U.S.) XXIII. 362/1 Then turns his *passion-blazing eye and stamps impotently with 
shackled feet.  
1925 W. B. Yeats Vision iii. 183 Aristophanes’ *passion-clouded eye.  
1899 — Wind among Reeds 26 Because your crying brings to my mind *Passion-dimmed eyes and 
long heavy hair.  
1899 Crockett Kit Kennedy 406 Curious freaks of violent and *passion-driven men.  
1877 M. Arnold Last Ess. on Ch. & Relig. 22 The *Passion-filled reasoning and rhetoric of Pascal.  
1842 Faber Styrian Lake, etc. 105 When in a *passion-fit I spoke.  
1916 A. Huxley Burning Wheel 29 So, troubled, *passion-frantic, The poet’s mind boils gold and 
amethyst.
a1644 Quarles Sol. Recant. Sol. iv. 63 A self-conceipt may bribe Thy *passion-guided Will to take up 
Arms ’Gainst soveraign Reason.  
a1835 Mrs. Hemans Poems, Genius singing to Love, The *passion-kindled melody Might seem to 
gush from Sappho’s fervent heart.  
1799 Campbell Pleas. Hope i. 121 Congenial Hope! thy *passion-kindling power, How bright, how 
strong, in youth’s untroubled hour!  
1893 F. Greenwood Lover’s Lex. 275 Then we shall be at peace from the *passion-mongers.  
1889 O. Wilde in 19th Cent. Jan. 47 The *passion-pale face of Andromeda.  
c1865 G. M. Hopkins Voice from World in Poems (1967) 125 How turn my *passion-pastured thought 
To gentle manna and simple bread?  
1879 Black Macleod of D. xxxvii, Your feelings supposed to be always up at *passion-pitch.  
1876 G. M. Hopkins Wreck of Deutschland xxxiii, in Poems (1967) 62 Our *passion-plungèd giant 
risen, The Christ of the Father compassionate, fetched in the storm of his strides.  
1592 Greene Disput. Wks. (Grosart) X. 241, I began to waxe *passion-proud.  
1606 Sylvester Du Bartas ii. iv. ii. Magnificence 510 O why is my Minde More *passion-stirred, then my 
hand is strong?  
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1605 Ibid. ii. iii. iv. Captains 1070 What Sea more apt to swell Then is th’ unbridled Vulgar, *passion-
toss’t?  
1880 O. Crawfurd Portugal 369 Modern *passion-verse generally in its lyric form.  
1799 Coleridge Lines in Concert Room ii, Nature’s *passion-warbled plaint.  
1881 O. Wilde Poems 4 With *passion-wearied face.  
1821 Shelley Adonais ix, The *passion-wingèd ministers of thought.  
1814 Southey Roderick xiv, One countenance So strongly mark’d, so *passion-worn.  
b. Special Combs.:  
† passion-banner, a banner inscribed with the tokens of Christ’s Passion;  
Passion cross, see quot. and Cross of Passion in 1;  
† passion-day, the day on which a martyr suffered;  
passion-fruit, the edible fruit of some species of Passion-flower, esp. Passiflora edulis, the granadilla, which 
produces egg-shaped fruit with reddish-purple, slightly wrinkled skin and sweet yellow pulp surrounding small 
black seeds;  
passion killers slang (see quots.);  
passion-lettuce, an early kind of spring lettuce;  
passion-music, music to which the narrative of the Passion is set (cf. 1 c);  
so passion-oratorio;  
passion play, a mystery-play representing the Passion of Christ; also transf.;  
passion-tide, a tide or flow of passion; see also Passion-tide;  
passion-tree, a species of Passion-flower cultivated for its fruit;  
passion vine = passion-flower;  
passion wagon slang (see quot. 1948). Also Passion Sunday, Passion Week.  
1552 Inventory in Ecclesiologist XVII. 125 A *passion banner of red sarsnet.  
1780 Edmondson Her. II. Gloss., *Passion Cross, the same as the Cross Calvary. Cross Calvary,..the
Cross of the Passion.
1882 Cussans Hand-bk. Her. iv. 60 The Latin Cross is sometimes called a Passion Cross; but in the 
latter, all the limbs should be couped, that is the top and bottom of the Cross should not touch the 
extremities of the shield while still retaining the distinctive features of the Latin Cross.
1672 Cave Prim. Chr. i. vii. (1673) 204 We celebrate the *passion days of the Martyrs.  
1752 H. Walpole Lett. (1846) II. 454 A garden of Eden, from which..my sister-in-law long ago gathered 
*passion-fruit.  
1867 R. Henning Let. 18 Feb. (1966) 234, I have also been making some passionfruit jelly.  
1881 Mrs. C. Praed Policy & P. I. 145 A high fence..overgrown with passion-fruit.  
1908 E. J. Banfield Confessions of Beachcomber i. vi. 192 There may be some who do not know that 
the humble papaw..belongs to the passion-fruit family.  
1934 T. Wood Cobbers xvii. 217 Passion fruit, squeezed into a wineglass, mixed with cream and 
sugar and a spoonful of sherry, has a rich smoothness.  
1961 L. van der Post Heart of Hunter i. ii. 27 His old lady, dark and wrinkled with age like a passion 
fruit about to fall.
1969 Oxf. Bk. Food Plants 98/1 Passion Fruit or Purple Granadilla (Passiflora edulis). A perennial 
climbing plant, originally native to Brazil but now widely planted in the tropics, it is also sufficiently 
hardy to be grown in some Mediterranean countries.  
1974 Herald (Melbourne) 5 Apr. 23/1 Pavlova,..a crusty meringue-like sweet-cake made from egg 
whites and sugar and topped with whipped cream and, usually, passionfruit.  
1976 Observer 17 Oct. 36/3 (Advt.), Easy to grow delicious passion fruits. Our own specially cultivated 
pot-grown species of Granadilla for fruiting in Britain.  
1977 ‘E. Crispin’ Glimpses of Moon xii. 235 The infant Grand Duchess..lisps a request for a glass 
of..passion-fruit juice.  
1943 C. H. Ward-Jackson Piece of Cake 47 *Passion killers, service knickers issued to airwomen.  
1946 J. Irving Royal Navalese 136 An elastic-bound bifurcated undergarment said to be worn in the 
women’s Services and known..as ‘passion-killers’.  
1974 Times 17 Dec. 12/5 Stout fleecy lined drawers..which would have been called by this generation 
‘passion-killers’.
1707 Mortimer Husb. (1721) II. 148 Another sort of Lettices, called *Passion Lettice, prosper well in 
light Ground.  
1880 W. S. Rockstro in Grove’s Dict. Mus. II. 665 Here then we have the first idea of the ‘*Passion 
Oratorio’.
1870 in J. Brown Lett. (1912) 378 I was very much touched by the *Passion-play, and wrote some very 
bad verses at Ammergau.  
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1873 Baedeker’s South. Germany (ed. 3) 128 Ober-Ammergau, celebrated for the passion-plays 
performed there every ten years.  
1965 B. Sweet-Escott Baker St. Irreg. iii. 90 It turned out to be..the ritual passion play on the 10th of 
the month of Muharram which commemorates the death of Hassan.  
1975 Listener 10 Apr. 472/3 Going to Oberammergau to the Passion Play.  
1825 D. L. Richardson Sonn. 27 While its *passion-tides serener flow.  
1741 Compl. Fam.-Piece ii. iii. 362 If you now plant, and make Layers of the *Passion-tree, in most 
Places, it will make it bear Fruit.  
1853 ‘P. Paxton’ Stray Yankee in Texas 57 The ‘*passion vine’ with its singular flower and luscious 
fruit.
1862 R. Henning Let. 23 Sept. (1966) 100 A veranda covered with passion-vine and a garden full of 
petunias in most brilliant flower.  
1892 Daily News 27 Aug. 3/1 A dish of the edible fruit of the passion vine.  
1946 Coast to Coast 1945 64 Let his girls dig in the orchard or chip around the passion-vines.  
1957 M. West Kundu ii. 19 A passion vine trailing over a bamboo summer-house.  
1969 West Australians 5 July 41/7 (Advt.), Nellie Kelly the amazing grafted passion vine.  
1948 Partridge Dict. Forces’ Slang 137 *Passion waggon, truck taking men for a day’s, or part of a 
day’s, leave, into a town or place of entertainment.  








[ad. L. emotion-em, n. of action f. e-move-re, f. e out + move-re to move.]  
† 1. A moving out, migration, transference from one place to another. Obs.  
1603 Knolles Hist. Turks (1621) 3 The divers emotions of that people [the Turks].  
1695 Woodward Nat. Hist. Earth i. (1723) 45 Some accidental Emotion..of the Center of Gravity.  
† 2. A moving, stirring, agitation, perturbation (in physical sense). Obs.  
1692 Locke Educ. 7 When exercise has left any Emotion in his Blood or Pulse.  
1708 O. Bridgman in Phil. Trans. XXVI. 138 Thunder..caused so great an Emotion in the Air.  
1755 Porter ibid. XLIX. 118 The horses rose from their litter with violent emotions.  
1758 Ibid. L. 647 The waters continuing in the caverns..caused the emotion or earth~quake.  
1772 Monro ibid. LXII. 18 A diluted spirit of vitriol..occasioned no..emotion.  
a1822 Shelley Love’s Philos. 6 The winds of heaven mix forever With a sweet emotion.  
† 3. transf. A political or social agitation; a tumult, popular disturbance. Obs.  
1579 Fenton Guicciard. ii, There were..great stirres and emocions in Lombardye.  
1709 Addison Tatler No. 24 313 Accounts of Publick Emotions, occasion’d by the Want of Corn.  
1757 Burke Abridgem. Eng. Hist. Wks. X. 432 Even in England some emotions were excited in favour 
of the Duke [Robert of Normandy, in 1103].  
4. a. fig. Any agitation or disturbance of mind, feeling, passion; any vehement or excited mental state.  
1660 Jer. Taylor Duct. Dubit. (R.), The emotions of humanity..the meltings of a worthy disposition.  
1712 Steele Spect. No. 432 39 I hope to see the Pope..without violent Emotions.  
1762 Kames Elem. Crit. ii. §2. (1833) 37 The joy of gratification is properly called an emotion.  
1785 Reid Int. Powers 725 The emotion raised by grand objects is awful.  
1828 Scott F.M. Perth, Desirous that his emotion should not be read upon his countenance.  
b. Psychology. A mental ‘feeling’ or ‘affection’ (e.g. of pleasure or pain, desire or aversion, surprise, hope or 
fear, etc.), as distinguished from cognitive or volitional states of consciousness. Also abstr. ‘feeling’ as 
distinguished from the other classes of mental phenomena.  
1808 Med. Jrnl. XIX. 422 Sea-sickness..is greatly under the dominion of emotion.  
1841-4 Emerson Ess. Friendship Wks. (Bohn) I. 81 In poetry..the emotions of benevolence and 
complacency..are likened to the material effects of fire.  
1842 Kingsley Lett. (1878) I. 61 The intellect is stilled, and the Emotions alone perform 
their..involuntary functions.  
1871 Tyndall Fragm. Sc. (ed. 6) II. xi. 231 He..almost denounces me..for referring Religion to the 
region of Emotion.  
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1875 Jowett Plato (ed. 2) I. 249 The..emotions of pity, wonder, sternness, stamped upon their 
countenances.  
5. attrib. and Comb.  
a. attrib., as emotion-marker, -reaction.  
b. objective and obj. gen., as emotion-arousing, -provoking adjs.  
c. instrumental, as emotion-charged, -shaken adjs.  
1884 W. James Coll. Ess. & Rev. (1920) 258 What the action itself may be is quite insignificant, so 
long as I can perceive in it intent or animus. This is the emotion-arousing perception.  
1937 Burlington Mag. June 262/1 He does not attempt to amend his emotion-charged statements.  
1964 Crystal & Quirk Prosodic & Paraling. Features in Eng. iii. 41 The problem arises as to where 
arbitrary divisions in the cline of spasmodic emotion-markers should be made.  
1951 J. M. Fraser Psychol. vi. 65 In ordinary life, however, emotion-provoking situations can seldom 
be solved by such actions.  
a1930 D. H. Lawrence Apocalypse (1931) ix. 93 Nay, every image will be understood differently by 
every reader, according to his emotion-reaction.  




A Non-Exhaustive List of Treatises on the Passions or Closely Related to the issue 
Published in English in the Late 16th th – Early 17  Century 
 
- Thomas ROGERS, A philosophicall discourse, entitled, The anatomie of the Minde, London 
1576; 
- Thomas ROGERS, A patterne of a passionate minde containing a briefe description of the 
sundry strange affects of the minde of man: in the ende whereof is set downe a lesson, meete 
to be learned of all estates in general, London, 1580 (an abridgement of 1576); 
- John WOOLTON, A new anatomie of whole man as well of his body, as of his soule: 
declaring the condition and constitution of the same, in his first creation, corruption, 
regeneration and glorification, London, 1576 
- John WOOLTON, Of the conscience A discourse wherein is plainely declared, the 
unspeakable joye, and comfort of a good conscience, and the intolerable griefe and 
discomfort of an evill conscience, London, 1576 
- John WOOLTON, A treatise of the immortalitie of the soule, 1576 
- Levinus LEMNIUS, A Touchstone of Complexions, translated into English by Thomas 
Newton in 1576; 
- De proprietabus rerum by Batholomaeus Anglicus (Bartolomew of Glanville) published in 
1582; Batman vppon Bartholome, his booke De proprietabus rerum; 
- Timothy BRIGHT, A Treatise of Melancholie, 1586; 
- Philip DE MORNAY, The True Trial and Examination of a Man’s Own Self, 1586, 
translated by Thomas Newton; 
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- Pierre DE LA PRIMAUDAYE, The French Academie (Books 1 and 2:1586, 1594) in 
English translation by Thomas Bowes; Book 3 translated by Robert Dolman, (1601) Book 4 
by W(illiam?), P(ihilippe?) (1618); 
- Juan HUARTE, Examen de Ingenios, The Examination of mens Wits, in which, by 
discovering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what possession each one is apt and how far 
he shall profit them, translated out of the Spanish tongue by M. Camillo Camilli, Englished 
out of his Italian, by R. C. Esquire, London, 1596 (Richard Carew) 
- Sir John DAVIES, Nosce Teipsum, 1599; 
- Thomas WRIGHT, The Passions of the Minde in Generall, 1601;  
- Thomas WRIGHT, The Passions of the Minde in Generall, corrected, enlarged and with 
sundry new discourse augmented, With a treatise thereto adjoining of the Clymatericall 
yeare, occasioned by the death of Queen Elizabeth, London, 1604 
- John DAVIES OF HEREFORD, Microcosmus, the discovery of the little world, Oxford, 
1603; 
- Joseph HALL, Heaven upon Earth of True Peace and Tranquility of Mind, 1606 
- Joseph HALL, Characters of Virtues and Vices, 1608 
- Pierre CHARRON, Of Wisdome in three books, London 1606 (with a dedication to Prince 
Henry) and 1612, translated into English by Sampson Lennard; 
- Thomas WALKINGTON, The Optick glass of Humours or the Touchstone of Golden 
Temperature,  or the Philosophers stone to make a golden temper, London, 1607 
- Anthony DIXON, The Dignitie of man (1612); 
- Nicholas COFFETEAU, A table of humane passions With their causes and effects. Written 
by ye Reuerend Father in God F.N. Coeffeteau, Bishop of Dardania ... Translated into 
English by Edw. Grimeston Sergiant at Armes., London : Printed by Nicholas Okes, 1621. 
- Nicolas COFFETEAU, A Table of Humane Passions, 1621 translated into English by 
Edmund Grimeston; 
- Robert BURTON, Anatomy of Melancholy, 1621. 
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APPENDIX 3 
449The entry ‘émotion’ in Le Robert
 
ÉMOTION n. f.  
En 1534, esmotion; de émouvoir, d'après motion «mouvement», XIIIe. - Motion, émouvoir. 
 
Action d'émouvoir; résultat de cette action.  
 
- 1. Vx. Mouvement (du corps, d'un corps). - Spécialt. Mouvement (par oppos. à l'état normal 
de calme) d'un corps collectif, agitation et fermentation populaire à l'occasion d'un événement 
inquiétant, pouvant dégénérer en troubles civils; par ext., ces troubles. - Conspiration, émeute, 
révolte, sédition. «L'émotion de Catilina» (Montaigne). Calmer l'émotion populaire. Une 
grande émotion se dessinait dans l'armée. CIT. 1. 2.   
Mouvement affectant un individu et ayant pour effet de le soustraire à l'état de repos et 
d'équilibre. Émotion d'esprit (- Coquetterie, cit. 3). CIT. 3 
Ce mouvement, considéré dans ses effets physiologiques. - Malaise, trouble. Sentir un peu 
d'émotion. Émotion du pouls. Émotion de fièvre : mouvement fébrile. CIT. 4. 5. 6. 
    
Mouvement plus complexe, intéressant le «coeur» autant que la vie organique. CIT. 7. 8. 
   
- 2. Mod. Psychol. et cour. État de conscience complexe, généralement brusque et 
momentané, accompagné de troubles physiologiques (pâleur ou rougissement, accélération du 
pouls, palpitations, sensation de malaise, tremblements, incapacité de bouger ou agitation). 
Les théories physiologiques, intellectualistes de l'émotion (- ci-dessous, cit. 10 et 11). CIT. 9. 
10. 11.    
Par ext. Sensation (agréable ou désagréable), considérée du point de vue affectif. - Affection, 
douleur, plaisir, sentiment; émoi, excitation, impression. Émotions simples, composées. 
Émotion sexuelle. Émotions religieuses, morales, esthétiques, intellectuelles. Émotions 
stimulantes, sthéniques (- Asthénique, cit.). L'émotion tendre. - Sympathie. Émotions 
fondamentales : amour, chagrin, colère, désir, frayeur, haine, jalousie, joie, peur, plaisir, 
tristesse. Les racines de l'émotion. - Attraction, aversion, désir, inclination, instinct, répulsion, 
tendance. 
(Syntagmes didact.). L'émotion-choc, brusque et brève. - cour. ou littér. Affolement, agitation, 
bouleversement, commotion, désarroi, ébranlement, effervescence, enthousiasme, frisson, 
saisissement, transe, trouble. - L'émotion-sentiment, progressive et stable. - Sentiment. 
Conditions intérieures et extérieures de l'émotion. Modifications organiques qui 
accompagnent l'émotion (- Coeur, cit. 6). L'expression des émotions. L'émotion étouffe, 
coupe (cit. 18) le souffle, affaiblit (- Amollir, cit. 2), paralyse, annihile (cit. 2) la volonté. - 
Causer une grande émotion à qqn. - Bouleverser, émotionner, émouvoir, suffoquer. être brisé 
(cit. 5) d'émotion. Frémir, frissonner, trembler, tressaillir, s'évanouir d'émotion (- Angoisse, 
cit. 2). Le coeur, la gorge se serre d'émotion. Frapper, saisir d'émotion. Idées qui suscitent une 
émotion. Éprouver, ressentir beaucoup d'émotions (- Émotif). La qualité, l'intensité d'une 
émotion. Une émotion contenue (cit. 18). Dissimuler (cit. 6), maîtriser son émotion. Simuler 
une émotion. Une émotion forte, intense, poignante, vive; délicate, légère, douce, tendre (- 
Aube, cit. 10). Des émotions enivrantes (- Annoncer, cit. 17). Le charme d'une émotion. être 
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avide d'émotions. Le monde des émotions. Il était plein, vibrant d'émotion. Un cri d'émotion. 
Parler avec émotion. - Balbutier (- Balbutiement, cit. 1). être égaré par une émotion violente. - 
Perdre ses esprits*; être éperdu*; être hors de soi. S'abandonner à une émotion (- Caresse, cit. 
3; dessécher, cit. 15). - Attendrir (s'). Ne pouvoir cacher son émotion. Trahir son émotion. 
Rougir d'émotion, devenir cramoisi, rouge d'émotion. Sa voix se brisa d'émotion. Devenir 
blanc, vert d'émotion. Cf. Changer de couleur, de visage. Ne ressentir aucune émotion (- 
Apathique). Accueillir sans émotion une mauvaise nouvelle (- Devoir, cit. 30), avec 
indifférence; - Sans sourciller*. - Fam. On n'a pas eu d'émotion : on n'a eu aucune inquiétude. 
CIT. 11.1. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
      
(Sens affaibli). État affectif, plaisir ou douleur, nettement prononcé. L'émotion dans l'art. 
Problème de l'émotion chez l'artiste. - Sensibilité. Émotion créatrice. - Délire, enthousiasme, 
fureur (vx), inspiration. Émotion esthétique, ressentie par le lecteur, l'auditeur, le spectateur. - 
Sentiment. Émotion ou insensibilité de l'acteur, de l'exécutant. 
    
CIT. 17. 18. 19.  
CONTR. Calme, paix, sérénité; apathie, froideur, indifférence, insensibilité, sang-froid. 
DÉR. Émotionnel, émotionner. 
Citations
1 Rome autrefois a vu de ces émotions (...) Quand il fallait calmer toute une populace, Le 
sénat n'épargnait promesse ni menace (...)  
CORNEILLE, Nicomède, V, 2. 
 
2 On ne parle que de la guerre (...) toute l'Europe est en émotion. 
Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres, 259, 23 mars 1672. 
 
3  La définition des passions de l'âme  (...) On les peut nommer des perceptions (...) On les 
peut aussi nommer des sentiments (...) mais on peut encore mieux les nommer des émotions 
de l'âme, non seulement à cause que ce nom peut être attribué à tous les changements qui 
arrivent en elle, c'est-à-dire à toutes les diverses pensées qui lui viennent, mais 
particulièrement pour ce que, de toutes les sortes de pensées qu'elle peut avoir, il n'y en a 
point d'autres qui l'agitent et l'ébranlent si fort que font ces passions.  
DESCARTES, les Passions de l'âme, I, 27-28. 
 
4 Nous-mêmes, pour bien faire, ne devrions jamais mettre la main sur nos serviteurs, tandis 
que la colère nous dure. Pendant que le pouls nous bat et que nous sentons de l'émotion, 
remettons la partie (...) c'est la passion qui commande alors (...) ce n'est plus nous.  
MONTAIGNE, Essais, II, 437. 
 
5 (...) le printemps vous fait toujours quelque émotion (...) 
Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 961, 29 avr. 1685. 
 
6 (...) le bon abbé ne se porte pas bien; il a mal à un genou, et un peu d'émotion tous les soirs.  
Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 504, 19 févr. 1676. 
 
7 La tendresse visible de leurs mutuelles ardeurs me donna de l'émotion; j'en fus frappé au 
coeur et mon amour commença par la jalousie (...) le dépit alarma mes désirs (...)  
MOLIèRE, Dom Juan, I, 2. 
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8 Je ne répondrai point, Madame, à toute l'émotion que vous a donnée le gain d'une bataille  
(Neerwinde)  qui nous coûte si cher. Nous avons passé par ces tristes réflexions (...) 
Mme DE SÉVIGNÉ, Lettres 1362, 26 août 1693. 
 
9 Il n'y a, ce me semble, émotion que là où il y a choc, secousse. On devrait, par suite, appeler 
émotion l'action exercée sur la volonté  (au sens large)  par une représentation ou une 
affection simple, action qui provoque ensuite la réaction de la volonté.  
J. LACHELIER, cité par LALANDE. 
 
10 J'entends par émotion un choc brusque, souvent violent, intense, avec augmentation ou 
arrêt des mouvements : la peur, la colère, le coup de foudre en amour, etc. En cela, je me 
conforme à l'étymologie du mot «émotion» qui signifie surtout mouvement.  
Th. RIBOT, Logique des sentiments, p. 67. 
 
11 L'émotion est une cause dont les manifestations physiques sont les effets, disent les uns; 
les manifestations physiques sont la cause dont l'émotion est l'effet, disent les autres. Selon 
moi, il y aurait un grand avantage à éliminer de la question toute notion de cause et d'effet (...) 
et substituer à la position dualiste une conception unitaire (...) Aucun état de conscience ne 
doit être dissocié de ses conditions physiques : ils composent un tout (...) Chaque espèce 
d'émotion doit être considérée de cette manière : ce que les mouvements de la face et du 
corps, les troubles vaso-moteurs, respiratoires, sécrétoires expriment objectivement, les états 
de conscience corrélatifs (...) l'expriment subjectivement. 
Th. RIBOT, Psychologie des sentiments, p. 113. 
 
11.1 (...) un physionomiste eût sans peine reconnu que le bourgmestre van Tricasse était le 
flegme personnifié. Jamais - ni par la colère, ni par la passion -, jamais une émotion 
quelconque n'avait accéléré les mouvements du coeur de cet homme ni rougi sa face; jamais 
ses pupilles ne s'étaient contractées sous l'influence d'une irritation, si passagère qu'on 
voudrait la supposer. 
J. VERNE, le Docteur Ox, p. 10, Hachette 1966. 
 
12 Si le goût est une chose de caprice, s'il n'y a aucune règle du beau, d'o  viennent donc ces 
émotions délicieuses qui s'élèvent si subitement, si involontairement, si tumultueusement au 
fond de nos âmes, qui les dilatent ou qui les serrent, et qui forcent de nos yeux les pleurs de la 
joie, de la douleur, de l'admiration, soit à l'aspect de quelque grand phénomène physique, soit 
au récit de quelque grand trait moral?  Apage, Sophista!  tu ne persuaderas jamais à mon 
coeur qu'il a tort de frémir; à mes entrailles, qu'elles ont tort de s'émouvoir. 
DIDEROT, Sur la peinture, VII. 
 
13 J'avoue que, pour ma part, j'avais le coeur serré comme par une main invisible; les tempes 
me sifflaient, et des sueurs chaudes et froides me passaient dans le dos. C'est une des plus 
fortes émotions que j'aie jamais éprouvée. 
Th. GAUTIER, Voyage en Espagne, p. 55. 
 
14 Car l'amour est un art, comme la musique. Il donne des émotions du même ordre, aussi 
délicates, aussi vibrantes, parfois peut-être plus intenses (...) 
Pierre LOUYS, Aphrodite, I, Chrysis. 
 
15 (...) l'émotion presque religieuse qu'inspire un passé très lointain. 
Ch. MAURRAS, Anthinéa, p. 51. 
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16 Nathanaël, que toute émotion sache te devenir une ivresse. Si ce que tu manges ne te grise 
pas, c'est que tu n'avais pas assez faim. 
GIDE, les Nourritures terrestres, p. 41. 
 
17 Quel jeu plus parfait que celui de la Clairon? cependant suivez-la, étudiez-la, et vous serez 
convaincu qu'à la sixième représentation elle sait par coeur tous les détails de son jeu comme 
tous les mots de son rôle (...) Je ne doute point que la Clairon n'éprouve le tourment du 
Quesnoy dans ses premières tentatives; mais la lutte passée, lorsqu'elle s'est une fois élevée à 
la hauteur de son fantôme, elle se possède, elle se répète sans émotion.  
DIDEROT, Paradoxe sur le comédien. 
 
18 En un mot, la poésie ne peut exister sans l'émotion, ou, si l'on veut, sans un mouvement de 
l'âme qui règle celui des paroles. 
CLAUDEL, Positions et Propositions, p. 97. 
 
19 L'émotion créatrice est la seule et véritable connaissance. 
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